MUGHAL ADMINISTRATION IN GOLCONDA

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J. F. RICHARDS

CLARENDON PRESS · OXFORD
1975

Oxford University Press, Ely House, London W.1
GLASGOW NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON
CAPE TOWN IBADAN NAIROBI DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA ADDIS ABABA
DELHI BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS KARACHI LAHORE DACCA
KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE HONG KONG TOKYO

ISBN 0 19 821561 4

Printed in Great Britain
by William Clowes & Sons, Limited
London, Beccles and Colchester

To My Wife

And

Our Children

Acknowledgements

BEFORE all else, I must acknowledge the debt that I owe to those historians who have preceded me in the study of late Mughal India. I have relied again and again on the writings of that master historian, Jadunath Sarkar. Today, in 1974, his narrative approach and his intellectual concerns appear a bit old-fashioned. Only a historian who has tried to develop an accurate narrative of political and public events, using the fragmented sources typical of this period, can appreciate the magnitude of Sarkar's contribution. He set the narrative frame for the late Mughal period virtually single-handed. Because I have been trying to fill in a peculiar regional gap in his narrative, I am most aware of his skills. I am indebted in a similar manner to M. Athar Ali, Irfan Habib, and I. H. Qureshi whose monographs have tutored me in the intricacies of the Mughal administrative system.

I have benefited much from the friendship and encouragement of a number of my colleagues. T. R. Metcalf, both as a teacher and as a friend, has assisted me since the inception of this book. Robert Frykenberg, my colleague at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, has been a consistent support in the years of our association. Reinhard Bendix, Eugene Irschick, Carolyn Elliot, Philip Calkins, Om Prakash, Joseph Brennig, and Michael Pearson have read and commented upon my work. My discussions with Harry Harootunian and Steven Feierman have also helped me immeasurably.

This work could not have been completed in its present form without the services of my copyist, H. K. Parwaz. His impeccable transcriptions and scholarship greatly facilitated my work on the documents of the Inayat Jang Collection. Karla McMechan completed a painstaking and detailed review of my references and bibliography, for which I am most grateful.

I finished a substantial revision of this book in the course of a delightful year spent at the Centre for South Asian Studies in Cambridge. Ben Farmer, Director of the Centre, and Anthony

Richards, the Librarian, extended a warm welcome as did Eric Stokes, Christopher Bayley, Francis Robinson, David Washbrook, Gordon Johnson, and Peter Musgrave. The Master and Fellows of St. John's College also treated me hospitably and graciously.

In the course of this study, I had occasion to work at a number of libraries and museums. At the State Archives of Andhra Pradesh, V. K. Bawa, the former Director, and Ziauddin Ahmad were extremely helpful. At the National Archives of India, A. I. Tirmizi, the Deputy Director, and Kabir Kausar encouraged and facilitated work on the Inayat Jang documents. The brief period in which I was able to stay at the residence of Raghubir Sinh and work in his incomparable research library at Sitamau (M.P.) was one of the most productive periods I have enjoyed. Both the Salar Jang Museum Library and the Asafia Library in Hyderabad offered a number of significant manuscript finds. Thanks to the efforts of Muhammad Ashraf, the former is an especially well-run and organized facility for those interested in Persian manuscripts. The staffs of the Archives Nationales in Paris, the Rijksarchief in the Hague, and the Oriental Manuscripts Room in the British Museum are unfailingly kind to transient scholars. Finally, with the greatest pleasure, I must thank the present Librarian, Jane Lancaster, her predecessor Stanley Sutton, Richard Bingle, and the other members of the staff at the India Office Library for their continuing collaboration with historians of South Asia, of every nationality and historical interest.

I am grateful for the generous and flexible financial assistance of the Foreign Area Fellowship Program which allowed me to complete my initial research. Later, the American Council of Learned Societies and the Committee on Comparative World History of the University of Wisconsin provided the means for me to live and work in England for a year. I am especially indebted to the Chairman of the Comparative World History Committee, my colleague, Philip Curtin, for his encouragement of my work and his ready financial assistance on more than one occasion. The Graduate Research Committee of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, also assisted me financially for two summers' writing.


I can now thank appropriately my first scholarly patrons: My aunt and uncle, Priscilla and Lauris Richards, who contributed to the training of a historian by meeting my expenses for four years

as an undergraduate at the University of New Hampshire. Other members of my family, my parents, and my brother and sister have always encouraged me by their interest in and concern for my research. Finally, I owe much to my wife Ann for her patience, warmth and energy in helping me through years spent training as a historian and in research and writing. I dedicate this book to her and to our children.

Madison, Wisconsin
January, 1974 J.F.R.

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The Sultanate of Golconda

GOLCONDA, created in the early years of the sixteenth century, was a conquest state ruled by a Turco-Persian dynasty and dominated by a Muslim political and economic élite. The kingdom of the Qutb Shahs represented successful expansion of the frontier of Islamic conquest into the eastern half of peninsular India, the Deccan. The subject peoples, the indigenous inhabitants of the region, were almost entirely Telugu-speaking Hindus. By the mid-seventeenth century the boundaries of Golconda closely coincided with the Telugu linguistic and cultural region which has found political expression today in the State of Andhra Pradesh.[1] Thus, Golconda, though of considerable size (as large as most European kingdoms of the same period), was a regional kingdom, not an empire.

Like the other medieval Muslim states located south of the Vindhya mountain range, the political system of Golconda developed independently from that of the Delhi Sultanate or the Mughal empire, the great land empires of the Indo-Gangetic plain. Despite a common political tradition—the Perso-Islamic—differences in physical geography, indigenous social and political structures, and the relative size of conquering groups of Muslims all contributed to the distinctive character of Golconda. Certainly, the rulers of this relatively compact regional kingdom avoided some of the difficulties faced by imperial monarchs like the Mughals, who ruled over a sprawling series of linguistic and cultural regions.

[1] Cf. H. K. Sherwani's reconstruction of the boundaries of Golconda in 'The Reign of 'Abdu'l-lah Qutb Shah (1626–1672): Economic Aspects I', *Journal of Indian History*, XLII (Aug. 1964), 443–70; (Dec. 1964), 677–97, map (p. 681) and text (pp. 681–4). According to Sherwani, 'The Qutb Shahi dominions in the time of Abdu'l-lah Qutb Shah therefore included practically the whole of the present Andhra Pradesh.... At the same time the Telugu speaking district of Kurnul... remained under the 'Adilshahi sway' (p. 684). See also G. A. Grierson's delineation of the early twentieth-century boundaries of the Telugu linguistic region in his *Linguistic Survey of India* (Calcutta, 1903–28), IV. 557.

Throughout the modest historical literature devoted to Golconda within the past few decades, several significant themes constantly recur: first, both the Qutb Shah sultans and their kingdom were highly prosperous—two circumstances which need not necessarily accompany one another. The king of Golconda, in particular, was accounted by contemporary observers to be one of the richest princes in India, surpassed only by the Mughal emperor. The inhabitants of Golconda were also favoured with evident prosperity in the productivity of the countryside and the busy trade of the urban places of the kingdom. Secondly, after an initial period of political uncertainty and insecurity, the political and military system of Golconda evolved to the point that for over one hundred years there was no serious internal challenge offered either to the dynasty or to the Muslim ruling élite. Thirdly, the Qutb Shahs steadily expanded the area under their control at the expense of the politically fragmented rajas, *nayaks*, and chiefs who were successors to the Kakatiya, Gajapati, Vijayanagara, and other formerly powerful Hindu kingdoms.

Golconda's strength and wealth provided a basis for the emergence of a distinct regional Muslim culture which found expression in literature (Deccani Urdu and Persian), architecture, and painting, as well as in the life style of the ruling élite and its followers. This 'Deccani' culture was centred at the royal court and capital at Hyderabad; but also was reflected in large towns like Eluru where Muslims had settled in large numbers.[1]

[1] The only complete history of Golconda in book form is Abdul Majeed Siddiqui's *History of Golconda* (Hyderabad, 1956). The eminent historian H. K. Sherwani has far surpassed Siddiqui's work in a series of twenty-five articles published between 1955 and 1968. These provide a comprehensive and detailed history of the kingdom from its establishment under Sultan-Quli Qutb Shah to its demise under Abul Hasan. (We are still waiting for publication of Sherwani's large history of Golconda, now in press.) (See J. D. Pearson, *Index Islamicus* and *Supplements* for a full listing of Sherwani's articles.) Recently, Sherwani has collected and revised a number of these papers in a monograph entitled *Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah* (New York, 1968). Other monographs include a study of the Dutch East India Company's trading activities in seventeenth-century Golconda by Tapan Raychaudhuri, *Jan Company in Coromandel: 1605–1690*, Verhandelingen van het Koninkilijk Instituut voor Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde, vol. XXXVIII (The Hague, 1962), and a political biography of Mir Jumla, a famous seventeenth-century chief minister of Golconda, by J. N. Sarkar, *The Life of Mir Jumla* (Calcutta, 1951). A historical geographer, Shah Manzur 'Alam, has contributed two valuable articles on Hyderabad, the capital and Machilipatnam, the major port: 'The Growth of Hyderabad City: A Historical Perspective', *Studies in Indian Culture: Ghulam Yazdani Commemoration*

This impressive record of strength, stability, and vitality suggests an achievement which was in its essence political. The ruling élite of Golconda moved beyond the purely military rule of an inherently unstable conquest state to fabricate political devices and institutions workable over an extended period of time. Thus, further analysis of the Qutb Shah system in Golconda requires consideration of several related questions: first, what was the nature of political integration within the indigenous Telugu society prior to the Muslim advance? Secondly, after their victory, how did the conquerors elicit active co-operation from many of their former enemies, the militant Telugu warriors of the eastern Deccan? Finally, what were the bases of the extraordinary power and wealth of the later kings of Golconda (to the extent that the term 'Golconda' entered the English language in the seventeenth century as a synonym for a place of great riches)?

THE EVOLUTION OF TELUGU SOCIETY

Earlier, the 'core area of periodic and persistent political power' of the Telugu-speaking eastern Deccan was the deltaic area of the Godavari river centred on Rajmundry.[1] This is an area of high agricultural productivity based on triple cropping of paddy rice which has always supported a dense population. Gradually, the centre of political power and economic activity shifted to the less fertile tracts of the interior, i.e. from Andhra to Telengana. Despite the arid and generally inhospitable nature of the plateau, groups of

Volume, ed. by H. K. Sherwani (Hyderabad, 1966); and 'Masulipatam—A Metropolitan Port in the Seventeenth Century', *Islamic Culture*, XXXIII (1959), 169–87. I. A. Ghauri has also analysed the administrative and military institutions of both Bijapur and Golconda in 'Local Government under the Sultanates of Bijapur and Golconda' *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, III (Jan. 1966), 43–62; and 'Organization of the Army under the Sultanates of Bijapur and Golconda', *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, XIV (July 1966), 147–71. Unfortunately, Ghauri sometimes fails to make a clear distinction between the institutions of Bijapur and those of Golconda in these articles. Dr. Ghauri is also the author of an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation entitled 'The Political Institutions of Bijapur 1536–1686 and Golconda 1518–1636' (University of London, 1961). Aside from a few articles on Golconda's coinage, e.g. P. M. Joshi, 'Coins current in the Kingdom of Golconda', *Journal of the Numismatic Society of India*, I (1943), 85–95, and specialized works on Deccani painting and literature, the historical writing devoted specifically to the Qutb Shahi kingdom is virtually exhausted with this list.

[1] David Sopher in R. R. Platt, ed., *India: A Compendium* (New York: American Geographical Society, 1962), p. 121; see also Fig. 34.

Telugu warrior/cultivators had been slowly settling in this region.[1] Predominantly from the Reddi and Valama castes, these settlers, accompanied by their Saivite Brahmin priests and other dependants, stubbornly pushed into the interior to establish a viable agricultural society. The economic key to this settlement was an advanced agricultural technology consisting of the cultivation of paddy, use of the plough and bullock, and rain-fed tank irrigation. The last device was especially important. The sinking of wells in the hard gneissic formations of Telengana (unlike the lavas of the western Deccan) was an expensive and chancy business. In addition to successful technical adaptation to the difficult landscape of Telengana, the Telugu settlers brought with them a cluster of other linked cultural traits: a kinship caste structure which facilitated agricultural colonization; the Telugu language; a high tradition of Saivite Brahmanical Hinduism: and not least the aggressiveness, militancy, and stubbornness of the Reddi and Valama warrior/ cultivator.

By the eleventh century A.D., or before, the 'cultural landscape' of Telengana had assumed a remarkably stable form—one which would persist until the twentieth century. Dominant groups of Telugu Sudras controlled nucleated fortified villages, each with its tank(s) and paddy fields. From this society emerged a large, centralized Telugu state in the later medieval period. The state was ruled by the Kakatiya dynasty with its seat at Warangal,[2] on the Telengana plateau. The Kakatiya state was a political expression of the settlement of the interior by Telugu warriors. Thus, the economic strength of the state rested on extension and refinement of the techniques of village tank construction and irrigation. Throughout the kingdom, Kakatiya monarchs and members of the ruling élite invested vast resources in the planning, construction, management, and upkeep of scores of monumental tanks and ancillary irrigation canals. Construction of these great artificial lakes provided religious merit as well as economic benefits to both patron and society.

At the heart of the official ideology of the state was the Saivite religion of the villages. The Kakatiya rulers freely endowed Saiva

[1] A. B. Mukerji, 'Succession of Cultural Landscapes in Telengana Reddi Villages', *Indian Geographical Journal*, XXXIX (1964), 42–58.

[2] The following discussion of the Kakatiyas is based on N. Venkataramanayya and M. Somasekhara Sarma, 'The Kakatiyas of Warangal', in *The Early History of the Deccan*, ed. by G. Yazdani (London, 2 vols., 1960).

monasteries and temples with tax-free lands (*agrahara*). A long line of Saiva teachers served as personal advisers to succeeding Kakatiya monarchs. The Kakatiyas also conceived and paid for the construction of numerous monumental temples.

But the military strength of the Kakatiya state came from successful exploitation of the aggressive qualities of the Telugu warrior/cultivators. The highest-ranking and most influential nobles in the kingdom, mostly from the Valama and Reddi castes, were organized into an élite body of royal servants. These *nayaks* were under the direct personal command of the king. By the end of the thirteenth century, the principal Kakatiya *nayaks* numbered approximately seventy-five, each of whom received an estate from the king, held under military tenure. From the revenues of the assigned estate, the *nayak* supported himself and a stipulated body of troops. *Nayaks* also commanded most of the sixty or more fortresses which formed the primary means of internal control and external defence for the kingdom. These fortified sites, upon which great stress was laid in Kakatiya treatises on statecraft, replicated the network of fortified villages in Telengana.

In addition to the *nayaks*, who formed a distinct corporate group, the Kakatiyas relied on hereditary military slaves (*lenkas*) for manpower. *Lenkas* were predominantly ordinary soldiers, but they could, on occasion, rise to fill military posts comparable to those held by *nayaks*. In such cases, *lenkas* holding high offices received military estates under the same conditions as those held by the great *nayaks*. However, *lenkas*, unlike *nayaks*, were clearly bondsmen with a servile social status. As slaves they could have different masters; *nayaks* served only the king.

Telugu society of the thirteenth century was clearly highly militarized. *Nayaks*, *lenkas*, and other warriors subscribed to a demanding military ethic which stressed courage, personal service, and loyalty to a master. The traditions of the Valama warrior caste, as described in the family records of the nineteenth-century raja of Venkatagiri, illustrate this ethic. The second son of the second generation of the family, Prasaditya Naidu, 'engaged the heart of Kakateya Ganapati Rauluvara [the Kakatiya king] and became an invariable attendant at his court':[1]

On one occasion when the king was besieged in his capital by enemies,

[1] T. Rama Row, *Biographical Sketches of the Rajahs of Venkatagiri* (Madras, 1875), pp. 9–10.

he called together his seventy-seven favourite warriors, and told them that whichever of them should vanquish and disperse the besiegers and return victorious should be met by the king himself in person and conducted with honour to the Palace, there to share the royal seat, ... Prasaditya Naidu sprang forward with courage and requested permission to fight for the reward. Leave was given and in a short time he engaged the enemy in a short fight, completely routed and dispersed them, and, in return for this successful and loyal service, received all the promised honours and more.

Lenkas followed an even more stringent military ethic under which their loyalties were given first to their immediate masters who need not necessarily be the king:[1]

The *lenkas* were slaves who had entered into a covenant with their lord to devote themselves exclusively to his service. They took an oath (*basa*) to look on their lord as their *guru* and deity in this world and the next, to have no regard either for their own property or for their lives in furtherance of his interests, to stand by him in the hour of danger, ... either to perish with him in the clash of arms or to kill themselves if they should chance to survive him.

The extreme stress on selfless personal service in the *lenka* code is only equalled by norms followed by the *ekkatlu* (sing. *ekkati*) or heroes of single combat. These were another hereditary group of warriors renowned for their skill in hand-to-hand fighting who formed a reserve force in Telugu armies. When not on campaign the *ekkatlu* dispersed to their homes where they held grants of land 'in every important town and village in the kingdom'.[2]

The efflorescence of the Kakatiyas enhanced several traits of Telugu society which, by the thirteenth century, gave the eastern Deccan its distinctive cultural and social personality. Included among these traits (in addition to the Telugu language) would be the vastly extended system of large-scale tank irrigation and paddy cultivation as the economic base of society. Another was the ideological and institutional strength of the monasteries, temples, and Brahmins of Saivite Hinduism. Rooted in the stubborn attitudes of the Reddi and Valama settlers of the inhospitable Telengana plateau, we can also plainly see the dominance of warriors and

[1] Venkataramanayya and Sarma, op. cit. II. 668.

[2] M. S. Sarma, *History of the Reddi Kingdoms* (Waltair, 1948), p. 241. The *ekkatlu* may well have been a special group of *lenkas*. The secondary sources are unclear on this point.

a warrior ethic in the society. Finally, perhaps most important, was the unbroken continuity between society and state: the village tank and the royal reservoir, the village temple and the Saivite *matha*, the Reddi or Valama village headman and the Reddi or Valama *nayak* in service to the crown. This bundle of characteristics suggests a strong capacity for resistance. Invasion and conquest of the eastern Deccan by the Muslims, who appeared early in the fourteenth century, were to be difficult, time-consuming, and expensive.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MILITARY FRONTIER

Contrary to a general impression, the Muslims did not obtain permanent political control over the entire Deccan in the fourteenth century.[1] In 1323 the armies of Ghiyasuddin Tughlaq did capture the last Kakatiya king, occupy Warangal, the capital, and annex the kingdom (after the manner of the occupation of the Maratha kingdom of the Yadavas to the west). However, within three years, a confederation of former Kakatiya *nayaks* began a series of revolts which eventually, after two decades, pushed the invaders out of Telengana. Thereafter, between 1347 and 1363, Kapaya Nayak, one of the leading *nayak* rebels, held off attacks from Muhammad Shah Bahmani, ruler of the breakaway Bahmani Sultanate with its capital at Gulbarga, a city located close to the Maratha/Telugu cultural boundary. Finally in 1363 Muhammad Shah Bahmani forced a subsidiary treaty on the Telugu king. Among its other provisions this treaty set the boundary between Bahmani and Telugu territory just east of Golconda hill-fort and town. The Muslim ruler also acquired a slice of territory which included Kaulas, Ḳohir, and other major forts and towns of western Telengana. Thus, Golconda fort became the central point for a salient of Muslim power extending into the eastern Deccan.

However, at least two centuries of intermittent hostilities followed before the greater part of the eastern Telugu-speaking territories fell under Muslim control. The pattern of political

[1] The interpretation in this section rests on a careful reading of the following works: H. K. Sherwani. *The Bahmanis of the Deccan* (Hyderabad, 1943), M. S. Sarma, *History of the Reddi Kingdoms*, cited above, and by the same author, the important work, *A Forgotten Chapter of Andhra History* (Madras, 1945). The strength of Telugu resistance to Muslim invasion, which kept the eastern Deccan relatively clear of Muslim domination for two centuries (*circa* A.D. 1320 to 1520), is not sufficiently stressed in general works of South Asian history.

developments can be sketched as follows. In the period between 1366 and 1424 two Telugu warrior states shared control of the region. In the interior the Valama Recarlas ruled at Rajkonda (a great hill-fort located between Bhongir and Warangal). On the coast, in Andhra, the Vemas, a Reddi dynasty, had established a kingdom at Kondavidu (in present-day Guntur district). The Recarla Valamas paid tribute to the Bahmanis for this half-century, while the Reddis were tributary to the Rayas of Vijayanagar.

Relative stability ended in 1424 when Vijayanagar moved north and swallowed up the Reddi kingdom. The Recarla Valamas, confronted with a difficult choice, opted for an alliance with Vijayanagar. The Bahmani forces responded by attacking and occupying Warangal, killing the Recarla king, and further extending the line of Muslim control. Between 1425 and 1470 Vijayanagar and the Gajapati rulers of Orissa, alternately controlling political affairs in the remainder of Telengana and Andhra, mounted an effective defence against the Bahmanis. Finally in 1470 a sudden Muslim thrust resulted in another break-through. The Bahmani Sultan, asked to intervene in the internal politics of the Orissan kingdom, sent an expedition to the eastern coast. The general in charge seized Rajmundry, the major town on the Godavari, and Kondavidu just south of the Krishna. The Sultan proclaimed Andhra to be the easternmost province of the Sultanate. The remaining portion of Telengana, including the Recarla territories, also seems to have been occupied by Bahmani troops—although it is not at all certain that they ever occupied all the Valama fortresses. This expansive burst provides the basis for the statement, often made, that the Bahmani Sultanate stretched from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal.[1] But within three decades, by 1500, political deterioration at the Bahmani capital allowed the two major Hindu powers—Orissa and Vijayanagar—to reoccupy coastal Andhra and a substantial part of Telengana.

For a century and a half after the Muslim conquest of the Kakatiyas, the only part of the eastern Deccan to be steadily occupied and ruled by Muslims was that relatively small slice of territory on the western border. In 1425 this foothold was expanded to include Warangal, and in 1470 the Bahmanis had a nominal hold over both Telengana and Andhra. But this was far

[1] See Sherwani, *The Bahmanis* . . . , for a map (frontispiece) showing the boundaries of the kingdom in 1358 and 1481.

from a definitive or meaningful occupation. Throughout this lengthy period, the warrior nobility of the Kakatiyas, although severed from their former source of authority and legitimacy, continued to exist. Although much diminished in power and territory from the Kakatiyas, the Valama kings of Rajkonda and the Reddi kings of Kondavidu did supply a focus of authority and cohesion for each subregion. Constant warfare ensured that the military ethic of the *nayaks* and *lenkas*, became more intense, if it changed at all.

However, by about 1500, further political fragmentation had occurred. Confused conflict between the retreating Bahmani and the advancing Orissan and Vijayanagar forces in Telengana left a large number of virtually independent *nayaks*. Each occupied one of the many strongholds with which the countryside was studded; each commanded a body of hereditary Telugu troops who garrisoned the fort and defended it and its surrounding territory. These *nayaks* probably paid tribute to or negotiated with Muslim generals or Vijayanagar governors –whoever was present to make demands. Nevertheless it is apparent that outside the Bahmani salient surrounding Golconda there was little real political consolidation.

FOUNDING OF GOLCONDA

The kingdom of Golconda was established by the conquests of Sultan Quli, founder of the Qutb Shah dynasty.[1] In 1491 Sultan Quli, a descendant of the Turkoman Qara-Quvinlu ('black sheep') dynasty of Iran, assumed governorship of the province of Telengana, the Bahmani province. A nearly simultaneous break-up of the Sultanate forced Sultan Quli into the position of an independent ruler virtually by default. In his first years as governor, at least, Sultan Quli had no discernible ambitions. Later, he did not assume the titles and other insignia of royalty. During the first three decades of his governorship Sultan Quli engaged in continuous warfare simply to maintain his holdings. The Muslim administrator was thrust into a bitter struggle for domination in the eastern Deccan between the Gajapati kings of Orissa and Krishna Deva Raya, one of the most effective of the Vijayanagar rulers.

[1] Cf. H. K. Sherwani, 'Sultan-Quli Qutb 'l-Mulk, the First Ruler of Medieval Tilangana, Part I', *Journal of Indian History*, XXXIII (Dec. 1955), 261–87, and Part II: 'Qutbu'l-Mulk's Military Campaigns', *Journal of Indian History*, XXXIV (Apr. 1956), 1–31.

Eventually, in 1530, Sultan Quli took advantage of a succession struggle in Vijayanagar at the death of Krishna Deva Raya. The now independent Muslim ruler launched an explosive series of attacks to the east which, after four years, gave him full control over the interior districts north of the Krishna and the coastal districts as far north as Rajmundry on the Godavari. Sultan Quli met and defeated three separate opponents to accomplish this objective. To the south of Golconda the conqueror directed his armies against the *nayaks* who still controlled the great hill-fortresses. The latter, still linked by tributary and kinship ties to the warrior élite of Vijayanagar, received direct military support from that state. To the east, between Golconda and the sea, Sultan Quli unseated a confederacy of Gajapati chiefs tied to the Orissan dynasty. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Bahmani Sultanate even fortress-towns as far inland as Warangal and Nalgonda had fallen to these rajas. Finally, to the north and west, Sultan Quli thwarted his former colleagues of the Bahmani nobility who had tried to seize Elgandel, Malankur, and Ramgir, the major fortresses in that region.

CONSOLIDATION UNDER IBRAHIM

Sultan Quli's legacy in 1543 included a fragile conquest state, not a stable polity. The *nayaks* and their followers, who still controlled the Telengana fortresses, possessed recent memories of harsh defeats by the Muslim conqueror, but had few incentives to offer their loyalties to the new regime. The critical problem for Sultan Quli's successors was that of winning the support of the *nayaks* so that they could be assimilated to the new state structure.

A solution to this problem came under Ibrahim Qutb Shah.[1] During his lengthy thirty-year reign (1550–80), Ibrahim, unlike his father, played down the Islamic and Persian character of the monarchy. Although he remained a Muslim, Ibrahim succeeded in presenting himself as an indigenous king, ruling, in so far as possible, in the idiom and style of a Kakatiya, Valama, or Reddi monarch. Ibrahim stressed his sympathy for Telugu culture and

[1] See H. S. Sherwani, 'The Medieval State of Tilangana, A Period of Uncertainty, 1543–1550', *Journal of Indian History*, XXXV (Apr. 1957), 37–72, and 'Tilangana under Ibrahim Qutb Shah: Diplomacy and Military Campaigns· Part I, 1550–1565', *Journal of Indian History*, XXXV (Aug. 1957), 247–69 (Dec. 1957), 359–85, and Part II (1565–1580), XXVI (Apr. 1958), 73–100.

life in a number of public expressions: from an extended exile in Vijayanagar he had acquired facility in the indigenous language as well as a Telugu wife. Throughout his reign Ibrahim enforced a policy of official bilingualism, in both Persian and Telugu. He evidently enjoyed, and certainly actively patronized, Telugu poets and writers. He also kept up the practice of setting aside substantial tax-free lands and villages for the support of Brahmins and temples. Ibrahim also pointedly refrained from collection of the *jiziya* or capitation tax on non-Muslims. All these conciliatory policies were maintained without exception by his successors until the end of the dynasty.

But perhaps as significant as any of these practices was a symbolic act ordered by Ibrahim in 1551, the year after his accession to the throne. In that year, Ibrahim set his engineers to clear and renovate a large run-down Kakatiya irrigation work at Pangal. In so doing, the Qutb Shah king made an appeal to some of the most deep-rooted aspects of Telugu culture. In the bilingual inscription commemorating the work Ibrahim retained one part of the income from lands irrigated by the complex for the royal treasury, another portion for the cultivators, and the remainder for the support of Muslim holy men and Brahmins.[1]

Ibrahim's policies and his personality enabled him to appeal to the tradition of personal loyalty and service still maintained by the corporate, hereditary bodies of *nayaks* and their followers in the great citadels of Golconda. As early as 1550, when Ibrahim was returning from Vijayanagar to make an attempt on the Golconda throne after the death of his brother Jamshid, he was able to elicit dramatic expressions of military fealty from the *nayaks*. For example, the garrison of Koilkonda fort, located to the south-west of Hyderabad, sent two envoys offering to take an oath of allegiance to his cause. When Ibrahim arrived at the fortress, the chief officers of the garrison met him with gifts. Thereafter, according to the lengthy inscription on a pillar still standing inside the walls of the fort, 'all the Nayakvadas, the army, retinue, the artillery, and the bondmen of Koalakonda *sic*' assembled before Ibrahim, the Prince, 'sitting on the master's sofa' who questioned them:[2]

'You brought me who was at Vijayanagaram; shall I trust you?' and

[1] *Annual Report* of the Archaeological Department of H.E.H. the Nizam's Dominions, 1927–8, pp. 4–5. [2] Ibid., 1928–9, pp. 23–4.

the following are the oaths which we [the garrison] gave (*you*) our master: '(*We swear*) that if any of us, the armbearers that have entered the gates of Koyalkonda *sic*, join hands . . . with any other person other than [Ibrahim] they must be considered to be very low and they will incur the sin of having killed cows and Brahmans at Varanasi. . . . This is an oath (*which applies*) to all the armbearers of Koyalkonda *sic*.'

The oath-giving commemorated in this epigraph is only comprehensible if seen in the context of the *nayak* military ethic and corporate tradition, of which Ibrahim was the beneficiary.

However, Ibrahim also had to contend with a competing appeal from his former host, the Telugu ruler of Vijayanagar. If put to the test, it is doubtful that Ibrahim could have won over the Golconda *nayaks* from the attraction of a ruler who traced the founding of his state from two former *nayaks* of the Kakatiya kingdom. When the Vijayanagar ruler mounted an invasion of Golconda, the wavering *nayak* garrisons began to acknowledge his sovereignty. Although his invasion was beaten back, the Vijayanagar king continued to intervene in the affairs of Golconda by encouraging the *nayaks* to rebel against Ibrahim. These attempts culminated in an uprising led by the Telugu garrison of Golconda fort at the capital. The attempt failed because the other *nayak* garrisons did not join the rebels. Ibrahim unhestitatingly crushed the revolt and executed the entire garrison of Golconda fort.

Shortly thereafter the possibility of intervention or invasion from the south ended. In 1565 Ibrahim joined with the four other Muslim sultans of the Deccan in a joint war against Vijayanagar. At the battle of Talikota the Muslim sultans destroyed the Hindu kingdom completely. After this event the Telugu *nayaks* of Golconda were denied support or refuge from outside the boundaries of Golconda.

STABILITY IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

In 1589 Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah, son and successor to Ibrahim, began to lay out a new capital sited a few miles east of Golconda fort on the Musi river.[1] When completed, by the end of the century, Hyderabad was a magnificent open city, planned on a grid pattern. Essentially a Muslim city, it contained mosques, baths, shops, hospitals, and *sarais*. Yet even though Hyderabad was expressly designed to be a Muslim capital thrust into the

[1] See H. K. Sherwani, *Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah*, pp. 8–11.

Telengana plateau, it did contain one significant feature of the indigenous culture. Two enormous tanks, formed by *anicuts* thrown across the Musi river, continued the royal Telugu tradition of massive irrigation works. Designed and built as an open, virtually unfortified city, Hyderabad also symbolized the political and economic power of its builder and the state he headed.

The rapidly growing wealth and population of the capital accompanied and paralleled the evolution of a centralized political and administrative system. Although not overly complex or bureaucratized, the administrative system presided over by the Qutb Shahs was remarkably effective in securing the kingdom from internal revolts or from outside attack, as well as in raising revenues apparently much in excess of the requirements of the state. The success of the system rested on the maintenance of preponderant force kept in readiness to serve the king at the capital. But equally important was the readiness of all important segments of the indigenous population to accept the legitimacy of the regime.

The power of the king, never seriously challenged from within, commanded the loyalties of the Muslim nobility, who served the state as its highest-ranking administrators. Members of this body attended court in person, while keeping their personally recruited and paid bodies of heavy cavalry in reserve as part of the central army at the capital. Or, Muslim nobles could be sent to act as administrators in the various provinces of the kingdom. Here they were responsible for all military, police, and revenue functions in a given area. Payment for their services was obtained through a military fief (*musqasa*) which supposedly yielded a fixed sum in tax collections.[1] In so far as can be determined, nobles holding *muqasas* were free to sublease their holdings to tax-farmers or private entrepreneurs for whatever price the market would bear. Characteristically for the Golconda system, nobles assigned administrative posts in the provinces seem to have been subject to little direct regulation as long as they obeyed the orders of the king and did not arouse heated protests from the population under their

[1] For example, Abdullah Qutb Shah gave Yulchi Bek, one of his experienced field generals, a *muqasa* in Kaulas district. At the same time, Yulchi Bek also acquired command of Kaulas fort and responsibility for the administration of the district. From his total annual salary of 40,000 gold *hun*, the Mughal general paid the salaries of one hundred picked Persian and Turqi cavalrymen who accompanied him to his new post. See Nizamuddin Ahmad, *Hadiqat-u-Sulateen*, ed. by Syed Ali Bilgrami (Hyderabad, 1961), pp. 220–1.

jurisdiction. All nobles, whether acting as district chiefs or as military commanders, were subject to demotion, transfer, and supervision by the king or his chief minister. The nobles of Golconda were not semi-independent tributary chieftains.

The fulcrum of state power lay in the forces of heavy cavalry directly under the command of the king and paid from the central treasury. These Persian and Turkish troopers, riding large, armoured, imported horses, had long established a decisive tactical superiority over the lighter-armed and mounted Telugu and Maratha warriors of the Deccan. Contemporary estimates agree that the king of Golconda could muster at least 30,000 and perhaps as many as 80,000 horsemen for his standing army.[1] An additional number of foreign cavalry served in the employ of the various members of the nobility. A large artillery park supplied a supporting arm for the heavy cavalry. Cannon were manned by European gunners on direct salaries. Overwhelming military power at the direct disposal of the king ensured that serious rebellion or defiance of his authority was not likely to succeed.

Impressive state power demanded access to large, uninterrupted revenues. The economic strength of the monarchy and polity derived first from the burgeoning economy of Golconda and secondly from the operation of an efficient, ruthless, state revenue system. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a number of developments contributed to what was probably a steady increase in over-all economic production in the Telugu-speaking areas. At the same time, successive kings of Golconda and their advisers were quick to devise flexible means to exploit any new sources of wealth which came to their attention.

After a series of discoveries in the early sixteenth century, Golconda (and Bijapur, to a lesser degree) emerged as the most important market for large diamonds in the world. Stones found in the mining area adjacent to Vijayawada on the Krishna river or near Kurnool were polished, cut, and sold at the mines or in the 'diamond quarter' of Hyderabad city. By the 1670s at least

[1] To cite only two examples: Bhimsen, a Mughal officer, writing in 1700, commented that before the Mughal conquest Bijapur possessed a central army of 150,000 cavalry and Golconda a smaller force of 80,000. Bhimsen, 'Nuskha-i Dilkusha', British Museum MS. Or. 23, fols. 138b–139a. Manucci refers to a force of 30,000 horsemen mustered by Abul Hasan just prior to the siege of Golconda fort. Niccolao Manucci, *Storia do Mogor, 1653–1708*, tr. by W. Irvine, 4 vols. (London, 1907–8), II. 306.

twenty-three mines in Golconda were in productive operation.[1] In most, ill-paid workers, employed by individual entrepreneurs, washed and sifted the dirt extracted from alluvial surface pits in search of possible stones. As many as several hundred thousand contractors, labourers, money-lenders, merchants, and officials might be engaged at the Golconda mines at any given time. Royal control and regulation of this vast enterprise afforded a large, steady income to the royal treasury as well as possession of the choicest and largest stones found. At each mine or cluster of adjacent mines, a royal licensee, usually a Telugu Brahmin, paid a set amount to control all mining and supply concessions at the workings. This mine controller also turned over all diamonds found over a certain size to the royal treasury.

The new diamond industry undoubtedly helped the growth of regional and long-distance trade—especially with Persia and other areas in the Middle East. Golconda's new capital city grew rapidly in settlement area and population to become the dominant centre of consumption in the region. Moreover the presence of the Qutb Shah court stimulated the evolution of Hyderabad as the major market for large-scale mercantile and state finance in south India. The city's location on the main commercial route between the west-coast ports and those of the east coast also ensured that it would become an important entrepôt for inland trade in the Deccan.[2] Two hundred miles to the east, Machilipatnam, possessing an excellent anchorage, came to rival the great Mughal port of Surat in Gujerat in the size of its international trade.

As the seventeenth century progressed another source of state revenue became more and more significant. Under the stimulus of British, Dutch, and French trading-company capital investment, exports from Golconda of textiles, slaves, indigo, food-stuffs, saltpetre, and iron increased steadily in volume and value.[3]

[1] The best single account of the mines is 'A Description of the Diamond Mines', presented by the Earl Marshall of England [Henry Howard, 6th Duke of Norfolk] to the Royal Society of London in 1677. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London*, XII (25 June 1677), 907–17. This description is based on visits made by the anonymous author to the Golconda mines.

[2] See Shah Manzur 'Alam, 'The Growth of Hyderabad City: A Historical Perspective', in *Studies in Indian Culture* (Hyderabad, 1966), and by the same author, 'Masulipatam—A Metropolitan Port in the Seventeenth Century', *Islamic Culture*, XXXIII (1959), 169–87.

[3] For a full discussion of European trade and its impact see Tapan Raychaudhuri, *Jan Company in Coromandel: 1605–1690* (The Hague, 1962).

Merchant middlemen (Telugu *komatis*, Persians, and Armenians) acquired goods for export from weavers, dyers, and other industrial producers. 'Centres of export' grew up around the coastal trading towns like Vishakapatnam, Machilipatnam, Fort St. George at Madras, or Pondichery. European payment for these goods came primarily through imports of gold and silver. These found their way in ever increasing amounts to the mints and treasuries of the Qutb Shahs. The value to the regime of access to a steadily increasing, fully accessible stock of precious metals cannot be overemphasized.

As the economy of Golconda expanded the central administration maintained effective access to every economic sector in the society. The mechanisms for taxation and revenue collection bore certain common characteristics: first, revenue collection was relatively decentralized and hence efficient. That is, state investment in the building and operation of an expensive administrative structure was kept at a minimum level. The king, or in certain cases, high-ranking nobles, usually imposed full personal responsibility for revenue collection on a single official or private individual (i.e. a tax-farmer), who made predetermined payments on a regular basis. Secondly, collection was rigorous. Tax-farmers who failed to make their required payments quickly met harsh punishment. Thirdly, the system, often as a result of competitive bidding for tax concessions or monopolies, tended toward maximum, frequently rapacious demands. Finally, direct participation in the collection system seems to have been a province of non-Muslims, especially Brahmins.

These characteristics are clearly visible in the system of state concessions applied to the diamond mines. The Golconda regime tapped trade moving by land through similar methods. Private individuals, usually Brahmins, obtained concessions either from the king or from nobles holding *muqasas* to collect road tolls at specified intervals along the main trade routes of the kingdom. Sea customs were collected by the same method at Machilipatnam and the other ports. Another, particularly regressive, monopoly was that maintained for the production and sale of salt. Concessionaires appointed by the state were allowed to sell salt manufactured in salt-pans along the coast at prices far above the cost of production. Similar methods were utilized in the land revenue system, the most valuable source of state funds. As we shall discuss

in detail in the next chapter, the Qutb Shahs made extensive use of tax-farmers to collect the tax on agricultural production.

For inland tolls and the salt monopoly (and for the new diamond industry) the Muslim regime had clearly adopted the simple, effective, indigenous approach. Under the Kakatiyas, and later under the Recarla Valamas, or the Reddis of Kondavidu, the state handed over all responsibility for collection of road tolls, taxes, and trade, salt and garden lands to special trade guilds who paid fixed amounts on a regular basis. These 'tax farmers had their own branches in different localities, and their own officials, office establishments, and accountants to keep records of their transactions, receipts and remissions.'[1] These tax-farmers were from the Telugu mercantile castes. At some as yet undetermined point in time, perhaps as a direct result of the Muslim conquest, secular Brahmins replaced members of the former guilds of tax-collectors. In the countryside, for collection of the land tax, the regime also tried to retain the efficiency of the farming system, but resistance from the dominant Telugu warrior/cultivator castes made the new, imposed Muslim system somewhat more rigid, formal, and demanding than those of the preceding Hindu regimes.

BRAHMINS AND *NAYAKS*

Obviously a conquest state established and ruled by an alien minority needed military power supported by adequate revenues to survive. But acceptance of the regime and active co-operation by some members of the most powerful groups in local society were also vital. The Quth Shahs did manage to persuade a sizeable number of Telugu Brahmins that their best interests lay in perpetuation of the state, not in its downfall. Thus, as in previous regimes, Brahmin clerks and accountants appear to have filled most of the lower-ranking positions in the Golconda central administration. Brahmins were especially strong in the Telugu branch of the central secretariat which issued orders and edicts in the indigenous language. Telugu Brahmins also practised their traditional skills in the central fiscal office. Brahmins frequently rose to the highest positions in these state departments. But by far the greatest strength of this caste lay beyond the capital in its

[1] Venkataramanayya and Sarma, op. cit., p. 684. The tax-farmers (*sunkarulu*) gathered revenues which were collectively termed *sunkam*. Cf. also Sarma, *History of the Reddi Kingdoms*, pp. 401–2.

control of the revenue system. In every type of tax collection the agents who actually made the collection were virtually all Brahmins. Brahmins also served as ubiquitous agents (*vakils*) for virtually all great men, whether Muslim nobles or Hindu, Armenian, or European merchants. In this capacity Brahmins often achieved substantial wealth and real if delegated power. Numerous, though subordinate, official posts, entrepreneurial opportunities in tax-farming, and widespread opportunities as agents and brokers largely counter-balanced the inevitable loss of patronage and wordly influence experienced by temple or priestly Brahmins of the region under a Muslim dynasty.

Apart from Brahmin officials, Telugu *nayaks* were the only other important indigenous social group to participate in the central political system. These warriors maintained a recognized existence in the eyes of the state throughout the seventeenth century. Thus, the 'noble *nayakwarian*' in residence at the Qutb Shah court appear to have been courtiers at times, but their most important function was military. *Nayaks* and their followers at the capital (some of whom belonged to the élite royal horse guard, the *khas khail*) constituted a body of troops available for active service at any time. However, contemporary sources confirm that the *nayaks* also retained their earlier function as hereditary garrison troops. As they had in the pre-Golconda period, Telugu *nayaks* manned the great fortresses of the eastern Deccan, but now under Muslim control. For example, at Kondapalli fort, perhaps the most impressive citadel in the Andhra coastal region with a garrison of three to four thousand men, 'the chief Commandant is a Moslem, assisted by some *Nayaks*, who are Gentus [i.e. Telugus].'[1]

Nayaks possessed a political importance much greater than their purely military function. Members of the great Telugu warrior/cultivator castes, they had direct links of both kinship and interest with the regional aristocracy of Golconda: the *zamindars* who dominated the traditional agrarian system of the kingdom. Involvement in the central political system, coupled with considerable autonomy in the agrarian sector, served as partial compensation for the loss of independent Hindu political power. The result was a substantial measure of support for the Qutb Shah regime.

[1] William Moreland, ed., *The Relations of Golconda*, Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, vol. LXVI (London, 1931), p. 79.

When the term *nayak* or *nayakwari* was extended beyond mere military captains in the employ of the state to include what were clearly great tributary chieftains, this linkage becomes much more evident. These grandees probably did not perform continuous personal service at the Qutb Shah court. They did send sons or other relatives as surrogates for them in attendance on the king. These men and their followers (actually sureties for good behaviour) swelled the ranks of the Telugu troops at the capital. The 'great *nayaks*' (*nayakwarian-i azam*) also brought under their personal command large contingents of troops for specific campaigns. For example, three Telugu chiefs mustered 30,000 spearmen to reinforce the Golconda horsemen which invaded the southern Karnatik under the general Mir Jumla in the mid-1640s. These Golconda *nayaks* willingly joined the campaign to extend Muslim domination over their fellow Telugu *nayaks* still loyal to the Vijayanagar successor state at Chandragiri.[1]

CONCLUSION

A number of similarities exist between the concentrated power of the Qutb Shahs, rulers of Golconda, and that of the Timurids, rulers of the Mughal empire. In each state, an effective central administration and strong central army was sustained by steady, increasing revenues. Military power depended on access to troops of heavy cavalry, largely Muslims of recent foreign origin. Continued expansion also helped to strengthen a common tendency toward the centralization of power. In both kingdom and empire, successive rulers grappled with similar problems of governing the society of South Asia. In this region, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as now, the fabric of local society was as dense, resilient, and resistent to the demands of centralized authority as in any peasant society in the world (and perhaps more so than most).

Ibrahim Qutb Shah (1550–80) and Akbar (1556–1605), the two contemporary monarchs who built each system, managed to secure the active and willing service of the most powerful warrior castes in the eastern Deccan and in North India. The four leading Telugu warrior castes and the Rajputs responded to a multifaceted appeal. Both Ibrahim and Akbar conveyed a sense of personal warmth, a concern for religious and cultural sensibilities, a promise of economic rewards to their newly recruited servants. But not

[1] Ahmad, *Hadiqat-u-Salateen*, p. 300.

least, both Telugus and Rajputs responded to an appeal to their ethos as warriors—an appeal aimed at their desire for service and obedience. Although defeated, they and their sons and followers could retain an individual and collective identity as men of honour serving a true king.

II

The Agrarian System of Golconda

LAND TAX ASSESSMENT

THE greatest single source of revenue for the central government derived from the king's claim to a share of all agricultural production. Through the mechanism of the land tax the Qutb Shahs appropriated a large share of every harvest. From the earliest years of Muslim rule in Golconda there existed a 'perfect assessment' (*jam'i-kamil*) which specified a normative land-tax figure for each village, subdistrict, and district in the kingdom. By the latter part of the seventeenth century, with the addition of the Karnatik territories, the *jam'i-kamil* totalled over eight million gold *hun* per year.[1] One of the most significant innovations introduced by the conquerors was to insist on assessment and collection of the land tax in cash rather than in kind. Under the Reddis of Kondavidu, for example, the state actually collected grain and other produce. According to Sarma, 'In almost all big villages the king had *raca-gadelu* (royal granaries) to store the king's share of grain.'[2]

The origins of the 'perfect assessment'—whether arrived at by political negotiation, royal fiat, or systematic land surveys—are obscure. The Muslim conquerors did superimpose their own pattern of territorial subdivisions over the existing Hindu units. In the fifteenth century (apparently both in Andhra and Telengana) the basic territorial unit was the *sima* which was grouped into *bhumi* or districts.[3] The Qutb Shah reorganization imposed new

[1] Khafi Khan *Muntakhab-al Lubab*, II. 367–8, provides a *jama'* for Golconda at its conquest of 28,790,000 rupees which, if converted at 3·5 rupees, would be 8,225,714 gold *hun*. The official figure from the Inayat Jang Collection is 29,188,125 rupees or 8,339,750 *hun*. [*sic*] I.J. Coll., 1/7/72. Siddiqui, *History of Golconda*, pp. 356–7 gives a much lower figure from a late eighteenth-century chronicle. Siddiqui's figure of 24,750,000 rupees is probably an expression of the *hasil* or collection figures expected rather than an accurate statement of the *jam'i-kamil*.

[2] Sarma, *History of the Reddi Kingdom*, p. 367.

[3] The *sima* did not disappear completely for there are still references to *simas* which infrequently were recognized as existing units by the Mughals after the conquest. Ibid., pp. 217–18.

and larger spatial divisions called *parganas*, which seem to have incorporated several *simas* within their boundaries. When this change-over occurred the Muslim regime could have used assessment figures from the *simas* to calculate the proper figure for each new territorial unit. This would eliminate the effort and expense of a new land survey.[1]

State demand at the time of the formulation of the perfect assessment seems to have been computed on the equivalent of one-half share of production.[2] Although initially severe, the demand was unquestionably mitigated. For example, the Qutb Shahs were careful not to tamper with land grants to temples and to Brahmins, nor to interfere with internal village revenue arrangements. Moreover, the apparent willingness of the state to forgo revision of the demand allowed for rewards to those cultivators or villages who successfully expanded cultivation and productivity.

LAND-TAX COLLECTION

In part of Golconda the central revenue ministry retained direct control over collection of the land tax. In the remainder, great nobles holding revenue assignments on specified lands (*muqasa*) had temporary authority to make land-tax collections.[3] Proceeds from the *muqasa* enabled the holder to defray his salary and those of his soldiers and entourage. In either case, tax-farming through an elaborate series of lessees and sub-lessees was the usual approach to revenue collection.[4]

Along the coast, the port towns and their hinterland constituted a zone of highly productive export centres. The state tapped these

[1] Numerous inscriptions testify that land measurement and cadastral surveys were a common practice in the pre-Muslim eastern Deccan. The medieval Hindu kingdoms used measuring poles of a fixed length for this purpose. Cf. ibid., pp. 363–7.

[2] Cf. a letter summarizing conclusions made by Thomas Munro, first British administrator to assume control of the Ceded Districts in the late eighteenth century, regarding the Golconda assessment. In Munro's account, a composite of testimony taken from locally dominant chiefs, he portrays the introduction of a much more formal, systematic, money-oriented, agrarian system by the new Muslim state. W. Francis, *Madras District Gazetteers: Anantapur* (Madras, 1905), pp. 102–3.

[3] The Golconda term for this type of salary assignment is *muqasa*, rather than *jagir*, its approximate Mughal equivalent. The Golconda version was far closer to the older *iqta'* (of the Delhi Sultanate) in the wide powers afforded the holder.

[4] Cf. Raychaudhuri, *Jan Company*, pp. 6–8, for a summary description of the Golconda revenue system which differs slightly from that given here.

by means of what is uniformly described as a rapacious farming system. The governors (*sar-samatu*) of the coastal districts north of the Krishna held their posts on farming terms similar to those imposed on the governor of the Karnatik. That is, before securing his appointment each governor had to agree to pay to the central treasury a fixed sum each year. This represented the normal land-tax collections for his district. For example, in the seventeenth century, the governor of Nizampatnam, a port district on the mouth of the Krishna, paid 55,000 gold *hun* yearly, less 5,000 *hun* allowance for the upkeep of his official establishment.[1] Once established, the governor was free to try to recoup his expenses (including whatever bribes and presents were necessary to obtain the post) and make a profit on the tax collections. Only the authority of the central treasury, exercised through revenue superintendents in each district (*amildars*), offered any restraint on the governor's actions. The *amildars* seem to have been more concerned with punctual payment than with the welfare of the peasantry. Some 'governors' were merely speculators who immediately sublet their entire districts at a healthy profit.[2] More commonly however, governors on the coast sublet land-tax collection in their districts to smaller entrepreneurs by means of annual bidding.

Every year the successful tax-farmers or sub-lessees of the district governors assumed charge of the major towns and the parganas surrounding them. These *hawaldars* wielded full revenue, and magisterial powers over their territories. Streynsham Master, the British merchant, encountered *hawaldars* at every large town and village along his route from Madras north to Machilipatnam. These officers were, according to Master, the visible representatives of the Golconda government. When Master reached the mouth of the Krishna river, he found at Madapollam and two adjacent towns 'distinct Havaldars for the gathering of the ground rent, independent from . . . Metchlepatam, . . .'[3] In other words, in Andhra, the officer immediately and directly responsible for the land and other taxes was a tax-farmer, a private entrepreneur. The *hawaldars'* primary concern was to meet the required thrice-yearly instalment of his obligation to the district governor. Similarly, the district governor in turn worried about making his annual payment to the central treasury. At every level, delay or

[1] Moreland, *Relations*, p. 81. [2] Ibid. [3] Master, *Diaries*, II. 160.

non-payment—regardless of fluctuations in actual collections—could mean, at best, a severe flogging, and, at worst, imprisonment or even execution for the unlucky speculator.

As one might expect, desperate men, driven by fear, on the one hand, and by the possibility of great profits, on the other, applied severe measures to the taxpayers under their jurisdiction. The *amildars* did little to restrain the tax-farmers. Harsh tactics enabled them to continue stable revenue flows to the centre. By accepting the risk of harvest fluctuations the various types of farmers in the Golconda system, and those who financed them, acted as insurers for steady, maximal, land revenues. Interestingly enough, these entrepreneurs were overwhelmingly Hindus, primarily Brahmins, rather than Muslims. The latter disliked 'troubling themselves with farms or administration, except as Supervisors [*amildars*] [to see] that the Governors duly fulfill their obligations'.[1]

Whether the especially harsh system of annual tax-farms observed in coastal Andhra was also in effect in the interior districts is unclear. There is little or no direct evidence bearing on this question. One possibility is that many districts not kept under direct crown control in Telengana were given to nobles holding salary assignments. These *muqasadars*, who held full revenue, executive and military powers, were probably the equivalent of district governors (*sar-samatu*) in Andhra. This would almost certainly have been true for the *muqasa* held by Yulchi Bek at Kaulas.[2] If this was the case we can then assume that lands controlled by salary assignees were subject to tax-farming. Certainly, the testimony of Thevenot leaves no doubt about this:[3] '. . . they [the nobles] have gratifications from the King, of Lands and Villages whereof he allows them the Use, where they commit extraordinary extractions by the Bramens, who are their Farmers.' Collection practices in crown lands probably followed the general pattern, but again there is no direct evidence on this point. We also have little information about the extent of crown territories and their relationship to *jagir* lands or to lands held by governors on farming terms.[4]

[1] Moreland, *Relations* . . . , p. 82. [2] See above, Chapter I, p. 13, n. 1.

[3] Thevenot, *Indian Travels*, p. 143.

[4] Later evidence suggests that the area immediately surrounding the headquarters of every district, meaning the *pargana* bearing the same name as the

Harsh as the Golconda land-tax system undoubtedly was, it was not so oppressive as to halt or appreciably slow agricultural production. Contemporary observers simultaneously deplore the severities of the land-tax collections and exclaim over the obvious prosperity of the countryside: 'The Kingdom of Golconda, speaking generally, is a rich country, abounding in corn, rice, cattle, sheep, fowls and other commodities necessary to life.'[1] Tank irrigation in Telengana and the fertility of the deltas in Andhra partly explain this abundance. Still, one may well ask how cultivators could continue to produce year after year if the bulk of their harvests were seized by completely rapacious tax officials. In other words what kinds of forces, if any, acted to temper and reduce the oppression of the revenue system?

The state seems to have imposed certain restraints, both direct and indirect, on the tax-farmers. The *jam'i-kamil* may have been such a restraint. The existence of a 'standard assessment' in a system which relied in large measure on tax-farms allotted yearly to the highest bidder is on the surface, at least, an anomaly. One possibility is that the *jam'i-kamil* figure assigned to each territorial unit represented a bargaining point for all parties concerned in revenue collection: the central revenue ministry and its *amildars*, *muqasadars* and their agents, the district governors, tax-farmers, and the hereditary local officials in each village and *pargana*. The last group may have viewed the assessment figure as a ceiling beyond which payment should not be made to the tax-farmer. Thus, the *jam'i-kamil* might have been a weapon for local non-Muslim agrarian society in its struggle against the demands of the central government.

The state also placed a relatively small, but significant, proportion of agricultural lands beyond the reach of its tax-collectors. Perhaps the most important of these were the lands set aside for the support of mosques, tombs, and other Islamic establishments. For example, in 1638 Abdullah Qutb Shah issued a royal order

district, was called the *hawili pargana* and invariably classified as crown property. This meant that the *hawili parganas* were regarded as critical sources of revenue which were usually reserved for the support of the district governors, the principal fort in the district, etc.

[1] Tavernier, *Travels in India*, I. 121. Cf. also Thevenot, p. 131: 'In short, there are few or no Countries, that delight Travellers with their verdure, more than the Fields of this Kingdom, because of the Rice and Corn that is to be seen everywhere, and the many lovely Reservatories [i.e. tanks] that are to be found in it.'

(*farman*) to the state revenue officers (*'amal*) of three *parganas* in Rajmundry district (on the Godavari). In his order, Abdullah acknowledged that the public crier (*mu'azzan*) and the caretaker (*farash*) of the mosque of Lonkher village had made a complaint. They had protested that the tax-farmer (*ijaradar*) of the *pargana*, a man named Balas Venkatadri, had seized the produce (*ghalah zamin*) which formed the endowment of the mosque. The tax-farmer was also making other demands which were contrary to custom, on the pretext that these lands were not entered in the official accounts. The king ordered the *amildars* to recover the grain which Balas Venkatadri had forcibly taken and to put an end to his illegal demands on the mosque's tax-exempt lands (*in'am*).[1]

LOCAL OFFICIALS AND LOCAL SOCIETY

The greatest check to the severity of Golconda's tax-farming system was the strength of local rural society throughout the kingdom. The density and resilience of peasant societies in the face of outside demands are well recognized. Nevertheless, Telugu society as it had evolved by the mid-sixteenth century appears to have been exceptionally strong and self-sustaining. In large part this was due to the Telugu warriors, who, supported by Brahmins, dominated agrarian society in the eastern Deccan.

The regional aristocracy was drawn from four major castes: Razus, Valamas, Kammas, and Kapus (Reddis).[2] Members of these castes, although ritually not considered twice-born Kshatriyas like the Rajputs of northern and central India, played a similar role in the social system of the eastern Deccan. Depending on local conditions, either Razus, Valamas, Kammas, or Reddis formed the dominant land-controlling stratum in every village

[1] India Office Library, London. Elliot Collection, Eur. Ms. F.50, No. 46. This document has survived in a draft copy of a translation made from Persian to English for the British administrator, Walter Elliot, in the nineteenth century. Fortunately, interlinear notes provide the Persian version of key terms. The use of the term *ijaradar* demonstrates conclusively that the 'renters' and 'farmers' noticed by European observers were indeed revenue speculators from the viewpoint of the state. The Elliot translations in this immediate volume (F.50) are congruent in their form and language with other Golconda *farmans*, and seem to be authentic. However, only six of the fifty are from Golconda; the remainder pertain to Bijapur. No. 45 also refers to *in'am* lands attached to a mosque in Eluru district.

[2] See E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of Southern India* (7 vols.; Madras, 1909): 'Razu', VI. 247–56; 'Velama', III. 336–42; 'Kamma', III. 94–105; 'Kapu', III. 222–49.

(aside from Brahmin-dominated *agrahara* villages). On the next upward level they functioned as local chiefs and rajas of varying importance. By their grip on land, and on surplus agricultural production, these warrior/cultivators wielded immense political, economic, and military power in the countryside. In order to tap agricultural production effectively the Qutb Shahs had either to remove these groups or come to terms with them. In another region, in the fifteenth century the Sultans of Gujerat had chosen the former course. In a series of bitter struggles they had succeeded in ejecting Rajput warriors from the most desirable sections of Gujerat's fertile plain.[1] But the Qutb Shahs and their advisers choosing not to follow this model, began to build a new agrarian system with the co-operation of the Telugu warrior aristocracy. In part, this co-operation was obtained by the offer of rewards and benefits and, in part, by the threat of force. But the new rulers of the region could also utilize the characteristic attitudes and ethic of the Telugu warriors for their own ends. If their local economic and social position did not suffer too severely; if their religious scruples were not overly offended; and if competing claims on their loyalties were eliminated, the regional aristocracy would provide at least minimal co-operation in every part of the kingdom to match the willing service of the corps of *nayaks* at the centre.

The first step in implementation of the new agrarian system was to recognize the antecedent claims and prescriptive rights of the regional aristocracy. The second step was to create or adapt devices whereby the regional aristocracy could participate in and identify its interests with the new political system. By far the most important problem was the method by which the land tax was to be assessed and collected. Here the new rulers simply applied time-tested local arrangements adapted from the Muslim experience in the western Deccan.

For each of the new subdistricts (*parganas*) established, the Qutb Shahs appointed a member of a powerful warrior family to act as headman or *deshmukh*. The primary task of the *deshmukh* (or *desai*, Persian, and *deshai*, Marathi) was to maintain an armed body of retainers and assist in the collection of the land tax.[2] Royal

[1] See S. C. Misra, *The Rise of Muslim Power in Gujerat* (London, 1963), pp. 203–14.

[2] These were originally Marathi terms carried into the eastern Telugu-speaking area by the Muslims.

officials (*hawaladars* or *karkuns*) or tax-farmers assigned to the subdistrict could rely on the local authority of the *deshmukh* or *deshai* to help enforce their demands. In return, the king assured the *deshmukh* a fixed percentage of the land tax collected (usually 5 per cent), full control of a number of tax-free villages, and hereditary lands within the *pargana*. Most important, the *deshmukh* gained hereditary tenure in office. The latter assurance—sealed by a royal *farman*—also implied royal support against encroachment by ambitious neighbouring chiefs and families.

Second, the crown selected a Brahmin as record-keeper or accountant (*despand*, Persian, and *deshpande* Marathi) for each subdistrict. This official kept complete records of taxes paid and lands cultivated on a yearly basis for each village in the subdistrict. He was expected to co-operate with the royal tax agent or farmer in the proper assessment of the land tax for the *pargana*. Remuneration was similar to, but usually less than, that of a *deshmukh*: a small percentage of the land tax, tax-free lands or villages, and assured hereditary status.

Within each village a similar pair of local officers antedated the Muslim conquest—despite their Persian titles. The village headman, or *muqaddam*, whose duties from the viewpoint of the revenue system paralleled those of the *deshmukh* at a higher level, belonged to the dominant agricultural caste of the village. The village accountant or *kulkarni* was usually a Brahmin. The pay and perquisites of the village officers came from the treasury and common lands of the village. Whether these village posts were confirmed by direct royal order is at this time at least an open question; for no royal patents of office for *muqaddams* or *kulkarnis* survive.

Documents from the late seventeenth century provide specific illustrations of the structure of the local agrarian system. A *farman* of Abul Hasan dated 1 April 1686 opens with a conventional address to the revenue collectors (*karkunan*), subdistrict headmen and accountants (*desaian* and *despandian*), and village headmen and accountants (*muqaddaman* and *kulkarnian*) past and present of Charkonda *pargana*, Devarkonda *sarkar*, Hyderabad. To these individuals the royal order confirms the appointment of the four sons of Yenkanna (Ramchandar Rao, Parsad Rao, Raghu Nayak Rao, and Sianat Rao) in the combined position of headmen (*deshmukh*) and accountant (*majmu'-dar*) for the ninety-six villages of the sub-

district. Yenkanna had held his position by a *farman* of Abdullah Qutb Shah. From the total number of villages the revenues from twelve are set aside to provide compensation for the position of headman (*deshmukh*) and revenues from nine villages constitute the perquisites of the accountant (*majmu'-dar*). Revenues from two additional villages are reserved for the support of Brahmins (*agrahara zunardaran*). The four individuals named also receive 10 per cent of the land-tax collections of the subdistrict for their services as well as the proceeds of a number of specialized market, transit, and liquor taxes. Any pre-existing tax-free lands they possess (*in'amat* or *seriyat*) retain that status. The terms and conditions of this appointment, derived from earlier grants (*asnad*), would be maintained in perpetuity.[1]

The most striking feature of this document is the scope of the king's financial concessions. Twenty-three of the ninety-six villages of Charkonda *pargana*, i.e. slightly less than one-quarter of the total, were completely under the control of the local officials. An indeterminate amount of pre-existing land grants were also immune to the demands of the tax-collector from the centre, while the four brothers who functioned as *deshmukh* and *deshpand* pocketed 10 per cent of the annual land-tax collections. Other more specialized taxes were also under their control. In other words, a large proportion of the land tax, as well as other levies, did not move beyond the boundaries of the subdistrict. These embedded revenues were inaccessible to any tax-farmer no matter how desperate or grasping. Obviously the local officers, supported by a written edict from the king, could be expected to react vigorously to any attempted encroachment. We also have traces of what seem to have been direct links between the monarchy and these local officials. At least three different narratives from the Mackenzie Collection, abstracted from local *pargana* and village records, describe the practice of visits made to the capital by the *deshmukhs* and village headmen. The author of the Annals of Condaved recorded that 'From former times the Inhabitants [i.e. the dominant chiefs] of all the Dasoms usually went once in five

[1] Khan, ed., *Farmans and Sanads of the Deccan Sultans*, Document 15, pp. 42–3 Persian text. The *farman* also assigns the position of *natgudi-dari* to the quartet Although the editors of the collection did define a number of technical terms they did not choose to define this term. The standard dictionaries and glossaries offer no definition for what is obviously an indigenous non-Muslim position despite the Persian suffix.

or six years to Golconda together with the Village Headmen to settle their Accounts; . . ."[1]

How common this customary journeying was to the Qutb Shah capital is not at all clear. If it was widespread, this could well have provided a channel for communication and royal support for the local *pargana* officials against exorbitant demands made by tax-farmers. There is also the possibility that some *deshmukhs* took on the functions of tax-farmers and agreed to pay the fixed revenues of their *pargana* directly to the crown.

We can, however, conclude that various forms of intervention from the centre, the preservation of lands exempt from central tax demands and the local interests of the hereditary *pargana* and village officials, were all significant checks on the tax-farmer. (The fact that the state chose not to disturb lands and villages traditionally left for the support of temples and Brahmins is also important.) Thus, these combined features offer at least a tentative explanation for the continued productivity of agriculture in Golconda despite a seemingly ruinous tax system.

ASSIMILATION OF LARGER CHIEFS

The Qutb Shahs were responsible for maintenance of order as well as collection of taxes in the countryside. One approach to this problem was to enlist the support of the more important Telugu chiefs by accepting and utilizing an existing local institution. The *muniwar* (the term used in northern Golconda) or the *kawali* (in the Karnatik) was a chief appointed by the king to maintain a force for policing the roads and keeping order over a number of *parganas* or even a full district.[2] As with other local officers the *muniwar*'s pay and expenses came from a small fixed percentage of the land-tax collections and proceeds from tax-free villages and lands left at his disposal by the state. Often the position was com-

[1] Annals of Condaved, p. 52. It is clear from the context in other passages that the term 'Inhabitants' is used to translate a word meaning the most prominent Valama and Kamma chiefs in the district. Cf. also India Office Library, London. Mackenzie Collection, Telugu (Unbound Translations), Class XIII, No. 18: 'Thus the said Inhabitants used to proceed to Golcondah to settle the Jamabandee of this Gramum, thus the Installment was paying to the Government of [Abul Hasan].' See also ibid., Class VIII, No. 4, p. 24: 'During the Government of Tooracuan[?] they delivered the whole account current at Golcondah.'

[2] These are transliterations from Persian; the Telugu spellings are *mannevadu* and *kavali*.

bined with a *deshmukh* appointment. A single individual might be *deshmukh* of his home *pargana* and act, at the same time, as *muniwar* for that *pargana* and several others. Under this arrangement, a number of the more important Telugu chiefs were brought under tighter control than if they had remained purely tributary rajas with autonomous powers within their territories. Yet the state was spared the effort and expense of intensive policing of territories under the *muniwar*'s charge. The state also did not relinquish its full claim to rural taxes as it would in the case of a tributary chief. Some, and perhaps all, *muniwars* also served as *nayaks*. Either they themselves or close relatives were available for personal military service at the capital or on campaign.

A traditional account, recorded in the early nineteenth century, of the origins and history of a leading Kamma house offers an excellent illustration of the establishment and operation of this institution under the Qutb Shahs. Sauyapanaid, the founder of the line, was a *nayak* who served in the mid-fifteenth century under Krishna Deva Raya, the famous Vijayanagar ruler. In this capacity he was given a tax-exempt village located east of Srisailam, just north of the Gundlekamma river in the Dupadu district.[1] The Founder's family served as *nayaks* for five generations under the same terms on Vijayanagar's eastern frontier, until 1565. Combined Muslim victory at the battle of Talikota allowed Golconda to extend its frontier to the south below the Krishna river.[2] In the aftermath of this victory, before Ibrahim Qutb Shah began to consolidate his new acquisitions, a predatory group, the Boyah of the Colava caste, began to plunder the area around Srisailam. According to the family tradition, a Niyogi Brahmin named Ramapiah, who had formerly been in the service of the Boyah, took refuge with Sauyapa, the current head of the Kamma house. The Brahmin proposed to his new patron that he be sent to the court of Ibrahim Qutb Shah. Once there, the emissary would offer to attack the Boyah in return for recognition by Ibrahim Qutb Shah and the concession of new lands.[3] Eventually, after six months at court, Ramapiah got a hearing and received a

[1] 'Historical Account of Sauyapa Naid and Suba Naid, zemindar of Marriapalla in Dupadu', India Office Library, Mackenzie Collection (Unbound Translations), Class VIII, Telugu (relating to the Ceded Districts) No. 35, p. 1. The Telugu version by Soobaunded(?) of this family history was finished on 12 Oct. 1813 and the English translation by Baboo Raw on 21 Oct. 1815.

[2] Ibid., p. 3. [3] Ibid., p. 4.

written commission for his master. He also obtained the service of a body of troops for the campaign against the Boyahs. As soon as Ramapiah arrived, Sauya attacked and pushed back the Boyahs, and took possession of their territory. Then, Sauya journeyed to the capital where at an audience with Ibrahim Qutb Shah he received four tax-free towns, 2 per cent of the revenues of the district as a 'watching allowance', and the right to collect customs at the entrance to one of the hill passes in that region.[1] The towns (which included Atmakur, Cumbum, and Dupadu) were, in fact, just inside what would be the southern boundary of Golconda until the mid-seventeenth century. At Ibrahim's command, Sauyapa left his lieutenant (a Valama warrior) and his Brahmin steward Ramapiah in charge in his new holdings. Sauyapa himself remained at court, presumably to become one of the 'noble-nayakwaris' in attendance at the capital.

In this account we can see clearly portrayed the entire process of assimilation into a regional political system of a local Telugu warrior chief. Sauyapa's eagerness for legitimation and recognition by the state—whether Hindu or Muslim—is noteworthy. So also is the characteristic role of the Brahmin factotum (who gained two tax-exempt villages from his successes). Equally significant, however, is the flexibility displayed by Ibrahim in his skilful utilization of the services of Sauyapa. At minimal cost, the Golconda king obtained consolidation and continuing protection of part of his southern frontier. By bringing this Kamma chief out of his home territory, Ibrahim also ensured that (provided he was tactfully treated) there would be a continuing incentive for loyalty to the state.

TRIBUTARY RAJAS

A number of important rajas occupying more remote or inaccessible areas remained tributary rajas. Unlike the *munivars*, they do not appear to have been subject to any meaningful control by the state over their territories. But they did pay tribute and were also subject to occasional demands for their presence at court. At least one source suggests that the tributary rajas were forced to appear with their annual tribute at court on the Persian Nau Ruz holiday.[2]

[1] Ibid., pp. 6–7.

[2] I. A. Ghauri, 'The Political Institutions of Bijapur 1536–1686 and Golconda 1518–1636' (Unpublished University of London dissertation, 1961), p. 96. Ghauri relies on references to this practice made in the poetry of Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah.

Virtually all the lands in the trans-Godavari region, in Srikakulam, were held by tributary rajas (with the exception of certain areas set aside for the support of Telugu auxiliaries). Another subregion largely given up to tributary chiefs was that hilly border zone between Andhra's coastal plain and the plateau of Telengana: i.e. the districts of Khammamett and Mustafanagar. One of the most important of these rajas was that of Paloncha, in Khammamett district. The family title, Ashwa Rao, dated from the Kakatiya period.[1]

Another larger holding was that of the Vipparla Valamas of Nuzvid in Mustafanagar district. According to the family history, the founders of this house served as *nayaks* under the Kakatiya rulers. Later in the fourteenth century one member of the family built up a small principality centred on a fortress he constructed at Nuzvid. Depending on the varying political struggle in the fifteenth century, successive members of the family served either the Gajapati kings or those of Vijayanagar. After the battle of Talikota, the current head of the family, Appanna, became a commander (*sardar*) under Ibrahim Qutb Shah and served with his king in his wars with Ahmadnagar. Ibrahim Qutb Shah gave Appanna the title of Vijay Appa Rao which was used by all his successors. The family account records confirmation of the grant of eighteen *parganas* (in Mustafanagar and Eluru districts) by Abul Hasan, the last Qutb Shah ruler.[2]

CONCLUSION

The newly arrived Muslim warriors and administrators of sixteenth-century Golconda superimposed their own political and administrative practices, derived from the Bahmani institutions of the western Deccan, over those of a conquered society. Large-scale settlement and colonization by Muslims did not occur. Instead the conquerors formed a political elite in a complex society

[1] *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Provincial Series: *Hyderabad State* (Calcutta, 1909), pp. 297–8. In 1901 the estate covered an area of about 800 square miles, extending in the east as far as Bhadrachalam.

[2] Sundaram Aiyar, *A Short Historical Sketch of the Zamindars of Nuzvid* (from the Telugu original of Madiraju Subbaraow) (Nuzvid, 1929), pp. 1–4. This brief work suggests the value of many of the original family documents which may still be in existence. An intensive analysis of these sources which must be both in Persian and Telugu would contribute much to our understanding of the history of the eastern Deccan.

of pre-existing social and political institutions. Although the relative numerical weakness of the Golconda élite forced upon it initial compromises and accommodations, the growth of state power in the seventeenth century ensured an equally steady growth in state pressure on the conquered society.

III

Political Change and Imperial Aggression in the Deccan

THE MUGHAL PRESENCE IN THE DECCAN

BETWEEN 1630 and 1633 a Mughal army under the personal command of the emperor, Shah Jahan, recently come to the throne, completed the conquest of Ahmadnagar. After this conquest, the only remaining Muslim states in the Deccan, Bijapur and Golconda—placed in direct proximity to the empire for the first time – faced a similar fate. Golconda could look forward to invasion from Orissa in the north-east to match the threat of Mughal attacks from Ahmadnagar's former territories in the north-west. A raid in force into Srikakulam by a Mughal army in 1630 had already served as a warning for the future.

Under these circumstances, when Shah Jahan once again came in person to the Deccan in 1635, the rulers of Bijapur and Golconda could only assume that a Mughal invasion, which would inevitably end in annexation, would soon take place. Surprisingly, however, this was not Shah Jahan's intention. Instead of outright occupation, he imposed tributary status on both Muhammad Adil Shah and Abdullah Qutb Shah. The harsh terms exacted by the emperor effectively bound both kingdoms into a Mughal sphere of influence in the southern part of the subcontinent.

According to the 'Document of Submission' (*inqiyad-nama*) acceded to by Abdullah Qutb Shah on 23 May 1636, tribute valued at 200,000 gold *hun* or 800,000 silver rupees would be sent yearly to Agra; Golconda's foreign policy would be directed by the Mughal emperor; and the Sultan of Golconda would hereafter strike Mughal gold *muhurs* and silver rupees according to dies supplied from the imperial mints. Furthermore, Abdullah agreed to have the names of the four 'rightly guided' Caliphs read in the Friday prayers according to the Sunni practice and to eliminate the names of the twelve Shi'a Imams. At the same time the *khutba* would mention the Mughal emperor as lawful ruler of the state

instead of the Safavid monarch who until that date had been treated as the symbolic suzerain of Golconda. Should any lapse of these conditions occur the Mughal emperor would be fully justified in annexing the kingdom.[1]

From the Mughal point of view, Abdullah Qutb Shah, addressed as a 'disciple' of Shah Jahan, was hereafter on the same legal footing as a petty *zamindar*; for he had lost all the attributes of medieval Islamic sovereignty. After the acceptance of Abdullah's submission by Shah Jahan, a Mughal ambassador, or better a 'resident' (*hajib*), whose function it was to enforce the emperor's orders, took up residence in Hyderabad. Over the next half-century the Mughal *hajib* was a prominent figure in Golconda's politics.

Shah Jahan's decision to exercise indirect rule in the two remaining Muslim Sultanates seems to have been a good one. By allowing Bijapur and Golconda to continue in existence as satellite states the emperor assured a stable southern frontier for the empire. Both kingdoms were strong enough to ensure political order in the western and eastern halves of the Deccan. Indeed they could easily maintain their hard-won dominance over the Maratha and Telugu warrior aristocracies without recourse to assistance from the Mughal treasury or army. Over the next forty years (1636–76) this unchallenged settlement contributed greatly to the peace and prosperity of Bijapur, Golconda, and the Mughal provinces of the Deccan.

Stability on the empire's southern frontier benefited the two tributary states as well since the Mughal emperor, as suzerain, undertook to guarantee the territorial integrity of both Bijapur and Golconda. Removal of any threat of invasion from the north freed Abdullah Qutb Shah and Muhammad Adil Shah to revive the older process of Islamic expansion southward. Actively encouraged by Shah Jahan, the two Muslim kings sent their armies against the fragmented remains of the Vijayanagar empire. These campaigns pushed the frontier of Muslim domination in the

[1] See Siddiqui, pp. 163–7, for the text of the document. Since Bijapur and Golconda were both tributaries of the emperor, Abdullah also agreed not to defend himself against any attacks by that state, but to rely instead on imperial assistance. This was in line with the Mughal insistence on regulating relationships among *zamindars* and tributaries. See also H. K. Sherwani, 'Reign of 'Abud'l-lah Qutb Shah (1626–1672): Political and Military Aspects', *Journal of Indian History* XLV (Apr. 1967), 120–3.

eastern half of the peninsula as far south as the Kaveri river. As a result of these victories, Golconda's holdings in the Karnatik now stretched from the Krishna river in the north to the Palar river (fifty to sixty miles south of Madras) in the south. In turn, the Bijapur Karnatik extended from the Palar river even further south to Tanjore on the Kaveri.[1]

Predictably, however, an expansionist sentiment—always present in the Mughal ruling élite—found expression in a faction which, in the years after 1636, rejected Shah Jahan's settlement and urged direct annexation of both Bijapur and Golconda. The latter, especially, was attractive because of its great wealth. The most prominent proponent of this view was Prince Aurangzeb who served as viceroy of the Mughal Deccan provinces twice before becoming emperor in 1658. Therefore, between 1636 and 1658, a fixed goal in the diplomacy of Golconda was to hold Shah Jahan to maintenance of the *status quo*. Failure to do so would mean extinction of the kingdom and the dynasty. In this struggle the agents of Abdullah Qutb Shah at the Mughal court found their most helpful ally in Prince Dara Shikoh. The Prince was more than pleased to assist in thwarting the ambitions of Aurangzeb, his brother and rival. Yet, it is doubtful if the desperate and at times servile diplomacy of Abdullah Qutb Shah, or even the arguments of Dara Shikoh, would have saved Golconda from Aurangzeb's ambition for conquest, if Shah Jahan had not insisted on a more balanced and broader view of imperial interests. Partly, one suspects, this attitude derived from the perspective of the occupant of the imperial throne who bore full responsibility for the entire empire.

The greatest test of Shah Jahan's Deccan policy came during the 1656 Mughal invasion of Golconda which was virtually a dress rehearsal of the final invasion and annexation in 1686–7. When Abdullah Qutb Shah declared open war on his over-powerful minister, Muhammad Said (Mir Jumla), the conqueror of the southern Karnatik, the latter fled to Aurangzeb and accepted an appointment as a high-ranking Mughal *mansabdar*. Aurangzeb then used the imprisonment by Abdullah Qutb Shah of Mir Jumla's son as a pretext to invade Golconda. A large force of Mughal cavalry under the command of Aurangzeb's son, Prince Muhammad Sultan, moved quickly into the kingdom. Muhammad

[1] Jadunath Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, 5 vols (Calcutta, 1912–30), V 50–1.

Sultan had instructions to seize Abdullah Qutb Shah at his capital and kill him outright before Shah Jahan could interfere. Taken completely by surprise, Abdullah barely saved his life by fleeing with his household and court to Golconda fort when the invaders occupied Hyderabad. In the next few days, before they were stopped, the delighted Mughal soldiery thoroughly looted the abandoned palaces and residences of Hyderabad, one of the wealthiest cities in India.[1]

After Aurangzeb's arrival, the Mughal army began a siege of Golconda fort, while intense diplomatic activity continued on all sides. Finally the Golconda envoy at the Mughal court persuaded Dara Shikoh and Shah Jahan that Aurangzeb had misrepresented the supposed disobedience of Abdullah Qutb Shah to imperial commands. Once convinced, Shah Jahan issued a pre-emptory order for Aurangzeb to withdraw. At that, the price exacted—marriage of Abdullah's daughter to Prince Muhammad Sultan and two million rupees indemnity—was high; for Aurangzeb had used every possible argument to obtain permission to annex Golconda. Nevertheless, obedient to the emperor's command, Aurangzeb withdrew his forces from the kingdom. The tributary relationship remained intact. A testimony to the advantages of this arrangement is the fact that Aurangzeb himself, even after becoming emperor, waited a full thirty years before changed political conditions caused him to annex Bijapur and Golconda. As governor on the scene he argued for annexation; as emperor and imperial statesman he preferred the *status quo*.

RISE OF THE BRAHMINS IN GOLCONDA

Shortly after the accession in 1672 of Abul Hasan, son-in-law of Abdullah Qutb Shah, a major turning-point occurred in the political history of Golconda: the new king dismissed Sayyid Muzaffar, the over-forceful chief minister, and named in his place Madanna Pandit, a Telugu Brahmin (a native of Hannamkonda in the Warangal district) who had been Sayyid Muzaffar's secretary and personal assistant. This was the first time that a non-Muslim had become chief executive officer of the kingdom.[2] Madanna

[1] Cf. ibid. I. 211–52, for complete details.

[2] See H. K. Sherwani, 'The Reign of Abu'l Hasan Qutb Shah', *Journal of Indian History*, XLVI (Dec. 1968), 315–19.

Pandit wasted little time in seizing control of other key positions in the administration and army. Akkanna, his brother and confidant, assumed the governorship of the Karnatik. Yenkanna, a nephew, newly-titled Rustam Rao by the king, received a large military command. Two other nephews and a cousin governed districts at Poonamallee (near Madras), Warangal and Bhadrachalam. At Onderconda (near Nalgonda) a brother-in-law of Madanna had charge of a district of nearly one hundred villages which returned more than 60,000 pagodas annually.[1] At Kohir, the frontier town and fortress, and elsewhere, other Brahmins, not necessarily kin to the chief minister, also supplanted Muslims.[2]

Capture of the political system by the Brahmins, previously relegated to a subordinate role in the administration and a negligible part in the army, appears to have had serious consequences for the formerly dominant group, the Persians. The only major post given a Persian by Madanna was that of commander of the army as successor to Akkanna. Muhammad Ibrahim, a Persian nobleman described in the Muslim sources as a 'time-server' and a 'hypocrite', took over this command.[3] Indigenous Muslims or Deccanis, on the other hand, did not suffer as badly as the Persians and other foreign Muslims.[4] Nevertheless, the rise of the Brahmins after 1674 caused a significant change in the composition of Golconda's ruling élite and a perceptible shift in the tone and direction of state policies.

Analysing the published edicts (*farmans*) of Abul Hasan, H. K. Sherwani concluded that these display 'a clear tendency towards some kind of favour to high Hindu officials and gentry', and by implication a marked absence of royal patronage for Muslim officials and *zamindars*.[5] That the rewards of political domination had indeed begun to flow in a radically different direction can be judged from the assessment of Abul Hasan's reign offered by the eighteenth-century Brahmin author of 'The Provincial Annals of Condaved': 'In the year [1674] . . . Madanah & Akanah were appointed his [Abul Hasan's] Prime Ministers. During their Government all of the Inhabitants of the Kingdom were in all

[1] Martin, *Mémoires*, II. 245.
[2] Ibid., p. 254, for the Brahmin governor of Kohir.
[3] Abu Tarab, *Hadiqat-ul 'Alam*, 2 vols. (Hyderabad, 1892), I. 368.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Cf. Sherwani 'The Reign of Abul Hasan', p. 323.

happiness still performing all daily Ceremonies.'[1] The phrase 'performing all daily Ceremonies' suggests an ideal of political and social order which is scarcely Muslim. It may not be too far-fetched to argue that for Telugu Brahmins, at least, Madanna and Akkanna resembled those virtuous Brahmin ministers of earlier times who, acting for a Kshatriya king (i.e. Abul Hasan), sustained *dharma* in an ideal polity. From this viewpoint, pious Hindus and especially Brahmins could perform their daily ceremonies both in the household and the temple in peace and security.

The same chronicle also contains an example of the [illegible] strengthened network of Brahmin influence which stretched from Hyderabad, the capital, to every district in the kingdom. For several generations before 1674 the Manak Rao family, Velama warriors, had participated in the Golconda agrarian system at Kondavidu, south of the Krishna river on the coast. Successive leaders of the family served as *nayak* captains at Kondavidu fort and as *deshmukhs* of the territory in the vicinity of the fort. In the latter capacity the Manak Rao chiefs 'managed' the thirty villages which comprised Kondavidu *sima*, the old pre-Muslim administrative division. They collected revenues for the support of the fort garrison, kept order, and received the perquisites of their offices. Thus, the Manak Raos had long profited from local military and administrative service to the Qutb Shahs.[2]

The promotion of Madanna to chief minister provided a sudden opportunity for bettering the family's position: 'Moortee Bottloo', a Brahmin in the service of the Manak Rao house, was the son-in-law of the chief secretary to Madanna. In order to exploit this connection, 'Jangamiah' Manak Rao, the eldest son, travelled with Moortee Bottloo to the Qutb Shah court. There, through the intercession of the chief secretary, Jangamiah obtained personal interviews with Madanna, and later with the king, Abul

[1] 'The Provincial Annals of Condaved', India Office Library, Mackenzie Collection, General (Unbound Translations) Class VII, Telugu (relating to the northern circars), No. 2, p. 47.

[2] 'Then in the Division of Condaved Seema there was a Person of the Poonapilly Gotram named Croostanee Ragoopatee Manekarow whose Family from the times of his Forefathers as Naikapoodaree for the Killa [fort] of Condaveed [*sic*] managed the 30 Villages under it & collected the Roosooms of the Office of Naikdaree for that Seema', ibid., p. 47 All names and titles are given as they appear in the text. The original Telugu version of the chronicle, which should have been preserved in the Indian-language manuscripts of the Mackenzie Collection placed in Madras, cannot be traced.

Hasan. During a year's residence at court Jangamiah spent 7,000 gold *hun* for his living expenses as well as another large sum for bribes and presents. He financed this by giving bonds to the money-lenders at the capital. Eventually, after persistent effort and heavy expense, the *nayak* warrior obtained his prize: Abul Hasan issued a royal *farman* appointing Jangamiah Nayak *deshmukh* and *muniwar* for the entire district around Kondavidu fort which contained over 400 villages.[1] The financiers at Hyderabad who had backed Jangamiah appear to have made a shrewd decision. The income from his new offices would undoubtedly increase proportionate to the dramatic territorial increase in Jangamiah's office. For his part, the Brahmin, Moortee Bottloo, received a village endowed in perpetuity to him and his descendants from his master as payment for his influence and services at court.

Jangamiah's success at court implies a weakening of Muslim power and the ascendancy of Brahmins in the central government. But the incident also portrays one of the great strengths of the Golconda political system: both before and after 1674 *nayaks* and Brahmins alike found it advantageous to support the regime. After 1674, in Kondavidu at least, the opportunities and rewards of co-operation increased. Consequently, links between the locally dominant non-Muslim groups (in this case the Manak Raos and their Brahmin agents) and the centre grew stronger. Yet this did not cause a dramatic change in political behaviour. The journey of Jangamiah Manak Rao to Hyderabad and his extended lobbying at the Qutb Shah court do not appear as a startling innovation. *Nayaks* had long been part of the court scene in the capital. For Jangamiah Manak Rao, like his ancestors, the best prospect of furthering his own and his family's fortunes lay in royal favour, not in resistance and revolt.[2]

Muslim sources unanimously complain of harsh treatment under

[1] Ibid., pp. 47–8. The terse narrative omits any mention of the fate of the previous *deshmukh* and *muniwar* of Kondavidu district. Possibly Abul Hasan created the post for Jangamiah Manak Rao without displacing another member of the local aristocracy.

[2] Naturally enough, Madanna and Akkanna maintained close ties with and favoured their kinsmen who remained in their home district. A nineteenth-century gazetteer records that the dual position of *deshmukh* and *deshpand* for two *parganas* in Warangal district was held by a Brahmin whose ancestor had been secretary to Abul Hasan. See A. Walker, 'Statistical Report on the Circar of Warangal', *Madras Journal of Literature and Science*, XXXVII (1849), 244–5.

the new regime. At least three separate popular anecdotes pertaining to the hostility of Madanna and the newly lowered status of Muslims in Golconda are still extant. These, whether apocryphal or not, do confirm the extent of Muslim uneasiness over their loss of control of the state apparatus.[1] One possible source of redress for complaints of this nature was Aurangzeb, the Mughal emperor, who, as suzerain of Abul Hasan, might be expected to intervene. Mir Muhammad Hashim, son of Sayyid Muzaffar, the former chief minister who lost his post to Madanna, travelled to Ahmadnagar to complain in person to the emperor about the 'improper conduct' of Abul Hasan and the 'oppression and harshness' of Madanna.[2] This appeal did not go unnoticed. Aurangzeb stepped up the diplomatic and personal pressure exerted on Abul Hasan by the Mughal ambassador resident in Hyderabad.[3] Later, of course, the maltreatment of Muslims was an item on the bill of particulars drawn up to justify the final conquest of Golconda.

Just as critical of the Brahminical regime are the assessments of various European observers. These attribute to Madanna and Akanna greatly increased severity toward all non-Brahmins in the kingdom. Especially noticeable was a tightening of the revenue system which made it even more oppressive than before. The European reaction was, in part, simply irritation at the increased pressure put on them by Madanna to force them to disgorge a greater portion of their profits. Thus one must be cautious in interpreting general statements about the rapacity of the Brahmins.

Perhaps the most specific and damaging testimony to worsened conditions after 1674 comes from the French governor of Pondichery, Francois Martin who travelled north to Hyderabad in 1681. As soon as he crossed the Gundlekamma river, Martin began to notice ruined villages and towns. These, in the interval since his last journey (1670), had been depopulated by the avarice of the Brahmins.[4] At Mangalagiri, a large town on the Krishna, the large populace of weavers and 'painters' of cloth had disappeared because of 'the bad government of the Brahmins'.[5] 'Nendigon' (Nandigama), also on the Krishna, was still bustling and prosperous, but only because of the productivity of the diamond mine

[1] Cf. Siddiqui, pp. 248–9, for these accounts.
[2] Cf. Khafi Khan, III. 412–13. [3] Ibid.
[4] Martin, II. 235, 237, 238, 241, 243, 244. [5] Ibid., p. 238.

nearby, since many diamond merchants who came to trade lived in the town.[1]

Closer to Hyderabad at Anteguir (between Nandigama and Nalgonda) Martin found the largely Muslim inhabitants in extreme misery. So poor was the populace that his servants could not buy even such a minor luxury as betel in the shops. Martin attributed these dismal conditions to the fact that the town and its sixty-two surrounding villages (evidently forming a *pargana*) were under the government of Akkanna, the brother of the chief minister.[2] On the Machilipatnam-Hyderabad portion of his route Martin was also disturbed to notice great storage buildings for rice erected at every four leagues beside the road. In these *granges*, built at state expense by Madanna's order, attendants cooked and served rice to the Brahmins who travelled back and forth from the capital to the sea coast; but Muslims, Christians, or even non-Brahmin Hindus could not even obtain a drop of water.[3]

At Hyderabad Martin was impressed by the altered political climate:

> Just as I found matters have changed considerably along the route . . . from what they were in 1670, I have found similar changes at the court of the king. Since the Brahmin Madanna has become minister all [positions] have been filled by Brahmins. There are scarcely any more of those grand Persian, Afghan, and Deccani officers who gave such brilliance to the court with their great retinues. The best territories are in the hands of the creatures of Madanna.[4]

Those sudden political changes which took place in 1674 after Abul Hasan appointed Madanna Pandit as chief minister demonstrate the strength of royal authority as exercised through the central administrative system. Because the habit of obedience to the centre was so well developed, Madanna was able quietly to place members of his family and other clients in the most important posts throughout the kingdom. The Brahmin seizure of the administration was not an armed coup—rather it took place peacefully, from the inside. The great hostility of the displaced Muslim nobles was not expressed in violent resistance until much later. It appears, furthermore, that since Madanna owed his rise to power to the central political system, his policies were aimed at

[1] Ibid., p. 241. [2] Ibid., p. 243. [3] Ibid., p. 241.
[4] Ibid., p. 252.

strengthening and further consolidating power in the name of the Qutb Shah dynasty.

DEFENCE OF THE MUGHAL DECCAN

By the early 1670s political conditions in Bijapur had changed as drastically as they had in Golconda. First, accession to the throne of Bijapur by the young Sikandar Adil Shah in 1672 precipitated a long-drawn-out factional conflict between Afghan and Deccani parties in the nobility. This struggle completely weakened and disorganized the central administration of that kingdom.[1] Secondly, the Maratha regional aristocracy of the western Deccan, formerly integrated into the political system of Bijapur and the other Muslim states of that area, could now turn to another attractive alternative: service with Shivaji, the Maratha king. After several decades of a continuing revolt against Bijapur and its suzerain, the Mughal empire, Shivaji had succeeded in creating a new political entity in the area around Puna in the western Ghats. This had become an avowedly Hindu kingdom, whose ruler explicitly rejected Islamic political domination.

In 1674 Shivaji had himself crowned as an orthodox Hindu king in a carefully conceived and organized ceremony. A famous Brahmin scholar, brought from Banaras for the purpose, declared that Sivaji, though born of the *sudra* Maratha caste, was in fact a twice-born Kshatriya with a royal line of descent and hence fit to rule. This ceremony, which utilized all the symbols of Hindu monarchy, was clearly, in its intent and execution, a repudiation of the Indo-Persian political tradition then predominant on the subcontinent.[2]

With the emergence of a new predatory Maratha state, uncontrollable either by Bijapur or the Mughal empire, the political stability imparted to the Deccan by Shah Jahan's settlement of 1636 began to disappear. Another development which threatened even further instability came after 1674 when Madanna Pandit persuaded Abul Hasan to enter into a military alliance with Shivaji. Under the terms of this pact Golconda sent 100,000 gold *hun* every

[1] Cf. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, IV. 130 ff.

[2] See G. S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, 3 vols. (Bombay, rev. ed., 1956). I. 215–25, for a full description of the motivation, planning, and execution of the ceremony. Shivaji assumed the title of Chhatrapati instead of the Persian Padshah. All the remaining details and symbols were similarly revived from the Hindu political tradition.

year to the Maratha king as a military subsidy.[1] From Golconda's point of view, one beneficial aspect of this relationship was that it rendered its territories immune from the Maratha raids which ravaged Mughal and Bijapur districts. In 1677 Abul Hasan ventured to subsidize Shivaji's expedition to Tanjore and the southern Karnatik. This yielded large territories formerly considered to be under Bijapur's domination.[2] After the death of Shivaji in 1680 the alliance and subsidy continued under the rule of Shambhaji, his son and successor. A link was established between the Maratha kingdom, the most aggressive, and Golconda, the wealthiest and most stable kingdom in the Deccan.

These states, both controlled by Hindus, combined to exert increasing influence in Bijapur as the political disintegration of that kingdom continued. At one point Madanna Pandit even planned to send his brother Akkanna to Bijapur as a resident in order to bring some order out of the chaos of court politics there. Between 1674 and 1682 various Mughal governors of the Deccan provinces tried to counteract Maratha and Golconda influence in Bijapur by exerting military pressure on that state from the north—but this simply caused a further collapse of the political system. Aurangzeb was at first too preoccupied with the Afghan uprisings of the north-west frontier, and later with the Rajput wars, to mount a full-scale campaign to the south to meet the Maratha threat. However, complaints from imperial subjects who had been assaulted by the Marathas and appeals from Muslims who had lost political power in Golconda made it increasingly plain that the situation was deteriorating.

From the imperial perspective, the rebellion of Prince Akbar in 1681 finally brought the Deccan situation to a point of crisis. Akbar had been campaigning with Aurangzeb in Rajasthan, when he adopted a pro-Rajput stance and rebelled against his father. After crowning himself emperor, Akbar tried to capture Aurangzeb. Failing in this, the prince fled south where he took refuge at Shambhaji's court.[3] The possibility that Akbar, riding at the head of a Maratha, Rajput, and even Bijapur and Golconda coalition army might gain control of the Mughal Deccan provinces was one that Aurangzeb could not afford to risk. In 1682, at the conclusion of the Rajput war, the emperor moved south with his entire court

[1] Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, IV. 335 ff. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

and a grand assemblage of the imperial army to Aurangabad, the headquarters for the viceroy of the Deccan.

Fortunately for Aurangzeb, Shambhaji vacillated. Over the two-year period while Akbar was under his control, the Maratha ruler failed to use the rebel prince effectively in an assault on the empire. Finally, frustrated by the ineptitude and indifference of Shambhaji, Akbar left India by sea in 1683 for Persia. There he eventually died in exile.

Although the immediate threat posed by Akbar's presence in the Deccan no longer existed, the possibility of a similar situation arising in the future, should another of Aurangzeb's sons or grandsons rebel, could not be discounted. Furthermore, the Maratha problem continued; for Bijapur's moribund political system could not hope to contain Shambhaji. Golconda, firmly under Madanna's control, would also continue to support the Marathas with money and military aid. Once he had committed to the Deccan vast forces under his personal command, Aurangzeb decided that the only possible way to dispose fully of the Marathas and stabilize the southern frontier of the empire once more was to annex both Bijapur and Golconda.

In April 1685, after months of increasing military pressure, the Mughal grand army moved into Bijapur and, settling outside the capital, began an investment and siege. Over a year later, in September 1686, after a costly military effort, Sikandar Adil Shah capitulated and Bijapur became a Mughal province.

Shortly after the siege of Bijapur began, the Mughals intercepted a message from Abul Hasan, king of Golconda. This was to the effect that he would soon send an army of 40,000 from the east against the Mughal army while the Maratha forces attacked from the opposite direction in an attempt to force Aurangzeb to lift the siege. The emperor, angered by what he considered to be a betrayal by a tributary ruler, immediately sent Prince Shah Alam into Golconda at the head of a large Mughal army. The invading force defeated a large Qutb Shah defending army at Malkhed on the border. At the close of the battle Muhammad Ibrahim, the Persian nobleman who was commander-in-chief of the Golconda army, paralysed the kingdom's defences by defecting to the Mughals with his entire group of followers.[1]

Shah Alam, not meeting any other significant resistance, moved

[1] Ibid., p. 345.

his forces into Hyderabad city, while Abul Hasan fled to Golconda fort (as his predecessor had done thiry years before). The Mughal soldiers freely plundered Abul Hasan's royal palaces in Hyderabad. However, Shah Alam was not prepared to organize a siege against Golconda fort which would have to be as massive as that already under way against Bijapur. Therefore, Aurangzeb authorized the offer of terms to Abul Hasan for the withdrawal of the Mughal army from the kingdom: If Abul Hasan would cede two disputed border districts, pay an enormous war indemnity, and dismiss his Brahmin ministers Madanna and Akkanna, the matter would be settled.[1] As soon as he obtained Abul Hasan's agreement. Shah Alam brought his army back to the border to await payment of the indemnity and proof of the dismissal of the Brahmins.

After several months, when the Golconda king had still not dismissed Madanna and Akkanna, a group of Muslim nobles organized a murder plot. In March 1686, on the streets of Golconda fort, Muslim slaves (members of the royal bodyguard) attacked and murdered Madanna, Akkanna, and their nephew Yenkanna.[2] There followed a general massacre of Brahmins and their families in the Hindu quarter of the fort.[3] The conspirators sent the severed heads of Madanna and Akkanna to the emperor as a guarantee that the policies of Golconda would not in the future conflict with those of the empire. In one violent night, Mughal pressure, working on Muslim outrage, brought an end to Brahmin control of Golconda.

Unfortunately for the hopes of the Muslim nobles their actions did not preserve the kingdom. Aurangzeb simply waited until he had completed the siege of Bijapur before turning his attention to the final conquest of Golconda. On 14 January 1687 the emperor 'mounted his horse to punish that luckless man, Abul Hussan'.[4] One of the contemporary Mughal historiec of Aurangzeb's reign sets out the emperor's charges against the king of Golconda:

Abul Hasan . . . made the vagabond Hindus the managers and

[1] Ibid., pp. 348–9. [2] Ibid., pp. 350–1.

[3] Condaved, p. 49. 'At the time this took place [Madanna's murder] the Brahmins were in their houses at the time of devotion & taking food & the Mhlechmaloo [i.e. Muslims] put many of them to death: the slaughter continued till four Gurries from Noon were past'. See also Martin, II. 415–18; and Havart, Book II, 224–5. Both sources confirm these details.

[4] Quoted in Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, IV 356.

administrators of the affairs of his State, and gave currency to the rites of that accursed race. And . . . the Persians (i.e. Shias) with the support of that worthless sect (the Hindus) began to practise there publicly all kinds of shameful sins. No respect was left for Islam and its adherents; mosques were without splendour while idol-temples flourished; . . . In the many kinds of injury that the hellish Sambha [Shambhaji, the Maratha king] had inflicted on worshippers of the True God, Abul Hasan became his helper and ally. On . . . hearing one vain threat (from that Maratha king) what vast sums did he not send to that enemy and simply through his meanness of spirit and cowardice kept himself safe from plunder by that man?[1]

In short, the crimes of Abul Hasan included allowing the Brahmins to gain control of the kingdom, favouring Hinduism and Shi'ism over orthodox Islam, and subsidizing Shambhaji's attacks on Mughal territory while keeping Golconda free from the Maratha scourge. It is evident from this statement that Aurangzeb considered the Golconda/Maratha axis a threat to the entire system of Islamic rule in the Deccan. Shah Jahan's settlement of 1636 was no longer effective.

Aurangzeb decided on the solution which he had argued for thirty years before: complete elimination of the last troublesome tributary states.[2] The Mughal general, Firuz Jang, moved ahead of the emperor to capture one of the Golconda frontier forts. Then, meeting no resistance he marched to the capital and occupied the entire city. Abul Hasan had fled with what remained of his army to Golconda fort, just west of the city. Here behind the immense walls with virtually inexhaustible supplies of ammunition, water, and food (including fields for cultivation) he could hope to hold out for months or even years while negotiating with an invader growing impatient with the effort of a lengthy siege.[3]

Abul Hasan seriously underestimated Aurangzeb's grim deter-

[1] Saqui Musta'id Khan, *Ma'asir-i Alamgiri*, trans. by Jadunath Sarkar, Bibliotheca Indica, no. 269 (Calcutta, 1947), p. 174.

[2] Another reason for the emperor's decision must have been the size of Abul Hasan's arrears in tribute. A Mughal fiscal report lists arrears of over sixteen million rupees (16,222,278) in 1687. See I.J. Coll., I/2/1. It is very likely that Abul Hasan had paid little that was not forced from him since his accession when he paid 900,000 rupees in cash, jewels, and elephants. *Ma'asir-i 'Alamgiri*, p. 144. All future references to the *Ma'asir-i 'Alamgiri* will be to the text unless otherwise stated.

[3] This description of the siege is taken from Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, IV. 356–86.

mination to put an end to the kingdom of Golconda. The emperor, personally directing the siege, allowed nothing to deflect him from the final conquest. At the end of January, the Mughal army completely invested the entire fort which was several miles in circumference. The slow business of a conventional Mughal siege operation began; covered trenches were run to the edge of the great ditch surrounding the fort; gun platforms equal in height to the fort walls were erected; and eventually a breach (made by mining and blasting or, if possible, by artillery fire) was made for the final assault. The Mughals also were prepared to fill the defending moat of the fort with cotton bags filled with sand so that an assault column could reach the breached walls, and not be caught in the open. Aurangzeb had assembled nearly 50,000 infantry, probably an equal number of cavalry, and over one hundred large artillery pieces for this effort.

Soon after the digging began the only Golconda attempt at a relief of the garrison took place. Shaikh Nizam, the most prominent Golconda noble in command of troops outside the fort, attacked the Mughals with a cavalry force of 40,000. However, the imperial cavalry drove off his army. This defeat, in which the Golconda forces took heavy losses, discouraged any further attempts to break through the Mughal siege lines from outside the fort. Shaikh Nizam, seeing that the position was hopeless, eventually submitted to Aurangzeb before the final fall of the fort.

However, this early success was the only bright note for Aurangzeb as the siege progressed. As the trenches advanced, he had to suppress serious discontent about the propriety and wisdom of his policies. The head of the Muslim judiciary and religious patronage, the imperial *sadar*, Qazi Abdullah, although an orthodox Sunni, begged the emperor to accept formal surrender and renewal of tributary status for Abul Hasan. As had his predecessor in the office (firmly packed off to Mecca for his trouble), the chief *sadar* objected to spilling the blood of Muslims in order to eliminate the last Muslim state in India outside the empire. Much more of a threat from the emperor's point of view were the reservations of his son, Prince Shah Alam, who for a mixture of motives also did not wish to see Abul Hasan ruined. The Prince had been negotiating secretly with Abul Hasan in an attempt to get him to surrender on terms. The prince offered to act as his intercessor with the emperor. When Aurangzeb learned of these secret exchanges, he

placed the Prince and his four sons under arrest in the camp—a captivity which was to last seven years. These incidents suggest that rigid and disastrous suppression of even the most modest form of policy discussion at the imperial centre had already begun. Even imperial princes with reservations about Aurangzeb's extended forward policy were forced to keep their views to themselves or to pay a high price for expressing their opinions.

Work on the trenches and gun platforms proceeded slowly—hampered by steady fire from the fort and occasional sorties from the garrison. By early June, after four months, the Mughals also found themselves short of food (an ever present difficulty for these large camps). The previous year had been short of rain and crops failed over the entire Deccan. Local supplies were also short because planting of rice in and around Hyderabad had been virtually halted because of the invasion. Also, by this time, the heavy rains of the Hyderabad monsoon made transport of food grains difficult. Faced with cold rain and short rations the morale of the Mughal soldiers fell. Nevertheless, Aurangzeb, despite these problems, was determined to launch the final breaching and assault. At dawn on 20 June the emperor ordered the fuses lit on the first of three mines (each containing 37,000 pounds of gun-powder) tunnelled under the fort walls. This explosion, driven back against the assault force, killed over 1,000 Mughal troops. The second mine, also discovered and countermined by the garrison, killed many of the attackers. The disorganized Mughals fell back under the pressure of a Golconda counter-attack. The third mine, fired the next day, failed to explode at all.

As what had become a general famine in Hyderabad and the Mughal camp continued, made more devastating by a cholera epidemic, the emperor could not rely on his army for any further assaults. But instead of negotiating with Abul Hasan, Aurangzeb dramatically publicized his determination to win at any cost. Under his orders, the Mughal army built and manned a wood and earthen wall completely around Golconda fort.

The emperor concurrently issued a proclamation formally annexing the entire kingdom. Golconda became the Mughal province of Hyderabad. The latter bore the official epithet 'Dar-ul Jahad', the Muslim term for the 'Land of War'.[1] Aurangzeb selected Abdurrahim Khan, the imperial *buyutat*, as adminis-

[1] Khafi Khan, II. 358–9.

trator for the occupied city and its hinterland during the siege. According to the chronicler all the 'infidel customs' which Abul Hasan had countenanced were to be discarded; idol temples were to be destroyed and mosques built in their place.[1]

Outside Hyderabad, the Mughal invasion, with its political uncertainty and administrative breakdown, was the signal for widespread disorder. Throughout the siege all the overland routes in Golconda were blocked to unarmed traffic.[2] Bandits and hill chieftains came out of the refuge areas in the hills and forests to plunder at will. Some of the more important rajas and *zamindars*, unchecked by the central government, used this opportunity to loot inviting targets as well. The soaring price of grain meant that anyone possessing stocks of food grain was vulnerable.[3] Simultaneously, bands of unpaid Qutb Shahi cavalry and foraging Mughal troops burned and looted everywhere in the kingdom.[4]

In the ensuing three months, the emperor simply waited. With the king, the central administration, and the army sealed off in Golconda fort, the end was virtually certain. No single governor or fortress commander possessed sufficient initiative, incentive, or resources to attempt to relieve Abul Hasan. Denied support and funds from the capital, local Qutb Shah officials also waited, and tried, for the most part unsuccessfully, to keep order within their jurisdiction. To discourage any possible action of this type Aurangzeb did send a single expedition which seized Kondapalli fort in Mustafanagar district. This fort, one of the strongest in the kingdom, was reputed to have been a depository for Abul Hasan's surplus treasure. Abul Hasan stubbornly held out refusing to surrender on the emperor's terms. Finally, in September 1687, treason by one of the Golconda nobles gave the Mughals access to the fort in a night assault. After eight months of bitter stalemate, the great fortress was taken in one night. Abul Hasan became a captive of the Mughal emperor.

[1] Ibid.

[2] *Records of Fort St. George: Letters to Fort St. George* [1681-1765], 45 vols. (Madras: Records Office, 1910-1943), 1687, pp. 102-3.

[3] e.g. the *deshmukh* and *muniwar* of Kondavidu district, Krustani Bavanah Manik Rao, 'began to send his Peons to the Places where Grain was buried in Pots which he took by force with other effects, he also extorted money from the Merchants & other affluent People'. Condaved, p. 50.

[4] Madras Presidency, *Records of Fort St. George. Diary and Consultation Books* [1672/8-1756], 85 vols. (Madras. Records Office, 1910-43), 1687, p. 148; Martin, II. 487,505; K.A. 1324 (1688), fols. 769-72.

IV

The Procedure of Conquest, 1687–1688

A FEW days after the surrender of Golconda fort, Aurangzeb moved his camp from the siege lines into the city of Hyderabad. From the imperial audience tent pitched beside the Char Minar in the precise centre of the city came a series of orders which, during the next four months, directed the establishment of a new administration in the defeated kingdom.

Administration of the capital, Hyderabad, and its hinterland, the district of Muhammadnagar, presented few difficulties. The Mughals had occupied the capital since the earliest days of the siege and had established the nucleus of an administration when Aurangzeb officially annexed the kingdom. Within the sizeable territory enclosed by the great walls of Golconda fort recovery from the effects of the siege was rapid. The complete surprise of the final assault on the fort meant that resistance was light and scattered. Casualties were few and property damage slight.[1] Indeed, the inhabitants of the fortress, soldiers, officials, and the workers, merchants, and even peasants, of the resident population, fared remarkably well in view of the fact that Abul Hasan did not surrender. A bloody terror and general massacre did not follow the Mughal victory. This is especially noteworthy after the long, stubborn defence of the garrison, and the bitter hostility displayed in the clashes between the two sides which left heavy casualties. Such leniency was also at variance with the biting invective of official Mughal statements which denounced equally the heresy and tolerance of unbelievers displayed by Abul Hasan. Aurangzeb's objectives in the war against Golconda were far broader than simple-minded satisfaction of his emotions. Slaughter of the defenders of Golconda fort would scarcely assist the strategic needs of the Mughal empire in the Deccan.

Annexation of Golconda was the climax to long years of Mughal

[1] *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 1687, p. 93. Martin, II. 470, 504.

pressure which had begun during the first Mughal advance into the Deccan under Akbar in the early years of the seventeenth century. An earlier step, as important as the 1687 conquest, was Shah Jahan's assertion of Mughal suzerainty over Golconda in 1636. Subsequent tribute and indemnity payments over the intervening fifty years were only one aspect of the complex relationship between the empire and the kingdom. When Aurangzeb finally decided to end the long process, both participants knew one another too well to engage in dramatic gestures. Neither indiscriminate terror on the part of the Mughals, nor continued resistance in the outlying parts of the kingdom by the remaining Golconda officials, offered much appeal. The final victory was a long-feared and long-anticipated result of the Mughal interest in Golconda.

Aurangzeb, aware of this attitude, wanted to avoid any actions which would precipitate a general resistance and require expensive campaigns to force the surrender of the dozen major fortresses still in the hands of Golconda officials. As soon as Golconda fort was secure, he sent imperial orders (*farmans*) to all incumbent administrators and military officers throughout the kingdom. These documents confirmed the recipients in their positions, assured their safety, and ordered that they formally acknowledge the emperor's authority. Simultaneously, troops of Mughal horsemen arrived at various strategic points to emphasize the reality of imperial power.

At Machilipatnam, the vital port, the Golconda sub-governor, who had gathered a fortune in office, fled. His hurried departure left the town open for a force of 400 Mughal horsemen.[1] The Brahmin sub-governor of Poonamallee near Madras, who evidently possessed a clearer conscience, remained at his post. He reasoned 'that as the world turned round like a wheel, he had beaten his drum, and fired his guns, for the victory which the mighty Allumgire [Aurangzeb Alamgir] had gained over his old master [Abul Hasan]'.[2] Everywhere there was a pause, a lull, and compliance with Aurangzeb's edicts. The populace waited to assess the impact of this great political event. For a short time 'except for the name of the ruler, scarcely anything appears to

[1] *RFSG: Dairy* 1687, p. 171.

[2] Robert Orme, *Historical Fragments of the Mogul Empire* (London, 1782), p. 227.

have changed in these two kingdoms [i.e. Golconda proper and the Karnatik] . . .'[1]

FIRST MEASURES

Aurangzeb's leniency did not extend to the Qutb Shah monarchy. Abul Hasan was still alive, but he and his family remained under guard in Aurangzeb's camp. All his wealth and possessions became spoils of war. While Mughal nobles and officers of the army acquired the lower-ranking women in the defeated king's harem, court officials and accountants busied themselves with his treasuries in the fort. Coined money alone totalled nearly seven million gold *hun* and twenty million silver rupees; but there were also large quantities of precious stones, jewelled objects, gold and silver plate, and other valuables.[2] Mughal officials spent several weeks inventorying, packing, and shipping this treasure by camel north to the imperial vaults in Agra and Delhi.[3] Even depleted, as it must have been, by a year of warfare and siege when normal revenues were cut off, the size and variety of Abul Hasan's treasury testify to the truth behind his reputation for immense wealth (and the economic power which accrued to the state in Golconda). Formal distribution of the rewards of victory took place at a festive ceremonial audience, held shortly after the fall of the fort. Aurangzeb gave robes of honour, jewelled tokens, and lavish promotions in rank to Prince Azam, Prince Bidar Bakht, and thirty-one *amirs* who had commanded the besieging army.[4] The highest-ranking noble present at the audience, and first in order of precedence (after the two princes), was a Persian entitled Mahabat Khan, formerly Mir Muhammad Ibrahim, who until January 1686 had been commander-in-chief of Golconda's army. Aurangzeb had reason to be grateful to Mahabat Khan, for his desertion had caused Golconda's defeat at the battle of Malkhed and given the Mughal army entry to Hyderabad. His defection had also precipitated the assassination of his former associates, the Brahmin ministers, Madanna and Akkanna. On this occasion Mahabat Khan received a complete robe of honour and promotion by 1000/1000

[1] Martin, II. 504. [2] Khafi Khan, II. 367.

[3] Oxford University, Bodleian Library, Ms. Rawlinson A. 171, 'Report from Dr. St. John to the King', fols. 52–3. K. A. 1324 (20.11.1687), fol. 785.

[4] At least four of the thirty-one *mansabdars* honoured are identifiable as former Muslim nobles from Golconda who had deserted to the Mughals before or during the final conflict. K. A. 1324 (25.10.1687), fols. 782–4.

to the rank of 7000/7000.[1] This new rank, the highest a *mansabdar* could achieve (save for princes of the blood), was one reached by fewer than a score of Mughal *amirs* in the latter part of the seventeenth century.[2]

At the same audience, Aurangzeb named Mahabat Khan as the first Mughal governor of the conquered kingdom. The former servant of the Qutb Shahs was to administer the 'entire country of Hyderabad, Sikakul, and the Karnatik', the three administrative and territorial subregions of the kingdom. The emperor also kept another former Golconda officer, Ali Askar Khan, as chief executive of the Karnatik. Ali Askar Khan, also a Persian, had been a close associate of Mahabat Khan before the latter's defection.[3] A third Golconda noble, now a Mughal *mansabdar*, became commandant of Golconda fort.[4] Assignment of these key positions to men like Mahabat Khan and Ali Askar Khan appears to have been largely an exercise in public relations. Widely reported, these appointments signalled to other Golconda officers, not yet surrendered, that honourable accommodation with the Mughals was possible. These, along with Aurangzeb's other immediate actions, were intended to convey a message that the spirit of the new regime would not be of radical and unpleasant change. This interpretation is largely supported (with some important exceptions) by the later development of Mughal administration in Hyderabad.

The pragmatic emphasis of initial (and later) Mughal policy in Golconda is reflected in the detailed written instructions from Aurangzeb to Mahabat Khan.[5] In general, Aurangzeb aimed at

[1] For a full discussion of the *mansabdari* system and the system of *jagirs* see M. Athar Ali, *The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb* (Aligarh, 1966). Hereafter, whenever reference to the rank of a *mansabdar* is made, the terms *zat* and *suwar* will be omitted. Thus, a rank of 2000 *zat* and 1000 *suwar* will appear as (2000/1000).

[2] See Athar Ali, pp. 216–18. Between 1678 and 1707, only seventeen men, including Mahabat Khan, held this rank. The emperor's largess even went so far as to give audience and a position as a *mansabdar* to Mahabat Khan's grandson, newly arrived from Persia. This affords an interesting illustration of the strong connections still maintained with their homeland by Persian members of Golconda's élite. *Ma'asir-i Alamgiri*, pp. 302–3.

[3] *RFSG: Diary*, 12 Dec. 1687, pp. 193–6. Ibid., 16 Jan. 1688, p. 11, Martin, II. 508

[4] K.A. 1324 (25.10.1687), fols 78a–4.

[5] British Museum, Sloane Collection, no. 3582 (Persian MS.), fols. 113a–b. This is an imperial order to Qasim Khan, later Ali Askar Khan, governor of the Karnatik, which relays information about the appointment of Mahabat Khan

reviving and gradually reshaping Golconda's administrative institutions to conform to the norms of the empire. The emperor ordered his new governor to replace the incumbent Golconda commanders of the kingdom's great forts with capable Mughal *mansabdars*. Mahabat Khan was to determine the qualifications of the displaced Golconda officers and send them with his recommendations to the imperial camp where they would be granted an audience and assigned suitable posts in Mughal service. Similarly, he was to appoint trustworthy and experienced financial officers (*'amils* and *hawaldars*) for the administrative subdivisions (*mahal*) previously managed by Golconda's central treasury. These appointees (not necessarily new Mughal officials) were to collect the arrears of taxes accumulated during the past year of warfare as well as the revenues assessed for the present year.

Beyond this, no other persons were to be disturbed. Indeed, Mahabat Khan's instructions contain explicit warnings against interference with other individuals or institutions. He was to confirm the tax-free grants of land for military service (*muqasa*) and for religious and charitable purposes (*in'am*) on exactly the same terms as had existed under the Golconda government. Under no circumstances were their holders to be disturbed. In every *mahal*, provided that a proper tax roll existed, the new governor was to continue the salaries and tax-free lands of the *muniwars* and other important notables (*mutawattinin*). Finally, he was to keep up an effective provincial military establishment and to attend to the population and enrichment of the province.

Within two months, by December 1687, Aurangzeb seems to have concluded that the propaganda value of these appointments was exhausted, and he transferred Mahabat Khan from Hyderabad to the governorship of Lahore in the Panjab. At the same time, the emperor removed Ali Askar Khan from his post as *faujdar* of the Karnatik and sent him to northern India as well.[1] Some Golconda nobles remained in office, but there was obviously a great risk in leaving the entire kingdom in the hands of members of the former ruling élite. Ruhullah Khan, chief *bakhshi* of the empire, who enjoyed the emperor's complete confidence, became temporary

and gives a copy of specific instructions from the emperor to the new governor. There is a postcript with instructions for the Karnatik.

[1] Martin, II. 508, *RFSG: Diary*, 12 Dec. 1687, pp. 193–6. Ibid 16 Jan. 1688, p. 11.

governor of the new province after the removal of Mahabat Khan.

FURTHER ASSIMILATION

Aurangzeb's deliberately mild tone, as well as his sense of the local political situation, was first successful in gaining passive formal acceptance of his authority, and with little delay active co-operation on the part of Golconda's officials and nobles. As the official Mughal historian described the events of December and January 1687–8: 'It would verily require another volume to describe in detail the coming of the Haidarabadis to the imperial Court, their gaining of *mansabs* from seven *hazari* to 5-*sadi*, and the admission into imperial service of professional men, men of skill, and artisans of every kind.'[1] Most of the middle- and lower-level bureaucrats in the capital—office managers, accountants, clerks—all without great political power, seized the opportunity to trade their local knowledge for positions in the new administration. For example, Haji Mansur, who had been in charge of the various royal workshops (*buyutat*) and palaces, became a 250-*zat* Mughal *mansabdar* with similar duties and salary under the new regime.[2] Other individuals, such as the highly skilled artists and craftsmen who accepted imperial service, may have moved out of Hyderabad to the imperial court. The fall of Bijapur and Golconda meant that Aurangzeb and the greatest Mughal nobles were the only sources of specialized artistic patronage left in the Deccan. Members of the Muslim *ulema*, whose subsistence depended on grants from the state treasury or tax concessions on their lands, also appear to have readily accepted the new regime.

Members of Golconda's central army, including Abul Hasan's renowned household cavalry, were left with neither patron nor employer after the king's imprisonment. Like the bureaucracy they had to come to terms with the new regime as individuals, or in small groups. Aurangzeb re-employed some of the great bodies of Persian heavy cavalry. Some he simply disbanded. Those left

[1] *Ma'asir-i Alamgiri*, p. 302.

[2] Yusuf Husain Khan, ed., *Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign: 1659–1706 A.D.* (Hyderabad: Andhra Pradesh Central Records Office, 1958), pp. 193–194. Haji Mansur was to receive 1,000 gold pagodas yearly. His son also made the transition to Mughal service as his assistant or office superintendent (*darogha*). See I. H. Qureshi, *The Administration of the Mughal Empire* (Karachi, 1966), pp. 59–60, for a discussion of the Mughal *buyutat*.

without employment joined their companions in the countryside who had already deserted during the siege of Golconda fort and taken to banditry. Others joined the Marathas in plundering the region.[1] The Telugu infantry, also dispersed, found ready employment on both sides during the Mughal/Maratha wars which racked the south in the next two decades.[2] Musketeers from the Karnatik were especially in demand for their specialized skills in this period.

The position of the nobility of Golconda was not as vulnerable. Those persons who had dominated the kingdom's political system through control of the highest civil and military positions still commanded the loyalty of large bodies of armed retainers and soldiers. For men this powerful, with the pride which comes from the possession of power, there were always alternatives, especially for those still at large in various parts of the region. They could flee to take service with the Marathas or they could simply have become free-lance rebels and bandits—perhaps in alliance with some of the bolder members of the regional aristocracy. Aurangzeb's success in winning over and assimilating the majority of the nobles of Golconda is a reflection of his tactical political skills and the wisdom of his policy of moderation. But one significant qualification needs to be made: this effort was almost exclusively directed at the Muslim nobles of Golconda.

For the large Muslim segment of the Golconda nobility, Mughal victory did not bring death, captivity, or slavery—even for those who had fought to the end. Invariably, noble status and participation in a common Indo-Persian aristocratic culture brought ready acceptance and assimilation in the larger political system. This can be seen in Aurangzeb's treatment of Abul Hasan's immediate family. The ex-king's adopted son, Abdullah, did not share his father's life-long imprisonment. Instead, at the victory audience, Aurangzeb commissioned Abdullah a *mansabdar* with a rank of 4000/4000.[3] The emperor matched Abul Hasan's three daughters with husbands suitable in status for their royal parentage.[4] 'By the imperial command' the eldest princess became the wife of Sikandar, the young ex-king of Bijapur, who was also held prisoner by Aurangzeb. The youngest princess became the bride of Inayat Khan, son of Asad Khan, who as imperial *wazir*, was the most powerful noble in the empire. Aurangzeb's marriage of the re-

[1] Manucci, II. 309; Duff, I. 283. [2] Duff, I. 307.
[3] *Ma'asir-i Alamgiri*, p. 303. [4] Ibid., pp. 312–13.

maining daughter to Muhammad Umar, son of the late Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi, is especially interesting. The Shaikh, a member of the Naqshbandi Sufi order, was one of the most influential and widely known preachers and writers in seventeenth-century Mughal India. He is assumed to have exercised a conservative political influence on Aurangzeb, which helped shape the latter's official policies. Abul Hasan's sister, Jani Khanum, was married to Sharif-ul Mulk, a Muslim nobleman who defected to the Mughals in 1685 along with his two sons after the defeat at Malkhed. Aurangzeb welcomed the Golconda king's brother-in-law and rewarded him with an appointment as a Mughal *amir* of 3000 *zat*. Sharif-ul Mulk campaigned with the Mughal armies until his death in June 1687. At that time the emperor gave Iftikhar Khan, one of the sons, his father's rank as a *mansabdar*. His brother, Hidayat Khan was placed in the service of Prince Muhammad Azam.[1] The widow, Jani Khanum, apparently did not leave Hyderabad when her husband changed sides, but she was not troubled by Aurangzeb after the conquest. Eventually, in 1696, the emperor gave this Muslim noblewoman the revenues from a single village in Hyderabad for her subsistence.[2]

Other Muslim nobles, not connected with the royal family, also found honourable employment as Mughal *mansabdars*. Although the later careers of only a few of the highest nobles can be traced, this small group controlled and led many others: relatives, companions (*hamrahan*), retainers, and subordinate military officers. Thus, the destiny of these men was the destiny of the Muslim political élite in Golconda after 1687.

Without exception, members of this group of ex-Golconda officers performed creditably in responsible posts as military commanders, provincial governors, and *faujdars* anywhere they were posted. For example, Sarandaz Khan, the Afghan officer who betrayed Golconda fort, won, after lengthy service, an appointment to the deputy governorship of Berar province in 1704.[3]

A brilliantly successful figure in his new role (by Mughal

[1] Shah Nawaz Khan, Samsamud-dowla [Abd al-Razzaq], *Ma'asir-ul Umara* [completed by his son 'Abd al-Haqq], ed. by Maulawi Abd-ur-Rahim, Bibliotheca Indica, no. 112 (3 vols; Calcutta, 1888–95) (vol. II ed. by Maulawi Abd-us-Rahim and Ashraf Ali), II. 688–90.

[2] I.J. Coll., I/18/606. Tax receipts from Chalkpala(?) village in Rajkonda *pargana*, Bhongir district, were 1,041 rupees annually.

[3] *Ma'asir-i Alamgiri*, p. 470. Sarandaz Khan's rank was 1500/500 by this time.

standards) was Shaikh Nizam, who was an outstanding military leader when he served the Qutb Shahs. After making an unsuccessful attempt at relief of Golconda fort during the first weeks of the siege, he finally surrendered to the emperor before the final assault. Two years later, in 1689, now a Mughal cavalry commander operating in the western Deccan, Shaikh Nizam (retitled Muqarrab Khan) carried out a daring raid into Maratha territory. He surprised Shambhaji, the Maratha king, with only a few companions, captured him and his chief adviser, and brought them back to the imperial camp.[1]

This feat, by suddenly truncating the Maratha state, appeared to the emperor as a welcome, and unexpected, climax to the strategic policy which he had pursued for over eight years in the Deccan. Shambhaji, the aggressive Maratha ruler, joined the deposed kings of Bijapur and Golconda as prisoners in Aurangzeb's camp. An effective end to the Maratha threat to imperial stability in the south could not be far off. Shambhaji's captor received a lavish demonstration of the emperor's gratitude: promotion to the highest possible rank (7000/7000), a new title, 50,000 rupees, robes, a horse with a jewelled saddle, and similar honours for his three sons.[2] For several years after this triumph, Shaikh Nizam continued to campaign against the Marathas. Eventually, he became *faujdar* of Kolapur (Kolhapur?) in the western Deccan.[3]

Desirable appointments did not go exclusively to those Golconda officers who had deserted Abul Hasan. The celebrated hero of the final defence of Golconda fort, a Persian noble named Abdur Razzaq Lari, also concluded his career as a Mughal servant. Abdur Razzaq had publicly rejected secret overtures by the Mughals for his defection during the siege. A pious Shi'a Muslim, Abdur Razzaq had compared the Mughal attack on Golconda with the Shi'a passion at Karbala. On the night that the fort was betrayed, he fought single-handed in the streets. In the morning, when found, he was nearly dead from numerous battle wounds. After treatment by Mughal court physicians, the hero recovered. Aurangzeb, struck by his loyalty, offered him a high rank as a *mansabdar*. Abdur Razzaq refused, saying curtly that no one who had served Abul Hasan could honourably serve the Mughal.

[1] Ibid., pp. 320–6. [2] *Ma'asir-i Alamgiri*, p. 325.
[3] *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, I. 794–8.

Aurangzeb's reaction was so angry that only protection by Firuz Jang, the famous Mughal general, saved the impetuous warrior. Finally, after a year of inaction, Abdur Razzaq reluctantly accepted a post as *faujdar* of Rahiri in Maharashtra. Later after further service as governor of the Bijapur Konkan, he retired to Lar, his birthplace in Persia. His sons continued to serve as Mughal officers after his departure.[1]

Full assimilation of men like Shaikh Nizam and Abdur Razzaq inevitably meant that they were subject to frequent transfers to prevent local attachments. Thus, after the conquest, the former Muslim ruling élite of Golconda began to move out of the kingdom and to disperse throughout the subcontinent. Aurangzeb was understandably reluctant to leave Golconda completely under Mahabat Khan. He transferred the former Golconda army chief 1,200 miles north to Lahore as governor of the Panjab.[2] At the same time the emperor moved Ali Askar Khan, a close associate of Mahabat Khan, from administration of the Karnatik to duty with the Mughal army campaigning against the Marathas at Jinji. A few years later Ali Askar Khan travelled north to become governor of Awadh, in North India.[3]

However, the Mughal ruler realized that first-hand experience in the administration of Golconda was not an asset which he could afford to ignore completely—especially in remote areas, difficult to control. In the northernmost coastal districts, from Rajmundry north to the Orissan border, three prominent Golconda administrators remained in office undisturbed by the events of 1687. Sayyid Abdullah, *sar-i lashkar* of Sikakul district under Abul Hasan, Husain Bek governor of Rajmundry district, and Mir Muhammad Hade, governor of Nursapur, the port on the Godaveri delta, all became Mughal *faujdars*.[4] But their duties and territorial responsibilities remained the same for at least two full years, until the end of 1689. All three men were indigenous or 'Deccani'

[1] *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II. 818–21. See also Khan, *Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign*, pp. 191–2, 196–7, 212.

[2] Manucci, III. 95. Martin, II. 508–9. [3] *Ma'asir-i Alamgiri*, p. 370.

[4] For Sayyid Abdullah's appointment see *RFSG: LFSG*, 17 Apr. 1687, p. 116. For Husain Bek see *RFSC: Diary* 21 Mar. 1688, p. 53. In June 1681 Francois Martin met 'Oussein Beg' riding from the capital to the coast to take over as governor of Rajmundry. Martin, II. 246–7. The British merchants refer to him in the same position in 1684. Charles Fawcett, ed., *The English Factories in India*, new series, 4 vols (Oxford, 1936–55), IV. 141. For Mir Muhammad Hade, identified as a 'Hyderabadi', see Akh., vols. XXXVI–XXXVII (12 Safar 36), p. 19.

Muslims, not Persians, who seem to have been part of the Deccani faction in opposition to Madanna and Akkanna, Abul Hasan's two Brahmin ministers.[1] This fact may provide a partial explanation for their retention in office, since the Deccanis had pleaded their case with Aurangzeb and had virtually invited Mughal intervention in the kingdom.

During the same two-year period, late 1687 to late 1689, the Mughal administrative hold on the southern Karnatik had never been firmly established. A series of *faujdars* based at Kanchipuram, the temple town south of Madras, had failed to cope with revolts and Maratha attacks. Former Golconda nobles or Mughal *mansabdars* had been equally unreliable and ineffective in this difficult post.[2] Finally, in early 1690, Aurangzeb ordered Husain Bek, retitled Ali Mardan Khan, south to Kancipuram as *faujdar* of the entire twelve districts of the Karnatik.[3]

At the same time, Ali Mardan Khan kept over-all administrative responsibility for his old territories in Rajmundry as well as for the four other coastal districts lying between the Godaveri and the Krishna. Mir Muhammad Hade, the *faujdar* of Nursapur, acted as his deputy. Furthermore, Aurangzeb also placed his former associate Sayyid Abdullah, the *faujdar* of Sikakul, under Ali Mardan Khan.[4] Ali Mardan Khan (ranked at 5000/5000) then held final administrative responsibility over the entire Coromandel coast, from south of Madras to Orissa. This was as much as two-thirds the territory of the former kingdom.

Within the Karnatik itself, as befitted his rank, Ali Mardan Khan's responsibilities were much heavier than those assigned an ordinary *faujdar*. He became chief revenue and fiscal officer (*diwan*) of the region as well. In this dual capacity he was to funnel supplies and treasure from the north through Kanchipuram to the

[1] This supposition is virtually certain in the case of Sayyid Abdullah, who lost his post at Sikakul to a Brahmin officer sent by Madanna. Sayyid Abdullah only regained his position after the Brahmin party was destroyed in 1686.

[2] See Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, V. 56–62.

[3] 'Akham-i 'Alamgiri', State Central Library (Hyderabad, India), Persian MS. 1358, is a collection of copies of letters received by Ali Mardan Khan as *faujdar* of the Karnatik and later as governor of Berar. The identification of Husain Bek and Ali Mardan Khan is established in K. A. 1324 (25.10 1687), fol. 784, where he is listed as Ali Mardan Khan alias Husain Bek. Cf. also *Ma'asiru-l-Umara*, II. 824, for a reference to his original name as 'Mir Husaini'.

[4] 'Akham-i 'Alamgiri,' fols. 28a, 51b–52a provides evidence for Ali Mardan Khan's role in the administration of the northern districts.

immense Mughal army assembled for the newly begun siege of Jinji. The *faujdar* and *diwan* of the Karnatik also recruited locally and paid from local revenues many of the troops used in that operation.[1]

Ali Mardan Khan's pivotal role in the administration of Golconda ended suddenly when he was captured by Santaji, the Maratha general. After nearly two years in captivity, Ali Mardan Khan was ultimately able to raise sufficient funds to ransom his release from the Marathas. But he returned to the governorship of Berar province in the western Deccan instead of to the Karnatik.[2] For Ali Mardan Khan, as for most of the other Muslim grandees of Golconda, whether Persian or Deccani, the pattern held of ready acceptance, marked by parity in pay and status, responsible service, and transfer leading to inter-regional mobility.

Those Golconda administrators who remained in the north in Srikakulam were an exception. In 1690 Sayyid Abdullah, *faujdar* of Sikakul, died in office.[3] He was succeeded by another former Golconda officer, Mustafa Quli Khan, who kept the post till he died in 1698. Mir Muhammad Hade remained *faujdar* of Nursapur until 1700 without being transferred. In this frontier zone, where Golconda's authority rested lightly on the indigenous rajas and chiefs, a vestigial remnant of Golconda's Muslim élite continued in power.

In every known instance, the Muslim political élite of Golconda found nearly comparable roles in the service of the empire. At least twenty-four Mughal *amirs*, holding ranks of a 1000 *zat* or over in the latter part of Aurangzeb's reign, can be firmly identified as former servants of Abul Hasan.[4] Those who deserted their king

[1] 'Nushka-i Dilkusha', fol. 95b: *Ma'asiru-l-Umara*, II. 824–5; Khan, *Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign*, pp. 225–6 'Akham-i 'Alamgiri', fols. 27a, 35b.

[2] *Ma'asiru l-Umara*, II. 824–25; Manucci, III. 273. *Ma'asir-i Alamgiri*, p. 364. By his death in 1706 Ali Mardan Khan had been transferred to the governorship of Khandesh.

[3] See 'Akham-i 'Alamgiri'. fol. 32a, for the death of Sayyid Abdullah, and the seizure of his estate by Mir Muhammad Hade, acting under orders from Ali Mardan Khan.

[4] These men are included in Athar Ali's extended listing of the Mughal nobility. They are as follows (with the number assigned them by Athar Ali): No. 8 Shaikh Nizam (7000/7000), 15 Muhammad Ibrahim (7000/7000); 17 Sayyid Muzaffar (7000/); 18 Ikhlas Khan, son of Shaikh Nizam (6000/5000); 27 Ali Mardan Khan (6000/5000); 28 Ismail Khan Mokha (6000/5000); 40 Shuja'at Khan (5000/5000); 71 Shaikh Miran Munawwar Khan, son of Shaikh Nizam (5000/2500); 85 Shaikh Abdullah son of Shaikh Nizam (4000/4000); 86 Abdullah

before the end received no greater rewards than those who did not. Even sectarian feelings failed to prejudice the future of outspoken Shi'as like Abdur Razzaq Lari. For its Muslim nobles, the fall of Golconda might have been a blow to sentiment, but it did not appreciably damage their lives and fortunes.

NON-ASSIMILATION OF HINDU NOBLES

The experience of the highest Hindu officials of Golconda, nearly all Brahmins, was completely different from that of their Muslim colleagues. Few of the Brahmin officials who had come to power under Abul Hasan even survived the conquest. During the first occupation of Hyderabad by Prince Shah Alam's army in 1685, Abul Hasan Qutb Shah conspired to assassinate Madanna and Akkanna and their nephew, Rustam Rao. Immediately after these murders a mob attacked all Brahmin officials and killed most of those who worked in the central administration. Behind this conspiracy were strong pressures from Aurangzeb, who saw this as one means to end Brahmin control of the state. Presentation of the severed heads of Madanna and Akkanna in public audience at the emperor's court helped to placate the emperor and to bring about a withdrawal of the Mughal army from Hyderabad.[1]

Survivors of the massacre, who managed to retain their offices, soon lost them when the Mughals took over. For example, the Brahmin governor of Kancipuram and another Brahmin at Poonamalle in the Karnatik readily submitted to the incoming Mughals, but were quickly replaced by Muslim officers.[2] Nor do these two Brahmins reappear as Mughal *mansabdars*; they dis-

Khan, son of Abul Hasan (4000/4000); 99 Abdur Razzaq Lari (4000/3000); 111 Shaikh Ladu (4000/) (part of Shaikh Nizam's entourage); 116 Mohibb-i Ali Askar Khan (4000/); 166 Sharif-ul Mulk, brother-in-law of Abul Hasan (3000/2000); 172 Sohrab Husain Hyderabadi (3000/1500) Cf. I.J. Coll., I/15/594; 181 Muhammad Taqui (3000/1500); 183 Abdul Qadir son of Abdur Razzaq Lari (3000/1500); 195 Sayyid Abul Hasan (3000/1000); 197 Iftikar Khan, nephew of Abul Hasan (3000/1000); 235 Najabat Khan, son of Sayyid Muzzafar (2500/1500); 265 Muhammad Hade (2000/2400); 311 Ali Alam (2000/500); 386 Asalat Khan son of Sayyid Muzzafar (1500/700); 394 Sayyid Mujeeb Bakhsh son of Sayyid Muzzafar (1500/600); 536 Abdul Shakar (1000/500). Some of these nobles are only identified by the addition of 'Hyderabadi' to their titles. There were certainly other Muslim entrants to Mughal service whom Athar Ali does not list. Among these would be Sayyid Abdullah, and (presumably) Mustafa Quli Khan and his son Fakirullah Khan, i.e. the group of Golconda nobles left on the Andhra coast. See Athar Ali, *Mughal Nobility*, pp. 175–272.

[1] Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, IV. 350–2.

[2] *RFSG: Diary*, 21 Nov. 1687, p. 180.

appear into complete anonymity. That none of the Brahmin nobles successfully transferred to Mughal service is virtually certain, and not surprising, in view of Aurangzeb's openly announced intention to destroy Brahmin control of Golconda.

Another section of lesser Hindu nobles was formed by soldiers and administrators of the Kamma, Valama, Kapu, and Razu castes. Although we know very little about their actual organization it appears that these *nayaks*, as they were called, constituted a body of officers available for military and administrative service anywhere in the kingdom. Recruitment of the *nayaks* from the same castes, and in many cases from the same families, who were politically and economically dominant in the various districts of Golconda, meant that this body was as useful politically as it was militarily to the Qutb Shahs.

The fate of the *nayaks* and their followers at the centre after the conquest is largely conjecture. Aurangzeb's decision to disband what remained of Golconda's central army probably meant that the majority were simply discharged, along with the ordinary Telugu soldiers. Some of these redundant commanders may have returned to their districts and turned to banditry: others may have found employment as auxiliaries hired by the Mughals in the Maratha war in the Karnatik. The only relatively certain fact is that very few *nayaks*, whether serving in and around Hyderabad, the Karnatik, or the remainder of the Deccan, became Mughal *mansabdars*. Only one man, Yacham Na'ir, gained an appointment as a Mughal *amir*—and his career in imperial service scarcely qualifies as an example of full assimilation.[1]

Aurangzeb's treatment of Golconda's high officials, generals, and nobles divides sharply on religious lines. Persian, Deccani, and Afghan nobles shared sufficiently in a common Indo-Persian aristocratic culture to be accepted readily by the emperor and employed as *mansabdars*. Once safely removed from Golconda, these former servants of the Qutb Shah regime could be trusted with responsible positions as provincial governors, *faujdars*, and

[1] Athar Ali, *Mughal Nobility*, pp. 216–71, list entitled '*Mansabdars* who Held or Reached the Rank of 1000 *zat* and above during the Period 1679–1707'. This summary of the biographical data on 575 Mughal *amirs* reveals only eight recognizably Telugu names. Seven of the eight individuals in this group were connected with the principality of Sagar which was outside the Golconda political system. Yacham Na'ir (no. 35) is discussed in my article, 'The Hyderabad Karnatik, 1687–1707', in *Modern Asian Studies*, IX (1975) pp. 241–60.

field generals. Aurangzeb was even prepared to leave a few of Golconda's Deccani officers in key posts in the northern coastal districts and the Karnatik (but not the interior districts of Telengana). We can identify at least twenty-four such Muslim nobles from Golconda who entered Mughal service with their followers at this time. Another large group made the change-over from Bijapur. In general this transition was remarkably smooth. The Golconda administrators who remained in Andhra and the Karnatik did get involved in factional conflicts with various incoming Mughal officials.[1] There were also occasional instances of hostility expressed against the new-comers.[2] But on the whole, the integration of the Muslim nobility of Golconda (and Bijapur) into the corps of *mansabdars* presented no real difficulties.

Just the opposite was true for Brahmin nobles and Telugu rajas who shared only suspicion and distrust with the Mughal emperor. No Brahmins are known to have made the transition to imperial service. Yacham Na'ir, the only Telugu *nayak* who became a *mansabdar*, was eventually executed for treason. Aurangzeb was indisputably biased against the Telugu nobility and aristocracy of Golconda. Restricted entry to the imperial service was really only an extension of the emperor's pre-conquest policies toward Golconda.

However, any explanation which attributes only religious motives to Aurangzeb does less than full justice to the emperor's grasp of political and strategic realities. He was prepared to confer *mansabdari* status and rank on Hindus if he thought it politically expedient. Thus, we find a total of ninety-six Maratha names in the most comprehensive listing yet arrived at of Mughal *amirs*.[3] These Maratha nobles, equally Hindu, varied in status from the captured grandson of Shivaji to *deshmukhs* of only local importance. Here necessity overrode Aurangzeb's distrust of the regional aristocracy of the western Deccan. During the last quarter of the seventeenth century Maratha revolts had grown in intensity and

[1] See my article for the collision between Ali Mardan Khan and Zulfikar Khan in the Karnatik.

[2] When Muhammad Ibrahim, formerly commander of Golconda's armies, became governor of the Panjab he travelled to the capital in order to view the emperor's palaces at Agra. The governor, Aqil Khan, refused him entry on the grounds that he was a Hyderabadi and not a fit person for this kind of privilege *Ma'asir-i Alamgiri*, p. 383.

[3] Athar Ali, Table 2b, p. 35.

extent to the point that the Muslim-dominated political order in much of the Mughal Deccan was seriously undermined. The emperor, in order to draw off rebellious Maratha chiefs and subvert the Maratha political system, freely offered high positions in his service.

One qualification must be made. In contrast to the Muslim nobles of Golconda, Maratha *mansabdars* never fully participated in the governance of the empire. No Marathas, despite their inflated ranks, served as provincial governors, and few, if any, as *faujdars*. Instead, they served as troop captains for Mughal generals on campaign in the Deccan. Clearly the emperor could not overcome his distrust of the Marathas enough to allow their full assimilation on equal terms with other Muslim and Rajput *mansabdars*. The emperor's policy here also may not have been entirely a religious bias. The Maratha chiefs unquestionably had a parochial political outlook difficult to accommodate in an imperial system.

Nevertheless, the contrast in policy remains to be explained. Why did the same political and military reasons for absorption of Maratha chiefs not apply as well to the regional aristocracy of the eastern Deccan? The answer, quite simply, is that in Golconda, unlike Bijapur, there still existed a viable regional political system which could provide linkage between the Telugu warriors and the imperial centre. Aurangzeb could reduce the threat to the cohesiveness of the imperial service posed by too rapid assimilation of large numbers of Hindu *zamindars*.

CONDITIONS IN 1688

Before the end of January, the Mughal ruler had completed all arrangements for Golconda which required his personal presence in Hyderabad. On the twenty-fifth of the month, the great assemblage of the imperial camp and the grand army moved slowly out of the conquered city and marched west toward Bijapur. Simultaneously, a 40,000-man army under Prince Azam rode in the direction of Maharashtra to attack Shambhaji, the Maratha king. The leading Mughal general, Firuz Jang, led a body of 25,000 horsemen toward Adoni, the small Afghan principality on the western border of the Hyderabad Karnatik where Siddi Masud, the former *wazir* of Bijapur, had taken refuge. As he passed Golconda's western border Aurangzeb sent Abul Hasan under guard to

Daulatabad fort, outside Aurangabad in the western Deccan. The first phase of the conquest of Golconda had ended.[1]

The nucleus of a provincial administration was in operation at the capital under the direction of Ruhullah Khan, the temporary governor. Most of the nobility and bureaucrats of the centre had accepted positions under the new regime. Mughal *mansabdars* had already begun to displace the former ruling élite, and more would follow. Golconda's army was either disbanded or safely re-employed elsewhere. In the outlying areas the great forts and towns—if not the intervening countryside—were firmly in imperial hands. This latest and most prestigious acquisition to the empire now provided treasure, supplies, and manpower for the wars against the Marathas. From the emperor's point of view the situation in Hyderabad was more than satisfactory.

Soon after Aurangzeb's departure, however, it became evident that the presence of the imperial camp and army had maintained an artificial stability in the new province. The most conspicuous testimonial to this fact came from the Marathas; for the dethroning of Abul Hasan meant that the alliance between the Quth Shah ruler and the Maratha king (sustained by a yearly subsidy payment from Golconda) no longer protected the new Mughal territories. Consequently, Hyderabad soon became a target for Maratha raids. In April Daniel Chardin, a European merchant, reported from the provincial capital that:

> Sevagees (Shambhaji's) troupes jon'd with Siddesmasson's (Siddi Masud, the ruler of Adoni) are within Six Leagues of Gulcondah, burning and destroying all before them, they expect them there in a little time, That Nabob Rowalloo Cawn (Ruhulla Khan, the governor) has Sent his Jewells and treasure into the Castle, and he and his family is on the following thereof, That there are no Souldiers in the Fort, nor provissions fitt to withstand an Enemy So that if the Enemy comes, he may with great facillity take the Fort, That the Dutch and French are much in the Maretta's favour, and all Roads are full of Robbers . . .[2]

Although the fortifications of Golconda saved the Mughals on this occasion, Chardin's description reflects the weakness of Ruhullah Khan's military position. Apparently the emperor seriously underestimated the military force which was required to govern and

[1] *Ma'asir-i Alamgiri*, p. 308.

[2] *RFSG: Diary*, 6 May 1688, p. 76. Inserted comments are from the edited text.

defend Hyderabad. There exists a sharp contrast between the forces available to Ruhullah Khan and those kept by his immediate predecessor, Abul Hasan. For that matter, none of the Qutb Shah rulers for the past century had found himself in anything resembling Ruhullah Khan's plight (save from Mughal invasions).

The Marathas withdrew and did not reach the capital again in 1688, but continued disorder for the remainder of the year was not due entirely to their influence. Localized turbulence, arising from the activities of bandit chiefs, as well as plundering by the regional aristocracy, had continued throughout the previous year during the siege of Golconda. After a pause in deference to Aurangzeb's presence in Hyderabad, this turmoil resumed. Submission by Qutb Shah officials in charge of the forts and towns had brought peace on only one level. The process of pacification, of asserting imperial authority over the dominant rajas in the countryside and the bandits and petty tribal hill chiefs, would require time, sufficient force, and, more often than not, negotiations resembling diplomacy rather than routine administration.

These difficulties were heightened by other serious problems. By the first months of the year, the entire region was just beginning to recover from the combined effect of crop failures, food shortages and starvation, and a cholera epidemic which had spread throughout the eastern Deccan in 1686–7. The resulting deaths and forced migrations occurred on a scale seen only in the most fearsome Indian famines.[1] Many local disturbances had resulted from high prices and food shortages as *zamindars* and bandits looted stocks of grain and money from merchants and other wealthy persons.[2] Even though ample rains came in the monsoon season of 1687 (June to September), so few people remained to cultivate the land that shortages and high prices lasted until the following year.[3] Masses of refugees had moved south towards Tanjore and the Kaveri delta area which had not suffered crop failures. Others crowded into the European port-towns like Madras, Pondicherry,

[1] Distress in the region from famine and epidemic is described in every contemporary source. There are also many references to the political troubles and economic stagnation. See Raychaudhuri, pp. 68–74, for a summary of the Dutch records; the British account is in *RFSG: Diary*, 1687, *Letters from* and *Letters to FSG*, 1687, 1688, *passim* Martin II. 497, 505, 526, 530, 531, and 536, has excellent descriptive material. See also *Ma'asir-i Alamgiri*, pp. 291–2, for the Persian chronicles and Condaved, pp. 48–51, for the Telugu sources.

[2] Condaved, p. 50. [3] Martin, II. 497.

and Pulicat, which, even though they could import grain by sea, had no defence against disease. As a result of this disaster, both urban and rural areas were still seriously depopulated. Francois Martin, French head merchant at Pondicherry, recorded in his journal the reaction of one of his employees who had gone to Petapoli (Nizampatnam), a port near Machilipatnam, in March 1688: 'What he wrote about the misery of the country is frightening: in places where there had been thirty or forty thousand souls there is no one to be found; the countryside strewn with bones, the houses and the streets filled with bodies; the few people remaining are half-dead, the others like skeletons.'[1] The local Telugu chronicle confirmed this description: 'From the South Sea to the Eastern Sea . . . all Persons were destroyed by the Famine excepting one or two men in each village . . .'[2]

Under conditions such as these nearly all economic activity stopped. Even when agricultural production began to pick up in 1688, trade remained frozen; for the roads were uniformly dangerous. At the capital, the greatest market in the province, no business at all was transacted; 'every body hiding their Diamonds and money'.[3] Diamond production had ceased and the area around the mines was deserted.[4] Along the coast the communities of weavers, bleachers, and other craftsmen who had produced cloth for export in better times had nearly disappeared. Any who remained would be discouraged from attempts at production by a shortage of raw cotton. The Dutch estimated that it would be several years before the industry recovered.[5] The only flourishing economic activity was the slave-trade. The Dutch and other European trading companies bought and shipped large numbers of people trying to save themselves from starvation.[6]

During the first year of imperial rule the new province certainly justified its official epithet, the 'land of war'. *Dar-ul Jahad* Hyderabad, which had suffered invasion and siege, disorder, famine, plague, and depopulation, scarcely resembled the rich, fertile, and productive kingdom praised by the Mughal chroniclers.[7] To re-

[1] Ibid., p. 533. [2] Condaved, p. 50.
[3] *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 9 Mar. 1688, p. 43. [4] Martin, II. 526.
[5] K.A. 1376 (1691), fols. 110–11.
[6] J. Talboys Wheeler, *Madras in the Olden Times*, 3 vols (Madras, 1861–2), I. 190–3.
[7] Cf. *Ma'asir-i Alamgiri*, p. 302, for a sample comment on the richness and desirability of Golconda.

store peace and prosperity was the task of the provincial governor and the relatively small body of Mughal officials assisting him.

CONCLUSION

The transition from regional kingdom to imperial province brought with it several changes of more than temporary importance. When Aurangzeb exiled and imprisoned Abul Hasan, he removed the pivot of Golconda's political system; for the king was the source of all authority, legitimacy, and power. The Qutb Shah ruler was also the controller of vast wealth which the tax and tribute system of Golconda had funnelled to the capital. As artistic and literary patron, the king was the most important single stimulus to high culture—whether expressed in Telugu, Persian, or Deccani Urdu idioms—in Golconda. As religious patron, Abul Hasan subsidized Muslim institutions (both Shi'a and Sunni) and Hindu temples. The presence of the king and his court sparked the vital urban life of Hyderabad, which from its inception was a courtly city, a political capital of great size and importance.

Replacement of the deposed monarch by a Mughal governor could never fill this loss. No matter how noble or wealthy, a governor was necessarily far less than a king in all aspects of public life. A Mughal governor was, moreover, part of a harsher, less personal imperial system. Thus, it is scarcely surprising that popular opinion in the conquered kingdom continued to exhibit a sentimental attachment to the former dynasty and a corresponding dislike of the emotional distance of the new regime. As late as 1698, twelve years after the conquest, rumours circulated that Abul Hasan, the ex-king, had escaped from Mughal captivity in Daulatabad fort (near Aurangabad) and that he would make an attempt to regain his throne with Maratha aid.[1] Similarly, in 1700, at Machilipatnam, rumours about a possible restoration were greeted with great enthusiasm by the local populace, who retained both affection for Abul Hasan and pity for his condition.[2]

[1] Cf. Manucci, III. 192.

[2] Cf. a report by William Norris, English ambassador to the Mughal emperor, who was resident in Machilipatnam for nearly a year. Norris was living in the house occupied by the former ruler of Golconda on an earlier state visit to the port. Because Norris rarely left his residence popular accounts suggested that the British envoy was actually the escaped king in disguise. Das, *The Norris Embassy*, p. 160.

Aurangzeb further lessened the powers and grandeur of the new Hyderabad governor by splitting off the Karnatik territories, south of the Krishna and Gundlekamma rivers, from Hyderabad province. The *faujdar* of the Hyderabad Karnatik, although bearing a lesser title than the *subadar* of Hyderabad, in fact possessed all the powers of a provincial governor. This administrative decision severed existing lines of authority and communication between the former capital of Golconda and the territories to the south. Later, during the early eighteenth century, what had been a purely administrative boundary became, in effect, a frontier between newly forming quasi-independent polities.[1] The flow of resources followed the shift in power and control. After 1687, tax collections, bribes, tribute, specie for coining, and diamonds from the southern districts moved to the headquarters of the *faujdar* of the Karnatik, not to Hyderabad.

Integration into the imperial system also had serious economic consequences for the eastern Deccan, and especially for Hyderabad city, the focus of the redistributive system of Golconda. In both the northern and southern divisions of the kingdom, Mughal administrators began to send the greater part of their surpluses directly to the central treasury at Aurangabad, or to the mobile imperial camp. Thus, the wealth of Golconda, including its diamonds, began to be systematically drained. Hyderabad and its inhabitants, previously beneficiaries of the economic rewards of political domination, suffered accordingly. At the time of annexation. Hyderabad, as the foremost commercial and capital centre in the south, had developed a complex economic structure which could not be destroyed overnight. Nevertheless, the events of 1687 and the emperor's administrative choices, set off a process of relative decline. Two new centres of economic life emerged in the south: the peripatetic centre of Mughal power at the Emperor's camp, and Madras, the English city-state on the south-east coast.[2] Gradually, the economic centre of gravity began to shift south and east in peninsular India.

Another nearly immediate consequence of Golconda's absorp-

[1] For a discussion of Mughal administration in the Hyderabad Karnatik, see J. F. Richards, 'The Hyderabad Karnatik, 1687–1707', *Modern Asian Studies* IX (1975) pp. 241–60.

[2] See J. F. Richards, 'European City-States on the Coromandel Coast'. in P. M. Joshi, ed., *Studies in the Foreign Relations of India* (Prof. H. K. Sherwani Felicitation Volume).

tion into the empire was a radical change in the composition of the political élite of the Telugu-speaking portion of the Deccan. Instead of the Brahmins, Persians, Afghans, and Deccani Muslims who formed the Golconda nobility prior to annexation, the new ruling élite was composed of Mughal *mansabdars* drawn originally from North India.[1]

The varied, personal, cultural, political, and economic ties between Golconda and Safavid Persia also diminished with the dispersal of the Persian nobility of Golconda. The activities and presence of Persian and Armenian merchants, now denied direct royal patronage in Hyderabad, were much reduced as were the number and importance of the Persian community as a whole.

Destruction of the Brahmin party at Golconda in 1686 and the annexation a year later put an end to the defensive alliance and military subsidy with the Marathas. Had Madanna stayed in power, this link might well have surpassed and overshadowed the long-standing relationship with Safavid Persia. Between 1674 and 1686 the thrust of Galconda's external relations had increasingly turned to the interior, to a coalition with the Marathas in the west—thus joining the Maratha and Telugu warrior aristocracies in a new political framework. By the early 1680s, given the shattered political condition of Bijapur, the prospect of Hindu domination of the Deccan was not at all improbable. Seemingly unlimited Maratha aggression was supported by the wealth of Golconda. But more worrisome than the military threat was the joint Maratha-Telugu challenge to the legitimacy of Muslim power

To counter this danger, the Mughal emperor devoted his full attention and applied a large proportion of the resources of the empire for nearly a year to conquering Golconda. Within a few months of victory, the emperor and his chief officials easily disposed of the preliminary measures necessary to establishing Mughal authority in the vast new territories. But to the much more complex problems of political, administrative, and economic consolidation Aurangzeb gave only a fraction of his energy and

[1] Cf. Laren B. Leonard, 'The Kayasths of Hyderabad City: Their Internal History and their Role in Politics and Society from 1850 to 1900' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1969), pp. 25, 39–46, 50. According to this study the nobility, the merchant community, and the military of Hyderabad State under the Nizams had no direct connection with similar groups in seventeenth-century Golconda.

provided only those resources which could be raised from within the boundaries of the new territories. It is to this essentially routine effort, carried out successfully many times in the past by the imperial bureaucracy, that we now turn.

V

The Configuration of Imperial Power

JUST prior to the imperial take-over of Golconda, a detached observer might well have been excused for assuming that few changes in both the theory and practice of administration might occur in the post-annexation period. Both the conquered regional kingdom and the Mughal empire were conquest states, heirs to a common Perso-Islamic military and administrative tradition. Thus the parallels and similarities in organization and structure were obvious: in each state, a well-organized central administration gathered and recorded information (in Persian), received and transmitted communications, acquired and disbursed enormously large revenues, and mobilized men and materials for the service of the state. The central administration of each state was under the active direction of a Muslim monarch and his immediate ministers. The power of the centre, for each state, was enforced by garrisons of well-armed troops (mostly heavy cavalry) stationed at rural fortresses and urban citadels. In both domains a clearly visible distinction was made between zones subject to indirect administration under tributary chiefs and those areas under direct administration by the centre. In each case, the latter area of direct or 'regulation' administration was further subdivided into areas controlled by the treasury and those territories alienated to nobles and officials for purposes of salary payment and maintenance of troops. In both the regional kingdom and the empire, territorial divisions were roughly similar: proceeding from the village (or urban ward) to the subdistrict (*pargana*) to the district. On the next upward level, the three largest administrative divisions of Golconda (the trans-Godavari region, the Karnatik, and the kingdom proper) resembled Mughal provinces. At each level of administration transferable officials, selected and sent by the central administration, carried out revenue and peace-keeping operations in conjunction with co-operating local notables.

However, noteworthy differences in organization, other than simply those of size and scale, may be seen, for example in the

degree of bureaucratization of each political system. In general, the empire was far more bureaucratized than the kingdom. For example, specialization of administrative roles was seemingly less advanced in the Golconda system. The king vested broad, undifferentiated powers, fiscal, executive, and military, in one individual who controlled areas ranging from a portion of a *pargana* to one or more districts. In crown territories this might be an entrepreneur tax-collector (subject only to occasional checks by a Muslim superior) or in other areas a noble dominating lands assigned to him for which he bore full administrative responsibility. By contrast, in the Mughal system, these powers and functions were carefully sorted out. Within a Mughal district one could find a *faujdar*, charged with general maintenance of order; a fort commander in charge of the greatest stronghold; a *thanadar* commanding one or more military check-points; an *amin* answerable for collection of revenues from crown lands; one or more agents liable for collection of taxes for nobles with absentee salary holdings in the district; and a newswriter responsible for reporting on all remarkable events in the district. All of these officers acted independently of one another and all reported to different superiors.

Unlike the grandees of Golconda, the nobles and administrators of the Mughal empire were more tightly disciplined and minutely ranked. Thus, all members of the administrative cadre transferred to Hyderabad in 1687–8, as well as those former members of the Golconda administration fortunate enough to keep their positions, were *mansabdars*. In the strictly graded official hierarchy of the empire, the Mughal ruler assigned each responsible official, whether soldier or bureaucrat, a two-part numerical (*mansab*) rank. Personal or *zat* rank was expressed in even numbers from as low as 20 *zat* to a maximum of 7,000 *zat* (save for princes of the blood who could hold ranks as high as 20,000 *zat*). The emperor raised or lowered all personal ranks primarily on the basis of performance in positions and tasks assigned by him. *Zat* rank determined the *mansabdar*'s relative status, his pay, and set limits on his honorific titles, forms of address, and official assignments. Those five or six hundred *mansabdars* who held a *zat* rank of 1000 or above were officially classified as nobles or *amirs*. This small group constituted the tiny ruling élite of the entire empire.

A second ranking system existed alongside the first. Trooper or *suwar* rank was expressed in multiples of five ranging from a

minimum of five to as much as 7000. Those *mansabdars* who held *suwar* rank received extra pay which obliged them to recruit, command, and pay a body of heavy cavalry acceptable to imperial standards. The actual number of horsemen present in a *mansabdar*'s contingent was not equivalent to the number of his *suwar* rank but a fraction stipulated by a complex series of regulations. Extremely low-ranking *mansabdars* (i.e. under 100 *zat*) usually did not have either the perquisites or responsibilities of *suwar* rank.

A good many lesser *mansabdars* received their salaries in cash payments directly from the central or provincial treasuries. But more often *mansabdars* received payment for their *zat* and *suwar* rank in the form of salary assignments known as *jagirs*. Under this arrangement, the state transferred to the *mansabdar* the right of collection of its share of the land tax from a specified area in an amount equivalent to his pay claim. Ordinarily, assignment of a *jagir* conferred only the right to collect the state's tax on agricultural production, without any additional administrative responsibilities or rights of occupation and landholding. In fact, the Mughal revenue administration transferred *jagirs* frequently to forestall development of local landed estates which would grow into fiefs. Since Akbar's time the *jagir* system had provided the imperial central administration with a flexible, decentralized system of revenue collection and payment of military salaries which simultaneously provided rigid centralized control. The *jagir* system was inseparably connected with the *mansabdari* system which was equally successful.

The dual numerical ranking system for *mansabdars* was a formal expression of the uniformity, discipline, and cohesiveness of the Mughal administrative and military élite. For over a century *mansabdars* with empire-wide mobility had been the reliable instruments of imperial unification and expansion. The emperor personally approved and granted all advancements (and demotions) in rank, titles, and other awards and official postings for all *mansabdars*. No other officials held this power; and no other persons held the loyalty of the *mansabdars*. The *mansabdars* also were bound by established policies, procedural and substantive, by precedent, and by written regulations. In some posts they were under the orders of an immediate superior: in others, such as that of provincial governor, they reported directly to the emperor

or to his *wazir*. Thus, the several hundred Mughal *mansabdars* who came to Hyderabad just after the fall of Golconda fort were servants of a highly centralized and efficient bureaucratic apparatus.[1] Administration by these men, subject to transfer in and out of the province, would be the primary means by which assimilation of the eastern Deccan into the empire would take place.

THE EXECUTIVE AND MILITARY STRUCTURE

Imperial authority and domination rely on the establishment and protection of a series of vital points from which power can be exercised. In post-conquest Mughal Hyderabad, this network focused on a strategic centre, the capital, residence of the governor, and on nearby Golconda fort, the greatest stronghold in the region. In the countryside, a chain of great hill fortresses offered virtually impregnable refuges for imperial forces which dominated the surrounding area. Another series of fortified towns provided the headquarters for *faujdars* in command of cavalry forces, who held administrative responsibility for specific areas varying in size from a portion of one district to as many as three entire districts. The ultimate strength of this system of control rested on the overall stability of the imperial centre. But its immediate effectiveness in Hyderabad during Jan Sipar Khan's governorship was determined by the distribution of these points of power and the size and quality of military forces available to man them.

THE GOVERNOR

Shortly after the annexation, the temporary governor of Hyderabad, Ruhullah Khan, returned to his duties as chief inspector general (*mir bakhshi*) for the empire. Aurangzeb's next choice as governor (*subadar*) was a man called Jan Sipar Khan, who was to hold the position for twelve years until his death in 1700. In 1687 Jan Sipar Khan was *faujdar* and fort commander of Bidar, the old Bahmani capital to the west of Hyderabad. A man of long military and administrative experience, Jan Sipar Khan had followed his father in Mughal service.[2] The new appointee had proved his

[1] A notation on one salary document gives a figure of 895 *mansabdars* on duty in Hyderabad. I.J. Coll., I/8/53.

[2] *Hadiqatul'Alam*, II. 2–5. *Ma'asiru-l-Umara*, I. 535–7. Jan Sipar Khan's original name was Mir Bahadur Dil. His father, Sayyid Muhammad Sanzwar, migrated first to Khurasan from his native Iraq, and later to Mughal India to serve under Jahangir. At one point in his career Sayyid Muhammad held the governorship of Delhi with the title Mukhtar Khan.

reliability to the Mughal ruler long before when he had supported Aurangzeb against his brothers in the 1656–68 war of succession. In addition to loyalty and ability proved over the years, Jan Sipar Khan could bring experience from service in the Deccan at nearby Bidar to his new post. An indication of the emperor's confidence was the selection of Jan Sipar Khan to escort Abul Hasan, the deposed king of Golconda, to his new prison at Daulatabad, the great hill-fortress located near Aurangabad. (This also may have been a deliberate effort to allow Jan Sipar Khan to acquire information during the journey from the former king.)

As soon as he had completed his mission, Jan Sipar Khan went directly to Hyderabad with his family, household, and military contingent. Here he occupied the governor's palace in Hyderabad. As *subadar*, Jan Sipar Khan was the highest-ranking (3500/1700) Mughal official in Hyderabad, and the direct representative of the emperor. He was responsible for external defence and internal peace and order. His son, Rustam Dil Khan, was also an *amir* (1000/900) who acted as his father's deputy and assistant. According to the biographical dictionary of the Mughal nobility, Rustam Dil Khan 'managed the affairs of the province of Hyderabad of which his father was the governor'.[1] This phrase refers to an arrangement whereby Jan Sipar Khan stayed at the capital and his son campaigned with a mobile force against recalcitrant *zamindars*, bandits, and Maratha raiders.

On his arrival in Hyderabad the new governor found that little remained of the immense military establishment kept at the capital by the Qutb Shahs. The plight of Ruhullah Khan, Jan Sipar Khan's predecessor, forced by lack of troops to hide in Golconda fort while a Maratha force plundered just outside the walls, illustrates the severity of the problem.[2] To overcome this deficiency, Aurangzeb sent a force of 500 heavy cavalry and 5,000 musketeers to form the nucleus of a provincial army at Hyderabad. For several years, the soldiers in this force drew their pay directly from the provincial treasury at a total annual cost of nearly half a million silver rupees.[3]

By May 1692, as the organization of the provincial administration proceeded, the basis of payment for these men shifted from cash payments to assignment of *jagirs* set aside for their upkeep.[4] It

[1] *Ma'asiru-l-Umara*, II. 324. [2] See above Chapter III, p. 46.
[3] I.J. Coll., I/8/53. [4] Ibid.

TABLE I

	Pay per Month	Total Annual Pay	
I. Cavalry			
125 troopers with two horses	Rs. 50	Rs. 75,000	
375 troopers with one horse	Rs. 25	112,500	
500 troopers, 625 horses			187,500
II. Infantry			
4,500 musketeers	Rs. 5	Rs. 270,000	
500 musketeers	Rs. 4	24,000	
5,000 infantry			294,000
			481,500

also appears that the cavalry, at least, were by this time fully absorbed into the contingent which Jan Sipar Khan was required to maintain according to his *suwar* rank.

Both the governor, Jan Sipar Khan, and his son, Rustam Dil Khan, as stipulated in imperial regulations, organized, commanded, and paid a large body of heavy cavalry. Table II gives the details of the rank, total pay assigned in *jagirs*, established receipts, and the number of men and horses actually mustered (calculated from the applicable rules).

The combined pay of Jan Sipar Khan (3500/2700) and his son, Rustam Dil Khan (1000/900), was calculated at the standard rates for their respective ranks. The total was 1,111,000 rupees assigned in a *jagir* with an expected return of 67 per cent (i.e. on an 'eight-month' basis) or 737,039 rupees. The *jagirs* assigned them were located entirely within Hyderabad, so that the province bore the entire fiscal burden of the governor's personal and military expenses. The Deccan revenue administration alienated the land tax in all or part of fifteen separate, unattached *parganas*. All fifteen *parganas* were located in the interior districts of Telengana as if to emphasize that the locus of the governor's activities was primarily around Hyderabad and not the more inaccessible coast.

The actual military obligations of the governor and his deputy

TABLE II

	Governor	Deputy	Total
Name	Jan Sipar Khan, Term: A.D. 1688–1700	Rustam Dil Khan	
Deccani	ND	ND	
Non-Deccani			
Rank			
(A) *Zat*	3,500	1,000	4,500
(B) *Suwar*			
(1) 2h	1,000		1,000
(2) Ordinary	1,000	900	1,900
(3) Conditional	700*		700
Month scale	8	8	8
Total pay (12 months)			
Dams	35,300,000	9,100,000	44,400,000
Rupees	882,500	227,500	1,110,000
Jagir			
% Hyd.	100	100	100
Established receipts (*Hasil*)			737,039
*Actual contingent one-third ratio			
Men	1,234	300	1,534
Horses	1,346	327	1,673
Estimated pay	403,800	98,100	501,900

* 200 *Suwar* conditional on service as *faujdar* of Kaulas.

Source: I/16/126, 25 Safar 44. This is Jan Sipar Khan's rank and salary at his death in 1700. The announcement of his death appears in a news-letter dated the previous day, 24 Safar, which gives the same rank for him. Akh., vol. IVI. (24 Safar 44), p. 292. Calculated from tables supplied in Athar Ali, p. 56. Pay computed at 25 Rs. per man per month.

were fixed by their *suwar* rank with an additional 500 'conditional' (*mashrut*) figure contingent on service as governor of Hyderabad and 200 further *suwar* added for his dual position as *faujdar* of Kaulas district. One thousand of the governor's original *suwar* rank was 'two horse' which meant simply that both his pay and troop obligations were doubled. By applying the rules for the actual muster of troops, based on the 'one-third ratio' (from

mansabdars serving in the same province in which their *jagirs* were located) we can calculate that Jan Sipar Khan had to support 1,284 men and 1,346 horses[1] (that is, 112 higher-paid men brought two horses to muster). The annual pay bill for this body at Rs. 25 per man per month (Rs. 50 for men with remounts) would have been Rs. 403,800. A similar calculation for Rustam Dil Khan shows that on the 'one-third' ratio he had to muster 300 men with 327 horses at a total annual cost of Rs. 98,100. Thus, imperial regulations demanded of the governor and his son that they recruit a force of 1,534 heavy cavalry with 139 additional remounts at a yearly cost of approximately 500,000 rupees. This could easily be met from their *jagir* receipts. The remainder, over 200,000 rupees, would still be available for personal non-military expenditure.

These figures, based on a report prepared for the *diwan* of the Deccan at the governor's death in 1700, illustrate two seemingly contradictory points: together these two men controlled enormous revenues (at a time when a foot-soldier received a salary of Rs. 5 per month) in keeping with their pre-eminent position in the

[1] This calculation (and those which follow) of military obligations is based on tables supplied by Athar Ali, *Mughal Nobility* . . ., pp. 53–9. Those *mansabdars* who held *jagirs* in the province to which they were posted were required to muster horsemen equivalent to one-third their *suwar* rank. Those *mansabdars* who served in provinces where they did not hold *jagirs* were required to bring one-fourth their nominal rank. For excessively arduous or distant campaigns a rule of one-fifth was applied. The number of men with remounts demanded varied according to the month-scale assigned the *mansabdar*. (The month-scale expressed the proportion of actual receipts to the fixed assessment allowed in the *mansabdar*'s *jagir*.) At a month-scale of six months (i.e. *jagirs* were assigned with receipts (*hasil*) at 50% of the assessed demand) no remounts were necessary and the number of men and horses was the same at exactly one-third the total *suwar* rank. *Mansabdars* paid on a scale of five months or less brought fewer men and horses to the muster than one-third or one-fourth their nominal rank. Pay for each unit of *suwar* rank was 8,000 *dams* or 200 rupees. Thus, a *mansabdar* with a *suwar* rank of 100 at six months would have actually collected 100 × 200 = Rs. 20,000 × 50% = 10,000 rupees. He was obliged to muster 34 men and 34 mounts on the one-third scale. At the going rate for cavalrymen he would have paid Rs. 300 per year per man or a total of 10,200 rupees. 'Two-horse' (*do-asba*) rank simply meant that the muster requirements and pay were doubled for each *suwar* unit. An accurate computation of the *mansabdar*'s actual forces demands knowledge of his full rank, month-scale, and the location of his *jagirs*.

Some Hyderabad *mansabdars* had special concessions which further lessened the total number of men and horses on duty. In 1689 *mansabdars* serving in Hyderabad with ranks of less than 100 were excused from supplying one horse in four. It is not clear whether this refers to *zat* or *suwar* rank. If the latter this would be much more significant. Cf. Akh., vols. XXVIII–XXXIII (15 Shawal 33), p. 109.

new province. These were, moreover, revenues formally assigned them; we can surely assume that there were many other opportunities for the governor and those immediately associated with him to increase their wealth without stepping beyond accepted limits of behaviour. The governor also had a sizeable army under his personal command composed of approximately 1,500 heavy cavalry, and 5,000 musketeers. Yet there exists a marked disparity between the position of Jan Sipar Khan, governor of Hyderabad *suba*, and Abul Hasan Qutb Shah, king of Golconda. The leading political figure in the region prior to 1687, the king, had immensely greater resources in money and men under his personal control than did the leading political figure after that date, the governor.

In practice, of course, neither Jan Sipar Khan nor Rustam Dil Khan was likely to have kept scrupulously to the full number of men and horses at all times. Such economizing on salaries was inevitable, as was a delay in replacing men lost to disease, battle wounds, or desertion. But it is important to bear in mind that it was difficult for the governor's followers to fall too far below the required numbers. As we shall see, in Hyderabad as elsewhere, the Mughal administration still paid single-minded and zealous attention to this problem. The system of military inspection and certification ensured that at fixed intervals all *mansabdars* had to muster the right number of horsemen or they suffered serious penalties.

The governor also continued to command and control the corps of musketeers stationed in Hyderabad, even though they were not paid from his personal *jagir*, but from other lands in the province. By 1695 Jan Sipar Khan reported to the emperor that actual strength of the 5,000 musketeers authorized for service in the province had declined seriously. Only 3,500 men were on duty; the remainder had deserted. Aurangzeb sanctioned the recruitment of 500 replacements to bring the total to 4,000 men.[1] Thus, in the case of the infantry, where the system of controls was less effective than for the cavalry, the discrepancy between authorized troop levels and actual levels was between 20 and 30 per cent.

Certainly Jan Sipar Khan could command the services of a number of other Mughal officers stationed at the capital. These, which are listed in the table, included the garrison commander of Golconda fort, the *kotwal* and *faujdar* of Hyderabad city and its

[1] Akh XXXIX (9 Rabi II), 112.

TABLE III

	Commander of Golconda Fort	*Kotwal* and *Faujdar* of Hyderabad and Environs	Chief Army Inspector and Newswriter	Superintendent of forts for Hyderabad Province	Superintendent of Urban Institutions, City Walls, etc.	Total
Name	Jalaluddin Khan	Muhammad Rabi Khan	Mir Ali Khan	Nizam Bik	Akhas Kishen	
Deccani or non-Deccani	ND	ND	ND	ND	ND	
Rank						
Zat		500	400	300	400	
Two-horse		100				
Ordinary		80	10	20	30	
Conditional		50	10			
Month scale	7	6	6	5	6	
Total pay (12 months)						
Dams	4,258,000	3,340,000	620,000	520,000	700,000	9,438,000
Rupees	106,450	83,500	15,500	13,000	17,500	235,950
Established receipts	65,947	41,750	7,286	6,500	8,750	130,233
% Hyd.	100	100	100	100		
Rate	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3	
Men	140*	110	7	5	7	269
Horses	140*	110	7	5	7	269
Estimated Pay	43,000	33,000	2,100	1,500	2,100	80,700
Source	I/11/20 I/12/208	I/14/1006	I/13/269 I/13/360	I/13/688 I/14/370	I/13/226	

* Estimate only.

suburbs, the military inspector and intelligence officer of the province (the *bakhshi*), the superintendent of forts, and the superintendent of imperial stores, palaces, and workshops (*buyutat*). Total salaries for this group totalled approximately 130,000 rupees in receipts. Together they mustered under their personal command nearly another 300 cavalry, But, as developments in Aurangzeb's last years demonstrate, these officers did not constitute a 'staff' for the governor in the presently accepted bureaucratic sense. They were far more akin to lesser department heads, each with his own organization and his own well-defined jurisdiction who reported directly to the emperor. Each would resist arbitrary attempts by the governor to infringe his powers or to conscript his troops for extended campaigning. This was especially true of the *kotwal* of Hyderabad and the commander of Golconda fort who were chief administrators of the largest metropolis and the greatest stronghold in the eastern Deccan. At best, the governor could influence appointments and dismissals to these posts. Without exaggerating the practical limits of any monarch's powers in dealing with his administrative organizations, it is obvious that Abul Hasan, as king of Golconda, had considerably more discretionary authority than had the Mughal governor. Even though a Mughal tributary, the king could replace officials and redefine official roles with a freedom denied Jan Sipar Khan. After 1687 the single line of control between suzerain emperor and tributary king (limited, for the most part, to control over external relations) suddenly became a complex bundle of direct connections leading from the emperor and his central officials to each important Mughal official in Hyderabad.

THE FORTS

When the Mughals occupied Golconda in 1687, they inherited a chain of great bastions scattered throughout the kingdom (see map 87). These had formed the military backbone of Muslim domination under the Qutb Shahs, and were still garrisoned when the dynasty fell. The existence of the forts presented Aurangzeb with a problem of military security: basically he had to decide whether or not to use the forts. If he chose not to utilize these strongholds they could simply be abandoned, or they could be stripped, dismantled, and levelled. The first alternative meant that they would be left open for occupation and use by rajas or even bandits and become a


threat to the dominant power. Destruction would be a costly, laborious business considering the size and location of each. If, on the other hand, Aurangzeb chose to maintain the forts, they would have to be adequately supplied and manned. If the forts were not scrupulously administered and maintained, allowed to run down with weakened garrisons, they would become points of imperial weakness rather than strength. The emperor decided on the second alternative. Continuation of the existing system had the merit of avoiding the cost of new military construction and the effort of organizing a new system of security.[1]

The size of the garrisons in the forts, even on paper, appears to have been barely adequate to defend the extended walls and immense gates of these fortresses, most of which can still be seen today. Infantry garrisons (*ahsham*) ranged from 108 at Bhongir fort to a maximum of 500 men at Kaulas, Koilkonda, and Pangal forts. The entire infantry complement for all the forts probably did not exceed 5,000 men.[2] The number of cavalry posted to each stronghold was equally low. The emperor appointed a Mughal *mansabdar* as commandant (*qal'adar*) for each garrison. Each commandant brought a body of horsemen with him to serve at his new post. This consisted of his sons and other close relatives, companions and assistants, and the troopers (*tabinan*) demanded by his *suwar* rank. The emperor further increased the number of cavalry at each fort by placing a 'conditional' increment of 50 to 100 *suwar* on the rank of each *mansabdar* assigned to command a fort. But even with this supplement the total number of horsemen accompanying each *qal'adar* would rarely have been more than one hundred and was more likely to have been between thirty and fifty men, as Table IV illustrates.

Because of the critical importance of these forts and their isolation which precluded direct supervision and control, Aurangzeb exercised great care in selecting commandants. None were *amirs*, but with ranks ranging from 200/30 to 500/400, the men selected were able and responsible members of the imperial ser-

[1] The only expenditure on fortifications made was the sum of 80,000 rupees for repair and strengthening of the walls of the capital in 1695. Akh. XXXVIII (19 Shawal), 455.

[2] The table gives an estimated strength for twelve of the thirteen Hyderabad forts (omitting Golconda). Precise figures are available for ten forts, but not for the entire thirteen. In 1702 the established infantry strength in the ten forts was 3,268 men who were paid a total of 175,845 rupees annually. I.J. Coll., 1/18/806.



MAP 2. Forts and Garrisons in Hyderabad, A.D. 1702

vice with an interest in promotion. Moreover, the emperor chose only officers of proved loyalties. Like the governor and the most important provincial officers at the centre, none of the Mughal fort commandants in Hyderabad had served Bijapur or Hyderabad. The Mughal ruler had no intention of allowing former Golconda officers, or indeed any 'Deccanis' as they were known in Mughal official parlance, to take charge of any vital strongpoints in the new province.[1] Instead he relied exclusively on Muslim *mansabdars* originally from other parts of the empire. The general pattern of appointments is illustrated by Table V which gives details of the rank, pay, *jagirs*, and estimated cavalry following of eight fort commanders who served in Hyderabad during the last decade of Aurangzeb's reign.[2]

[1] The term 'Deccani' or *dakaniyan* in Golconda meant those Muslims who were indigenous to the region either because of conversion or long residence over generations as opposed to the foreigners like the Persian migrants. Under the Mughals the official use of the term Deccani was for all nobles, whether natives or migrants, Muslims or Hindus, who had been in service with Bijapur, Golconda, or the Maratha kingdom. Cf. Athar Ali, *Mughal Nobility . . .*, pp. 26–27.

[2] Information on another five commandants had been compiled, but not listed on the table. The five (none of whom was Deccani) were as follows: Ra'yat Khan (700/300), commandant of Kaulas fort in the 39th year, I J. Coll.,

Table IV

Hyderabad Forts and Garrisons in A.D. *1702*

	Infantry garrison	Total salary (annual)	Average pay
		Rs.	Rs.
I. Telengana			
(1) Kaulas	500 *ahsham*	25,920	51·8
(2) Medak	(500)*	(29,250)*	(58·5)*
(3) Elgandel	(500)*	(29,250)*	(58·5)*
(4) Warangul	200	16,068	55·3
(5) Malankur	250	12,576	50·3
(6) Ghanpura	110	6,432	58·5
(7) Devarkonda	350	17,736	50·7
(8) Koilkonda	500	28,665	57·3
(9) Bhongir	108	6,124	55·7
(10) Pangal	500	28,665	57·3
II. Andhra			
(11) Murtazanagar (Kondavidu)	500	26,073	52·1
(12) Mustafanagar (Kondapalli)	250	12,576	50·3
	4,268	234,335	54·9

* Figures for Medak and Elgandel, not given in the official source (although these and Golconda fort are mentioned), are estimates. The estimates are at the maximum troop level and at the maximum average salary. The term *ahsham* is neutral denoting infantry and says nothing of its composition or organization.

Source: I.J. Coll., I/18/806.

The fortress commandants headed entities which were so organized, supplied, and paid as to be relatively self-sufficient in its relations with the capital. There was a well-defined internal organization. Subordinate officers were in charge of the infantry, the cannon, and the military stores of the fort. Some of these men

I/11/20. Sayyid Mir, commanding Bhongir fort in the 46th year, I.J. Coll., I/18/459. Murtaza Quli, at Elgandel fort in the 46th year, I.J. Coll., I/17/1188. Allah Quli (300/150), at Medak fort in the 39th year, I.J. Coll, I/11/144. Qasam Bek (500/400), at Mustafanagar in the 50th year. I.J. Coll., I/20/1342.

held low *mansabs*, like one Abdul Samid (80/5) listed as an artilleryman who was in charge of the arsenal at Warangal fort.[1] Other minor officials and clerks who were not *mansabdars* handled the fort's food supplies, the treasury, and the accounts.

If necessary, the garrisons could maintain themselves in a hostile countryside for some time without direct recourse to Hyderabad. In an arrangement inherited from the Qutb Shahs, the modest sums required to meet the monthly salaries of the garrisons came from lands surrounding the fort. *Jagirs* were set aside for that purpose in each of the *hawili parganas* in which a fort was located. The provincial revenue office also earmarked lands in the *hawili pargana* to pay the 'conditional' portion of the fort commander's salary. Revenue officials also made an effort to provide a large portion of the commandant's remaining pay claim for his followers (*tabinan*) from the same *pargana* in which he was stationed. Thus, each fort commandant had direct access to and control over the sources of pay for the entire infantry garrison and for most if not all his cavalry. The jurisdiction of each fort commander was limited to the *jagirs* he controlled and to a very narrow circle of territory surrounding the stronghold which he commanded. Each fort commander seems to have been authorized to act as a *faujdar* in a zone not to exceed ten miles in any direction from the foot of the fort walls. In so defining his role, the Mughal administration stressed the purely military rather than the administrative functions of these officers.[2]

This is not to say that the commandant and his officers were totally free of fiscal control from Hyderabad. The permanent staff of the fort, including the treasurer, stores clerk, etc., fell under the supervision of the provisional auditors at Hyderabad. The provincial accountants also demanded muster and identification documents (*chihra*) for each soldier when he was paid.[3] All *mansabdars*, including the fort commandant, had to submit similar muster and

[1] I.J. Coll., I/14/698.

[2] Cf. I.J. Coll., I/13/656. A *qala'dar* newly appointed at Bhongir fort noted that 'according to [the emperor's] order the *faujdari* four *karoh* from the foot of the fort is the responsibility of the commander.' He therefore asked for confirmation of the same arrangement.

[3] Thousands of *chihra* documents can be found in the enormous collection of Mughal documents in the State Archives of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, India. Most are from Aurangabad and other forts in the western Deccan. Unfortunately, this collection is not yet sorted or classified and hence is virtually unusable.

Table V

References to Fort Commanders in the Period 1697–1707

Fort	Commander (1)	Deccani or Non-Deccani (2)	*Zat* (3)	Two-Horse (4)	Ordinary (5)	Conditional (6)	Mon- scal (7)
I. Telengana							
(1) Elgandel	Amanullah	ND	200		30	70	6
(2) Bhongir	Sayyid Bahadur	ND				50	
(3) Medak	Muhammad Baqi	ND	250		10	50	5
(4) Kaulas	Muhammad Jafar and son	ND	500		40	160	
	Muhammad Baqir	ND	150			20	6
(5) Devarkonda	Not identified—May have been *Faujdar* of Indur						
(6) Koilkonda	Not identified						
(7) Ghanpura	Sayyid Shuja't	ND	400		100		4
(8) Pangal	Muhammad Muhsir	ND	200		50		6?
(9) Malankur	Muhammad Riza Bik	ND	500		50	50	5
(10) Warangal	Sayyid Izzatullah	ND	250		30	100	6
II. Andhra							
(11) Murtazanagar (Kondavidu)							
(12) Mustafanagar (Kondapalli)	Sahib Singh	ND	500		300	100	5

inspection certificates for their cavalry troopers as well as branding certificates for the horses.

Financial practices differed somewhat at Golconda, and two nearby fortresses, Medak and Elgandel. The provincial *diwan* sent cash for pay of the garrisons of these three forts directly

Total Pay		% in Hyderabad	Established Receipts	Rule	Actual Contingent		Estimated Pay	Source
Dams	Rupees				Men	Horses		
(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
1,080,000	27,000	61	12,110	¼	25	25	7,500	I/18/1211
		Listed as *Faujdar*						I/13/945
790,000	19,750	?	8,216*	⅓	15	15	4,500	I/18/636
2,300,000								
370,000								I/14/300
2,670,000	66,750	54	33,375	¼	55	55	16,500	
Not identified								
Not identified								Akh. XXVIII–XXXIII (6 Shawal 33), 36
990,000	24,750	45	8,248	¼	12	12	3,600	I/13/384
660,000†	16,000	100	8,000	⅕	10	10	3,000*	I/14/1001
1,500,000	37,500	48	17,485	¼	20	20	6,000	I/23/291
1,370,000	34,250	88	13,312 2,000 Hyd. Hindustan	¼	33	33	9,900	I/14/299
9,060,000	226,000							
3,900,000	97,500	85	48,750‡	¼	100	100	30,000	I/15/126
3,960,000 (Ave.)					270 (Ave.)			
620,000					34			

*Estimate only. † Calculated from tables in Irvine, pp. 8–4. ‡ Calculated from tables in Athar Ali, p. 56.

from the provincial treasury instead of allocating *jagirs* in the lands adjacent to the forts. The *hawili pargana* surrounding Golconda fort (i.e. Muhammadnagar *pargana*) was set aside for *jagirs* given various small *mansabdars* in the central Hyderabad administration —clerks, office managers, secretaries, accountants, auditors, and

treasurers. In most cases, these men did not have the resources to collect their salaries from distant *jagirs*. The *hawili* lands customarily assigned the fort garrisons in Medak and Elgandel *parganas* were expropriated by the revenue office as part of the extensive *jagir* given Prince Muhammad Kam Bakhsh. When this occurred, the revenue office tried to assign *jagirs* for the garrison's pay in Elgandel district, but removed from the immediate vicinity of the fort. But the garrison refused to accept this arrangement and the revenue office agreed to make cash salary payments instead.[1]

The locations of the thirteen fortresses in Hyderabad are surprising and, at first appearance, inexplicable. As the map shows these were not, by any means, erected to defend the frontiers of the kingdom or to guard the wilder refuge areas. The most striking feature is the imbalance between the eleven forts maintained in interior Telengana and two strongholds located on either side of the Krishna river in coastal Andhra. North-east along the coast, from Kondapalli to Rajmundry and from Rajmundry to the border of Orissa, no great bastions, apart from fortified towns, were to be found. The most likely explanation for this spatial distribution lies in the pattern of conquest in the eastern Deccan, in which Muslim power was concentrated on interior Telengana and its dominant capital. The conquerors took over and strengthened the most impressive Telugu hill-forts in Telengana, forced abandonment of many others, but do not appear to have constructed many new forts themselves. In Andhra, where the same indigenous network of extremely large hill-fortresses did not exist, the conquerors did not make the investment of resources necessary to continue the line of fortresses to the north.

There is, moreover, some evidence that despite the existing administrative checks and controls, forts were chronically under-strength, and in some instances desperately so. At Koilkonda fort, to the south-west of Hyderabad, the large hereditary garrison of Telugu infantry commanded by *nayaks* had disintegrated during the troubled years of the conquest. In mid-1689 the news-writer for Hyderabad sent a report to the court about a recent event at Koilkonda fort. The commandant, Rustam Bek, had dramatically placed five cavalrymen of his personal contingent (*suwaran tabinan*) on the parapet of the fort and announced that these men, and a like number of the infantry garrison (*mardom-i*

[1] I.J. Coll., I/16/8.

ahsham), were the only troops in his command. The emperor, on receipt of the report, ordered an immediate investigation and reinforcement of the garrison.[1]

Fifteen years later, in 1702, the newly assigned commandant of Mustafanagar (Kondapalli) fort had similar complaints. When Kwaja Hashim arrived at the fortress he discovered that only 27 troops from a regular complement of 300 were still on duty; the others had deserted because they were not paid. Supplies were low and the walls and gates out of repair. At the moment he was manning the fort with his own followers. He requested that the royal accountants (*mutasaddian*) at Hyderabad, who were responsible for the administration and supply of the fort, be ordered to send assistance. He needed fresh soldiers, artillerymen, and more supplies. The accountants should also send an overseer (*sazawal*) to represent them as well as an accountant (*mushrif*) and treasurer (*tahwildar*). Aurangzeb approved these requests.[2]

Furthermore, no arrangements appear to have been made for the establishment of *thanas* anywhere in Hyderabad. The Mughals normally set up small fortified check-points called *thanas* (Hindi for small fort) to protect more settled areas against incursions from predatory tribal peoples. These, manned by a commander called a *thanadar* and a small body of cavalry, were used for both external and internal frontiers. For example, the province of Kabul, always threatened by tribal uprisings on the Afghan frontier, had twenty-nine *thanadars*. Ajmer, the Mughal point of control for the Rajput tribes in Rajasthan, had eleven *thanadars*.[3] Certainly the various Telugu chiefs dominant in Khammamett district, along the course of the Godavari, and indeed along most of the Andhra coast, posed the same kind of potential threat as did the Afghans and the Rajputs. The series of uprisings which took place during and after the conquest amply testified to that. But Aurangzeb does not seem to have employed *thanas* in Hyderabad in any number.[4] This departure from normal practice was probably a

[1] Akh. XXXIII (6 Shawal 33), 86.

[2] Akh. XLVIII (6 Shawal 48), 36b. There is an unexplained discrepancy of 50 between the total number given by the commandant and the figure of 250 found in the figures of the revenue office.


[3] British Museum, Or. MS. 1779, fols. 86b–105b.

[4] When the *faujdar* of Sikakul occupied the territories of a rebellious raja in the 43rd year, *thanas* were established in the raja's lands. Akh. XLIII (19 Zelhejja), 111. Other than this no reference to the operation of *thanas* in Hyderabad has been found.

mistake; for a screen of *thanas* was more flexible, less expensive, and far better suited for the aggressive defence and rapid punitive campaigns in which the Mughals excelled than the static defences of a chain of under-manned and ill-supplied fortresses.

THE FAUJDARS

In the Mughal administrative system *faujdars*, responsible for maintenance of public order in the districts, played a much more active administrative role than the fort commandants, whose duties were primarily military and defensive in nature.[1] In every part of the empire the *faujdars* were the officers who forced reluctant



MAP 3. *Faujdars* posted in Hyderabad Province, 1697–9

chiefs and *zamindars* to disgorge tribute and taxes, or who led expeditions to attack, burn, and destroy groups of villages whose inhabitants had refused to pay the land tax; or who pursued marauding bandits who may have looted a market town. The Mughal *faujdar*, riding at the head of several hundred mailed cavalry, or seated in his audience tent interviewing prisoners, was an imposing and impressive expression of the power of the state. The *faujdar*'s rank was appropriate to the importance of his position, often being as high as 1000 *zat* with a correspondingly large *suwar* rank. *Faujdars* also, although nominally subordinate to the provincial governor, could and did report directly to the emperor.

[1] See Qureshi, *Mughal Administration*, p. 231.

Each *faujdar* operated within a fixed territorial jurisdiction. Contrary to the usual impression this was not a single district, but a variable unit composed of one, two, or even three or more districts or parts of districts.[1]

In 1697, a decade after annexation, nine *faujdars* divided responsibility for the territorial administration of Hyderabad. One *faujdar* was chief administrator of the capital, whose jurisdiction was confined to the city and its environs (see above). The remainder were distributed throughout the province. Collectively, the eight *faujdars* stationed in the districts commanded approximately 1,200 cavalry, a force almost as large as that under the governor (see table). In an emergency the governor could draw on these forces for assistance, but normally they were split up and served at the headquarters of the officer who recruited them. Annual expenditure for the eight *faujdars* and their followers in 1697 amounted to just over one million rupees *jama'* and 465,000 rupees in fixed receipts. Most, but not all, of this sum came from salary assignments on lands within Hyderabad itself.

Hyderabad, with just nine *faujdars*, was administered less intensively than other provinces of comparable size and resources. Allahabad *suba* was divided into twenty-two *faujdar's* areas in 1691.[2] Bengal had twelve *faujdars* under Aurangzeb.[3] This inferiority is especially noticeable in Andhra. As the accompanying map shows, seven *faujdars* were posted to interior Telengana and only two to Andhra. This ratio, even more than the relative numbers of forts, suggests a marked lessening of administrative intensity on the coast.

The governor of Hyderabad, Jan Sipar Khan, acted as *faujdar* of Kaulas, the district and town to the north-west of the capital on the border. Kaulas *pargana*, one of the largest in the province with revenues of 264,000 rupees, was the location of *jagirs* which provided nearly a fifth of the governor's salary. Kaulas was also the source of pay for the commander of Golconda fort, the *faujdar* of Hyderabad, and other leading officials stationed at the capital. To the south-west of the capital, at Kohir, a *faujdar* had

[1] Qureshi gives this impression in his brief discussion of the role of the *faujdar*.

[2] Sinha, S. N. 'The Administrative Set-Up of the Subah of Allahabad under the Great Mughals', *Islamic Culture*, XXXIX (1965), 106.

[3] Anjali Chatterjee, *Bengal in the Reign of Aurangzib (1658–1707)* (Calcutta, 1967), p. 40.

charge of Koilkonda district and, we can assume, areas in Ghanpura and Pangal districts as well. Nearer Hyderabad, about thirty-five miles to the east, the *faujdar* of Bhongir district also commanded the fortress at Bhongir. To the north-east, the *faujdar* of Elgandel was essentially a revenue officer given responsibility for the administration of the *khalisa* or directly administered royal lands in the interior. The *faujdar* and *amin* of Elgandel, to give him his full title, had charge of the twenty-one *parganas* of Elgandel district as well as parts of Medak, Malankur, and Devarkonda districts. Further to the east, in the hilly block of territory forming a barrier between the coastal plain and the interior plateau, another *faujdar* was stationed at Khammamett town. This officer had a formidable assignment, for he had to administer all of Khammamett district and most of Eluru district on the coast.

The remaining *faujdar* stationed in 1697 in Telengana was officially classified as a Deccani. Ibtida Khan (1000/600), *faujdar* of Nursapur (also called Sultanpur) in Medak district, acquired his position in 1687. Although positive evidence is lacking, it is likely that he was a former Golconda officer, rather than one from Bijapur. Possibly Ibtida Khan had held a *jagir* in and around Nursapur under Golconda or had some other connection with the area. Technically, Ibtida Khan was classified as a noble or *amir*, but the disabilities imposed on Deccan *mansabdars* by Aurangzeb meant that his position in reality was comparable to non-Deccani *faujdars* of lesser rank. A low month-scale of only four months and the obligatory one-fourth deduction from his total pay meant that his pay was much lower than that usually given to his nominal rank. Indeed, as the calculation on the table shows, the proceeds from his *jagir* were not even adequate to pay the 128 horsemen which he should have supported at the one-fourth ratio normally demanded of Deccani *mansabdars*. Since this peculiarity of the regulations would leave him with no personal salary at all, we may assume that some additional concessions must have been made either to increase his pay or lower the military demands. The extent to which Ibtida Khan's jurisdiction went beyond the boundaries of Nursapur *pargana* is not clear from the official papers. His performance must have been satisfactory, because in the mid-1690s the emperor extended his responsibilities to include parts of Nalgonda district to the south-east.

The only two *faujdars* assigned to the coastal districts were also Deccanis and *amirs*, who had been attached to Golconda before the conquest. Fakirullah Khan (1500/1000), *faujdar* and *amin* of Sikakul, administered the entire coast from the port of Nizampatnam (Petapoli) in the south to the border of Orissa in the north.[1] This dual appointment, similar to that of the *faujdar* and *amin* of Elgandel, gave Fakirullah Khan both executive and fiscal responsibilities over the coastal districts, most of which were *khalisa* lands. Mir Muhammad Hade (1000/600), *faujdar* of Nursapur, a port just south of the Godavari, had held the post since 1687. He appears to have had control over the port and its immediate hinterland, but little else. By the late 1690s his territory probably bounded that under the administration of the *faujdar* of Khammett and Eluru districts, although even this is not clear.

That only two *faujdars* should be assigned to the entire Andhra coast, is surprising; but that the ranks of these two men should be such that they were only paid for approximately 300 cavalry between them is even more surprising. If we consider that there were only two fortresses at Kondapalli and Kondavidu, garrisoned by a total of 200 horsemen and 750 infantry at peak strength, imperial power on the coast appears deficient to the point of feebleness. One possible explanation for the looseness of the administration in Andhra may have been that Aurangzeb assumed that by leaving the area in the hands of two Deccani *faujdars*, with previous experience in the region, it would remain quiet and productive without the necessity for overwhelming force.

Continuity rather than disruption was the primary characteristic of post-conquest Mughal rule in Andhra; but continuity was not sufficient to overcome the military weakness of the *faujdars* of Nursapur and Sikakul.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTINUITIES IN ANDHRA

The Mughal administrative and military establishment in coastal Andhra, although unimpressive, was not quite as weak as the

[1] Fakirullah Khan was the third Mughal *faujdar* at Sikakul. The first was Sayyid Abdullah, who died in 1690. The second was Mustafa Quli Khan, Fakirullah Khan's father, who served from 1690 till his death in 1698. Full details of his rank and *jagirs* are not available but they seem to have been very close to those held by his son. According to the Dutch the 'government' of Mustafa Quli Khan included all the coastal areas or 'lower lands' (*benedelanden*) from Petapoli to Sikakul. K.A. 1408 (25.4.1692) fol. 648. I.J. Coll., I/15/10, confirms this statement.

Table VI

Faujdars in 1697–9

Position	Name (1)	Deccani or Non-Deccani (2)	Rank: Zat (3)	Rank: Suwar: Two-horse (4)	Rank: Suwar: Ordinary (5)	Rank: Suwar: Conditional (6)	Month scale (7)
I. Telengana							
(1) Kaulas: *Faujdar* of Kaulas	Jan Sipar Khan Governor, Term: 1695–1700	ND				200	8
(2) Koil-konda: *Faujdar* of Kovir	Sayyid Muzzafur Khan, Term: 1688?–1704	ND	700	300	100	500	7
(3) Medak: *Faujdar* Nursapur and Nalgon	Ibtida Khan Term: 1687–1703	D	1,000	150	450		4
(4) Bhongir and Warangal: *Faujdar* and *Qila'dar* of Bhongir	Sayyid Bahadur Term: 1699–1703	ND	300		20	80	6
(5) Elgandel: *Faujdar* and *Amin* of Elgandel and Indur (*khalisa* lands)	Kar Talab Khan Term: 1698–1701	ND	600	120	180		6
			520		50		6
(6) Khammamett and Elluru: *Faujdar*	Hasan Quli Khan	ND	700	200	300		5
II. Andhra							
(7) Sikakul: *Faujdar* and *Amin*	Fakirullah Khan Term: 1698–1700	D	1,500		1,000		5
(8) Narsapur: *Faujdar*	Mir Muhammad Hadi, Term: 1687–1700	D	1,000	50	400	150	4

Sources, I.J. Coll. (1) I/16/126, (2) I/11/201; I/13/411, (3) I/19/1417–18, (4) I/13/945; I/15/[illegible] I/15/349, (5) I/20/321–22, (6) I/16/68–69, (7) I/14/1038; I/13/369. (8) Akh. XXXVII–XXXVIII (12 Safar 36) p. 19.

Total Pay 12 months		*Jagir* % in Hyderabad	Established receipts	Actual Contingent			
Dams	Rupees			Rule	Men	Horses	Estimated pay
(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
				Included in Governor's Contingent			
[illegible],700,000	267,500	? (Minimum of 62% in Hyderabad)	155,952†	1/3	400	412	123,600
4,551,700 (After 1/4 deduction)	113,792	100	37,923	1/3	135	135	40,500
1,720,000	43,000	70	15,000	1/4	43	43	12,900
4,260,000		11		1/4	705	105	31,800
1,030,000					13	13	3,900
5,290,000	132,250		62,265				35,700
6,700,000*	167,500	100	68,340	1/3	168	168	50,400
8,025,000 (After 1/4 deduction)	200,625	100	83,593	1/3	240	240	72,000
5,062,500* (After 1/4 deduction)	126,562	?	42,651	1/3	163	163	48,900
42,049,200	1,051,229		465,724		1,267	1,279	384,000

* Amount computed from tables supplied in Irvine, pp. 8–9.
† Calculated from month ratio.

evidence from the surviving Mughal official records implic . Much of the shape and structure of the coastal administration is not revealed in the official sources because Aurangzeb allowed the less formal, decentralized Golconda system to continue virtuall without alteration. Even after two of the three incumbent Qutb Shahi *sar-lashkars* or governors were removed from the scene in 1690 (one by death and one by transfer) the emperor appointed another Deccani *mansabdar* (almost certainly a former Golconda noble) to take charge of the entire coast. Mustafa Quli Khan also bore full responsibility for tax collections in the four districts set aside for *khalisa* revenues (Machilipatnam, Nizampatnam Rajmundry, and Sikakul).

British traders at Vishakapatnam and Machilipatnam, although well aware of the larger political events which had taken place, continued to use the old Qutb Shah terms in referring to the Mughal administrators with whom they dealt. As late as 1694, the British, in common with the other inhabitants of the area, consistently addressed the *faujdar* of Sikakul as the 'Seir Lascar', a corruption of *sar-lashkar*, the Golconda term for governor.[1] At each of the coastal trading towns, from Madapollam north across the Godavari to Orissa, local notables were still in office whose job it was to govern the town and its immediate hinterland and to collect taxes from the inhabitants. Most of these were Brahmin *hawaldars* (British 'Avaldars') who, it is clear, were essentially tax-farmers trying desperately to wring sufficient funds from the town to pay the instalments on the bids which they had made to Mustafa Quli Khan. Simon Holcombe, the British head merchant at Vishakapatnam, dissatisfied with the instability caused by frequent changes of *hawaldars*, complained that because 'ye greatest bidder allways carrying it [i.e. Vishakapatnam] without respect to any obligation, of a limited time or ye like so yt here has been 3 avaldars in less yn a fortnight'.[2] Finally, in December 1693 after negotiations with Mustafa Quli Khan, who stopped off in Vishakapatnam, Holcombe succeeded in becoming *hawaldar* himself. He paid Mustafa Quli Khan (who was in need of funds to send a gift to Aurangzeb) 2,500 rupees in cash and agreed to pay 4,862 rupees per annum as 'rent' for the town. The contract terms, set out in a *qual* from the *faujdar*, but not from the emperor, were that the

[1] Vizagapatam, 'Consultations', 19 July 1693 and *passim*.
[2] Ibid., 13 Dec. 1693; Ibid., 16 Dec. 1693.

agreement would last three years, or, alternatively, as long as Mustafa Quli Khan remained in office. The full amount must be paid every year regardless of losses because of 'want of Rain'.[1] As soon as he received his *qaul* Holcombe immediately seized the current accounts from 'Vencajee' the dispossessed *hawaldar* and called in the heads of all the town castes, gave them betel, and announced the details of the new regime.[2]

At Srikakulam and Kassimkota, the largest urban centres north of the Godavari, Mustafa Quli Khan appointed two members of his personal staff to govern the towns and collect tax instalments from the *hawaldars*. Govind Appa, a Brahmin, was governor and *sar-simt* (the old Golconda term) at Srikakulam, and Mir Jafar was 'the Sarsimut and Gover' at Kassimkota.[3] The remaining territory, towards the interior, was left in the hands of Telugu *sardars* or tributary rajas. The former supplied troops to the *faujdar* and paid fixed taxes; the latter simply paid tribute.[4]

South of the Godavari arrangements were somewhat more formal with less subleasing under the personal control of the *faujdar*. Much of the administration was in the hands of the *deshmukhs*, one for each district, who did not bid for their posts as did the town *hawaldars*, but paid fixed amounts based on a long-standing tax assessment on each village and *pargana*. Two Brahmins controlled the richest commercial centres on the Krishna delta. 'Cornu Caularee' was the chief governor or *deshmukh* of Nizampatnam port and its surrounding villages which formed the smallest district on the coast.[5] 'Gonculla Anca Chief Praminy' was the *deshmukh* who administered Machilipatnam port and its hinterland, also a district, and raised nearly 500,000 rupees a year in taxes.[6] The large territorial districts—Rajmundry, Eluru, Mustafanagar, and Murtazanagar—were controlled by *deshmukhs*

[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid. On 17 December (old style) Mustafa Quli Khan 'sent one of his braminys and maldars [soldiers] with a Rocca [order] to adjust ye town accts. between us and ye late avaldar'.

[3] 'Govindappa Chief Govr. of these parts and 2d Braminy to ye Sier Lascar' Vizagapatam, 'Consultations', 24 Sept. 1693. For Mir Jafar see ibid., 13 May 1695.

[4] e.g. 'Bolall Raws ye great Raja of Comely who pays ye Sier Lascar 40,000 Rups. yearly for ye Rent of his Country', ibid., 21 Oct. 1693.

[5] *RFSG: Diary*, 2 and 7 Apr. 1694, p. 34. 'Cornu Caularee' was referred to specifically as a Brahmin.

[6] Vizagapatam, 'Consultations', 26 Oct. 1693.

who belonged to the Telugu warrior castes. For example, members of the Koldinder Razu family of Mogulturru were *deshmukhs* in Eluru district.

Mustafa Quil Khan's closest associates—the confidants, advisers, and subordinates who were in constant contact with him—were largely local men, non-Muslims who were not *mansabdars*. His accountant and chief adviser was 'Atchana', a Telugu Brahmin as was Govindappa, another adviser and governor of Srikakulam in the *faujdar*'s absence.[1] 'Gatcheraz', probably a Razu soldier, was Mustafa Quli Khan's *bakhshi*. (He may have held a *mansab* in this position.[2]) Bairam Sahib, son of Sayyid Abdullah, the Golconda officer who was Mustafa Quli Khan's predecessor as *faujdar* of Sikakul, was another member of the *faujdar*'s entourage.[3] The banker and money-changer 'Shroff Surappa' was another confidant, constantly in the *faujdar*'s company, who provided financial advice and services.[4]

This essentially irregular form of administration continued for seven years without any interference from the fully occupied provincial headquarters at Hyderabad. Mustafa Quli Khan ignored the provincial governor and *divan* and submitted his reports and made his tax payments directly to the emperor. In his own territory the *faujdar* appointed, removed, and supervised his subordinates as he saw fit. He continued the Golconda practice of giving a single individual both general administrative duties and fiscal responsibilities instead of adopting the Mughal policy of separation. He sublet tax-farms of the major towns and profited by the practice. Scrupulous attention to the emperor's orders and regular shipments of funds to the emperor's camp preserved his autonomy for several years.[5]

The first real challenge to Mustafa Quli Khan came in October 1694. The Hyderabad governor, Jan Sipar Khan, sent one of his accountants to Srikakulam with a sharp demand for the reports

[1] Vizagapatam, 'Consultations', 28 June 1694. *Ibid.*, 12 Dec. 1693.

[2] *Ibid.*, 25 June 1694. The English corruption is 'Buchshaw'.

[3] Ibid., 18 Aug. 1694. [4] Ibid., 21 Mar. 1694.

[5] Mustafa Quli Khan seems to have been especially careful to take account of the emperor's attitudes. When two Dutch converts to Islam fled from the *faujdar*'s service, Mustafa Quli Khan suspected the British of harbouring them. He wrote to Holcombe at Vishakapatnam and 'ordered ye returning ym to prevent further trouble ye Mogull [Aurangzeb] being very zealous in converting people to his faith and therefore he would highly resent it' if the fugitives were concealed. Vizagapatam, 'Consultations', 10 Jan. 1694.

required by regulations, now in arrears for the past four or five years. Mustafa Quli Khan immediately sent an imperial mace-bearer (i.e. messenger) to Hyderabad to give the governor an account of the 'position of affairs' in the coastal districts.[1] But this was only the opening round in what rapidly became a bitter factional struggle for control of Andhra. Jan Sipar Khan, still dissatisfied, was determined to gain effective jurisdiction over all parts of Hyderabad. The next year, when Mustafa Quli Khan's position was badly weakened by a widespread revolt, the governor assailed the oppression and maladministration of Mustafa Quli Khan in a letter to the emperor. Jan Sipar Khan tried unsuccessfully to suggest the replacement of Mustafa Quli Khan by Rustam Dil Khan, the governor's son.[2] Eventually, after the death of Mustafa Quli Khan, the Hyderabad governor managed to displace his son and successor and put his own man in as *faujdar* of Sikakul. Victory in this conflict went to the governor and his son, members of a long-established Mughal family; defeat was the result for the Deccani *faujdar* and his son, who were comparative new-comers to the imperial service. By 1700 the way was cleared for a more formal, conventional style of administration on the coast.

OTHER MANSABDARS

A few *mansabdars* served in Hyderabad in a purely military capacity. The emperor did not give these men a specific job like the *faujdars* but attached them to Jan Sipar Khan. The governor either kept these officers at the capital or sent them with Rustam Dil Khan on his frequent expeditions. The horsemen they led supplied a small, but undoubtedly welcome increment to the provincial army. The most prominent of these unattached *mansabdars* was a man called Muhammad Taqi (1000/300), a Deccani who served in Hyderabad from 1687 to at least 1702 and perhaps longer. Together with his son, Sayyid Ali (500/100), Muhammad Taqi placed approximately eighty to eighty-five horsemen at the governor's disposal. He and his son controlled *jagirs* with receipts of 44,000 rupees located near the capital in three adjoining *parganas* in Devarkonda and Bhongir districts. The fact that neither the two

[1] Ibid., 21 Oct. 1694.
[2] Akh XLIII (19 Zelhejja), 111. For details of this conflict see my article "Mughal Retreat from Coastal Andhra". (Forthcoming.)

officers nor their two *jagirs* were permanently transferred in over fifteen years attests to their usefulness in the eyes of the governor.

Documents relating to Muhammad Taqi's long career in Hyderabad give us an exceptional look at the operation of the provincial *bakhshi*'s office.[1] The primary job of the *bakhshi* was to maintain the efficiency and strength of the cavalry. His office, in conjunction with the revenue office, enforced the elaborate rules for branding of horses, identification of men, routine inspections, and authorization for assignment of *jagirs* or cash salaries. Those *mansabdars* who could not produce the required number of horsemen at inspections lost their *jagirs* or their salary payments until they made good the deficiency. Those officers who did not appear for campaigns with the stipulated number of followers also had their *jagirs* confiscated.

In 1694 the *diwan* of Hyderabad, acting with the approval of the *diwan* of the Deccan, seized Muhammad Taqi's *jagirs* 'because of inadequate evidence of branding' from the *bakhshi*. Several months later Muhammad Taqi obtained a branding certificate for the horses of his followers from the accountants (*mutasaddian*) of Hyderabad. When his agent reported this to the *diwan* of the Deccan at Aurangabad, Muhammad Taqi regained his *jagirs*.[2]

Eight years later, in 1702, a similar sequence of events took place. Rustam Dil Khan, the deputy governor, reported to the *diwan* of the Deccan that Muhammad Taqi's followers (*tabinan*) were not present for duty in the specified numbers. The *diwan* immediately transferred Muhammad Taqi's *jagir* lands to the pool of territories awaiting reassignment (*paibaqi*). On this occasion, over a year passed before Muhammad Taqi brought his contingent to full strength. Finally, the *diwan* received a document bearing the seals of the *bakhshi* of Hyderabad and Rustam Dil Khan certifying that Muhammad Taqi had 61 horsemen present (*mujudat*). This was only three short of the 64 horsemen demanded on the one-fourth rule for his *suwar* rank of 300 (at five months). His son, Sayyid Ali, mustered 22 horsemen, which was the correct number for his rank of 100 *suwar* at five months. Once again proof of con-

[1] Exceptional only in the sense that most of the papers surviving from Hyderabad in the Inayat Jang Collection are from the *diwan*'s office rather than from the office of the provincial *bakhshi*.

[2] I.J. Coll. I/11/106; I/11/128.

formity to the regulations brought release of Muhammad Taqi's *jagirs* to him.[1]

This case (and a number of others) amply demonstrates that the Mughal inspection system was in full operation in Hyderabad during Jan Sipar Khan's governorship. The former stringent policy of frequent transfers faltered and allowed this former Bijapur or Golconda noble to cling tenaciously to a nascent fief in Hyderabad. But, despite this, Muhammad Taqi could not successfully evade his military obligations. Obviously there were delays and the usual bureaucratic hitches in the system which meant that some contingents would be temporarily below strength. Nevertheless, blatant violations of the regulations were rigidly and automatically checked.

TOTAL MILITARY STRENGTH IN HYDERABAD

Unfortunately, a detailed contemporary description, official or unofficial, of the provincial army in Hyderabad has not survived. However, it is possible to make a reasonable estimate from the data previously presented. Table VII shows the authorized strength and annual cost of the most important components of the Mughal forces permanently stationed in Hyderabad by 1700

As the table reveals, the revenues allocated for military purposes in Hyderabad were modest. Annual expenditure on the pay of the governor and other officers at the capital (i.e. the principal *faujdars*, fort commandants, their followers, the musketeers, and the fort garrisons) amounted to just over two million rupees. Additional costs for salaries of a few *mansabdars* not included in the listing as well as for field artillery, supplies, and munitions undoubtedly raised the total but it is evident that military expenses were only a fraction of the normal revenues of the province. This modest expenditure supported an equally modest provincial army. Regular

[1] I J. Coll., I/19/1277. Muhammad Taqi and Sayyid Ali held a *jagir* in Charkonda *pargana*, Devarkonda district, valued at 46,125 rupees *jama* and 19,220 *hasil* for their personal salaries. They also held three assignments for the salaries of their horsemen which had receipts totalling 24,909 rupees. These were in Charkonda and Velchal *parganas* in Devarkonda district and in Rajkonda in Bhongir district. The minimum cash salary for 83 (61 + 22) horsemen at 25 rupees per month would have been 24,900 rupees a year and for 86 horsemen, 25,800 rupees annually. Because Muhammad Taqi's entire pay claim was subject to an automatic 25% deduction, he was only obliged to meet the 'one-fourth' rule for his horsemen instead of the rule of one-third. This must have been the case for other Deccani *mansabdars* as well.

Table VII

Total Estimated Annual Pay Bill for Executive/Military Establishment

	Jama'			Cavalry		Com-man-ders	Infan-try
	Dams	Rupees	Receipts	Men	Horses		
(1) Governor and Son	44,400,000	1,111,000	737,039	1,534	1,673	2	
(2) Central officials	9,438,000	235,950	130,233	269	269	5	
(3) *Faujdars*	42,049,160	1,051,229	465,724	1,267	1,279	8	
(4) Fort Commanders (12); average at 1,620,000 *dams* and 34 men	19,440,000*	486,000*	243,000	408	408	12	
(5) Fort Garrisons	18,746,800*	468,670*	234,335				4,268
(6) Musketeers	23,520,000*	588,000*	294,000				5,000
Total	158,353,960	3,958,849	2,104,331	3,478	3,628	27	9,268

* *Jagir* estimated at 6 months receipts.

cavalry employed by *mansabdars* could not have exceeded 5,000 horsemen. Infantry of all descriptions totalled 10,000 to 12,000 men. The governor must have had some form of field artillery under his command but there is no specific reference to a central artillery park. Moreover, these are normative figures; numbers based on maximum strength in reality must have been considerably lower.

Such evidence as is available suggests that the infantry at the capital and in the forts was most deficient in this regard. Rigid operation of the inspection system seems to have kept the cavalry at close to the authorized level. For example, in 1691, Jan Sipar Khan collected a force estimated at 5,000 horsemen to defend Hyderabad against a Maratha army of twice that number.[1] We may infer from this estimate that the governor's mounted forces were at nearly full strength at this point in time. In later years, Rustam Dil Khan's expeditions against *zamindars* and extended campaigns against the Marathas confirm that the governor could assemble cavalry enough for aggressive as well as purely defensive action. This picture accurately reflects the Mughal military bias: infantry was necessary, but for more than a century the imperial

[1] *RFSG: Diary*, 5 Dec. 1691, p. 53.

cavalry had repeatedly and easily beaten Rajputs, Afghans, Marathas, or any other purely regional forces in the entire subcontinent.

Nevertheless, even at full strength, Mughal cavalry forces in Hyderabad had declined dramatically from the numbers employed under the Qutb Shahs. Contemporary observers put the number of state-employed cavalry quartered in the capital as high as 80,000 horsemen. In the last months of the kingdom, Abul Hasan fielded an army of 30,000 horsemen.[1] The new ruling group in Hyderabad could not rely on the same massive, immediately visible, overwhelming force for its security.

An equally serious decline seems to have taken place in the fortress garrisons. For example, in the 1660s 3,000 to 4,000 Telugu infantry manned the enormous fortifications at Kondapalli, just north of the Krishna. The authorized garrison in 1702 under the Mughals was only 300 men, and only twenty-seven of these were on duty. Reduction of the garrisons to barely a tenth of the size under Golconda, compounded by what appears to be frequent neglect and maladministration, was the most dangerous flaw in the military administration of Hyderabad.

From the Mughal emperor's perspective at the end of 1687, his military arrangements for Hyderabad were undoubtedly reasonable. Successes in Rajasthan, Bijapur, and now Golconda had demonstrated the true strength of the empire. Soon, after he dealt with the Marathas, Hyderabad would become a peaceful, well-governed province in that empire. Any need for the immense army kept up by the Qutb Shahs would disappear. Several thousand imperial cavalry was sufficient to put down all but the most serious revolts by *zamindars* since reinforcements could be readily supplied to the governor in an emergency. But, as events were to prove, normality was elusive. On repeated occasions the governors of Hyderabad faced simultaneous internal rebellions and shattering raids launched from outside the borders of the province. The existing provincial forces could not cope with such dual danger without assistance. By 1700, as Aurangzeb's difficulties with the Marathas in the western Deccan multiplied, that assistance was very slow in coming to Hyderabad, if it came at all.

[1] Manucci, II. 306. Manucci's estimate is supported by Dutch observers at Golconda who reported that Abul Hasan's army in 1685 consisted of 30,000 horsemen. The troopers were paid six months in advance to encourage them to fight against the Mughals. K.A. 1300 (16 11.1685), fol. 243.

VI


The Mughal Conquerors and the Regional Aristocracy

THE first, most pressing, business for the new rulers of Golconda was restoration of order. In nearly every district the regional aristocracy, or in Mughal terminology the *zamindars*, were engaged in military operations.[1] Leading figures in the various Telugu warrior families dominant in each district were either in open conflict with the Mughal forces, or they were busy plundering the hapless peasantry and merchants within their reach.[2]

After pacification, the next step was re-establishment of a political link between Hyderabad and the *zamindars*. The regionally focused political system of the Qutb Shahs had been based on a mixture of the threat of overwhelming military power and the rewards of undisturbed local dominance plus the opportunity for prestigious service of the state. Could this arrangement be reconstructed within Hyderabad? Or, would it be necessary to assimilate some of the leading *zamindars* directly into the Mughal official service as *mansabdars*? As Aurangzeb undoubtedly realized, resolution of this question was the single most important

[1] Hereafter the term 'regional aristocracy' will be synonymous with *zamindars*. The term *zamindar* (lit. 'landholder' in Persian) is one of the most difficult terms used in Indian history. The Mughals applied this term to a segment of Indian society found all over the empire. *Zamindars*, as a group, had these common characteristics: (1) they were primarily a rural group who held power over land; (2) this was hereditary local power acquired, in most cases by conquest, and held through generations; (3) they had an ascriptive, legitimate right to claim a share in the surplus produce of the peasantry; (4) they were linked by kinship ties in a network of families and lineages dominant in a single region, often a *pargana* or subdistrict; (5) this local despotism was maintained by possession of armed power in the form of troops and fortresses, some of these troops being kinsmen, some not; (6) the position of the *zamindars* was also strengthened by the fact that they had the closest possible identification with the language, customs, and religion of the local population. This description is based on Habib, pp. 136–89, esp. pp. 167–8. The Mughals also applied the term *zamindar* to all tributary chiefs, rajas, and kings, no matter how powerful.

[2] Cf. Condaved, p. 50, for one example of the plundering activities of the *zamindars*.



MAP 4. Important *Zamindars* in the Eastern Deccan

issue which he faced in dealing with the 'new lands' of the eastern Deccan. Mistakes and failures in dealing with the regional aristocracy could obstruct and seriously delay successful absorption of the region into the empire.

EXTERNAL THREATS: THE MARATHAS

Before coming to terms with the Telugu *zamindars* in Hyderabad, the new Mughal administration first had to discourage attacks by the wide-ranging regional aristocracy of the western provinces: the Marathas. Aurangzeb's victory in late 1687 dissolved the Qutb Shah–Bhonsle alliance and opened the territories of Golconda to attack. During the first four years under the Mughals, Maratha armies made several raids in force against the very centre

of the province, in and around the capital. On each occasion, the provincial governor, finding his forces severely outnumbered, could do little to stop the raiders.

Early in 1688 a Maratha army plundered the countryside near Hyderabad without any challenge from Ruhullah Khan, the temporary governor.[1] Again in 1691 Jan Sipar Khan stayed prudently in Golconda fort while a Maratha force of 10,000 horsemen devastated the villages of Telengana.[2] In April 1692 the Dutch received reports from their factory at Machilipatnam that Maratha bands sent by Ram Raja, the Maratha king, joined by riders under Pidia Nayak, the Bedar chief of Wakinkira, plundered daily in the 'uplands' (*bovenlanden*) not far from the capital.[3] The invaders extorted funds from the inhabitants and robbed many merchants on the roads to the general distraction of trade.

The feebleness of Jan Sipar Khan's reactions to these incursions reflects the general weakness of the Mughal position in Golconda in the early 1690s. A wave of revolts had swept the coastal territories from the southern boundaries of the Karnatik as far north as the Orissan border. The governor could obtain no assistance from the *faujdars* in these areas, many of whom were in flight. The emperor was more concerned to relieve the more critical situation in the Karnatik and Andhra than he was to assist Jan Sipar Khan. It appears that the governor was not in immediate danger of being driven out of Hyderabad as long as he clung to the shelter of Golconda fort. For the Maratha forays did not, as yet, directly challenge the Mughal occupation of Golconda. Instead, as the many discomfited peasants and merchants assaulted by the Marathas would attest, the raiders were more interested in immediate gains from looting than in formal conquest.

Suddenly, after 1692, Maratha pressure on Hyderabad eased. For the remaining eight years of Jan Sipar Khan's governorship, until 1700, all twenty districts north of the Krishna and Gundlekamma had a period of relative calm. The cause of this reprieve was the emergence of Jinji, the great triple fortress south of Madras, as the focal point for the Mughal–Maratha war. When Shivaji's surviving son, Ram Raja, fled to Jinji in 1692, the emperor sent a large Mughal army to capture him. For the better part of a decade

[1] See above, Chapter IV, p. 68.
[2] *RFSG: Diary*, 5 Dec. 1691, p. 53. Martin, III. 47.
[3] K.A. 1408 (25.4.1692), fol. 697.

the conflict raged in the Karnatik, but left Hyderabad relatively immune from outside attacks.[1]

Only one brush with the Marathas occurred in the early months of 1695. The noted Maratha general, Santaji, was reported to be moving north toward Hyderabad after raiding the Bijapur Karnatik and capturing its *faujdar*.[2] The emperor ordered Rustam Dil Khan and Rai Bindraban, *faujdar* and *amin* of Elgandel, to march to assist Himmat Khan, the Mughal commander, in pursuit of the Maratha force. Rustam Dil Khan was allowed to enlist 500 additional temporary cavalry (*sih bandi*) at 25 rupees a month to augment his own followers for this expedition.[3] Before the Hyderabad forces reached Himmat Khan, Santaji had trapped, ambushed, and killed his pursuer and scattered his forces. Rustam Dil Khan prudently avoided an open battle with the redoubtable general and followed the Maratha army south along the coast to Jinji. Here he spent some time with the imperial army at the siege before returning to Hyderabad.[4] Despite the inglorious end to this expedition, the fact that it was mounted at all shows a decided improvement in Jan Sipar Khan's position by the mid-1690s.

TELENGANA: RESTORATION OF HYDERABAD'S DOMINANT AUTHORITY

For several years after the departure of the emperor Aurangzeb in early 1688, Mughal authority in interior Hyderabad was challenged almost as severely as in the Karnatik or the northern coast. Revolts and disturbances by many *zamindars*, in addition to the annual Maratha assaults, hampered recovery of trade and industrial and agricultural production. Continued disorder, as well as disconcerting memories of the turbulent events of the conquest, made the new subjects of the empire uncertain and fearful.[5] At last, towards the end of 1691, a degree of stability returned when the governor and his subordinates began to win battles with *zamindars*.

A notable success occurred in October 1691, when Rustam Dil

[1] In 1697 the Dutch at Negapatnam contrasted the peacefulness of Hyderabad with the desolation caused by the Mughal–Maratha encounters in the Karnatik K.A. 1480 (23.12.1697), fol. 5

[2] Duff, I. 208–9. [3] Akh., XXXIX (28 Shaban), p. 193.

[4] Akh., XL (4 Ramzan), p. 11. K.A. 1471 (10.8.1696) fol. 30. Duff, I 292.

[5] K.A. 1376 (23.7.1690), fols. 110–11, has a short description of conditions in Hyderabad at this time.

Khan, the governor's son, captured Venkat Rao, *deshmukh* of Paulas, a *pargana* in Elgandel district.[1] Venkat Rao, 'the malefactor' (*mufisid*), had destroyed many villages and ruined their inhabitants by his plundering and burning. In this instance, before sending his prize on to the emperor, Rustam Dil Khan extorted 13,000 gold *hun*, 25,000 silver rupees, jewels, horses, and camels from Venkat Rao. The helpless *zamindar* agreed to this payment on the understanding that, if he did so, Rustam Dil Khan would ensure his personal safety at court. But on arriving at Aurangzeb's court, Venkat Rao discovered that he was in considerable danger, contrary to his captor's promises. In order to forestall his immediate execution the indignant Telugu chief converted to Islam. Yet, even after taking this step, the emperor sent him off to captivity in Bijapur fort. Eventually, the imprisoned Telugu *zamindar*'s loud complaints reached Aurangzeb, who ordered an investigation. When Venkat Rao's account proved to be true, the emperor forced Rustam Dil Khan to transfer all the money and goods that he obtained from his prisoner into the imperial treasury.[2] Although we do not know whether the success of his complaints earned Venkat Rao a release from Bijapur fort, the few facts which are available suggest the kinds of inconsistencies and difficulties which were present for the Telugu *zamindars* of Telengana in dealing with an imperial administrative system. Venkat Rao offered his captor what was tribute. It is likely that under the Qutb Shahs (or a similar regional system) such a payment, accompanied by suitable protestations of future good behaviour, would have won Venkat Rao his freedom and restoration to Paulas as a *deshmukh*. Instead, neither Rustam Dil Khan nor his father, the governor of Hyderabad, could make a final decision on his fate, but were forced to send him to the emperor. Here the immediate and harsh decision was for execution—prevented only by Venkat Rao's conversion to Islam. In this instance, at least, the opportunity to restore personal loyalties between Telugu chief and ruler was lost.

By May 1692 the emperor, after receiving reports of other successful encounters with *zamindars*, was confident enough to order

[1] Paulas is located about 120 miles north-east of Hyderabad at approximately 78°57′ and 18°50′. Venkat Rao was listed as *deshmukh* of Paulas in the first roll of local officials, I.J. Coll., I/1/17.

[2] K.A. 1408 (25.4.1692), fol. 697; I.J. Coll., I/11/282.

a full-scale military expedition against one of the most formidable Telugu rajas.[1] Anand Ashwa Rao, 'zamindar of *samat* Paloncha', was a Valama chief whose family had controlled a large block of territory in the hills of Khammamett district since the Kakatiya period. Independent and powerful, with a large army at his command, the Raja of Paloncha had not yet submitted to the Mughals and was in rebellion. Under direct orders from the emperor, Rustam Dil Khan gathered 4,000 musketeers and a large number of cavalry and marched to Paloncha. There, Mustafa Quli Khan, *faujdar* of Sikakul, was ordered to meet him with another army. Although the Dutch observers had predicted that this operation would run into serious difficulties because of the strength of Anand Rao's army, it appears that he chose to settle on terms rather than fight. At a meeting with Rustam Dil Khan, Anand Rao gave a verbal commitment to pay 50,000 rupees tribute or *peshkash* into the imperial treasury. Two years later the provincial *diwan* recorded receipt of the full 50,000 rupees from Anand Rao.[2] In this case the emperor evidently decided, because of the remoteness of Anand Rao's territories in Khammamett district, to treat him simply as a tributary raja. No attempt was made to define his role by calling him a *deshmukh* or *muniwar*.

Concurrent with the military operations of Rustam Dil Khan against the *zamindars*, the provincial *diwan* was engaged in meeting, formally recognizing, and settling terms of service for the semi-hereditary *muniwars*, *deshmukhs*, and *deshpands*.[3] Although the *diwan* was primarily concerned to restore an essential link in the revenue chain, the appointment of these local officials was an important political step as well. This was especially true in Telengana, unlike Andhra, because in the interior the Mughals dealt directly with the *deshmukhs* and *deshpands* of over a hundred individual *parganas*. In every district (with what appears to be the exception of Khammamett and Nalgonda) the *diwan*, acting for the emperor, gave a written confirmation of appointment and demanded signature of a standard bond for the remainder of the appointment fee after the initial deposit, if any, was collected. The Reddis, Valamas, and Brahmins who accepted the emperor's *sanad*

[1] K.A. 1408 (25.4.1692), fol. 698.

[2] I.J. Coll. I/12/338, I/16/625. Payment was made with 49,088 rupees and uncoined silver worth 912 rupees.

[3] See Chapter VII, pp. 138–147.

were, in fact, committing themselves and their followers to the ... regime. Those *zamindars* still in revolt, such as Venkat Ra... Paulas before his capture, did not become *deshmukhs*. Becoming *deshmukh* was a political act which openly aligned the individual *zamindar* with the Hyderabad administration.

Because this was not a routine administrative procedure, but involved questions of political loyalty and commitment ... scattered, locally entrenched warrior/aristocrats, the process of signing up *deshmukhs* and *deshpands* extended over seven ... years. By the end of this period most of the *pargana* officials ... formally installed in office—even though many still owed ... stantial arrears on their appointment fees. Others were still recalcitrant. In 1697 Bhim Reddi, a *zamindar* of Ghanpura district, sent Murarui, his Brahmin agent (*vakil*) to Rustam Dil Khan with the proposal that he, Bhim Reddi, be appointed *deshmukh* ... Kandur *pargana*, a position held by his ancestors. The incumbent, Jaka Reddi, had been named in the initial list of *deshmukhs* but instead of signing a bond had merely made a verbal commitment which he had since repudiated. Jaka Reddi was now in rebellion. Bhim Reddi offered to populate the district, make it inhabited and prosperous, and to pay 20,000 rupees *peshkash* for the award of the office.[1] In accepting this offer Rustam Dil Khan used internecine rivalries to secure co-operation from the *zamindars*, while simultaneously extracting a profit for the treasury. In this, and in similar situations described below for Kondavidu, disunity among *zamindars* made it unnecessary for the state to use its full military power against every rebel. Still, this could not have been possible without growing recognition by the Telugu warrior aristocracy of the reality of Mughal power. Otherwise, the emperor's patent for a *deshmukh*'s position would have had little meaning, much less a value of 20,000 rupees.

Other indicators of resurgent state power in Telengana also exist. While some *deshmukhs* and *deshpands* were still rebels,

[1] Asafia Scroll, Document no. 2. Jaka Reddi's name appears in I.J. Coll., I/1/17. Kandur *pargana* could have been present-day Koder, located near Ghanpura south-east of Hyderabad. The *pargana* had approximately fifty villages with a fixed *jama'* of 127,500 rupees and 50% *hasil* of 63,862 rupees. The provincial *diwan* raised the revenue demand 23% from an original *hasil* of 52,084 rupees after he received new information about the villages of the *pargana* in the 1689 settlement. This may have been part of the reason for Jaka Reddi's intransigence. I.J. Coll., I/7/98.

others decided to use the state to further [illegible] Rao held *deshmukh* rights to one half of [illegible] Koilkonda district. The other half belonged to [illegible] Kapu chief. *In 1690 Nirmal Rao* obtained official [illegible] purchase of the *deshmukh* rights belonging to [illegible] paid 1,771 rupees of the total 4,850-rupee [illegible] manded from the *deshmukhs* of Nurkol *pargana*, [illegible] new *bond for* the remainder, and received a [illegible] *mukh* over the entire *pargana*.[1]

Especially significant in this transaction is the sale of [illegible] rights with official approval. That the new administrat[illegible] allow such transfers of office and, by implication, at least [illegible] would enforce contracts of this type, are developments parallel to those more extensively documented for the entire seventeenth cen tury in the North Indian provinces of the Mughal empire.[2] It is unclear, because of deficiencies in the pre-1687 sources, whether or not this was a new practice associated with the Mughals, or whether it was also in evidence under the Qutb Shahs. In either case, in Mughal Hyderabad, the transfer of local offices could be initiated by *deshmukhs* wishing to expand their responsibilities, who could, if they got official sanction, buy out other *deshmukhs* or *deshpands*. This implies that the state had begun by the latter part of the seventeenth century to close off the possibility of local ex- pansion by armed aggression or militant colonization, which were the normal means for territorial expansion by aggressive warrior families. Armed expansion might still take place, but now a peace- ful alternative existed as well. By accepting this restriction and by acquiring the remaining *deshmukh* rights to Nurkol *pargana* through a cash purchase (which must have been equivalent at least to the capitalized annual value of 650 rupees times the yearly allowance), Nirmal Rao was testifying to his confidence in the strength of the Mughals in Hyderabad. In 1690 Nirmal Rao seemed confident that the Mughal empire would be in control of Hyderabad in the foreseeable future.[3]

[1] I.J. Coll., 1/6/48; 1/6/50 deshmukhs fees 2-1/2%, or 325 rupees for a half share. Unfortunately the purchase price paid by Nirmal Rao is not given in the text of the bond which survives.

[2] *Cf.* Habib, pp. 158–9.

[3] Another example of the sale of local offices appears in I.J. Coll., 1/16/630. In the 39th regnal year Gopal Kishen and Sahib Rai purchased two-thirds of the *deshpand* rights in Ibrahimpatan *pargana*, Devarkonda district.

TELENGANA: THE VALAMAS OF JATPOL

The Mughals did achieve one immediate success in their dealings with the regional aristocracy of Hyderabad. The provincial administration won active co-operation from the powerful Recarla Valamas of Pangal district, south of Hyderabad. Gopal Rao, the head of the family, was a descendant of Annapota Naidu, the famous thirteenth-century Telugu warrior/king. The administrative arrangements in Pangal district inherited by the new regime in 1687 reflect the military, political, and social dominance of Gopal Rao in that area. According to the list of local officials drawn up by the *diwan*'s office just after annexation, Gopal Rao and his sons held the principal local offices in three of the four *parganas* of the district: Gopal Rao was simultaneously *deshmukh* and *muniwar* for both the *hawili pargana* (surrounding Pangal fort and town) and for Kothakota *pargana* (centred on Kothakota town which is located on the main route south from Hyderabad city to the Karnatik). Gopal Rao's three sons, Nirmal Rao, Narain Rao, and Nur Singh Rao, acted jointly as *deshmukhs* for Jatpol *pargana* (Jatpol town is just a few miles north of the Krishna river). The same man, Tima Rao, acted as *deshpand* for *hawili* Pangal, Kothakota, and Jatpol *parganas*, i.e. for all those controlled by the family.[1] Assessed annual taxes under the Qutb Shahs were 26,777 gold *hun* for Jatpol and *hawili* Pangal *parganas* and 50,000 gold *hun* on Kothakota *pargana*, the headquarters of Gopal Rao.[2]

In evolving these arrangements, the Golconda administration had recognized and affirmed Gopal Rao's predominant position in Pangal district; but at the same time it defined and limited his powers. More important than an ordinary *deshmukh* dominant in a single *pargana*, Gopal Rao was not a prince who possessed the autonomy implied by the payment of straightforward tribute (like Anand Rao of Paloncha). He occupied, instead, an intermediate status somewhere between the two. The ambiguity of the Valama raja's position reflects the flexibility of the Golconda agrarian system. By asserting its powers and circumscribing Gopal Rao's freedom of action, the state ensured that it would extract a tax more closely allied to the productive capacity of Pangal district

[1] I.J. Coll., I/1/15.


[2] I.J. Coll., I/7/74; I/7/97. Two Reddi chiefs were joint *deshmukhs* of the fourth *pargana* in the district which paid another 36,000 *hun*.

than a simple payment of tribute would produce. But, at the same time, it left most of the burden of administration and revenue collection to Gopal Rao and his sons.

Just a year after the overthrow of Abul Hasan, the Valamas of Jatpol and the Mughals negotiated new agreements satisfactory to both sides. In mid-September 1688 the provincial *diwan*, Muhammad Shafi, met the three sons of Gopal Rao and reappointed them as joint *deshmukhs* of the greater part of Jatpol *pargana*. To keep their position, the three brothers were forced to agree to an enormous 336 per cent increase on the assessed revenues of their *pargana*.[1] They paid 750 rupees of the total 20,750 rupees demanded as an appointment fee. Three days later the *diwan* interviewed Gopal Rao, and another of his sons, Gopalin Rao. At this meeting the Hyderabad *diwan* gave Gopal Rao a *sanad* which confirmed him in his position as *deshmukh* of Kothakota, *hawili* Pangal, and the remainder of Jatpol *parganas*. The assessed revenue did not change on these holdings. Gopal Rao paid 3,750 rupees in cash and executed a bond for the remainder of his appointment fee (37,150).[2] Thus far, these agreements, apart from the massive tax increase, were very similar to those in force. Muhammad Shafi's most significant innovation was in regard to the position of *muniwar*. The *diwan* placed all *muniwar* responsibilities in the hands of Gopalin Rao. Muhammad Shafi also raised the *parganas* under Gopalin Rao's jurisdiction from three to ten. He became *muniwar* for *hawili* Pangal and Nakul Kandul *parganas* in the district, as well as for eight other *parganas* located in four other districts. The ten contiguous *parganas* to which Gopalin Rao's jurisdiction as *muniwar* extended formed a block of territory containing as many as 400 villages which stretched from fifty miles south of the capital to the banks of the Krishna river (see map 5). To obtain this concession, Gopalin Rao signed a bond which obliged him to pay a total of 100,000 rupees *peshkash*, and deposited 5,500 rupees in cash toward the total.[3]

At first glance, Gopal Rao and his sons seem to have paid dearly for their *sanads* from the provincial *diwan*. The Valama chiefs had handed over a total of 10,000 rupees in cash and executed formal, written agreements to pay another 147,900 rupees. In addition, they had accepted a threefold increase in the taxes assessed on Jatpol *pargana*. The 'established collections' for Jatpol shot up

[1] I.J. Coll., I/16/606. [2] Ibid., I/16/605. [3] Ibid., I/16/806.



MAP 5. Identifiable *Parganas* under Gopalin Rao, A.D. 1688

from 28,890 rupees to 129,375 rupees. Collections which had averaged only 400 rupees from each of the seventy-odd villages in the *pargana* would now be around 1,800 rupees yearly. Total tax collections from Pangal district would rise by 30 per cent from 339,099 to 439,583 rupees each year because of the increase in Jatpol *pargana* alone.[1] Formal fiscal returns, while large, did not seem to repay the combined costs of the appointment fees and the increase in taxes for Jatpol. The allowance (*rasum*) on the revenue for each of the positions held by members of the family would total only 20,000 rupees per year. A much more significant motive appears to have been the opportunity for sudden territorial aggrandizement beyond the boundaries of Pangal district.

Gopalin Rao acquired, at one stroke in 1688, state-supported and state-encouraged authority over an additional eight-*pargana* area, with assessed tax revenues one and a half times those in the *parganas* directly under his family's control in 1687. As *muniwar* he would be responsible for recruitment and deployment of an armed force to maintain public order over the ten *parganas* to which he was appointed. This included the policing of major roads, important markets, and towns. If the Mughals followed traditional practice Gopalin Rao would also receive rights to cer-

[1] Ibid., I/7/74; I/7/77.

tain tax-free lands in villages throughout the *parganas* under his jurisdiction.

Appointment of a *muniwar* over territories this extensive deviates somewhat from the normal pattern of Mughal administration. In adopting and utilizing a regional institution peculiar to the eastern Deccan, the Mughals were accepting a decentralized alternative to regulation administration. The distribution of *faujdars* in Hyderabad after 1688 suggests that no *faujdar* was directly responsible for the block of territory in which Gopalin Rao was *muniwar*. To the west, the closest *faujdar* was at Kovir in Koilkonda district, to the north at the capital itself, and to the east, Indurti in Devarkonda district.[1] The fort commanders, stationed at nearby Ghanpura and Pangal forts, might monitor the activities of Gopalin Rao, but they had only limited territorial responsibilities. In short, Gopalin Rao seems to have been left to carry out the magisterial, police, and military duties normally assigned a *faujdar*.

The benefits to the Hyderabad administration which accrued from this expedient were considerable: a large chunk of territory in Telengana was cheaply administered, an important local *zamindar* was committed to collaboration with the regime instead of rebellion, and the strain on the over-extended corps of *mansabdars* was lessened. At the same time the Mughals did not sacrifice either administrative control or revenues as radically as would have been necessary in the case of territories left to a tributary chief. Any disadvantages would appear if the Hyderabad administration experienced difficulties or weakness, and the Valamas of Jatpol and Kothakota began to see advantages in rebellion rather than collaboration.

A few years later the possibility of serious trouble with the Valamas of Jatpol does appear in the Mughal records. Nur Singh Rao, one of the sons of Gopal Rao, had emerged as a dominant figure in the family. However, his formal position as one of three *deshmukhs* over Jatpol *pargana*, may not have suited his ambition and talents. Six years after the original agreements were signed with the Mughals, Nur Singh Rao had begun illegal raiding to the south of the Krishna river in Ganjikota district, the site of a major fortress in the Hyderabad Karnatik. In early 1694 Nur Singh Rao, at the head of a force estimated at 100 horsemen and 6,000 infantry, captured a Mughal mace-bearer who was bringing cash to

[1] See map, Chapter V, p. 94.

be deposited in the treasury of Ganjikota fort. The Valama *zamindar* took all the cash as well as some supplies destined for the fort, and kept the mace-bearer imprisoned for two months before he released him.[1] However, a clash was avoided. In 1697 Nur Singh Rao, '*zamindar* of Jatpol', submitted a petition to the Mughal emperor. In this document the petitioner informed Aurangzeb that no local officials, either *deshmukhs* or *deshpands*, were appointed in either of two *parganas*: Ganjikota or Sikakul. Therefore, Nur Singh Rao asked for his own appointment as *deshpand* for each of these two *parganas*. He also requested that his associate, Kishen Rao (perhaps another member of the family), be named *deshmukh* for the same two *parganas*. In return for favourable action on his request Nur Singh Rao offered to pay 15,000 rupees into the imperial treasury within one year. This amount was intended to remove part of the outstanding arrears on the appointment fees owed by Nur Singh Rao and his brothers and father for their offices in Pangal district.[2]

A report from the office of the *diwan* of the Deccan on this request (given on the back of the document) states that Nur Singh Rao's information about Ganjikota was entirely correct. No current revenue accounts had been received from that *pargana*; not did anyone hold the office of *deshmukh* or *deshpand*. As for Sikakul, the *faujdar*, Mustafa Quli Khan, had submitted a list which named a *deshmukh* and a *deshpand* for the northern part of the area, but only a *deshpand* for the southern portion of the area beyond the Godavari. According to the revenue office files the established collections from Ganjikota were 261,366 rupees and from Sikakul (i.e. the entire territory beyond the Godavari) 840,822 rupees. The combined total for both *parganas* required correspondingly large appointment levies. As *deshpand* of both *parganas*, compensated at a rate of 1 per cent of the total tax burden, Nur Singh Rao would pay 71,563 rupees at 6½ times the annual proceeds. Kishen Rao, as *deshmukh* entitled to double the *deshpand*'s allowance, paid a fee of 143,370 rupees.[3]

[1] 'Akham-i 'Alamgiri', fol. 10b.

[2] I.J. Coll., I/13/978–9. The administration was beginning to demand 10% yearly payments on such arrears at this time.

[3] Ibid. The figure for the *jam'i-kamil* in the early eighteenth century given for Ganjikota *pargana* is 261,391 rupees, found in the Deh-be-Dehi Suba Farkhonda Bonyad. The same source gives a total revenue figure for Sikakul as 840,822 rupees. The calculation on 6½ years' allowance is actually a concession from the earlier practice of extracting 7½ times the annual allowance. A marginal

The emperor approved the petition. He filled the vacancies in Ganjikota and replaced the three local officials in Sikakul as suggested by Nur Singh Rao. Within eight months the latter had paid the promised 15,000 rupees. A claim of 215,403 rupees remained outstanding on the new *deshmukh* and *deshpand* of Sikakul and Ganjikota.

In view of Nur Singh Rao's activities in Ganjikota three years earlier, his interest in the *pargana* is not that surprising. His attempt to gain and hold local office in a *pargana* located ninety miles to the south of his home base at Jatpol is certainly ambitious. None the less, this may be a measure of the extent to which his influence and power had grown in the decade since the Mughals took over. In other words, Aurangzeb's appointment of Kishen Rao as *deshmukh* and Nur Singh Rao as *deshpand* for Ganjikota may have been merely a ratification of local power acquired through forceful expansion in a manner long practised by regional aristocracies all over the subcontinent.

Nur Singh Rao's request for local office in Sikakul, located 350 difficult miles to the north-east of Jatpol, is surprising and unexplained. The Valama leader obviously had access to sources of information in the Hyderabad revenue office or in Sikakul itself or both. But the reason for this interest is completely obscure.[1] On the other hand the emperor's possible motives for taking Nur

note on the document states that this was 'according to the regulations of the old territories': for every hundred. The old territories refers to Aurangabad and Bidar.

[1] One possible explanation can be advanced, even if it cannot be proved. The Gopal Rao who was *deshmukh* of Rajmundry district, just south of Sikakul, in the 1690s might have been Nur Singh Rao's father, Gopal Rao. Thus far, there is no direct evidence on which to base identification of the two names, but there are bits and pieces of evidence which make the idea plausible: (1) the initial listing of *deshmukhs* and *deshpands* lists Gopal Rao, *deshmukh* of Rajmundry, immediately after Gopal Rao, *deshmukh* of Pangal (2) A later reference, given below, describes Nur Singh Rao as governor of Rajmundry rather than as governor of Sikakul. (European sources tended to use the term governor as a synonym for *deshmukh*.) (3) Finally, the fact of Nur Singh Rao's interest in the coast, which must have been based on some previous link, suggests that his father might have been *deshmukh* of Rajmundry district. The latter, of course, is tautological reasoning and can only stand in a converging pattern of facts. If a firmly supported triangular link could be established between Gopal Rao, the *zamindar* of Pangal, Gopal Rao, *deshmukh* of Rajmundry, and the Venkat Patti, brother of the latter who was *deshmukh* of Muhammadnagar *pargana* at the capital, this would provide an extremely interesting view of the Golconda revenue system. See Chapter VII, pp. 144–6, for a discussion of Gopal Rao and Venkat Patti.

Singh Rao's petition seriously and giving him local office in Sikakul can at least be speculated upon. The year before the date of this petition in 1696, Mustafa Quli Khan, *faujdar* of Sikakul, had just finished a long-drawn-out campaign to put down a serious rebellion. One of the leading rebels was a former *sardar*, or commander of local auxiliary forces used to supply the bulk of military power in the region. The revolt of 1694–6 shattered this system when many of the auxiliary troops and their Razu and Valama leaders rebelled. The emperor may have decided to bring Nur Singh Rao, Kishen Rao, and their followers into Sikakul in order to replace the lost auxiliaries. As *deshmukh* and *deshpand* in Sikakul the two Valama chiefs would not be leaders of the local aristocracy as they were in Pangal district. Instead they would be outsiders, intermediaries, and servants of the Mughal administration in a turbulent region which only paid taxes when forced to do so by intense military pressure. This would be a repetition of the process by which Valama and Razu warriors followed the Qutb Shah administrators into the area a half-century before. In other words, Nur Singh Rao would become a *nayak* in Mughal service. In this instance, at least, the linkage between the new Hyderabad regime and an important section of the Telugu regional aristocracy had been restored.

One additional reference to Nur Singh Rao exists. In 1700 the British persuaded Mahdi Khan Bek, *faujdar* of Sikakul at the time, to write to Nur Singh Rao, who is described as the 'Governor of Rajmundum Country' and order that he follow previous practice in exempting the British from duties on their trade in cloth and teak wood. This implies that Nur Singh Rao may have even taken up a position on the coast in person and it also suggests that he may have held it for some time after his appointment.[1] The absence of other references in the various sources makes it impossible to have any information about the size of the military force Nur Singh Rao brought with him, or about his success or failure in collecting taxes in Sikakul.

ANDHRA: KAMMAS AND VALAMAS IN KONDAVIDU

North along the coast from the Hyderabad Karnatik lies a wedge-shaped area between the Gundlekamma and Krishna rivers. This

[1] India Office Library, *Factory Records*, 'Masulipatam: *Proceedings of the Old Company*, 1699–1700', G/26/13, p. 72.

area (present-day Guntur) was known as Murtazanagar district in the seventeenth century. As we have seen, Muslim conquest of the district in the sixteenth century brought subordination but only a very loose form of administrative control. Telugu clerks and warriors carried out nearly all the work of government in the district.

The focus of centralized power was the town and hill-fortress of Kondavidu, the district capital. The Muslim *amildar* for the district, the Brahmin district accountant, and the *nayak* in command of the fortress garrison were stationed here. But elsewhere, beyond the boundaries of Kondavidu town, effective political power was in the hands of two powerful Valama families. Least susceptible to Muslim control were the members of the Mal Razu Gonda Rao family who held Vinukonda, the second of a triad of great hill-fortresses which towered over the district. The other Valama family, the Manak Raos, were much more closely linked with Hyderabad. Throughout the seventeenth century, the head of the dominant line of the family had controlled the thirty villages of Kondavidu *sima* which immediately surrounded the fort. Other sections of the family controlled other *simas* near Kondavidu.[1] In the 1670s the Manak Raos exploited an opportunity for increased influence at Hyderabad, under the regime of Madanna Pandit. The head of the family became *muniwar* in charge of the entire district and *deshmukh* for the more than 400 villages of the *haveli pargana*. But the rising fortunes of the family, and its intimate ties with the Hyderabad regime were threatened by the Mughal victory in 1687.

We can follow in some detail the initial interaction of the Mughals with the Manak Raos and the Gonda Raos and the other elements in the delicately balanced political system of Murtazanagar district. The 'History of Condaved', compiled in the late eighteenth century, is based on records kept by a Brahmin family in the service of the Manak Raos. Although the narrative breaks off in 1691 because of a gap in the records, the chronicler does give us an unusual glimpse of the way in which imperial power and the regional aristocracy came to terms in this corner of the eastern Deccan.[2]

[1] Condaved, p. 47.

[2] The following account is based on the 'Annals of Condaved', pp. 47–58, unless otherwise cited.

In the course of the Mughal siege of Golconda fort, all signs of Qutb Shah authority appear to have disappeared in the district. The *'amildar* and his staff deserted their posts, leaving the region in the hands of the local officials and the *zamindars*. As famine progressed and all restraints from the centre disappeared, local disorder increased. Bhawana Manak Rao, currently *muniwar* of the district and *deshmukh* of Kondavidu *pargana*, plundered the local populace in an uninhibited fashion. When the price of grain soared he 'began to send his Peons to the Places where Grain was buried in Pits which he took by force with other effects'.[1] Joined by his brother, Janganna Rao, the *muniwar*, and his son, Narain Rao, he also 'extorted money from the Merchants & other affluent people'.[2] Bands of men sent from the south by Yacham Na'ir, the Venkatagiri raja, also plundered the district.

First contact with the Mughals came in June 1688 when 'Daulat Cawn' arrived with an army at Kondavidu fort. The Mughal general (tentatively identified as Daud Khan Panni) levied, but did not collect, an assessment of 50,000 *hun* on each of the four most prominent Valama *zamindars* of the district. He also placed Muhammad Rafi, one of his subordinates, in charge as *amildar* or district officer. Then 'Daulat Cawn' marched to the east where he confirmed several Afghan chiefs in control of Cuddapah and Kurnool.

In late July the Mughal commander returned to Kondavidu to resume negotiations with the most important local intermediary in Murtazanagar district, the *muniwar* and *deshmukh*, Bhawana Manak Rao. At their meeting 'Daulat Cawn' first presented the Telugu chief with a horse and ceremonial robes of honour. Next he suggested to Bhawana that he should send his son, Narain Rao, to the imperial court and camp (then near Daulatabad fort in the western Deccan) for an audience with the emperor. On this occasion Narain Rao would be given an imperial *farman* as *deshmukh* of Kondavidu and have all existing Manak Rao holdings confirmed. Bhawana Manak Rao agreed to the proposal. The young Telugu chief, given a horse and robes for the journey by the Mughal commander, travelled to the emperor's camp. He arrived in late August 1688, but within a month, just before his appointed

[1] Condaved, p. 50. This phrase is marked as a direct quotation from the records by the chronicler.

[2] Ibid.

audience, the young raja 'suddenly departed this life . . . in a very extraordinary manner'.[1] The chronicler's phrasing is ambiguous. Narain Rao's death could have resulted from either a sudden illness, an accident, or even assassination. Whatever the cause, the bereaved father and the remainder of the Manak Raos of Kondavidu must have been dubious about any further attempts at personal visits to the emperor. Still despite whatever resentments they may have retained, the Valamas had little choice but to acede to the new rulers. Bhawana Manak Rao, keeping his position as *muniwar*, on the same terms as before, signed a bond in which he agreed to an appointment fee of 98,438 rupees, equivalent to seven and a half year's allowances. This amount was rounded off to 100,000 rupees. The Hyderabad revenue office demanded and collected 10 per cent or 10,000 rupees immediately from Bhawana Manak Rao.[2] Rama Rao, son of the dead Narain Rao, filled the position which his father was to have held as *deshmukh* of the enormous *hawili pargana*. As *deshmukh* of Kondavidu, Rama Rao would receive 10,213 rupees (2·5 per cent) on annual collections of 681,865 rupees. He paid 7,650 rupees (10 per cent) of the total fee for appointment demanded.[3]

After committing 17,650 rupees in cash and nearly 160,000 rupees in bonds to the new regime the Manak Raos were anxious, at first, to co-operate in the revival of the district's revenue system. Soon after the agreements were signed Bhawana Manak Rao, the *muniwar*, assisted Muhammad Rafi, the *amildar*, to bring in and imprison in Kondavidu fort all the Brahmin *chaudhuris* or tax middlemen of the revenue system. Next, in early December 1688, the *muniwar* persuaded the two most powerful Gonda Rao rajas to travel to the district capital for meetings with Muhammad Rafi, and the *diwan* of Hyderabad who was due to arrive in Kondavidu shortly. When Muhammad Shafi, the provincial *diwan*, did reach the capital he was able to hold meetings with the leading *zumindars* of the district and with Manur Venkanna, the district accountant. In the course of his two- to three-week stay in

[1] Ibid., p. 53.

[2] I.J. Coll., I/16/602. Neither the *sanad* nor the bond survives. The conditions are recorded in a survey of such agreements made by the Hyderabad revenue office ten years later.

[3] I.J. Coll., I/16/615. The Mal Razu Gonda Raos may have also been appointed *deshmukhs* of Vinukonda and Bellamkonda districts, but no documentary evidence of this appears to have survived.

Kondavidu fort, the *diwan* also held hearings for the imprisoned *chaudhuris*. The latter were all fined (presumably for past arrears during the siege) and then released. This exercise appears to have been a warning to the revenue entrepreneurs that the same severe approach to non-collection of agreed revenues would be taken under Aurangzeb as under the previous dynasty. Before he left Kondavidu, the *diwan* also replaced Muhammad Rafi by Ali Khan, another Muslim *amildar*.

But within three months of the departure of the provincial *diwan*, all his administrative arrangements were nullified. The tensions which had been building among the Valama aristocracy of the district suddenly erupted into a serious and fast-moving rebellion in early April 1689. Bhawana Manak Rao came to believe that the *nayak* commander at Kondavidu fort, 'Ambatee Chennah and his men', planned to raise disturbances intending to destroy them [i.e. the *zamindars*] one after the other.[1] The *muniwar* called up assistance from his various kinsmen and moved to attack the government's forces. So, too, did the Gonda Rao forces from Vinukonda. As soon as he received the news of the outbreak, Muhammad Shafi, the *diwan*, marched back into the district to Bellamkonda (the third great hill-fortress of the district which was still apparently under Mughal control) and then moved south toward Kondavidu. At the same time, Manur Venkanna, the district accountant, who was firmly committed to the Mughals, brought another element into the political scene. The Brahmin accountant went north across the Krishna river to ask for assistance from a Kamma chief who controlled territories in neighbouring Mustafanagar district. At Manur Venkanna's request 'Madiah' Vasu Reddi, one of the Kamma leaders, brought an army of several hundred infantry into the district to attack the rebel Valamas.

Nevertheless, in spite of these reinforcements the rebels were too strong to be contained. Bhawana Manak Rao killed a Mughal officer and pushed the *diwan*'s forces back toward Bellamkonda. One of the Gonda Rao chiefs defeated 'Madiah' Vasu Reddi, killed a large number of his men, and forced the Kamma chief to flee to Kondavidu fort. Then the Gonda Rao forces pushed on to assault the district capital. By July 1689 all government forces

[1] Condaved, p. 54.

were in flight and the rebels had taken possession of Kondavidu fort and town.

Mughal reaction to the capture of Kondavidu was not slow in coming. Ali Mardan Khan (formerly Husain Bek), the governor of Rajmundry, led a strong relief force equipped with cavalry and artillery into the troubled district by the end of July.[1] When the Mughal army arrived and camped in front of Kondavidu the demoralized rebels made no serious attempt to fight. Instead they remained shut up within the fort. Ali Mardan Khan decided not to assault the fort, but to wait for the rebels to negotiate.

After several weeks three of the Valama chiefs (two Manak Raos and one Gonda Rao) tried to escape from the fort; but Mughal troops captured them. Ali Mardan Khan then moved north to Bellamkonda fort with his prisoners and army. When he reached Bellamkonda fort, he sent the three captured rajas to Hyderabad with an escort of 200 heavy cavalry. There followed a six-month lull while the Mughal commander remained out of the district.

During this interval the rebel coalition dissolved. The Manak Rao chiefs remaining in Kondavidu fort, including Bhawana the *muniwar*, submitted, came out of the fort, and returned to their home villages. The Gonda Rao rajas, on the other hand, prepared to defend the fort against an assault. In April of the following year (1690) Ali Mardan Khan returned with his army to Kondavidu. The Manak Rao chiefs began to co-operate with the Mughals in the collection of revenues, but the Gonda Raos still remained defiant in Kondavidu fort. By mid-August Ali Mardan Khan, grown impatient, ordered decapitation of the three Telugu rajas still held prisoner. He also called on the Vasu Reddis to supply a large number of Telugu infantry as auxiliaries for the Mughal forces on the understanding that the Kammas would thereby gain access to lands in Murtazanagar district.[2]

In the face of this increased pressure, the Gonda Rao rebels finally abandoned Kondavidu fort and retreated to their great hill-fort to the east at Vinukonda. Ali Mardan Khan encouraged the Vasu Reddis to follow and harass the Valamas in the east in and around Vinukonda. Although they did not fare too well in various

[1] Ibid., p. 55. Evidence for Ali Mardan Khan's presence in the district is given in 'Akham-i 'Alamgiri', fol. 51b. In this text Bhawana Manak Rao is referred to as 'Bhao Narain'.

[2] The text says that '250 Rowoova (or Tellinga Infantry)' came with one of the Vasu Reddi chiefs.

skirmishes with the Gonda Raos, the intruding Kammas were armed with authority by the Mughals to assume *deshmukh* right over part of the territories formerly under the Valama family.[1] During the remaining months of 1690 Valamas and Kammas continued to skirmish back and forth in the western part of the district. Ali Mardan Khan was engaged in the Karnatik. The Manak Rao chiefs were busy carrying out revenue operations in and near Kondavidu. Finally, in March 1691 the whole affair was quietly wound up when the Gonda Raos opened negotiations with the Vasu Reddis. In the chronicler's phrases the Valama chief 'made friendship with' the Kamma raja, 'after which they both sent orders into the Villages'.[2]

By mid-1691 a new *amildar* arrived from Hyderabad. By this time the political and administrative scene in the district had virtually returned to pre-1687 normality: The Muslim district officer, the hereditary Brahmin accountant, the Telugu *nayak* in command of the fortress garrison formed the core of state power in the district at Kondavidu fort. The leading Valama house, the Manak Raos, were still dominant in the *hawili pargana* and still actively co-operated with the Mughal officials sent from Hyderabad. At Vinukonda the other Valama group remained hostile but quiet. One new element had been added as a result of the conflict: a new powerful group of Kamma *zamindars*, i.e. the Vasu Reddis, had gained a territorial foothold on the south bank of the Krishna river opposite their lands in Mustafanagar district. In the aftermath of this struggle those groups which had co-operated with the Mughals—the Brahmin Manur Rao family and the Kamma Vasu Reddis—continued to gain territory and influence at the expense of the Valamas. Sixty years later, by the mid-eighteenth century, the Vasu Reddis, by virtue of their dominance of 300 of the 868 villages in what had become Guntur district, were the most powerful *zamindars*. Over the same period the Manur Rao holdings rose to include 150 villages. The two Valama families only held 410 villages between them by that time—forty less than the combined total for the Kammas and Brahmins.[3]

Mughal attempts in the period 1687–91 to reintegrate Murtazanagar district into a Hyderabad-centred political system were

[1] The text states that the Vasu Reddi raja 'gave his Security for the Choudaries who rented the Samootoos'. Condaved, p. 57.

[2] Condaved, p. 57. [3] Grant, p. 659.

ultimately successful. Yet, as in many other parts of Golconda, the transition was marked by the alienation and rebellion of the most powerful *zamindars* in the district. This tendency is most noticeable in the case of the Manak Raos, the Valamas who had enjoyed direct, personal ties with the court of Abul Hasan before 1687. The single attempt made by the Mughals to establish another similar personal relationship between the imperial court and the Manak Raos of Kondavidu ended in failure with the death, whether accidental or purposeful, of Narain Rao.

In dealing with the resistance of the Valamas, the Mughals were greatly assisted by countervailing elements in the local, or subregional, political system of the district. These included the Telugu garrison of the fortress and the hereditary Brahmin district accountant who decided that their best interests lay in supporting the new regime rather than the rebels. The local knowledge and influence of the district accountant was especially useful in exploiting rivalries between Valama and Kamma *zamindars*. For the next decade, or more, after the conclusion of the Valama revolt, the introduction of the Kammas as a counterweight probably served to keep the district relatively peaceful in contrast to conditions elsewhere.

In the end, however, the military power of the state, quickly and forcefully employed, broke the rebellion. The Telugu *zamindars* and their followers, who were almost entirely infantry, could offer no serious resistance to the Mughal cavalry and artillery in the open. This was so much the case that the emperor rebuked Ali Mardan Khan for employing artillery, which was scarce, for such a minor punitive operation.[1] Tactical superiority, the psychological advantage of long-established Muslim domination, and exploitation of disunity among the regional aristocracy all helped the Mughals to win at little real cost.

Details of Mughal administration in Kondavidu are much less abundant after the failure of the local chronicle. Those bits of evidence which do exist point to continuity of the existing system under more peaceful conditions. For example, Bhawana Manak Rao died in 1692 and was succeeded by his grandson Rama Rao as *muniwar* of the district. The financial terms were identical, and in this instance the new *muniwar* was given credit for the 10,000 rupees paid by his predecessor toward the total 100,000 rupees

[1] 'Akham-i 'Alamgiri', fol. 51b.

appointment fee.[1] There are indications that most of the revenue operations, as well, were left entirely in the control of the dominant *zamindars*, the four or five *deshmukhs*, in the same manner as under Qutb Shah rule.

ANDHRA: VALAMAS OF NUZVID

One of the most surprising omissions of the new Mughal government was its relative lack of contact with the *zamindars* in the coastal region between the Krishna river and the Godavari. In 1687 a group of Valama families linked by kinship ties (all members of the Viparla *gotram*) dominated the greater part of Mustafangar and part of Eluru districts. The most powerful family in this group was that of Vijaya Maka Appa Rao, who held 18 *parganas* by a royal grant from Abul Hasan Qutb Shah.[2] Entitled 'Raja Bahadur' by the same monarch, Vijaya Maka Appa Rao ruled what amounted to a small tributary kingdom from his fortified capital at Nuzvid. But despite the importance of Vijaya Appa Rao and the other Valama chiefs associated with him there is no sign in the official records of any formal recognition by the Mughals. Throughout the entire two decades of Aurangzeb's remaining years as emperor, none of these *zamindars* in Mustafanagar and Eluru signed bonds as *muniwars* or *deshmukhs*. Even the initial listing of *muniwars*, *deshmukhs*, and *deshpands* taken by the Mughals just after the conquest completely omits any names for Mustafanagar district. Only the nineteenth-century Appa Rao family history suggests that the Nuzvid *zamindars* 'came under the suzerainty of the Moghul Governors of Delhi [*sic*] who confirmed the grant of the 18 *Parganas*' at some point prior to the founding of Hyderabad State in 1724.[3] Nothing appears in the contemporary sources to suggest that the Valamas of Nuzvid were engaged in any sort of noticeable rebellion or plundering outside their own districts.

Figures from the 1689 revenue settlement reveal that there must have been an initial encounter between the provincial *diwan* and the *deshpands* of each subdistrict in this area. For Mustafanagar district, where Nuzvid is located, the Settlement papers list an

[1] I.J. Coll., I/16/603. Janganna or Jagnath Rao, brother of Bhawana, became *deshmukh* of the *hawili pargana* in place of his brother.

[2] See Chapter II, p. 33. [3] Sundaram Aiyar, p. 5.

original revenue demand (expressed in both Mughal *dams* and Qutb Shahi *huns* or pagodas) and an increased figure for each *pargana* in the district. Total revenue demanded from the district increased by 26 per cent from 269,357 to 338,574 gold *hun*. This converted to 1,186,061 silver rupees at the rate of 3·5 rupees per *hun*.[1] The 1689 Settlement allocated all 24 *parganas* of Mustafanagar district as *paibaqi* lands available for salary assignments to *mansabdars*. Yet, none of the area around Nuzvid, nor any land under the Appa Raos, was utilized for *jagirs*. In fact, the only *jagirs* given out in the district during the two decades between 1687 and 1707 were salary assignments given the commander and other *mansabdars* sent to Mustafanagar fort.[2] Any revenue collections made in the *parganas* of Mustafanagar unassigned as *jagirs* must have resulted from the efforts of agents of the *faujdar* and *amin* of Sikakul, who was responsible for the revenues of all of Andhra. But the absence of any evidence that Appa Rao of Nuzvid, or any of the other Valama *zamindars* of the district, accepted formal responsibility for the revenues either as *deshmukhs* or as tributary rajas suggests that collection of the full terms of the increased revenue settlement was unlikely.

The only known encounter between the new administration and the Nuzvid house took place in 1697. In that year the Mughal emperor tried to step up lagging collections by sending the *faujdar* of Khammamett to wring more funds out of the *zamindars* and revenue farmers in Eluru district. The *faujdar*'s revenue-collecting forces, under the command of his son-in-law, clashed with Maka Appa Rao and his followers who were engaged in a plundering and cattle-stealing raid on Lingagiri town, the seat of a smaller *zamindar*. In the skirmish the Mughal force lost its commander, who was killed, and nearly 90,000 rupees which he

[1] I.J. Coll., I/7/82, I/7/83, I/7/87. The total increase for the district is given, but not the increase for each *pargana*. The Qutb Shahi figures were based on the '*jam*'-*idami* received previously' and the increase was assessed on the basis of the 'records' of the *deshpands*.

[2] Sahib Singh (500/400), commander of Mustafanagar fort in 1699–1700, held two *jagirs* in the district, as well as others in North India. In the *hawili pargana* he was allocated lands with a *jama*' of 23,833 rupees and *hasil* of 11,042 rupees (six-month basis). In Vinkutah *pargana* Sahib Singh's *jagir* was 42,059 rupees *jama*', 20,176 *hasil*. In 1691 the proceeds of this *jagir* were 17,772 rupees; I.J. Coll., I/15/126. The military inspector and newswriter for the district held a small *jagir* of 1,000 rupees *jama*', 500 *hasil*, in the *hawili pargana* as well. I.J. Coll., I/19/1016.

was carrying from newly made collections.[1] The total impression conveyed of relations between the Mughals and the Appa Raos of Nuzvid is one of uneasy coexistence. Neither the provincial government at Hyderabad nor the *faujdar* of Sikakul had the resources or the inclination to mount a full-scale assault against the Valamas in this area. On the other hand Vijaya Maka Appa Rao and his successor did not rebel and occupy the principal fort in the district, as was the situation in Kondavidu. Perhaps from shrewdness, and perhaps from caution, they were not provocative. By the time that a clash did occur, in 1697, the Mughals on the coast were preoccupied with a serious revolt to the north of the Godavari in Sikakul itself.[2]

CONCLUSION

Bleak though their prospects were in 1688, Mughal authorities in Hyderabad did manage to quell nearly all internally inspired disturbances in the course of three to four years. The old margin of tactical military superiority, sustained by centralized political organization, restored the dominant position of Muslim-controlled Hyderabad city in the eastern Deccan. The Mughal goal during these proceedings was to regain the political *status quo*. They were content to exact expressions of submission from the rulers of long-established refuge areas. The hills of Khammamett and Mustafanagar, forming a barrier between the coastal and upland plains, were not subject to any attempt at direct administration. Elsewhere, the Mughals tried to rebuild the agrarian structure of the Qutb Shahs by working through the most powerful *zamindars*.

By 1692, as soon as Maratha attacks slackened, the governor, the provincial *diwan*, and their agents were able to move out into the countryside and make direct contact with individual chiefs on their home territory. The Hyderabad officials began to identify and to reappoint *deshmukhs*, *muniwars*, and *deshpands*. The usual pattern appears in this process: in Telengana, the older core area of Muslim domination, the Mughals dealt with Reddi, Valama, or other *zamindars* who were powerful in one or two *parganas*, but rarely more. In Andhra they negotiated with a handful of Valama,

[1] I.J. Coll., I/19/452. India Office Library, London, 'Lists of Hakims or Officers Administering the Guntur and Ellore Circars': Eur. MS. F. 47, pp. 62–71.

[2] See my article "Mughal Retreat from Coastal Andhra". (Forthcoming).

Razu, and Brahmin leaders who were prepared to act as *deshmukhs* and *muniwars* over complete districts.

There was, however, one critical omission in the Mughal re-working of the Qutb Shah administration. The opportunity and requirement for personal military service and attendance at court by the various rajas or *nayaks* disappeared. After 1687 no channel for personal contact existed between the Muslim ruler of the eastern Deccan and the Telugu warrior aristocracy of that region. No *zamindars* from Hyderabad entered imperial service as *mansabdars*. Instead the line of formal authority ran from the emperor, through a screen of provincial officials, and ultimately to the individual *deshmukhs*, *muniwars* or ordinary *zamindars*. Those isolated experiments in face-to-face contact between the emperor and Telugu chiefs which did take place were not at all successful. The fate of men like Narain Manak Rao of Kondavidu or Yacham Na'ir, the Venkatagiri raja was widely discussed and reported. A mere governor, no matter how forceful, could not engender the same responses as a reigning monarch. Diminished personal loyalties, coupled with widespread resentment at newly imposed discriminatory taxation, encouraged a generally sullen attitude among the former *nayaks* of Golconda.

Each of the various Telugu rajas in Hyderabad was still operating more or less within the boundaries of a single district. When he engaged in rebellions or plundering activities, these tended to have a specific focus in or near his own territories and had a limited existence. During the period of general disorder which accompanied the Mughal invasion (1685–8) nearly all *zamindars* (or *nayaks*) seized money and food grains from wealthy merchants and peasants. This was probably a response to the relaxation of central control from Hyderabad as well as the desire to build up their resources in a time of uncertainty and shortages. Later, when serious revolts did break out, those *zamindars* who engaged in them plundered and burnt for tactical reasons. They either wished to deny resources to the Mughals or to punish other rajas for collaborating. There were also instances in Kondavidu of *zamindars* forcing cultivators off the land to put pressure on the state. In all these instances raiding and plundering ended as soon as the *zamindars* made a formal submission to the Mughals.

Revolts did occur in Hyderabad. But for fifteen years after Mughal annexation the eastern Deccan was relatively peaceful by

comparison with the western Deccan. As James Duff, the chronicler of the Marathas observed, 'The disorders prevalent in Maharashtra' had not spread to the east in this period. Duff's explanation for this fact was that 'the inhabitants of those countries [i.e. the Telugu-speaking areas] are a very different race, and were less prone to those habits of predatory enterprise, which had long distinguished the natives of the Maharashtra.'[1] Possibly but, the primary reason for stability in Hyderabad relative to the western Deccan was the survival of the regional political structure of Golconda. As late as 1700 the Telugu warriors of the area were still operating within this system. That is, they still saw all political relationships from the perspective of *zamindars*. They constantly had to refer to and defer to the state with its physical centre at Hyderabad in all their political dealings. This constant reference back to the state and its representatives for support, for approval, and for legitimation caused, as it was intended to, fragmentation and internecine rivalries. None of the Telugu *zamindars* (with one or two exceptions) had a political vision extending beyond this system.[2]

[1] Duff, I. 306.

[2] Sitarama Pusapati, the Razu leader, a former Golconda *nayak* who rebelled successfully in Sikakul district on the northern Andhra coast in the 1690s, may have been evolving such an independent view. See J. F. Richards, 'Mughal Retreat from Coastal Andhra' (forthcoming). Another possible exception was Yacham Na'ir, the Valama raja of Venkatagiri, who led the revolt of 1690 in the Karnatik. His political ideas were encouraged by association with the refugee Maratha king at Jinji and perhaps by lingering memories of the Vijayanagar successor state at Chandragiri: See Richards 'The Hyderabad Karnatik; 1687 - 1707', *Modern Asian Studies* (1975), IX, pp. 241–60.

VII

Fiscal Organization

THE immediate task set for the Mughal *diwan* of Hyderabad and his subordinates in 1687 was simple and straightforward: to revive and reorganize the tax system of Golconda so that the resources of the eastern Deccan would move uninterruptedly into the imperial coffers. In part, achievement of this goal was beyond the effective control of the provincial *diwan*, since all state revenues were dependent on peace and economic recovery. But sustained revenue collections also depended on the ability of the *diwan* to build effective connecting links between the peasant, the artisan, the trader, and other producers of wealth and the tax official.

THE MUGHAL RUPEE

Annexation of Golconda meant immediate assimilation of the kingdom's monetary system to the standard currency of the empire. Previously, since 1636, Abdullah and Abul Hasan Qutb Shah had been forced to strike a limited number of Mughal silver rupees to symbolize their status as tributary rulers. But despite this enforced practice the rupee was not in widespread use in 1687—save for Sikakul where the popular preference was for silver currency. Right up to the Mughal conquest the monetary system of Golconda remained firmly based on gold. The standard coin was that used by the indigenous pre-Muslim kingdoms: the pagoda or *hun* (53 grain) stamped with the image of Vishnu. The pagoda's subsidiary coins, the half-pagoda and *fanam*, were also gold. The 5-grain *fanam*, heavily alloyed, was one of the smallest gold coins known, and was in general use for ordinary commercial transactions.[1] The Qutb Shahs issued all three of these gold coins from their mints with the Hindu types unaltered. They also struck in large numbers copper coins of 25–30 grains of a Muslim type which bore their names and titles.

[1] P. M. Joshi, 'Coins Current in the Kingdom of Golconda', *Journal of the Numismatic Society of India*, V (June 1943), 85–95.

In 1687 the Mughals stopped all production of pagodas, half-pagodas, and *fanams* at the central mint (shifted from Golconda fort to Hyderabad city) and issued gold *muhurs*, silver rupees, and copper coins in the usual imperial types. The gold *muhur* of Mughal India was used principally for ceremonial and hoarding purposes by the emperor, the nobility, and other wealthy members of society. Mughal currency was based on the silver rupee which became the official accounting unit. All taxes were assessed and collected in rupees. Mughal accountants in Golconda then converted revenue demands from pagodas to rupees at a rate of 1 : 3. The earliest official records expressed amounts in both currencies; later this practice died out and all figures were recorded solely in rupees.

A number of other mints in addition to that at the capital were active under Aurangzeb and his immediate successors. The two busiest commercial centres on the Andhra coast, Machilipatnam and Srikakulam, issued silver and copper coins, although no gold issues have survived. The Hyderabad mint also served the needs of Telengana, for no other mints were in evidence in the north. Mints were much more numerous in the Karnatik. Cuddapah, Ganjikota, Guti, Poonamali, and Jinji (after 1698) were in operation in Aurangzeb's reign. Some silver rupees were also struck, under licence, by the British East India Company at Madras (Chinapattan, the original name of the town, appears on the coins).[1]

The official changeover to a currency based on the silver rupee, with an accompanying increase in the production of rupees at the newly established imperial mints, did not put an immediate end to the older gold-centred system. The preference of the indigenous population was very much for gold coins. This tendency was reinforced by the fact that in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century the price of silver was high relative to gold. South

[1] R. B. Whitehead, 'Mint Towns of the Mughal Emperors', *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, VIII (Dec. 1912) Numismatic Supplement, no. XIX, 425–531. C. R. Singhal, *Mint-Towns of the Mughal Emperors of India* (Bombay: Numismatic Society of India, Memoir no. 4, 1953). M. Amjad Ali, 'The Mint Machlipatan Bandar', *Journal of the Numismatic Society of India* (1968), 162–6. Contrary to Ali's view, the mint at Machilipatnam began issuing Mughal coins as early as Aurangzeb's 32nd year (1688–9). Cf. Archaeological Department of H.E.H. the Nizam's Dominions, *Annual Report 1916–17* (Calcutta, 1918), p. 34 for report of a silver rupee of a standard type issued at Machilipatnam. A rupee of Aurangzeb's 32nd year is also reported from Sikakul. Cf. ibid., *1920–21*, Appendix A, pp. 24–5.

India was a gold-producing region and silver had to be imported. The Dutch, British, and French trading companies continued to mint gold pagodas at Pulicat, Madras, and Pondicherry just as they had before 1687. Weavers, merchants, and other suppliers of the companies demanded gold coins, not silver, as payment for their goods.[1]

Nevertheless, by making the gold pagoda unacceptable as a medium of payment in the tax system (one of the most important uses for medieval coins) and by stopping all official minting of the coin, the Mughals did strike a substantial blow at the gold-based monetary system of South India. Mughal administration carried with it another southward extension of the silver coinage of North India. Over the next century, steady pressure from the Mughal administration and its various successor states, including the British (who found it to their economic advantage to promote silver as merchants and who inherited the rupee from the Mughals when they became rulers), brought a gradual conversion to a dominant silver standard in Hyderabad and the Karnatik.[2]

THE JIZIYA

Another immediate, and markedly unpleasant economic change in Hyderabad took place when annexation extended the collection of *jiziya* to the province. This was a capitation tax levied on Jews and Christians in Islamic states which in theory afforded those who paid it freedom from persecution and also from compulsory military service. The *jiziya* was heavy, regressive, and, because of its discriminatory nature, usually unpopular with those who were forced to pay it. Some Muslim regimes in India imposed the *jiziya* on all non-Muslims; others, more anxious to conciliate their non-Muslim subjects, who formed the majority of the population, did not. The Qutb Shahs had never imposed the *jiziya* throughout the life of their state (1512–1687). The Mughal emperors had not collected *jiziya* either for a century until Aurangzeb revived the practice in 1679 as part of his general attempt to bring the Mughal empire into conformity with all prescriptions of the Sharia.

[1] For the cost and scarcity of silver which inhibited minting silver rupees see India Office Library (London), 'Original Correspondence', Madras to London, no. 5911, 17 Feb. 1694. For the demand for gold pagodas see *RFSG: Diary*, 10 Dec. 1701, p. 107.

[2] H. Dodwell, 'The Substitution of Silver for Gold in the Currency of South India' *Indian Journal of Economics*, III (Jan. 1921), 183–204.

The financial impact of this innovation on the conquered non-Muslim population of Golconda was potentially very great. All adult males paid a fixed sum based on the amount of property which they possessed. According to Manucci, 'Great merchants paid thirteen rupees and a half, the middle class six rupees and a quarter, and the poor three rupees and a half every year.'[1] As Habib has pointed out, the latter sum was particularly harsh on the poor since it represented over a month's wages for an unskilled urban labourer.[2] A separate corps of officials collected the *jiziya* from individual subjects in the cities. Elsewhere, in the countryside, the officials of the crown lands and *jagirdars* were charged a flat fee of 4 per cent on the *jama'* or assessed tax demand which they in turn were supposed to recover at the specified rates from the peasantry in the villages.[3] In other words, the official estimate was that collection of the *jiziya* was equivalent to a 4 per cent tax increase across the board. Thus, *jiziya* returns in Hyderabad could have been as high as three-quarters of a million rupees, and in the Karnatik nearly a half-million rupees.[4] The total, well over a million rupees, represented a handsome increment for Aurangzeb's hard-pressed treasury and a new burden for his new subjects in the eastern Deccan.

CONTACT WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS: TELENGANA

The first major task of the newly established Mughal fiscal office in Hyderabad was to identify and list the semi-hereditary *deshmukhs*, *deshpands*, and, where they existed, *muniwars* who remained in office after the fall of the Qutb Shahs. Muhammad Jafar, the *diwan* appointed when the kingdom was formally annexed before the fall of Golconda fort, had compiled an incomplete listing which covered only 15 *parganas*.[5] His successor, Muhammad Shafi, directed the completion of this project. Clerks and accountants

[1] Manucci, II. 234. Manucci comments that Aurangzeb brought in the *jiziya* partly to pay for his military campaigns and partly to encourage Hindus to become Muslim. He also suggests that the *jiziya* collectors were offensive and insulting when they collected the tax.

[2] Habib, pp. 245–6. [3] Ibid.

[4] These figures are calculated on the *jama'* of Hyderabad after the 1689–90 settlement: for Hyderabad 4% of 18,773,625 = 750,945 rupees; for the Karnatik 4% of 12,144,375 rupees = 485,775 rupees; total, 4% of 30,918,012 rupees = 1,236,721 rupees. These figures of course assume that successful collection was possible.

[5] I.J. Coll., I/3/109-I/3/112.

on his staff collected and recorded reports sent by *deshpands* in seventeen of the twenty districts in northern Golconda. Districts in the Karnatik, which was outside Muhammad Shafi's jurisdiction, were excluded from this survey. The finished product, entitled 'List of *zamindars* of the province *dar-al jahad* Hyderabad', was sent to the office of Diyanat Khan, *diwan* of the six provinces of the Deccan.[1]

For twelve of the thirteen districts of Telengana (no reports came from Khammamett district) the names of *deshmukhs* and *deshpands* appear under each *pargana*. Over half of the 103 *parganas* listed in Telengana (of a total of 137 *parganas*) two or more men acted jointly as *deshmukhs* or as *deshpands*. In extremely large *parganas*, such as *hawili* Kaulas with nearly 170 villages, the number of *deshmukhs* was as high as eight. In so far as it is possible to determine caste from names alone, the majority of *deshmukhs* were from the dominant military/agricultural castes: Reddis (Kapus), Valamas, and Kammas. Reddis held *deshmukh* positions in 41 of the total 103 *parganas* listed.[2] The next most common suffix for names of *deshmukhs* was 'Rao' with 'Nayak' appearing only occasionally. The *deshpands*, bearing names such as 'Govind Appa', 'Vinkana', and 'Munaji', were almost certainly Brahmins. Only three Reddis acted as *deshpands* in *parganas* in Medak district where Reddis were also *deshmukhs*.

As soon as this preliminary listing was compiled, the Mughal *diwan* moved to the next phase of his operations. In early 1688, shortly after the departure of the emperor from the province, Muhammad Shafi began to meet each of the *deshmukhs*, *deshpands*, and *muniwars* entered in his records. The object of these encounters was establishment of a formal link between the new regime and its indispensable intermediaries. When satisfactory terms were agreed, the provincial *diwan* recognized the position and perquisites of each *deshmukh* or *deshpand* by conferring a patent of office, a *sanad* written in Persian. Those so favoured executed a bond which set out their willingness to carry out their duties properly and to pay the specified appointment fee or *peshkash*.

The cost of each *sanad* was determined by the established tax receipts (*muqarrar hasil*) for each *pargana* or district. The appointment fee was equivalent to the *deshmukh*'s or *deshpand*'s annual

[1] Ibid., I/1/9–I/1/34. [2] Ibid. The total number of Reddi names was 74.

allowance of between 1 and 5 per cent on the tax receipts multiplied by 7½. The price of retaining office was high: equal to seven and a half years' income.[1] The harshness of this demand was eased somewhat by the fact that tax-free lands were not considered in computing the appointment fee. Moreover the *diwan* did not try to obtain the entire fee all at once, but would accept payment in instalments. Nevertheless, the total demanded rose to considerable sums if we consider that sixty rupees was the normal annual pay for an ordinary soldier or labourer. For example, Rama Reddi, *deshmukh* of *pargana* Vilur, Medak district in Telegana, settled with the Mughals in 1688. The established receipts of his *pargana* of 33 villages were 34,332 rupees. Rama Reddi's allowance at 5 per cent was 1,717 silver rupees yearly. This figure, multiplied by 7½, set his appointment fee at 12,879 rupees. To obtain his *sanad* Rama Reddi paid 1,286 rupees 15 annas in cash (10 per cent) and executed a bond (*muchalka*) for the remainder.[2]

The undertaking signed by Rama Reddi and the other *deshmukhs* in addition to a fiscal statement also contained a series of standard clauses, written in the first person, which spelled out the *deshmukh*'s duties. These fell into four main categories: (1) enforcement of the details of the assessed or settled taxes on the *pargana* (*haqiqat-i jama' bandi*) in consultation with revenue officers and *jagirdars*; (2) prompt collection of the necessary funds in cash (*zar-i wajib*) from the peasantry (*ra'aya*) to the satisfaction of the agents of the *jagirdars*; (3) prompt and regular transmission of information to the revenue office, including reports on the proportion of inhabited and waste lands in the *pargana* and abstracts of the records of the *deshpand*; and (4) encouragement and conciliation of the peasantry in order to ensure maximum cultivation and population in the *pargana*. The *deshmukh* also promised to meet any orders or demands from the accountants (*mutasaddian*) of the revenue office (*kachahri*).[3]

These obligations, signed by every *deshmukh*, demonstrate the

[1] James Grant Duff, writing about the western Deccan, says that the amount was 'upwards of six and a half years purchase.' Duff, I. 277.

[2] I.J. Coll., I/16/608. Conditions of appointment, but not the text of the *sanads* or bonds, for many local officials in Hyderabad are set out in a listing of arrears in appointment fees compiled about 1697. See I.J. Coll., I/16/602–I/16/636.

[3] I.J. Coll., I/6/48, I/6/50. This is a summary of the contents of the only bond found so far. Nirmal Rao, joint *deshmukh* of Turkul pargana, Kovilkonda district, signed this statement in 1691.

importance of this office in the eyes of the Mughal administration in Hyderabad. Each *deshmukh* was expected to use his local knowledge, his political influence, and, if necessary, his military resources to ensure that all taxes demanded from his *pargana* (or district) were fully assessed and collected. At the same time, acting as an official he was to prepare regular reports for the revenue office, to conform to the orders of the revenue accountants, and to work in co-operation with other officials or agents of *jagirdars* who had interests or responsibilities in his *pargana* or district.

The attitude of the Mughals towards the *deshmukhs* was unambiguous. They were local officials whose services were indispensable for the collection of taxes; but they were not in any sense tax-farmers or entrepreneurs. The most important consideration in their appointment was not financial resources and skill but political and military power on the local level. The *deshmukhs* received a percentage of the taxes collected, which could vary without fear of reprisal. Unlike tax-farmers they could not collect or retain amounts in excess of the established or assessed taxes. *Deshmukhs* were obliged to submit regular reports on conditions in the area under their jurisdiction. They were also subject to checks and supervision from other officials.

In the plains of North India, under the regulation agrarian system of the Mughals, *deshmukhs*, assisted by *deshpands* (called *chaudhuris* and *qanungos* in the north), carried out identical duties in the tax system. But in the north the Mughals also placed petty officials, who were not local men, in each *pargana*. *Parganas* under the direct administration of the provincial *diwan* (i.e. *khalisa* lands or unallocated *jagir* lands) might have as many as four officials: an assessment officer (*amin*), a collection officer (*karori*), a treasurer, and an accountant. *Parganas* assigned in salary to higher-ranking *mansabdars* would have one or more agents of the *mansabdar* in residence. In either situation, these officers, who came from beyond the boundaries of the *pargana*, assisted, supported, and supervised the local officials.[1] Thus, there existed a firm connection between the *pargana* and the revenue office at district or provincial headquarters. Tax payments and reports were transmitted immediately to agents of the central government within the *pargana*.

[1] See Habib, pp. 276-81, 287-94, for a description of these officials in the *pargana*.

There could be, if necessary, day-to-day contact between the *chaudhuri* (i.e. *deshmukh*) and the *karori* at critical periods such as harvest time.

To what extent was this system duplicated in Hyderabad? Was there, in practice, effective linkage between the revenue office and the *deshmukhs*? The situation in Telengana was most favourable to construction of an agrarian system similar to the regulation model of North India. With the possible exception of Khammamett district, the *diwan* had made direct contact with between 150 and 200 *deshmukhs* (and a similar number of *deshpands*) in over 100 *parganas*. Yet no direct evidence exists that salaried Mughal tax officials were in residence in all or even a majority of the 137 *parganas* of Telengana. Between forty and fifty *parganas* in Telengana were reserved for the *khalisa* lands. Most of these were administered by the *amin* and *faujdar* of Elgandel, who may have placed some of his staff in the larger *parganas*, but no details are available. Those *mansabdars* who obtained *jagirs* in Telengana undoubtedly sent agents to their holdings. Yet in the first ten to fifteen years of Mughal administration less than half of the *parganas* open to *jagir* assignments were so used.[1] Revenue collection from those *parganas* not assigned was the task of the provincial *diwan*. Although the absence of information is not conclusive, it is questionable whether the *diwan* of Hyderabad could muster sufficient men and resources in the first years after Golconda's conquest to tie each of the directly administered *parganas* of Telengana firmly into the tax system. If this assumption is correct, successful operation of the revenue system in the interior was precariously dependent on the goodwill, loyalty, and efficiency of the Reddi, Valama, and Kamma *deshmukhs*, and to a lesser extent the largely Brahmin *deshpands*.

CONTACT WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS: ANDHRA

The information recorded by the Hyderabad *diwan* for the seven coastal districts was much less detailed than that for Telengana. Presumably following a practice established by central revenue officials of Golconda, he was content to deal with intermediaries for entire districts on the more distant coastal plain, instead of meeting local officials in each of the seventy-four coastal *parganas*. The *diwan* succeeded in gathering information on only five of the

[1] For a discussion of this point see below, Chapter VIII, pp. 199–204.

seven Andhra districts. No information was received for Mustafanagar district, dominated by the Valamas of Nuzvid, or for Sikakul, which had been under full Muslim control for a relatively short time and had no standard organization of *parganas*. The *deshmukhs* in the five districts for which information was received were as follows:

1.	Machilipatnam	Kankul Venkanna-Brahmin (and *deshpand*)
2.	Nizampatnam	Anant Rao-?
3.	Rajmundry	Gopal Rao-?
4.	Eluru	Rama Razu-Razu (also *muniwar*)
5.	Murtazanagar	Rama Rao- Valama
		Bhawana Narain-Valama (also *muniwar*)

Some of the men on this list seem to have been entrepreneurs who held their offices because of access to financial resources, skills, and organization. Others were rajas who operated from a firm and expanding base of local military and political power. Both types differed from the Reddi or Valama chief, characteristic of the revenue system in the interior, who, together with his retainers and caste-fellows dominated a *pargana* of thirty to forty villages.

In the first category was Kankul Venkanna, the Brahmin listed as *deshmukh* and *deshpand* of Machilipatnam, who survived the various administrative changes in Andhra during the first years under the Mughals to become, in 1693, the chief Mughal official in Machilipatnam in charge of the general governance of the port. He was also in charge of the eighty-odd surrounding villages which made up the compact district. He was responsible for collection of customs and shipping duties from the port and municipal taxes from Machilipatnam town (96,874 rupees), the tax on the production of salt (242,561 rupees), and the land and market taxes from the villages outside the city (146,015 rupees).[1] Kankul Venkanna paid the total amount collected every year (485,452 rupees) to his superior, Mustafa Quli Khan, *faujdar* of the coastal districts and *amin* of all crown lands in the area.

Despite the importance of his work, Kankul Venkanna must have been in a particularly vulnerable position. He was not a *mansabdar*, with the economic and political security afforded by that status; nor was he a raja, or *nayak*, with the independence

[1] The revenue figures are set out in I.J. Coll., I/7/79 and I/7/85.

gained by command of local military forces. As a result he seems to have been very much dependent on the goodwill of Mustafa Quli Khan. For example, in July 1693 the *faujdar* brought Kankul Venkanna north to Srikakulam under armed guard in order to extract arrears of 9,000 rupees from him.[1] The *deshmukh* paid up and was released, but the incident illustrates the precariousness of his position. Just over two months later, the Machilipatnam *deshmukh*, accompanied by his brother, made another journey to Srikakulum for a meeting with Mustafa Quli Khan. Simon Holcombe, the English chief merchant, recorded the outcome of that encounter:[2]

> Gonculla Anca [Konkul Venkanna] Chief Braminy of Metchlapatam being returned from ye Sier Lascar [Mustafa Quli Khan] with Tasheriffs [honorific gifts] & additions to his Government now renting six lack [600,000 rupees] yearly whereas he never before exceeded five, & adviseing yt he & his brother would come to ye factry & twas agreed and ordered to tasheriff him.

This passage demonstrates that Kankul Venkanna was held rigorously accountable for payment in full of the established revenues of Machilipatnam to his superior. He was, in fact, a tax-farmer. However, unlike the entrepreneurial *hawaldars* of the commercial centres north of the Godavari, Kankul Venkanna did not bid openly for his post. The additional lands probably came from expropriation of tax-free land grants paying revenues of over 55,000 rupees which occurred at about this time.[3] Obviously, as an entrepreneur he would be expected to make large private payments to Mustafa Quli Khan at appropriate intervals, just as it is likely that he, in turn, received similar payments from local officials in the *parganas* and villages of Machilipatnam and the various concessionaires and officials in the port. But an important distinction remains between the attitudes and practices of a temporary tax-farmer who has obtained his post by successful bidding at an auction and a revenue intermediary collecting an established tax year after year.

Gopal Rao, *deshmukh* of Rajmundry district, seems to have been an entrepreneur similar to the Brahmin *deshmukh* of Machilipatnam. Although his caste is unknown, he belonged to a family which had obviously enjoyed close links with the previous admini-

[1] Vizagapatam, 'Consultations', 19 July 1693. [2] Ibid., 26 Oct. 1693.

[3] The Hyderabad *diwan* confiscated nearly 8,000 *bigahs* of land in Machilipatnam district. See Chapter VIII, p. 207.

stration. The financial interests of his family extended far beyond the boundaries of a single district: in late 1688 Gopal Rao received a *sanad* from Muhammad Shafi as *deshmukh* of Rajmundry. He signed the usual bond which committed him to payment of an appointment fee of 72,120 rupees. This enormous sum (of which he paid nothing) was computed on the basis of 2 per cent of the district revenues which were then 480,784 rupees per year.[1] Six months later his brother, Venkat Patti, also executed a bond as *deshmukh* for *hawili* Hyderabad and *hawili* Muhammadnagar (i.e. Golconda fort and its environs). As *deshmukh* of these two large *parganas*, he undertook to make tax collections assessed at 272,749 rupees from about 170 villages in the area just outside the capital and Golconda fort (excluding the revenues of the city itself). At 1·5 per cent his appointment fee was 30,750 rupees. Venkat Patti, who had been listed as *deshmukh* of these two important *parganas* in the first survey taken, was also referred to as a 'recorder of taxes and salaries'. This suggests that he was a minor Golconda official who held a similar post at the capital under the Mughals.[2] The two brothers together acted as *deshmukhs* for 26 *parganas* (two at the capital and twenty-four in Rajmundry) in which the total taxes, before any enhancements, were just over three-quarters of a million rupees (763,533). Their formal allowances alone came to 13,711 rupees each year. They were in debt to the new administration for over 100,000 rupees. The size of these financial obligations is impressive; but by far the most important aspect of this was the 200 miles distance which separated the capital at Hyderabad and the district headquarters at Rajmundry. When we encounter two brothers, one a minor official at the capital, acting as *deshmukhs* for such widely separated and extensive territories we begin to perceive the existence of a group of men prepared to perform large-scale financial tasks for the state in the eastern Deccan whether Golconda or the Mughal empire. In some instances, they were obviously willing to undertake these functions without the cushion of a local position since Venkat Patti and

[1] Gopal Rao was named as *deshmukh* in I.J. Coll., I/1/34. At 2% his annual allowance was 9,616 rupees. After 1689 the established receipts figure for Rajmundry district rose to 685,568 rupees. I.J. Coll., I/12/354; I/16/608.

[2] I.J. Coll., I/1/34; I/12/347; I/16/614. This is a firm identification. Gopal Rao's name and position appear on the same sheet in the first list, directly after those of Venkat Patti, and he is identified as the 'brother of Venkat Patti, *mal wajh-nawis*'.

Gopal Rao could only have been natives of either the capital or Rajmundry, not both. Under these circumstances the term *deshmukh* takes on an additional meaning.

Although men like Venkat Patti and Gopal Rao were useful, they were not indispensable. Five years after he had signed the original bond, Venkat Patti lost to a more aggressive competitor and was dismissed from his post as *deshmukh* of Hyderabad and Muhammadnagar *parganas*. The new *deshmukh*, Ramna, son of Dharmanji, took advantage of Venkat Patti's failure to pay off a substantial portion of his appointment fee. He travelled directly to Aurangzeb's court and in July 1693 paid 1,000 rupees in cash into the emperor's personal treasury (plus whatever bribes and presents were necessary to obtain an audience) to win the appointment on the same terms as his predecessor.[1]

On the other hand those district *deshmukhs* who were also rajas were not easily displaced. Men like Rama Razu, the Razu raja of Kanci Kalva who was *deshmukh* and *muniwar* of Eluru district, or Bhawana Narain, the Valama raja of Kondavidu and *deshmukh* and *muniwar* of Murtazanagar, had a firm grip on local power and could mobilize armed resistance to an outsider, or to a lesser raja superseding them. As the discussion in the preceding chapter shows, interaction between the state and these figures was an overwhelmingly political process which overshadowed the purely fiscal or revenue aspect.

Linkage of the half-dozen district *deshmukhs* of Andhra to the state was far more easily accomplished than in Telengana. The Mughal *amin* and *faujdar* stationed on the coast could easily deal with each *deshmukh* and *deshpand* in person. To simplicity was added certainty of collection. The Brahmin entrepreneur faced imprisonment if he failed too often; the raja faced unpleasant military pressure and interference with the partial autonomy in his district which regular revenue payments afforded. Yet, the state under the Qutb Shahs had necessarily conceded less than maximal revenue returns in Andhra by comparison with Telengana to obtain these benefits. If, as the Mughals decided. the revenue demands were to be raised in the early 1690s' a corresponding increase in the level of state investment in administrative and especially military resources would also be necessary. Only the prospect of readily

[1] The 1,000 rupees paid into the emperor's 'treasury of the exalted stirrup' (*khizanah rikab sa'dat*) was credited toward the 30,750-rupee appointment fee.

available military aid could buttress the entrepreneur enough to encourage him to make unpopular tax demands, and only military pressure, consistently applied, could persuade the rajas to do so.

THE SETTLEMENT OF 1689–90

The second major task for the *diwan* of Hyderabad was to determine what was to be the level and allocation of taxes and tribute within the province. The simplest approach was to continue unchanged all existing tax assessments imposed under Abul Hasan. Another option was to levy an arbitrary increase (or for that matter a decrease across the board) on all provincial revenues. Another, more laborious approach, was to look at each revenue-yielding unit in the kingdom, assemble all possible information about past and current returns, and set a new demand figure on the basis of judgements on future productivity, and consideration of such factors as location, the political strength of locally dominant groups, etc. This could result in a lessened assessment, but in practice, for most Indian governments, the demand usually rose after such an exercise. Soon after the conquest, Aurangzeb determined on the latter approach, called in India, a 'revenue settlement'. A new assessment would be made for each *pargana* or sub-district (but not for each village).

For over two years, Muhammad Shafi and his subordinates systematically gathered information about the financial structure inherited from the Qutb Shahs. One source for this was the records of the Golconda chancery at the capital. Another was the records of past collections and agrarian conditions maintained by the *deshpands* in each district and *pargana*. With this material, and figures on current receipts during the first two years, the provincial *diwan* established a new revenue settlement for Hyderabad. The shape of this settlement is of considerable importance; for it determined Mughal economic policies in Hyderabad during the ensuing four decades.

The settlement appears in a lengthy, 100-page document, entitled 'List of the *parganas* of province *dar-al jahad* Hyderabad, with the exception of the Karnatik, to the end of A.H. 1100 [1689–90]'.[1] The document bears the seal of Muhammad Shafi, *diwan* of Hyderabad, and the notation that its contents had been accepted 'without alteration' by Muhammad Shafi's immediate superior,

[1] I.J. Coll., I/7/72 to I/7/105.

TABLE VIII

	Number of Districts	Number of *Parganas*	*Jama'* Original	*Jama'* Additional	% increase	Total
A. Hyderabad	21	213	17,043,750	1,729,875	10	18,773,6[illegible]
B. Karnatik	12	125	12,144,375	—	—	12,144,3[illegible]
C. Provincial Total	33	338	29,188,125	1,729,875	6	30,918,0[illegible]

Source: I.J. Coll., I/7/72. All amounts are expressed in silver rupees. To obtain the equivalent in *dams* for the *jama'* multiply figures by 40. The original *jama'*, 29,188,125 rupees, is very close to the figure given by Khafi Khan for the *jama'dami* of the conquered

the *diwan* of the Deccan at Aurangabad. As the title indicates this was primarily a list of revenue figures with little commentary or explanation. The first page summarizes the revenue figures for the entire province as well as the Hyderabad Karnatik. Thereafter the report gives detailed revenue figures for each of the twenty territorial districts in Hyderabad and the diamond mines. In the last portion of the report the district totals are further broken down into *pargana*-wide figures. The report provides two figures for each *pargana*, and district, and for the province itself: (1) the 'assessment' (*jama'dami* or *jama'*) expressed in units of account called *dams* (40 to the rupee) and (2) the 'established receipts' (*muqarrar hasil*) expressed in rupees. The 'assessment' and 'established receipts' figures were virtually identical in many *parganas*; in others the figure for receipts was what appears to be a conventional 50 per cent of the assessment; and in a number of cases the receipts were of varying proportions to the assessments. The *hasil* figure is the more significant of the two figures. In every case where the *hasil* differs from the *jama'* or assessment figure, the Hyderabad revenue officials used the *hasil* figures in preference. For example the *hasil* figures, not the *jama'*, determined the allowances and appointment fees of the *deshmukhs* and *deshpands* of each *pargana*, or district. The assessment or *jama'* and established receipts or *muqarrar hasil* for each *pargana*, each district, and the province was further divided into the 'original' (*usal*) or Golconda figure and the *ezafah* or new Mughal increment.

The summary figures for the entire kingdom given in Table

Hasil Original	Average per *Pargana*	Addi- tional	% Increase	Total	Average Total *Hasil* per *Pargana*
13,744,095	(64,526)	1,764,569	13	15,508,664	(72,811)
8,285,223	(66,281)	—	—	8,285,223	(66,281)
22,029,318	(65,176)	1,764,569	8	23,793,887	(70,396)

kingdom, i.e. 28,790,000 rupees (1,151,600,000 *dams*). Since the chronicler's figure is even lower than that given here, this confirms that there was a real increase in assessed demand as a result of the 1689–90 settlement. Cf. Khafi Khan, II. 367–8.

VIII show that Golconda was indeed a rich prize to add to the empire. The annual revenues, i.e. the 'original established receipts' rather than the 'original assessment', from northern Golconda at the time of the Mughal victory amounted to 13,744,095 silver rupees. Twelve districts of the Karnatik firmly in possession of the Mughals in 1689 contributed another 8,285,223 rupees. The total was just over twenty-two million rupees (22,029,318) for the two regions.[1] Annual revenues for the whole empire just prior to the addition of Bijapur and Golconda were approximately 175 million rupees.[2] Thus, an additional twenty-two million rupees from Golconda alone would boost imperial revenues by 12 per cent to almost 200 million rupees. Moreover, any increases in demand coupled with sustained peace and prosperity would further push up the possible profits from Aurangzeb's advance into the eastern Deccan.

It should also be borne in mind that the figures established in the 1689-90 Settlement represented formally defined revenues, that is, levies such as the land tax or house and market taxes whose proceeds, moving through bureaucratic or quasi-bureaucratic channels, were relatively predictable. Other informal, less well-defined sources of revenue existed in Golconda as well. Confiscation of all diamonds over a specified size found in the famous Golconda mines, presents and bribes from merchants and other suppliants at court, levies on local officials for confirmation of

[1] I.J. Coll., I/7/72.
[2] Cf. Habib, p. 408. Table entitled 'Hasil-i (san-i) Kamil'.

their offices—all were lucrative, though less regular, additions to the revenues of the new province.

The total effect of the 1689 Settlement can be seen without difficulty in Table VIII. Existing assessments in the Karnatik remained unaltered, but the pitch of revenue demand intensified in Hyderabad. The assessment and the established receipts rose by nearly identical amounts: 1,729,875 rupees *jama'* and 1,764,569 rupees *hasil*. An increase of 13 per cent in the *hasil* meant that formal revenues in Hyderabad would reach 15·5 million rupees per annum. Previously, under Abul Hasan the revenue demand was nearly equivalent in intensity in northern Golconda and the Karnatik. The *hasil* had averaged 65,526 rupees per *pargana* in the north and 66,821 rupees in the south. Enhanced demands in 1689–90 changed this when average collections per *pargana* in Hyderabad rose to 72,811 rupees.

An average increase of 13 per cent on taxes and tribute in Hyderabad, although substantial, was probably somewhat less than the inhabitants of the conquered kingdom feared. Certainly, imperial precedent could be cited for harsher treatment. When the emperor Akbar finally conquered Khandesh, early in the seventeenth century, he imposed a 50 per cent increase across the board on all taxes levied by the deposed Farruqi dynasty.[1] But Aurangzeb's treatment of Golconda was not analagous to that of Khandesh eighty years earlier. In Golconda the increase was not uniform but selective and not arbitrary but made on the basis of information assembled over a two-year period.

The districts of interior Telengana escaped lightly (see Table IX). Here the average increase in the *hasil* was only 10 per cent—less than the provincial average. The greatest burden of this enhancement fell on fewer than twenty-five *parganas*.[2] In the remainder, over a hundred *parganas*, the *diwan* either left the assessments untouched or made only nominal increases. This suggests that most of Telengana had been taxed to near-capacity

[1] Habib, p. 263.

[2] In nine of the twenty-five subdistricts the *diwan* inexplicably imposed a uniform 25% increase in both *jama'* and *hasil*. In each of these the reference is to an 'addition because of one quarter' (*ezafah banabar sawai*) using the Hindi term for one quarter. The largest increase, 100,484, was levied on Jatpol *pargana* in Pangal district. This was really tribute exacted from the Recarla Valamas who dominated that *pargana* and district. This single exaction on one *pargana* was 12% of the total enhancement for Telengana.

by the Qutb Shahs—or at least the Mughal revenue officials decided that this was the case.

The districts of coastal Andhra suffered a steep enhancement by comparison. The average increment for the seven districts at 20 per cent was double that of the interior. But even this figure understates the change since Eluru, Sikakul, and Nizampatnam continued unaltered.[1] Increases for the four remaining districts—Machilipatnam (12 per cent), Murtazanager (24 per cent), Rajmundry (43 per cent), and Mustafanagar (43 per cent) –were thus very heavy.[2] The revenue officials justified their decision on these districts by referring to the information gained from local accounts. In the accounts for Rajmundry, which was particularly hard hit, the *diwan*'s office based its assessment for each *pargana* on the harvest figures for the best of one of the ten years preceding the settlement. The revised demand for Kurkonda *pargana*, for example, was determined according to the accounts (*sararashtah*) of A.H. 1096 (A.D. 1684–5).[3]

[1] Modest rises in demand came into effect several years later for Eluru (4%) and Sikakul (5%) districts. See I.J. Coll., I/19/452 and I/13/978, I/13/979.

[2] The increase in Mustafanagar district might have been closer to 25% if we consider the figures given for *huns* which were then converted to rupees. However the Mughal accountants used the ratio of 1:3·5 in establishing the new rupee demands for the district, but they only used the normal conversion rate of 1:3 *huns* to rupees for the original figure. The net effect was to boost the increment demanded to 43% since taxes would have to be paid at the rate of 3½ rupees to every *hun* instead of only 3.

[3] I.J. Coll., I/7/94. The district summary for Rajmundry (I/7/97) states that 'the additional *hasil(is)* is based on the ten-yearly average (*dah-salah*) of the *parganas* (which was) revealed.' This seems to be a reference to the Mughal practice of establishing average rates of harvests and prices over a ten-year period in order to arrive at a new revenue demand on the land tax. Cf. Habib, pp. 206–7. Yet in the accounts there is a reference only to a single year of the past ten which I take to be the highest. It is also possible that this is simply a *muwazuna-i dah salah* or ten-yearly record of area and revenues for the district. If this is the case this raises the question of the nature of the information obtained from the rolls of the *deshpands* in every district. If the *deshpand*'s figures were actually amounts collected by tax-farmers, by *jagirdars*, or governors, in excess of the nominal amount, under the Golconda system they might not have been recorded at the central financial office. If the *deshpand*'s figures were not production or crop figures of some kind but figures on payments, the increments assessed by Muhammad Shafi in 1689–90 would not have been an intensification in demand but a shift in the agency of collection. Still, even if this were the case, the fact that the Mughals converted the fluctuating figures of the *deshpands* into a permanent assessment—probably at the highest collections achieved during the best agricultural year in the previous ten years—is in itself significant. All of this is speculation in the absence of any corroborative evidence beyond the figures from the 1689–90 Settlement. I have chosen to accept the most obvious interpretation in the chapter: that this was indeed a real increase in demand.

TABLE IX

Hyderabad Province 1689–1690

Summary of all Districts (All amounts in silver rupees)

	Original *Jama'*	Additional *Jama'*	%	Total *Jama'*	Original *Hasil*	Additional *Hasil*	%	Total *Hasil*	% of Total *Hasil* to Total *Jama'*
A. Interior Districts									
1. Bhongir	1,306,125	90,000	7	1,396,125	709,799	55,481	6	765,280	55
2. Devarkonda	1,409,250	18,250	1	1,427,500	933,477	70,042	8	1,003,529	70
3. Elgandel	1,106,500	23,875	0·02	1,130,375	1,070,599	14,966	0·02	1,085,565	96
4. Ghanpura	695,875	23,875	3	719,750	412,881	11,958	3	424,843	60
5. Kaulas	562,000	65,125	12	627,125	561,883	65,323	12	627,207	100
6. Khammamett	726,250	—	—	726,250	495,235	57,611	12	552,847	76
7. Malankur	143,625	—	—	148,750	143,730	30,500	21	174,231	117
8. Medak	1,570,250	150,625	10	1,720,875	1,232,037	183,191	15	1,415,228	82
9. Muhammadnagar	1,850,000	288,750	16	2,138,750	1,308,889	153,088		1,461,978	69
10. Nalgonda	476,250	15,000		477,750	424,330	95,236	22	519,567	109
11. Pangal	528,250	144,750	27	672,500	339,099	100,484	30	439,583	73
12. Warangal	858,125	4,750		862,250	667,269	4,323		671,592	78
Total Interior	11,232,500	825,000	7	12,048,000	8,299,228	842,203	10	9,141,450	76
B. Coastal Districts									
13. Eluru	532,500	—	—	532,500	531,913	—	—	531,913	100
14. Machilipatnam	432,500	53,250	12	485,750	432,000	53,452	12	485,452	100
15. Murtazanagar	942,250	225,500	24	1,167,750	942,192	225,516	24	1,167,708	100

16. Mustafanagar	827,625	359,250	44	1,186,875	827,573	358,488	44	1,186,061	100
17. Nizampatnam	246,000	—	—	246,000	246,000	—		246,000	100
18. Rajmundry	480,000	205,000	43	685,000	480,785	204,783	43	685,568	100
19. Sikakul	800,000			800,000	800,000		12	800,000	100
Total Coast	4,260,875	843,000	20	5,103,875	4,260,463	842,239	20	5,102,702	100
C. Total Interior and Coast	15,493,375	1,668,000	11	17,151,875	12,559,691	1,684,442	13	14,244,152	83
D. Diamond Mines	300,000			300,000	255,000			255,000	85
Total	15,793,375	1,668,000	11	17,451,875	12,814,691	1,684,442	13	14,499,152	83
E. Provincial Summary (21 Districts)	*17,043,750	1,729,875		18,773,625	13,744,095*	1,764,569		15,508,664	83
Difference		61,875		1,321,750		80,127		1,009,512	
Koilkonda				1,056,246				1,056,246	
(early 1720s manual)				18,508,121				15,555,398	

Source for table: I.J. Coll., I/7/72 to I/7/105 inclusive. * Interpolated figures.

From the purely fiscal concern of the *diwan* of Hyderabad and his officials, the coastal villages of Andhra were clearly undertaxed or he would not have imposed these sharp enhancements in demand. We can make a tentative estimate of the degree of imbalance by calculating the average revenue per village in each region before the 1689–90 Settlement:[1]

	Number of Villages	Collection in Rupees	Average in Rupees
Telengana	5,216	7,988,799	1,532
Andhra	3,648	2,875,027	788

This differential in formal tax demands is especially surprising since the agricultural productivity of the fertile alluvial villages on the Krishna and the Godavari (and Kolleru lake) should have been far greater than those in Telengana which were dependent on tank irrigation. After the revisions resulting from the settlement the margin between Andhra and Telengana had narrowed considerably:

	Number of Villages	Collections in Rupees	Average in Rupees
Telengana	5,216	8,372,946	1,605
Andhra	3.648	3,717,263	1,019

The average *hasil* per village in Andhra was now approximately two-thirds the figure in Telengana whereas before it had only been about half. Average figures per *pergana* had made a similar movement: Andhra 51,629 to Telengana 69,774 rupees.

The 1689–90 report summarizes the major official categories or sources of formal provincial revenues. The most obvious distinc-

[1] The figures for Telengana are for twelve districts; Koilkonda has been excluded since the original *hasil* figure is not available. Figures for Andhra exclude Nizampatnam and Sikakul neither of which has the numbers of villages listed. The *sa'ir* revenues of the capital and the port and salt revenues for Mahilipatnam are also excluded from the calculation. The 1689–90 report does not provide the numbers of villages; these have been taken from an early eighteenth-century Mughal revenue manual: Hyderabad (India), State Central Library, Persian MS. *Deh-be-dehi Suba Farkhonda Bonyad.* Obvious problems in the data make the results obtained reliable perhaps to show a 2:1 ratio in the average revenues. Another cruder calculation can be made by deriving the average collections per *pargana*. These figures do appear in the 1689–90 report. On this basis average collections per *pargana* in the interior districts were 61,573 rupees and on the coast 39,930 rupees. This result confirms a discrepancy once again especially in view of the fact that the coastal *parganas* tended to be much larger in area: e.g. five *parganas* in Murtazanagar district.

tion is that between revenues labelled simply 'from the *parganas*' and other more specialized collections which are specifically named. As Table III shows, what might be termed 'Other Revenues' constitutes only 10 per cent (one and a half million rupees) of Hyderabad's collections. These included the *sa'ir* of the capital listed separately under the revenues for Muhammadnagar *pargana*. Duties on all goods entering and leaving the city (*octroi*), market taxes, house taxes, etc., were expected to raise over half a million rupees yearly. The royal gardens, irrigated lands, located in and near the capital and at Ibrahimpatan in Devarkonda district, were undoubtedly a legacy from the household establishment of the deposed dynasty.[1] In addition to fresh produce for the governor and high-ranking officers, the royal gardens contributed just over 100,000 rupees annually to the provincial treasury. Customs fees from Machilipatnam and Nizampatnam totalled 350,000 rupees and the annual revenues from the diamond mines are listed at

TABLE X

*Sources of Revenue**

Classification	Amount		% of Total
I. Other Revenues			
A *Sa'ir* Hyderabad city	533,400		
Golconda fort and town	23,543		
Total		556,586	
B Royal Gardens		109,973	
C Salt Monopoly at Machilipatnam		242,561	
D Port Revenues		342,875	
E Diamond mines (92 *mahals*)		255,000	
Total Other Revenues		1,506,995	10
II. Collections from the *Parganas*		14,001,670	90
Total Provincial Revenues		15,508,665	100

* I.J. Coll., I/7/72, I/7/73, I/7/76, I/7/79, I/7/96, I/7/101.

[1] The royal garden land (*bagh*) listed here is very likely the lands irrigated by the great tank built at Ibrahimpatan by Sultan Ibrahim Qutb Shah in the mid-sixteenth century. See above, Chapter I.

255,000 rupees. The exact nature of the latter figure is unexplained. It may refer to fixed fees collected for concessions from the mining contractors and merchants servicing the mines rather than to the much higher and fluctuating returns gained from seizure of all large stones found. The source and nature of these specialized revenues suggest that their greatest importance in the eyes of the provincial *diwan* lay in their accessibility, liquidity, and, barring general catastrophe to the economy, reliability.

The bulk of the state revenues in Hyderabad, 90 per cent, simply appear as an undifferentiated figure for each *pargana*. The Hyderabad revenue office treated each of the 213 *parganas*, which were territorial entities, as discrete fiscal units, or in Mughal terminology *mahals*. The 1689–90 report assigned an assessed valuation (*jama'*) in dams and an anticipated or established collection figure (*muqarrar hasil*) in rupees to each *pargana*. This practice was necessary for the operation of the system of *jagirs* in which past revenue collections as well as the assessed demand were taken into account in making salary assignments to *mansabdars*. But in this situation the difference between the assessment figure and collection figure was purely conventional in the majority of *parganas*. That is, the *hasil* figure was either 100 per cent or 50 per cent of the *jama'*. The most likely explanation for this is that under the less complex revenue system of Qutb Shahs, Golconda's officials did not need to and indeed could not keep such careful records of actual collections. Tax-farmers paid fixed amounts without submitting records of their collections; and *jagirdars* made their collections from territory over which they had administrative jurisdiction and paid whatever sum was stipulated to the treasury—also without submitting detailed reports. Thus, when the imperial revenue officials began to work in Hyderabad it is unlikely that they had in the Golconda records any basis for establishing reliable actual *hasil* figures in each *pargana*. These could only be established over time.

In the absence of specific information it is difficult to assess the composition of this category of revenues which must have varied in each *pargana*. Certainly, the preponderant share of the fourteen million rupees collected from the *parganas* must have been the proceeds of the state's claim on a share of agricultural production, i.e. the land tax or *mal*, collected from thousands of villages. But non-agricultural taxes on markets and houses in the larger market

towns must have also formed part of these totals, as did revenues from road tolls and internal customs posts outside the capital.

The critical financial test for the Mughals was clearly the successful assessment and collection of the largely agricultural taxes from the *parganas* which formed nine-tenths of Hyderabad's revenues. The urban specialized revenues from the capital, the largest metropolis in the region, and its two ports on the Krishna delta were significant, but no more than that. The dominant responsibility of the *diwan* of Hyderabad was to obtain through the *deshmukhs* a steady flow of funds from the countryside. Failure to do so would mean bankruptcy for the provincial administration.

One of the most significant objectives of the 1689–00 settlement was division of the revenues of Hyderabad between those reserved for the central treasury and those assigned to meet the salary claims of *mansabdars*. This was an essential preliminary step in the administration of newly annexed territory which determined both the mode of collection and the ultimate destination of all funds collected. In every province, in crown (*khalisa*) possessions, revenue officials subordinate to the *diwan* of the *khalisa* lands collected taxes and other payments and deposited them in the imperial treasury. Elsewhere, *mansabdars* who held salary assignments (i.e. *jagirs*) sent their own agents to make collections from their assigned territories. Allocation of the bulk of imperial revenues to *mansabdars*, if carefully supervised, reduced demands on the financial structure of the empire but retained the benefits of centralized control by the emperor.

However, in the course of the seventeenth century, decentralization of revenue collections by means of *jagirs* increasingly came into conflict with the appetite for funds of the growing central bureaucracy and army. In response to this need by 1668 the ratio of *khalisa* funds collected annually had risen to nearly one-fifth the total income of the empire.[1] Two decades later, in the aftermath of the Deccan conquest, the problem became acute. The scope of military operations against the Marathas in the Deccan demanded new funds from the central treasury. At the same time, large numbers of Maratha chiefs as well as many Muslim nobles of Bijapur and Golconda entered Mughal service at excessively high ranks. According to the court chroniclers the emperor could not

[1] Habib, p. 272. During his reign (1605–27), Jahangir had allowed the *khalisa* revenues to drop to 5% of the total.

find enough lands to satisfy the salary claims of both the newcomers and the older *mansabdars* of the empire. In his description of the events of 1691–2 Khafi Khan complained that since the influx of 'countless' Deccani and Maratha nobles with inflated ranks, even *mansabdars* of long-established official families (*khanah zadan*) had to wait four or five years to obtain *jagirs*. There was a shortage of lands for assignment (*qalat-i paibaqi*) and what was available was often undesirable.[1]

Under these circumstances, we might expect the emperor to divert all available revenues from Hyderabad to meet the pay claims of dissatisfied *mansabdars*. They, after all, were the élite corps on whose loyalty and efficiency the empire rested. Furthermore, assigning all or nearly all the province to *jagirs* would have the added advantage of easing the demand on the revenue office for trained manpower to administer the large new territories in the eastern Deccan. Yet the emperor's final policy decision for Hyderabad was scarcely an overwhelming victory for the *mansabdars*:

	Jama'	%	*Hasil*	%
Khalisa	6,868,750	37	6,696,217	44
Paibaqi	11,904,875	63	8,812,447	56
Total	18,773,625	100	15,508,664	100

Aurangzeb, who long ago assessed the economic potential of Golconda, had no intention of placating the *mansabdars* at the complete expense of the treasury. Nearly seven million rupees annual revenue was a substantial increment (as much as 20 per cent) to the *khalisa* of the entire empire.[2] The Hyderabad *khalisa* revenues also offered easier administration and transmission for operations in the Deccan than those collected in the northern provinces.

The distribution of the *khalisa* in Hyderabad is shown by districts in Table XI. The 2:1 ratio in over-all revenues between Telengana and Andhra was preserved in the assignment of *khalisa*

[1] Khafi Khan, II. 396–7. Cf. also a number of modern historians who have labelled this the 'crisis of the *jagirs*': Athar Ali, pp. 92–4 and Habib, pp. 269–73.

[2] Habib (p. 273 n.) reproduced from an administrative manual which predates the Deccan victories. According to this source the *jama'* (converted from *dams*) of the imperial *khalisa* was 32,839,034 rupees and the *hasil* 26,118,079 rupees. The Hyderabad *khalisa* revenues would raise that *jama'* by 20% to 39,535,251 rupees. This would bring the *jama'* close to Aurangzeb's announced ambition to bring the *khalisa* assessment up to forty million rupees.

revenues (4·2 million rupees in the interior to 2·2 million rupees on the coast) Yet in Andhra the allocation was by districts: all the revenues of the two ports, Machilipatnam and Nizampatnam, as well as Rajmundry and Sikakul were reserved to the crown; the other three districts were left in *paibaqi*. In Telengana the *diwan* made decisions for individual *parganas* without regard for the crown lands kept by the Qutb Shahs. There was obviously a careful attempt to select the most productive *parganas* for inclusion in the *khalisa*. Those *parganas* where the *hasil* was listed as equivalent to the *jama'* were almost invariably included in the *khalisa*; those where the ratio was less than 100 per cent were not.[1] Forty-four of the eighty-four *parganas* left for *jagirdars* had a conventional *hasil* of 50 per cent of the *jama'*—a fact which would cause technical difficulties later on. The interior *khalisa* was centred on Elgandel district to the north-east of Hyderabad which had 20 of 21 *parganas* in *khalisa* (all with 100 per cent *hasil*).

All specialized revenue sources in Hyderabad remained securely in the grip of the central treasury:

Source	Collections (*hasil*)	% of *Khalisa*
Sa'ir of the Capital	556,586	8
Royal Gardens	109,753	2
Salt Monopoly	242,561	4
Port Revenues	342,875	5
Diamond Mines	255,000	4
	1,506,994	23% of 6,696,217

Thus the 1·5 million rupees annual revenue from these sources formed 23 per cent of the Hyderabad *khalisa*.

But what of the 11·9 million rupees (*jama'*) which in theory at least were available by 1691 for use in meeting the overdue pay claims by the *mansabdars*? The question is whether the addition of these territories to the pool of lands given out as *jagirs* would have offset much of the additional demand arising out of the recruitment of new Deccani *mansabdars*. The comments of Khafi Khan for the same year suggest that this was not the case. Either

[1] The Hyderabad revenue officials noted that a number of *parganas* were previously in the *khalisa*, but had been shifted to *paibaqi*. This refers to the crown lands of Abul Hasan.

TABLE XI

Allocation of Khalisa Sharif and Paibaqi (All amounts in silver rupees)

	I *Khalisa Sharif*		II *Paibaqi*		III District Totals		IV Revenues in *Khalisa* (%)
	Parganas	*Hasil*	*Parganas*	*Hasil*	*Parganas*	*Hasil*	
A. Telengana							
Bhongir	1	69,645	10	695,635	11	765,280	9
Devarkonda	5	146,197	8	857,332	13	1,003,529	15
Elgandel	20	1,042,065	1	43,500	21	1,085,565	96
Ghanpura	—	—	9	424,843	9	424,843	—
Kaulas	2	283,086	3	344,121	5	627,207	45
Khammamett	—	—	11	552,847	11	552,847	—
Koilkonda	1	172,172*	12	837,341	13	1,009,512	17
Malankur	1	47,066	2	127,165	3	174,231	27
Medak	5	761,762	8	653,466	13	1,415,228	53
Muhammadnagar	3	942,240†	9	519,738	12	1,461,978	65
Nalgonda	—	—	5	519,567	5	519,567	—
Pangal	2	279,375	3	160,208	5	439,583	64
Warangal	13	480,589	3	191,003	16	671,592	72
Total Telengana	53	4,224,197	84	5,926,766	137	10,150,962	42

B. Andhra							
Eluru	—	—	11	531,912	11	531,912	—
Machilipatnam	8	485,452‡	—	—	8	485,452	100
Murtazanagar	—	—	5	1,167,708	5	1,167,708	—
Mustafanagar	—	—	24	1,186,061	24	1,186,061	—
Nizampatam	1	246,000	—	—	1	246,000	100
Rajmundry	24	685,568	—	—	24	685,568	100
Sikakul	1	800,000	—	—	1	800,000	100
Total Andhra	34	2,217,020	40	2,885,681	74	5,102,702	44
C. Diamond Mines	--	255,000	—	—	—	255,000	100
Total Province	87	6,696,217	124	8,812,447	211	15,508,664	43

Source: I.J. Coll., 1/7/72 to 1/7/105 inclusive.
* Figures for Koilkonda are calculated from provincial totals.
† *Sa'ir* 556, 586 Rs.
‡ Salt revenues 242,561 Rs

the Hyderabad *jagir* lands did not satisfy the new demand, or they were not utilized at all.

BABU PANDIT, QANUNGO OF HYDERABAD PROVINCE

After completion of the 1689–90 Revenue Settlement, the *diwan* of Hyderabad faced the problem of obtaining information as well as cash from the *parganas*. Even the simple recording of the amounts collected from each *pargana* each year was difficult for those *parganas* alienated to *jagirdars*. The taxes collected did not enter the provincial treasury at all. If the *diwan* relied on the initiative of 200 to 300 *deshpands* to send regular reports, these, at best, would be erratic and unreliable. Some form of direct official contact annually with each *deshpand* was essential. The emperor's solution to this difficulty was to appoint a local man as *qanungo*, or revenue recorder for Hyderabad and the Hyderabad Karnatik.

The *qanungo* stationed at Hyderabad administered a separate branch of the provincial office. He and his staff were responsible for obtaining accurate figures on assessments and collections in the *parganas* and for keeping this information current in the office registers. To do this, the *qanungo* sent his agents to examine the annual registers maintained by the *deshpands*. This procedure was especially useful in ensuring accurate reporting of tax-collection figures from the *parganas*. Because *parganas* with identical assessed revenues (*jama'* or *jama'dami*) could have widely varying revenue yields this fact had to be taken into consideration in assigning *jagirs* to *mansabdars*.

The first *qanungo* of Hyderabad and the Hyderabad Karnatik was Babu Pandit, officially classified as a *zamindar* holding a *mansab*.[1] This suggests that the new provincial revenue recorder may have had some association with the Golconda tax system—perhaps as a tax middleman or *deshpand*. If, as his title suggests, Babu Pandit was a Brahmin, this would be the only example of admission of a Golconda Brahmin to the corps of *mansabdars* by Aurangzeb. In this obviously special case the emperor's need for

[1] Cf. I.J. Coll., I/19/1559: 'List of *zamindars* honoured with *mansabs*'. The only name appearing under the heading for Hyderabad *suba* was that of 'Babu Pandit, *qanungo*'. Designation as a Deccani *mansabdar* supports the view that he was probably an official under the Qutb Shahs. A possible variant of Babu is 'Banu' or 'Nanu'.

local administrative knowledge to support the provincial *diwans* and other *mansabdars* foreign to the region must have overcome his usual reluctance to make such appointments.

Babu Pandit first became a *mansabdar* at the rank of 200 *zat*, 70 *suwar*, with a low three-month *hasil* ratio. The emperor also imposed the usual 25 per cent deduction on his pay claim for Deccani *mansabdars*.[1] Several years later, after the Mughal victory over the Marathas at Jinji added more territory in the Karnatik to his charge, his rank rose to 300/100, four-months ratio. One hundred *suwar* rank means that he had to raise and maintain between sixteen and eighteen horsemen.[2] Babu Pandit's salary claim (after an intricate series of calculations) came to 12,000 rupees for his salary and that of his cavalry. Payment was made by means of *jagir* assignments whose actual receipts were 4,000 rupees or ⅓ his nominal pay claim (i.e. four-months ratio). His *jagirs* lay in four *parganas: hawili* Hyderabad (the capital), *hawili* Muhammadnagar (Golconda fort) and two in Koilkonda district.[3] In almost every respect this was a normal *mansabdari* appointment complete with a *jagir* assignment. The only irregularity—a concession to Babu Pandit's local position—was exemption from the branding regulations (*dagh ma'af*). This unusual concession meant that the horses and men of Babu Pandit's small cavalry troop did not have to pass periodic inspections before he could collect their salaries from his *jagirs*. Although modest, Babu Pandit's rank was not insignificant, but was equivalent to that given most fortress commanders and some of the lesser *faujdars* in Hyderabad.

[1] I.J. Coll., I/13/387. The date of his original appointment does not appear in the records, but the earliest reference to him is in 1691.

[2] The higher figure is for the one-third rule but it is more likely that the one-fourth rule would be applied as it was for other Deccani *mansabdars* in Hyderabad. If Babu Pandit actually employed even 16 horsemen he would be out of pocket since their salaries would have come to at least 4,800 rupees per year. At the lower end of the *mansabdar* ranks the 25% reduction for Deccanis was extremely serious.

[3] I.J. Coll., I/18/659. The *jagir* figures (converted from *dams*) were:

Pargana	*Jama'*	*Hasil*
Hawili Hyderabad	1,000	333
Hawili Muhammadnagar	1,500	500
Shadipur (Koilkonda)	7,750	2,583
Mandur Valal (Koilkonda)	1,750	483
	12,000	4,000

The *qanungo* reported directly to the *diwan* of the Deccan, rather than to the *diwan* of Hyderabad or of the Hyderabad Karnatik. He appears to have provided another check on the activities and performance of the provincial *diwan*, and may have been required to inspect and sign the *diwan*'s account papers before they were accepted at Aurangabad. The office of provincial recorder and the functions associated with it do not have any known precedent before Aurangzeb's reign. The first reference to this post is in a *farman* issued by the emperor in 1670 naming three brothers as joint *qanungos* for all of Bihar province.[1] In so far as the translation of this document permits analysis, it seems that the *qanungos* were required to maintain agents in every *mahal* and district to provide up-to-date listings of *zamindars* and reports on the economic condition of the province. The three Hindu *qanungos*, unlike Babu Pandit, did not become *mansabdars*, but were appointed in perpetuity to the post. Instead of a *jagir* they received 0·5 per cent of the revenue of the province. In the course of two or more decades the post easily could have evolved to the point that the complex tasks given Babu Pandit became a routine part of the job.

The earliest known reference to the Hyderabad *qanungos* in the official records supplies an excellent illustration of the nature and scope of his activities: in 1691 Babu Pandit sent a report to Diyanat Khan, *diwan* of the Deccan, to the effect that a number of villages in Kaulas *pargana* were not entered in that district's tax roll (*jama'*). According to the *qanungo* the *deshmukhs* and *deshpandes* of the *pargana* (a large subdistrict which provided *jagirs* for the governor and many other provincial officials in the capital) had conspired to keep from being assessed villages with collections of 8,289 rupees. The local officials had simply listed these as *in'am* or

[1] H. R. Ghoshal, 'Two Mughal Farmans relating to the Appointment of Sadar Kanungos in Bihar', *Indian History Congress, Proceedings* (1958), p. 432. Dr. Ghoshal has reproduced an English translation of the original *farman* made by the British Collector of Muzaffarpur district in 1800. Why Dr. Ghoshal did not give us the text of the original document, still in Muzaffarpur's district record room, is a mystery. At the very least, a new and more satisfactory translation would have been more helpful than this vague rendering. Cf. also the discussion by Anjali Chatterjee, *Bengal in the Reign of Aurangzib (1658–1707)* (Calcutta, 1967), p. 61. The independence of the *sadar qanungos* of Bengal 'because of their appointment by the central government and of their office being hereditary' is discussed by Abdul Karim, *Murshid Quli Khan and His Times* (Dacca, 1963), pp. 63–70.

tax-free grants. When he received this report, Diyanat Khan sent a pre-emptory order to Muhammad Shafi, *diwan* of Hyderabad, to confiscate any tax-free villages or lands held by *zamindars* without royal patents.[1] This exchange resulted in the resumption of large numbers of grants throughout the province in the next year.[2]

This example underscores the *qanungo*'s role as operator of an intelligence or reporting arm of the revenue system in Hyderabad and the Karnatik. Reports from his agents, scattered throughout the two provinces, gave Babu Pandit information on harvest yields and tax collections in every *pargana*. For dishonest *jagirdars* or their agents, or royal tax-collectors in the crown territories who under-reported their receipts, the *qanungo*'s work threatened exposure. Or alternatively, if the *qanungo* himself was corrupt, he could falsely accuse officials and *jagirdars* of malfeasance unless he were paid not to do so. Whether legitimate or illegitimate, the power of Babu Pandit's position generated resistance. In February 1699 the *qanungo* complained to the imperial *bakhshi* at Aurangabad that royal accountants in the *khalisa* territories and *jagirdars* and *zamindars* elsewhere hindered or prevented altogether his agents from gathering revenue figures for his accounts. The emperor responded to this plea by sending out a general order to all parties in Hyderabad forbidding interference with the *qanungo*'s agents.[3]

Babu Pandit's position was enhanced by the fact that he was the only Mughal *mansabdar* whose official jurisdiction extended to every district in the former kingdom both north and south of the Krishna river. During the 1690s when he remained in office year after year Babu Pandit's stature and influence grew steadily. This was demonstrated in 1698 when the question arose of administration

[1] I.J. Coll., I/7/284. Other examples include a reference in the 'Akham-i 'Alamgiri' to an agent of Babu Pandit's supplying restrospective accounts of revenue and expenditure for the Karnatik (fol. 20b). The revenue office in Aurangabad also had recourse to the *qanungo*'s local knowledge in a dispute over allocation of a *jagir*: Sahib Singh, commander of Mustafanagar fort, had requested assignment of Vinkota *pargana* as part of his *jagir*. He claimed that Vinkota belonged to lands which customarily had supported the fort garrison. A marginal comment on the petition by the fort commander noted that, according to the *qanungo* of Hyderabad, Vinkota was located sixteen *kuroh* (about forty miles) from Mustafanagar fort. Sahib Singh had confused Vinkota with the *hawili pargana* which had traditionally supplied funds for the garrison. I.J. Coll., I/15/126.

[2] See Chapter VIII, p. 206–207. [3] I.J. Coll., I/15/150.

of the territories won from the Marathas at Jinji. This large area, stretching as far south as the Kaveri river, had formerly belonged to Bijapur. Therefore, Rudra, Babu Pandit's counterpart in Bijapur (one of two *qanungos* appointed to that province), claimed jurisdiction over the newly won Bijapur Karnatik. He offered to pay 5,000 rupees *peshkash* for the position. But Babu Pandit had secured the support of Zulfikar Khan, conqueror of Jinji and governor of all the districts in the Karnatik. The emperor rejected Rudra's claim and offer and confirmed Zulfikar Khan's choice of Babu Pandit as *qanungo* of the new province in the far south.[1]

Babu Pandit utilized other opportunities which his ambiguous status as a *mansabdar* with local connections gave him. Soon after becoming *qanungo*, he also secured the post of accountant (*kulkarni*) in charge of the *sa'ir* collections from the capital and Golconda fort. To obtain the post he paid 9,053 rupees towards a total fee for the position of 25,000 rupees. The *sa'ir* accountant was an important official who supervised the collection of the manifold market, house, and *octroi* taxes of the capital. He also maintained and submitted records of receipts to the *diwan* of *khalisa* at Aurangabad at regular intervals. The *kulkarni* of *sa'ir* was not a salaried *mansabdar*; instead he received a fixed percentage of collections. In a normal year these were supposed to reach half a million rupees, or more. Official and unofficial profits from the post were so great that in early 1695 one of Babu Pandit's subordinates, the treasurer of *sa'ir* collections, made an unsuccessful offer of 30,000 rupees *peshkash* to the emperor for the post.[2]

Babu Pandit continued to prosper in his wide-ranging intermediary role in the Hyderabad administration for at least eleven years. Finally, in 1702 the emperor dismissed Babu Pandit from the post of *qanungo* over Hyderabad and the two Karnatik subprovinces.[3] Yet the emperor did not transfer Babu Pandit to another position, as a *mansabdar* normally would have been. He could well have continued as accountant of the *sa'ir* revenues of the capital. His successor as *qanungo*, Shaikh Sa'dullah, was a

[1] Ibid., I/11/573.

[2] These documents provide a firm identification of Babu Pandit as both *qanungo* and *kulkarni* of *sa'ir*. I.J. Coll., I/10/29, I/10/31.

[3] Ibid., I/18/153, I/18/659. These papers record the reassignment of *jagirs* formerly held by Babu Pandit who was removed (*taghir*) from the position of *qanungo* of Hyderabad.

Muslim and probably also a native of Hyderabad.[1] Shaikh Sa'dullah held the post for five years until Aurangzeb's successor, the emperor Bahadur Shah, reappointed Babu Pandit *qanungo* of Hyderabad in 1708.[2]

FURTHER DEMANDS ON THE HYDERABAD DIWAN

Muhammad Shafi's work during the first three years of imperial administration, clearly substantial, included resumption of revenue collections, formal recognition of local officials, and the revised revenue settlement by *parganas* in 1689–90. None the less, his superior at Aurangabad, Diyanat Khan, *diwan* of the Deccan, was less than satisfied with the Hyderabad *diwan*'s performance. Diyanat Khan's main complaint was that reporting from Hyderabad was inadequate. Despite repeated orders, the detailed abstracts and summaries of the Hyderabad provincial records had not arrived in Aurangabad. Finally in May 1691 the *diwan* of the Deccan sent an *ahadi* (member of a select body of noble cavalry troopers) to Hyderabad with a sharp demand for the reports which were in arrears. Muhammad Shafi was to send them back immediately in care of Shaikh Khan Muhammad, the special messenger.[3]

Muhammad Shafi's response has not survived; still, the detailed list of papers demanded does give us some understanding of the expectations of the central fiscal office in regard to Hyderabad. In the introductory passage of his order, Diyanat Khan emphasized that he wanted what had been repeatedly sought: village-by-village accounts of the *parganas* in the province. Specifically, he asked for the following reports—each to be certified by Muhammad Shafi:

(1) a register (*awarja*) of villages and a book of salaries of *jagirdars* and *paibaqi* which had been released from the conquest to the present time. These accounts had not been received by the emperor;
(2) balances of the established assessment, collections, areas (*raqaba*) and sown area, etc. of villages; the details of roads and quarters of

[1] I.J. Coll., I/19/79, I/19/134.
[2] Akh. Bahadur Shah, vol. 1 (28 Jumada II), p. 149.
[3] I.J. Coll., I/6/120, I/6/121. Shaikh Khan Muhammad arrived in Hyderabad two days after the order was issued. It was received by Muhammad Rafi of the Hyderabad *diwan*'s staff.

the capital; lists of names of *deshmukhs*, *deshpands*, headmen, and *chaudhuris* of markets, in that province certified according to regulations by the signature of the *deshpands*. These must be (a) for the ten years previous to 1687 (*dah salah*) and (b) from the conquest to the present time;

(3) revenue receipts and arrears of the *khalisa sharif* from the end of A.H. 1099 [A.D. 1688–9] to the present;
(4) accounts from the *parganas* in Sikakul, Eluru, and Mustafanagar districts, etc. [i.e. Andhra] along with their village figures;
(5) the accounts of salary claims [for *mansabdars*] approved by the governor and the *diwan*;
(6) lists of the *faujdars* and other officials recommended by the governor for Hyderabad and approved by the emperor along with copies of their orders;
(7) accounts of entire villages, other lands and cash allowances per hundred rupees which formed the perquisites of the *zamindars*.
(8) accounts of tax-free grants (*in'am* and *madad-i ma'ash*) (including expenses for entire villages and other lands) held by authority of the previous administration and now by *sanad* from the emperor, and apart from these whatever could be confiscated;
(9) lists of names of *deshmukhs*, *deshpands*, etc., and *zamindars*;
(10) receipts and disbursements of the general treasury from the conquest to the end of the 34th year [17 May 1691].

Clearly, Diyanat Khan was bent on acquiring accurate information as to the current and past revenue assessments, collections, cultivated area, and other data about every village in the province as well as similar information for the capital city. He also wanted to know the destination of the taxes collected in every village: whether they went to an agent of the *diwan*, a collector for the *khalisa*, a *jagirdar*'s agent, a *deshmukh* or other *zamindar*, or the holder of a land grant. He wanted a full record of every *mansabdar*, *zamindar*, and local notable involved in the provincial revenue system. And, of course, he demanded full disclosure of the treasury balances, receipts, and expenditure.

Some of the lists demanded, such as the names of *deshmukhs* and *deshpands*, had already been supplied (or were sent to Aurangabad in response to this order). Yet, on the whole, it is doubtful if the Hyderabad *diwan* was able to compile and send this formidable list of records to Aurangabad with Diyanat Khan's messenger. Nevertheless this is somewhat beside the point. The important fact is that there was a norm of systematic reporting for the

Hyderabad *diwan*, a norm which was designed to ensure stringent fiscal control by the imperial centre over the new territories. Gradually this norm, expressed by emphatic and persistent orders from Diyanat Khan, began to take effect. By the end of a decade, as we shall see, the movement of information as well as cash from Hyderabad to Aurangabad and the flow of orders from Aurangabad to Hyderabad was regular and well established.

In early 1692 another *mansabdar*, Mir Muhammad Jafar, took over as *diwan* of Hyderabad. In October of that year Muhammad Shafi was permitted to present a gold *muhur* to the emperor in an audience at court before reassignment to another province.[1] This change-over marks the end of the first stage of fiscal organization in Hyderabad.

CONCLUSION

Mughal fiscal policies in Hyderabad, although essentially conservative, did bring about several significant changes after annexation. Tax-farming, or at least its worst form, ended soon after the Mughal administration began. *Ijarah*, or the leasing of taxes to private entrepreneurs, who bid for the privilege and were allowed to retain all profits over the sum which they had agreed to pay, was formally prohibited. This is scarcely surprising, since the practice was completely contrary to imperial regulations throughout the empire. *Ijarah* is not mentioned in the official records of Hyderabad after 1688. Confirmation that this was indeed official policy came in April 1694, when the Hyderabad *diwan*, Mir Muhammad Jafar, received a copy of a general order addressed to all provincial *diwans* which prohibited the leasing (*ijarah dadan*) of taxes anywhere in the empire. The emperor Aurangzeb forbade the *diwans* to give leases to anyone, especially subordinate revenue officials, on pain of imprisonment.[2]

Such a departure from the official attitude toward tax-farming under Golconda cut back sharply on opportunities for profit previously open to middlemen in the Qutb Shah tax system. Many of these middlemen were Brahmins, who engaged whole-heartedly

[1] I.J. Coll., I/7/288 dated 3 Sha'ban 35. Muhammad Shafi's appearance in court was announced in Akh., XXXVI–XXXVII (15 Safar), p. 12.

[2] I J. Coll., I/9/36. Aurangzeb's edict, issued on the last day of the 37th regnal year, was probably in response to his discovery of oppression in Kashmir by tax-farmers who held leases from Mughal *jagirdars*. Cf. Habib, p. 285.

in the leasing and subleasing of tax concessions of all kinds from the king, revenue officials, nobles holding *jagirs*, and more important tax-farmers. Certainly, not all the middlemen who had helped to operate the Golconda tax system lost out—the Mughals needed intermediaries too. A number of individuals survived as *deshmukhs* and *deshpands*, like Kankul Venkanna, the Brahmin *deshmukh* of Machilipatnam. On the coast, moreover, where the same body of officials, converted nominally to Mughal *mansabdars*, continued to rule, there is every likelihood that in practice tax-farming continued. Kankul Venkanna was under heavy pressure from the *faujdar* of Sikakul to meet the established collections from his district. There was also probably an element of concealed bidding in the presents which he was required to give to the *faujdar* in order to keep his post. We also know that Mustafa Quli Khan openly let the commercial centres on the coast to temporary tax-farmers just as they had been before the Mughals took over. Still, despite the persistence of custom and habit, the thrust of official policy was opposed to these practices. The terms of appointment for *deshmukhs* and *deshpands* were unambiguous in their implicit rejection of any form of tax-farming. No Mughal *jagirdar* holding lands in Hyderabad could openly sublease the revenues of the area assigned him, in contrast to the freedom given his counterpart under Golconda. Mughal collectors in charge of the *khalisa* lands were under similar constraints—nor were they as likely to consider and use the expedient of tax-farming as men like Mustafa Quli Khan who had been trained under a different system.

A second change resulted from the systematic inquiry into the records kept by the *deshpands* of each *pargana* conducted by Muhammad Shafi, the first provincial *diwan*. The 1689–90 Settlement selectively raised the revenue demand for the entire province. Another effect of this exercise was to elevate the proportionately lower assessment of the coastal districts to a level closer to the tax demand made on Telengana. By the second decade of the eighteenth century the 'established collection' figures arrived at in the 1689–90 Settlement were transformed into a single assessment figure: the *jam'i kamil* attached to every village, *pargana*, and district in the province.[1] These figures remained in

[1] 'Deh-be Dehi Suba Farkhonda Bonyad', compiled in the early 1720s, lists of the *jam'i kamil* for villages, *parganas*, and districts in Hyderabad and the

constant use as the opening basis for all negotiations and calculations about revenues in Hyderabad under the Mughals. Their immediate successors, the Nizams of Hyderabad, later the French, and ultimately the British, a century later, were forced to consider the 1689–90 Settlement. The longevity of this settlement, which lasted for well over a century, is truly surprising.[1]

Introduction of the *jiziya* for the first time in the eastern Deccan was another innovation which had political as well as economic implications. Oppressive as certain aspects of the Golconda revenue system may have been, the Qutb Shahs, after the excesses of their initial conquests were passed, had been generally tolerant and flexible in their relations with their non-Muslim subjects. The emperor Aurangzeb's insistence on collection of the *jiziya* was a notable deviation from long-established practice in Golconda. To add to its impact the *jiziya* had a sharp economic bite which placed another 4 per cent or even more on the assessed taxes of both the Karnatik and Hyderabad. In the case of the latter region, this was in addition to an average 13 per cent rise established by the 1689–90 revenue survey. Thus the benefits of Mughal fiscal administration in Hyderabad were mixed. Some of the worst excesses of uncontrolled tax-farming would be eliminated; but against this we must balance a severe enhancement in the total revenues demanded as well as imposition of a new, discriminatory form of taxation.

Official rejection of the *ijarah* system meant that a replacement was required. The *diwan* of the Deccan and other revenue officials responsible for setting up a Mughal agrarian system in Hyderabad could draw on at least two existing models. In the heartland of the empire, the northern plains of Allahabad, Agra, Delhi, and Lahore,

Karnatik. In most cases, the figures are identical with the *muqarrar hasil* figures of the 1689–90 Settlement.

[1] In his 'Sawanih-i Dakhan', *circa* 1760 (British Museum, Persian MS. Add. 26,263), Lachmi Narayan Shafiq supplies figures for Hyderabad identical to those found in the 'Deh-be Dehi Suba Farkhonda Bonyad', So too does James Grant in his 'Political Survey of the Northern Circars' completed in 1786. According to Grant (p. 643), even after a century this *jam'i kamil* was still essential for revenue collection in Andhra 'as exhibiting the only authoritative account extant in use, made from an actual survey of the local sub-divisions, number of villages, quantity of ground in or capable of cultivation, together with the estimated territorial produce in money, according to the established rule of Buttai [i.e. division of agricultural production] into ½ share for the cultivator and ½ for the state's demand'. Grant erroneously assumed that Aurangzeb's officials simply accepted the old Qutb Shah revenue settlement figures without alteration.

collection of the land tax was highly bureaucratized and systematic. In these provinces paid Mughal tax officers working with village officials assessed and collected the land tax, in cash, on the basis of field-by-field surveys. Tax-farming and other decentralized devices were prohibited at every level of the system. The assessment of taxes was governed by written regulations and established rates per crop and measured unit of land. Assessments and collections were made by an army of salaried petty officials assigned to each district and indeed to each *pargana* in the case of *khalisa* lands. In most *parganas*, imperial officials tried to bypass the *zamindars* and to deal directly with officials of individual villages. The state placated the *zamindars* by conceding their claim to local power and to a share in the tax on agricultural production. In return for co-operation and assistance in collections, the *zamindars* got an allowance ranging from 10 to 25 per cent of the total receipts.

The alternative model could be found in regions where special conditions made it difficult to impose and sustain the highly centralized revenue system of the northern plains. In provinces such as Bengal, imperial officials confronted with difficult terrain and an unruly regional aristocracy compromised regulations for the sake of stable and secure revenues. In Bengal the undisplaced *zamindars* continued to form an intermediate layer between the peasantry and the state. Each *zamindar* paid a fixed annual sum for each village under his control to the provincial treasury. He was then free to exact payments from the peasants regulated only by local custom and his own strength.[1]

The system which evolved in post-conquest Hyderabad fell between the two alternatives. First, the *diwan* of Hyderabad did not carry out a detailed land survey and painstaking assessment of measured agricultural lands in the new province. But he did systematically obtain and collate information from the records kept by the *deshpand* of each *pargana*, which he used to fix a standard assessment for every *pargana* in the kingdom. Once accomplished, this process was not repeated except in exceptional cases. To judge from later revenue works from the early eighteenth

[1] Cf. Habib, p. 263: 'In Bengal the *jama*' seems to have been directly adopted from the "*qanungoi*" papers of the previous government and from what we have already seen of the condition of this province, its *jama*' probably consisted of fixed annual claims of the administration against the local *zamindars*.'

century, it is probable that Muhammad Shafi also set assessments for each village in the province as well, even though these figures do not appear on the 1689–90 Settlement. Secondly, in so far as it is at all possible to estimate from the existing records, the *diwan* did not deploy petty tax officials in the countryside in anything comparable to their number in North India. Yet the rural scene in Hyderabad was not completely devoid of Mughal officials. The *amin* of *khalisa* in Telengana had a large staff to help him administer forty *khalisa parganas* in the interior. The provincial *qanungo* employed agents who collected information from every *pargana*. Finally, the *diwan* made no attempt to isolate the *zamindars* and deal directly with the peasantry. This was obviously impossible given the deficiencies in manpower which he faced. But, rather than give up all responsibility for administration and collection of the land tax to *zamindars* paying fixed amounts each year, the *diwan* relied on the services of the *deshmukhs*. These hybrid local officials (with occasional exceptions) were not tax-farmers but received a percentage of the taxes assessed on their *parganas* for their co-operation in the collection of the land tax. This arrangement placed this group of intermediaries very much in a prominent and powerful position in the countryside. There is no specific information in the Mughal records, or elsewhere, about the nature of the *deshmukh*'s relationships with other *zamindars*, or, for that matter, with the peasantry.

The total impression one gains is that the Mughal land-tax system in Hyderabad was, in fact, the decentralized system of Golconda with certain modifications. A new superstructure of Mughal revenue officials functioned at the capital and other key administrative centres in the province. The system was shorn of its heavy emphasis on entrepreneurial tax-farming, and refurbished by a new revenue assessment. Whether this revived and modified system would actually generate revenues from agricultural production at a satisfactory level, or even at a level close to that reached by the Qutb Shahs, was a question yet to be answered in 1690.

VIII

Operation of the Revenue System in Hyderabad, 1690–1700

At one point during the siege of Golconda fort, when both the supplies and morale of the Mughal army were at a low point, Abul Hasan sent a petition to the emperor Aurangzeb. Clutching desperately at any possible alternative to total ruin, the Qutb Shah king asked Aurangzeb to withdraw and to allow Abul Hasan, the 'slave' of the emperor, to administer his kingdom as he had before. If the imperial armies withdrew, he would supply them from the stores of Golconda fort and pay enormous reparations amounting to several tens of millions of rupees.[1] Abul Hasan argued that by accepting these payments (and later tribute) the emperor would benefit financially. If Aurangzeb pressed the siege, eventually took the fort, and placed the entire country under one of his *amirs* as governor, Golconda was so desolated by the war that this would be self-defeating. Until the country was fully restored to population and prosperity, salaries for the governor, his companions, and other necessary administrative expenses would be greater than tax revenues. Full recovery in Golconda was certain to take seven or eight years.

Aurangzeb, implacable, rejected this offer out of hand; but the issue raised by Abul Hasan is certainly pertinent to any discussion of Mughal administration in Hyderabad. In terms of imperial finance was Golconda, conquered and annexed, a good investment? Was the cost of conquest and of administration offset by rising revenues after 1687? Or to put the question slightly differently, would not Aurangzeb have done better to have accepted Abul Hasan's proposal and taken whatever he could extort from

[1] Khafi Khan, II. 349. To soothe the emperor's injured military pride in case of withdrawal, Abul Hasan cleverly offered to pay one *karur* (ten million rupees) for each stage at which Aurangzeb pitched his tents on the march to the borders of Golconda. Another *karur* would be paid for each of the attacks on Golconda fort overseen by the emperor in person. If this had been carried out the total was likely to have been several times the annual revenues of the kingdom.

the chastened king in the way of tribute and reparations (especially in view of the fact that Bijapur, already annexed, imposed an enormous administrative burden, on the Mughal bureaucracy and army)? This question can never be completely answered because of the destruction of the records of the central Mughal chancery, but we can estimate the degree to which the Mughals were successful in reviving revenue collections—as opposed to demands—in Golconda. This chapter examines the level of collections and operation of the revenue system in each of the major revenue classifications during the period of Jan Sipar Khan's governorship (i.e. up to A.D. 1700).

PESHKASH

Peshkash, or tribute, either recurring or non-recurring, was a payment made by a *zamindar* or tributary ruler to the emperor or one of his representatives as a sign of submission and inferior status. All *peshkash* revenues went directly into the imperial treasury; none were assigned as *jagirs*. In Hyderabad in the early 1690s the Mughals wrung what was euphemistically called tribute from various rajas and chiefs who were caught in plunder and/or rebellion. Venkat Rao, the *zamindar* of Paulas, gave up goods and money worth nearly 100,000 rupees to Rustam Dil Khan when he was made captive after a series of looting expeditions.[1] But these informal irregular payments must have declined as the state of public order improved in the province. Large as they might have been, such single payments could not have compensated for revenues lost from disorder in the first years after annexation. Also, in Sikakul, a number of rajas north of the Godavari purchased a degree of internal autonomy by payment of annual *peshkash*. The revolts in that area in the 1690s must have cut collections considerably, although we have no specific information on the losses involved.

However, the most lucrative type of *peshkash* in Hyderabad was that levied by the Mughals on the *deshmukhs*, *deshpands*, *muniwars*, and other local officials as a price for retention of their posts. As we have seen, the standard demand from each local official was for an amount, payable in instalments, equivalent to 7½ years' income from the percentage allowance granted on the

[1] See above, Chapter V, p. 112.

revenues. If completely assessed and collected from all local officials in Hyderabad the total return to the imperial treasury could have been as much as five million rupees or a third of the anticipated annual revenues.[1] However, the evidence at hand suggests that only a small percentage of this large amount was realized.

A document prepared by the *diwan* of Hyderabad supplies a compilation of *peshkash* accounts for local officials as of March 1699. According to this report many of the *deshmukhs*, *deshpands*, *muniwars*, and headmen and petty officials of the markets of the capital had paid either nothing or only token amounts on their obligations. Nearly nine years after the annexation, the arrears were:[2]

	Positions (Single or Joint)	Total *Peshkash*	Amount Paid	Arrears
Deshmukhs	30	1,193,640	96,672	1,096,968
Deshpands	17	303,039	3,939	299,100
Muniwars	4	343,206	5,500	337,706
Muqaddams	20	60,704	14,649	46,055
Total		1,900,589	120,769	1,779,829

Sources: I.J. Coll., I/16/567, I/16/604, I/16/626, I/16/638.

One of the purposes in drawing up the list of individual accounts was to get an exact statement of payments and arrears. Once this was achieved the *diwan* was preparing to make a fresh demand for payment of 10 per cent of the outstanding balance from each of the officials. This would be followed by a yearly payment of one half the cash allowance until the balance was paid. Thus two conclusions emerge from a reading of this document: first, *peshkash* collections from a sizeable group of local official (and perhaps from others as well) were negligible. Second, by 1696, the Hydera-

[1] One possible calculation is to assume that *deshmukh* allowances would average 2·5% and *deshpand* allowances 1·5% or a total of 4% per year. This figure multiplied by 7½ gives a demand of 30% of the annual revenues. Thus the *peshkash* returns could reach 3,672,130 rupees for the *deshmukhs* and *deshpands* alone (calculated on 12,237,101 rupees, the original established collections, less the specialized revenues).

[2] Report entitled 'Memorandum of the *peshkash* due the exalted state on bonds from *deshmukhs* and *muniwars*, etc. for province *Dar-al Jahad*, Hyderabad, to the end of 15 Sha'ban, 40'. The entire document runs to over 100 pages. I.J. Coll., I/16/546, I/16/602–657, and I/18/806.

bad fiscal office, still in possession of the bonds signed by the local officials, was organized and confident enough to contemplate making a fresh, systematic attempt at collection. As long as the political scene remained calm, the demand would not be abated nor the debts written off. If anything, a sum of nearly two million rupees in cash was likely to have been even more attractive to the emperor in 1696 than it had been a decade earlier.

However, the nature of the information given in this report raises several questions. What of the far larger number of local officials whose names appear on the first census of *deshmukhs*, *deshpands*, and *muniwars* just after the conquest? Does their exclusion from this report mean that they had paid the stipulated *peshkash* by this time; or that this is only a partial compilation and another list was prepared; or that many local officials escaped the formal assessment of *peshkash*? The *deshmukhs* listed in the report were responsible for collection of taxes from eighty of the 213 *purganas* in Hyderabad. The established collections of their holdings were 40 per cent of the total provincial revenues.[1] Some of the remaining majority of *deshmukhs* may well have paid all their arrears—especially those located in the more accessible *parganas* assigned to the *khalisa* in Elgandel and Warangal districts. Others, such as the *deshmukh* of Sikakul, almost certainly had never come to terms about *peshkash* prior to this time.[2] In other words, the most likely answer to this question is that this was in fact an incomplete listing of local officials which might have been supplemented by other, similar documents. This was almost certainly the situation for the *deshpands* who were a much smaller number in this document. However, it is certain that nearly two

[1] The *diwan*'s report lists the total revenues of the area under each *deshmukh*. In nearly all cases the figure used for this purpose, although called the *jama*', is actually the pre-increase established collection figure (*asal muqarrar hasil*) from the 1689–90 Settlement. Total revenues for the 30 *deshmukhs* were 4,915,279 rupees. The latter figure is 40 per cent of the total established revenues of 12,237,101 rupees (i.e. the original *hasil* figure minus specialized revenues not collected by *deshmukhs* such as the *sa'ir* of the capital). The proportion is probably somewhat higher since no total revenue figure was given for territories under Anand Rao, *zamindar* of Paloncha, who was listed as a *deshmukh*. Since no other *deshmukhs* are named for Khammamett in this document or in the original census of local officials, it is possible that Anand Rao acted as *deshmukh* for all of Khammamett district which had collections of 552,847 rupees.

[2] Cf. I.J. Coll., I/13/978–9. Nur Singh Rao, *zamindar* of Jatpol, made an offer to pay 143,370 rupees for the position of *deshmukh* of Sikakul (total revenues 840,822 rupees). The incumbent *deshmukh* does not seem to have paid or to have agreed to pay any *peshkash*.

million rupees remained outstanding in *peshkash* payments—a fact which is scarcely a testimony to the strength of the administration in its dealings with Hyderabad's *zamindars*.

KHALISA

The 1689–90 Revenue Settlement retained 6·7 million rupees in revenues (*muqarrar hasil*) for *khalisa* in Hyderabad. Of this total, 4·2 million rupees, nearly two-thirds, were to come from Telengana. The emperor made separate arrangements for collection of the revenues from the *sa'ir* of the capital (set at 556,586 rupees) and the royal gardens (109,973 rupees) located in and near the capital. The remainder of the *khalisa* receipts in Telengana would be derived from fifty-three *parganas* with annual established collections of just over 3·5 million rupees. In an effort to ensure full collection of this amount, just over half the entire Hyderabad *khalisa*, Aurangzeb placed a single collector, or *amin*, in charge,[1] who apparently was not under the direct supervision of the *diwan* of Hyderabad.

Initial organization of the *khalisa* lands in Telengana fell to Bindraban, a Hindu officer of the central *khalisa* administration. The emperor gave this *mansabdar* additional powers and duties as *faujdar* of Elgandel district. From his headquarters at Elgandel town Bindraban had relatively easy access to the twenty *parganas* of the district, all of which were included in the *khalisa*; to the thirteen crown districts of neighbouring Warangal district to the east; and to the other *khalisa parganas* in Medak, Kaulas, Bhongir, and Devarkonda. During his tenure in office Bindraban successfully organized the machinery of revenue collection through the *deshmukhs* and *deshpands*. He submitted regular reports to the central *khalisa* office and the *diwan* of the Deccan. Bindraban also conducted vigorous campaigns against any unco-operative local *zamindars*.[2]

In 1695 Aurangzeb transferred Bindraban out of Hyderabad and placed another *mansabdar* in his post. His successor, Kar Talab Khan, held the relatively high rank of 600 *zat*, 300 *suwar* (120 two horse). As *faujdar* of Elgandel he was given a conditional

[1] The *khalisa* figures are summarized in Table XI, pp. 160–1. Some of the fifty-three territorial *mahals* (e.g. three in Mummadnagar district, near the capital) may have been under the control of the *diwan* of Hyderabad.

[2] Akh. XXXVI–XXXVII (28 Rabi II), 70.

increment of 150 *suwār*. The new *khalisa* administrator also became *faujdar* of Indurti and several other *khalisa parganas* located in Devarkonda district to the south. This position (which may have also been held by Bindraban) carried with it a conditional *suwar* addition of 200. Kar Talab Khan brought with him a personal staff of five *mansabdars* of lesser rank who formed the nucleus of his sizeable administrative and military organization.[1] Support for these men and the approximately 150 cavalrymen which Kar Talab Khan was required to muster came from a *jagir* worth 63,681 rupees (annual *hasil*, five months' proportion of 135,250 rupees *jama'*). Kar Talab Khan collected over nine-tenths of his salary from two *parganas* in Bidar province. He held a small *jagir* (4,687 rupees) in Elgandel *pargana*, at his headquarters, and a tiny grant (377 rupees) in Medak *pargana*.[2]

Kar Talab Khan's rank, his triple appointment (i.e. as *amin* of *khalisa* and *faujdar* of Elgandel and Indurti), his independently derived salary, the importance of his assignment, and his autonomy all combined to make him a powerful figure in Hyderabad. The surviving administrative documents show that both Kar Talab Khan and his predecessor reported directly to the *diwan* of *khalisa* and to the emperor. They do not seem to have been subject to direct control by either the governor, Jan Sipar Khan, or the *diwan* of Hyderabad. By giving a single administrator fiscal, magisterial, and military power over the crown territories in Telengana, Aurangzeb could demand and enforce effective administration over these territories. This put yet another check on the power of the provincial governor. At the same time, a watchful governor, jealous of further encroachment on his position, could be depended upon to report undue aggrandizement by the *amin* and *faujdar* of Elgandel.

How successful was this arrangement? Table XII shows actual collections for four specimen years (1689–90, 1690–1, 1691–2, and 1696–7) for two *khalisa parganas* in Kaulas district. Narainkheda and Sahole *parganas*, containing as many as 200 villages, were located seventy miles to the north-west of Hyderabad city. Established receipts for the two *parganas* after the 1689–90 Settlement

[1] His followers were: Shujauddin (150/50); Muhammad Baqir (250); Muhammad Latif (80); Muhammad Tarif (60); and Muhammad Sa'id (80). I.J. Coll., I/20/322.

[2] I.J. Coll., I/20/321–35.

TABLE XII

Actual Collections in Two Khalisa Parganas, 1689–97

	NARAINKHEDA 168 Villages	SAHOLI 48 Villages	Total
1689–90 Settlement	158,544	124,542	283,086
Waste Area in 1689	41,152	39,617	80,769
Percentage	25	32	29
(Bindraban's administration) 1689–90 Collections	72,472	32,090	104,562
Percentage	44	26	37
1690–1 Collections	82,399	54,914	137,213
Percentage	52	44	49
1691–2 Collections	90,441	84,408	174,822
Percentage	57	68	62
(Kar Talab Khan's administration) 1696–7 Collections	NA	NA	153,560
Percentage	NA	NA	54

Sources: I.J. Coll., I/11/498, I/13/56, I/7/104, I/19/322. The 1696–7 collections were made on an enlarged assessment due to the expropriation of grants with revenues of 26,313 rupees in 1695. This increased the established collection figure by the same amount. See below for a discussion of the expropriation of the grants.

TABLE XIII

Mughal Collections and the Golconda Assessment

	NARAINKHEDA 168 Villages	SAHOLI 48 Villages	Total
Pre-1687 Assessment	145,771	97,396	243,167
1689–90 Collections	72,472	32,090	104,562
Percentage	50	33	43
1691–2 Collections	90,441	84,408	174,822
Percentage	62	87	72
1696–7 Collections	NA	NA	153,560
Percentage	NA	NA	63

Sources: Same as Table XII.

were 283,086 rupees—up 16 per cent from the Golconda figure. In his initial survey, the *diwan* of Hyderabad, Muhammad Shafi, estimated that 29 per cent of the assessed area was still laid waste after the effects of the war, but the remainder could be considered productive. As a result the first collections, in 1689–90, were only 37 per cent of the new Mughal assessment. Gradually, as the economy of the area recovered, collections also climbed to 49 per cent the next year and to a high of 62 per cent in 1691–2. In 1695 resumptions of land grants added 26,323 rupees to the taxable lands of the two *parganas*. Yet, even with this boost, by 1696–7 collections for the two *parganas* were down to 54 per cent of the 1689–90 figure. These figures, from an admittedly restricted sample, reveal the existence of a wide margin between the tax demand of the 1689–90 Settlement and cash reaching the imperial treasury. At best, the revenues of these *parganas* were 50 to 60 per cent of the assessment.

However, the performance of Bindraban and Kar Talab Khan looks considerably better if we compare Mughal collections with the Golconda assessment, rather than the enhanced 1689–90 figures. Table XIII shows that, on this basis, actual receipts rose to a high of 72 per cent in 1691–2 and dropped slightly to 63 per cent in 1696–7. Both tables show a noticeable increase between the first year and the last year of the series (from 29 per cent to 54 per cent and from 43 per cent to 63 per cent). This suggests that over a period of seven years there was some recovery from the effects of war and famine and at least partially successful administrative consolidation.

A more comprehensive look at receipts for forty *khalisa parganas* in Telengana in 1696–7 supports this interpretation (see Table XIV). Apart from five *parganas* newly resumed from *jagirdars*, the forty *parganas* listed constituted the *khalisa* then under Kar Talab Khan. A decade after the fall of Golconda fort, the proportion of collections to assessments in these *parganas* averaged 58 per cent. Kar Talab Khan achieved the best returns (68 per cent) in Elgandel district where his headquarters were located and the poorest (37 per cent) in the thirteen *khalisa parganas* of neighbouring Warangal district. The reasons for this discrepancy are as yet unknown. Nevertheless, the over-all average shows clearly that Mughal officials had re-established the links in the chain of connections between the state and the producers of wealth in the

Table XIV

1696–7 Collections in Forty Parganas under the Administration of Kar Talab Khan

	Number of *Parganas*	1689–90 Assessment	1696–7 Collections	Percentage
(1) Kaulas	2	283,086	153,560	54
(2) Medak	2	582,352	366,858	63
(3) Malankur	1	47,066	30,076	65
(4) Elgandel	20	1,042,065	707,297	68
(5) Warangal	13	480,589	179,959	36
(6) Bhongir	1	69,645	28,316	41
(7) Pangal	1	150,000	77,065	52
Total	40	2,654,803	1,543,671	58

Sources. I.J. Coll., I/16/249–50, I/16/353.

countryside and town of Telengana: craftsmen, merchants, and especially the agricultural cultivators.

Receipts may not have been as high as the emperor had expected and probably were both absolutely and proportionately less than those achieved by the revenue officials of Abul Hasan Qutb Shah. Still, in 1696–7 the *khalisa parganas* under Kar Talab Khan produced 1·5 million rupees in cash for deposit in the emperor's treasury. Aurangzeb may not have been completely content with this performance, but he showed no visible signs of dissatisfaction with Kar Talab Khan. In the late 1690s the latter became *diwan* of Hyderabad while retaining his existing titles as *amin* and *faujdar* of Elgandel and Indurti. Then, in 1701, the emperor selected Kar Talab Khan for a task of critical importance for the support of the imperial establishment in the Deccan—reorganization of the revenue administration of Bengal. Under his new title, Murshid Quli Khan he became first *diwan* of Bengal, later governor and *diwan*, and eventually independent ruler of the region.[1]

In Andhra, the allocation of *khalisa* territories had been by

[1] Cf. *Maasir-ul-umara*, III. 751–2, and Abdul Karim, *Murshid Quli Khan and His Times*, pp. 15–16. Kar Talab Khan is identified as Murshid Quli Khan in several of the Hyderabad documents as well.

districts. The 1689–90 Settlement classified Machilipatnam, Nizampatnam, Rajmundry, and Sikakul districts as *khalisa* territories. Within a few years' time an arrangement evolved whereby the *faujdar* of Sikakul, responsible for the general administration of the seven coastal districts, also became the *amin* or collector for whatever *khalisa* lands lay within his territory. It appears that the *faujdar* held his post on farming terms. That is, he was required to turn over a fixed sum to the central treasury each year.

A report prepared in 1712, in the reign of Bahadur Shah, Aurangzeb's immediate successor, reveals that revenue yields in the two ports, Machilipatnam and Nizampatnam in the period 1690–1704, were much better than any other areas in the Hyderabad *khalisa*. Mustafa Quli Khan and after him Rustam Dil Khan paid 448,000 rupees annually for the eight *parganas* of Machilipatnam district, including port custom, salt fees, and land taxes, but excluding *peshkash* from *zamindars*.[1] This was 92 per cent of the enhanced 1689–90 figure and more than the Golconda assessment (432,000 rupees). Receipts for Nizampatnam, the other port on the Krishna, actually exceeded the assessed total by 28 per cent to reach 314,000 rupees annually.[2]

In Rajmundry and Sikakul the record of collections was probably less happy for the Mughal revenue office, although no data on their receipts have been located. Certainly, the revolts in Sikakul must have interrupted regular tax collections for several years in the mid-1690s. We do possess a few collection figures for Eluru district in Andhra, which, along with Mustafanagar district, was transferred to the *khalisa* in 1697. When he made this change Aurangzeb for several years grouped Eluru, Mustafanagar, and Khammamett districts together under the administration of Hasan Quli Khan, the *faujdar* of Khammamett. The emperor also appointed Hasan Quli Khan *amin* of all *khalisa* lands in the three districts instead of adding to the responsibilities of Mustafa Quli Khan, the *faujdar* of Sikakul, who was barely coping with the disturbances north of the Godavari. The new *amin* of Eluru and

[1] I J. Coll., III/5/164. Most of this revenue derived from increased production and sale of salt. Production under Mustafa Quli Khan was 3,000 *khandi* or approximately 1·5 million pounds of salt. This was sold at a monopoly price of 12 rupees per *khandi* (about 500 pounds) while the costs of wages and production costs were only 1 rupee, 4 annas per *khandi*. Thus the profit on sales of 360,000 rupees was 322,500 rupees.

[2] Ibid. For the fiscal duties of the Sikakul *faujdar*, see I.J. Coll., I/15/10.

Mustafanagar carried out a settlement (*jama'bandi*) in Eluru which resulted in a modest upward adjustment of the revenue demand by 4 per cent to 553,250 rupees.[1] Collections in that year came to 134,000 rupees or less than a quarter of the assessment. Most of this amount never reached the treasury.

A clash with Appa Rao of Nuzvid resulted in the loss of nearly 90,000 rupees and the death of Hasan Quli Khan's son-in-law. The next year, 1698–9, collections rose slightly to 30 per cent (164,939) of the assessment. Whether this trend continued or not is unknown. Receipts from Mustafanagar district, in the face of overt resistance from the Valamas of Nuzvid, were likely to have been even less—provided that any collections at all were made.

Considering the escalating demand for productive *jagirs* in the 1690s we might expect encroachments on the Hyderabad *khalisa*, or even wholesale transfers of *khalisa* lands to *paibaqi*. In fact, nearly the opposite is true. The *diwan* of the Deccan scrupulously avoided granting *jagirs* to ordinary *mansabdars* in Hyderabad's crown territories. Some fort commanders and their subordinates were able to hold conditional *jagirs* in the *khalisa* territories surrounding their command.[2] And the *faujdar* of Sikakul held a larger assignment, varying between 50,000 and 60,000 rupees *hasil*, in the vicinity of Rajmundry, which was classified as *khalisa*.[3] But aside from these few examples the integrity of the crown territories was maintained.

The administration also took measures to expand the taxable lands in the *khalisa*. In May 1695 the *diwan* of Hyderabad, acting in conjunction with the chief religious official of the Mughal administration (the *sadar*), had investigated and confiscated 14,710 *bigahs* (8,826 acres) of tax-free lands whose holders could not produce valid evidence of their right to the lands in question.[4] This action raised potential *khalisa* revenues by over 100,000 rupees. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of this expropriation was its wide distribution. The grant holders, or *aimmadaran*, lost

[1] I.J. Coll., I/19/452.

[2] I.J. Coll., I/17/1188, records a salary assignment of 5,560 rupees in Elgandel *pargana* given to Murtaza Quli Khan, commander of Elgandel fort. I/17/967 records a *jagir* in Mustafanagar *pargana* worth 11,942 rupees (*hasil*) held by Sahib Singh, commander of Mustafanagar fort. In 1697 the commander of Medak fort held a *jagir* with a *hasil* of 10,610 rupees in *hawili* Medak *pargana*, also crown territory. I/13/288.

[3] I.J. Coll., I/14/1048, I/21/159.

[4] I.J. Coll., I/11/498, I/11/557.

lands in nearly every part of Hyderabad. Hardest hit were those holding lands in the eighty-odd villages in the environs of Machilipatnam port. Resumption of almost 8,000 *bigahs* of land raised the established tax collections of the district by 38 per cent from the 1689–90 figure.

Over a period of a dozen years, the *diwan* of the Deccan changed the status of a number of *parganas* in Telengana. Some, whose revenues were unsatisfactory, were shifted out of the *khalisa* and thrown open to assignment as *jagirs*. Others, if their revenues were improved, were brought into the *khalisa*. Yet, despite these changes, there was probably little alteration in the total value of the crown territories. By 1700 forty-five *parganas*, including five recently transferred from *jagirdars*, were still classified as *khalisa*, as compared with fifty-three crown *parganas* in 1690.[1] This apparent loss (which may not have been a loss in terms of actual revenues) was more than offset by the enlargement of the *khalisa* lands in Andhra. In 1695 Mustafanagar district (24 *parganas*) and in 1697 Eluru (11 *parganas*) had been incorporated into the *khalisa*.[2] This added lands with revenues set at 1·7 million rupees to the crown territories. Of the seven coastal districts, only Murtazanagar was left open for assignment to *jagirdars*.

SA'IR

Sa'ir was a revenue category in the Mughal system comparable to *mal*, the tax on agricultural production, *peshkash*, i.e. tribute, and *jiziya*, the capitation tax on non-Muslims. However, *sa'ir*, unlike the other major categories, was virtually a residual classification into which fell the multitude of specialized taxes common to pre-modern Indian states: road and ferry tolls, *octroi*, excise taxes on merchandise, shop and house taxes, etc. In Hyderabad collection of all *sa'ir* revenues, classified as *khalisa*, formed part of the official responsibilities of the *diwan* of Hyderabad.[3] The two most important sources of *sa'ir* revenues in the province were the commerce of the capital, Hyderabad city, and receipts from the various internal

[1] I.J. Coll., I/16/249–50. Since the names of the five *parganas* are not given, it is not possible to compute the total *khalisa* revenues at this time.

[2] I.J. Coll., I/11/498, I/14/264.

[3] In 1695 Mir Muhammad Jafar sent details of the income and expenses of the *sa'ir-i balda*, i.e. of the capital to the *daftar-i khalisa*, along with similar information for the customs posts (*chaukiat*). Unfortunately, only the cover sheet listing the report has survived, not the report itself. Cf. I.J. Coll., I/11/354.

customs posts scattered along the major roads approaching the capital.

In spite of the dramatic political changes of 1687 and the extended period of disorder which accompanied those changes, Hyderabad city (and Golconda fort) continued to be the greatest population centre, market, and financial centre in the eastern Deccan. The 1689–90 Settlement put the expected normal amount of *sa'ir* receipts from the metropolis at well over half a million rupees yearly. But more important than the actual amount was the fact that these revenues could be collected cheaply and conveniently with little chance of forcible resistance disturbing collections. Nor were there the problems associated with the transmission of revenues over long distances, as was the case with the land revenues.

The machinery of *sa'ir* collections at Hyderabad was probably very like that in operation under the Qutb Shahs. The *diwan* of Hyderabad, who was ultimately responsible for the *sa'ir*, approved appointments, collected records, and accepted the cash proceeds into the provincial treasury. Beneath him, however, the chief executive officer was the accountant (*kulkarni*) of *sa'ir*, who was not a *mansabdar*, but was recruited locally. The immediate staff of the *kulkarni* consisted of an office manager (*darogha*), a collector (*amin*), an auditor (*mushrif*), and a treasurer (*tahwildar*). Each major market in the city was treated as a separate fiscal unit or *mahal*. The *kulkarni* supervised petty officials (*muqiman*) who were posted to each *mahal* of the city. The *sa'ir* accountant also administered the customs posts (*chauki*) located at the city entrances.[1]

Below this imposed structure, as in the agrarian system, we find virtually self-regulating groups of specialized merchants, artisans, and semi-skilled labourers. Representing these groups was a body of representatives whom the Mughals officially recognized, for a price. At the head of this body of intermediaries were two men

[1] I.J. Coll., I/11/351. In his description of the mechanism for collection of urban taxes, I. H. Qureshi mentions only an *amin*, i.e. collector assisted by local *chaudhuris*, and omits any reference to a *kulkarni* and his staff. Cf. Qureshi, pp. 238–9. In his discussion of Mughal finances, Qureshi states that each market (*mandwi* or *kathehrah*) was strictly regulated so that the prescribed taxes could be collected from goods sold. The standard rate was 2½% *zakat* levied on Muslim traders and 5% *kharaj* on non-Muslim traders. These rates were calculated on the total value of the goods at the time of sale, and in theory were only to be assessed once within the empire. Merchants transporting goods could bring a certificate of exemption. Ibid., pp. 145–6.

who acted as chief merchants (*seth*) for the entire commercial community of Hyderabad. The emperor issued *sanads* to Timna(?) and Saropa which appointed them chief merchants of the royal grain market and all other markets (*mandwiat*) in the city.[1] Timna, who was also *chaudhuri* or headman of the timber market, paid 1,250 rupees toward his total appointment fee of 10,000 rupees. Saropa paid 2,211 rupees as an instalment on his 7,000-rupee fee. In the text of the bonds executed each *seth* agreed to see to the proper regulation of the markets and to increase the revenues of the state.

Below the head merchants could be found *chaudhurian* or headmen in each of the commodity markets of the city: grain, textiles, livestock, timber, spices and condiments (*kirana*), oil seeds (*kanjud*), milk, and the 'stall' (*dariba*) for betel.[2] The general impression gained from the few records which remain is that these positions, unlike the semi-hereditary *deshmukh* holdings in the countryside, were temporary and subject to change every few years. For example, Gulab Rai, who pledged 5,000 rupees as *chaudhuri* of the grain market, took over the same post for the spice and betel markets in 1696 for additional *peshkash* of 3,000 rupees. In so doing he displaced the incumbent *chaudhuris*.[3] The various service groups and trades also had headmen who collected taxes and acted as a link between the state and their fellows. Thus Nathal, head of the assayers and money-changers (*sahib-i 'iyar*), paid an initial 500-rupee instalment toward his total 3.000-rupee fee in 1690.[4] Other service groups included the city porters and labourers (*kaharan*) and the dyers (*rangrizan*).[5]

It is regrettable that exact figures for *sa'ir* collections in Hyderabad comparable to those given earlier for the *khalisa* are not available, since these must have fluctuated much as did the economy

[1] I.J. Coll., I/16/643–5, I/15/421.

[2] The *chaudhuris* were both Muslim and Hindu: Gulab Rai, a 'Hindustani merchant', was head of the *shahganj*, I/15/432; Muhammad Afzal, head of the piece-goods market (*kotah parcha*), paid 6,000 rupees toward a total *peshkash* of 12,000 rupees, to take the post over from Man Singh and Babu Rai in 1694, I/15/432; Muhammad Sharif and other livestock dealers (*dhlalan nakhas*) were to pay 800 rupees *peshkash*, I/15/423; Timna and Laxmi were to pay 1,001 rupees *peshkash* as heads of the oil-seed market, I/15/420; Govind Singh was head of the betel market (700 rupees), I/15/428; Rao, son of Chinna, paid 400 rupees as head of the cowherds (*golalan*), I/15/425.

[3] I.J. Coll., I/15/431. [4] Ibid., I/16/642.

[5] Muhammad, head of the labourers, paid 1,500 rupees, I.J. Coll., I/15/453, and Laxmanji, head of the dyers, 100 rupees, I/15/415.

and trade of the city. The impression given by those bits of anecdotal evidence which exist is that *sa'ir* collections returned very slowly, if at all, to their pre-conquest level. In the early 1690s Babu Pandit, the provincial *qanungo*, had pledged 25,000 rupees *peshkash* to obtain the post of chief collector (*kulkarni*) of *sa'ir* in Hyderabad. He held both positions simultaneously. By 1695 Babu Pandit urgently pleaded his inability to meet the stipulated instalments on his enormous appointment fee. The *kulkarni* claimed that he could not collect his allowance and was nearly ruined because recent *sa'ir* collections were only one-eighth the *jam'i-kamil*. This would mean that collections had dropped to about 80,000 rupees (on a total demand of 644,635 rupees). According to Babu Pandit, 'because of the desolation (*wirani*) it was impossible to collect any more.'[1] Even if we allow for rhetorical exaggeration, it would seem that *sa'ir* receipts were not entirely satisfactory.

Part of the reason for this decline may have been lax administration as well as 'desolation'. Just a few months after Babu Pandit sent his petition to the emperor, Aurangzeb ordered Muhammad Jafar, the *diwan* of Hyderabad, to tighten up procedures for collection of levies on food grains brought into the capital.[2] The emperor had received a disturbing report from the auditor (*mushrif*) of the central grain market (*shahganj*). This officer claimed that the falling-off in official receipts from the *shahganj* was not caused by a reduction in the quantity of grain brought into the city. Instead the market headmen (*chaudhuris*) and chief merchants (*seths*) conspired to bring the grain into the city by prohibited routes. In this way they avoided the official customs posts which were supposed to collect the taxes on food grains. If this was true, the emperor wanted immediate action taken to correct the situation. From the chronological juxtaposition of these two documents we can infer what was undoubtedly the case: subtle conspiratorial resistance to imperial demands by local notables in Hyderabad. This would be the urban version of the resistance to the demands of centralized authority practised by members of the rural warrior aristocracy. On the face of it, we might suspect that at precisely the same time that Babu Pandit was complaining of possible ruin as a result of low *sa'ir* collections, he was well paid

[1] I.J. Coll., I/10/29.
[2] I.J. Coll., I/11/598. The report was relayed by the provincial newswriter.

to ignore large-scale tax evasion in the Hyderabad grain trade. The cost to the imperial treasury of that or other possible local combinations is not difficult to visualize. Yet it is also true that because Hyderabad was part of a centralized administrative system, the shrinkage (or possibly a continued drop) in *sa'ir* collections was noticed. A subordinate official provided—through a channel independent of the immediately responsible officers—grounds to suspect malfeasance. Aurangzeb, sensitive to losses in revenues, sent direct orders to the *diwan* of Hyderabad to correct the situation. As long as the imperial centre remained vigorous, local subversion of the revenue system in Hyderabad could only be partially and temporarily successful.

Another important aspect of Hyderabad's large grain trade should not be overlooked. Whatever the fluctuations in *sa'ir* revenues may have been, throughout the 1690s the grain market at Hyderabad was an important source of supply for Aurangzeb's mobile court, central administration, and field armies. This was no small matter, since, at any given time, several hundred thousand nobles, courtiers, soldiers, tradesmen, and camp-followers massed around the emperor's tents.[1] Itinerant grain merchants (*banjaras*) were officially encouraged to transport large quantities of grain from Hyderabad to the bazaar at the imperial camp.[2]

Away from the capital, the *diwan* supervised the operation of a number of customs posts. These, manned by collectors (*amin*) and armed soldiers, collected the tolls permitted by imperial regulations. The *diwan* kept records of their operation, including the names of officials appointed and records of income and expenses.[3] Regrettably, anything other than a guess as to the returns from these imposts is impossible. Precise information as to the location of the various check-points is also unavailable. One observation which can be made, however, is that the method of collecting inland customs under the Mughals seems to have changed from the pre-1687 decentralized system of Golconda. Neither in the

[1] Cf. Careri's description of the Mughal camp in *Indian Travels of Thevenot and Careri*, ed. by Surendranath Sen, p. 218.

[2] Two Mughal newsletters to the royal court discuss the movement of grain from Hyderabad to the imperial camp in 1694. Cf. Akh., XXXVIII (5 Zelhejja), p. 111, and XXXVIII (28 Rabi II), p. 315. For a full description of the *banjaras*, who employed great herds of pack bullocks to move food grains and salt, see Habib, pp. 62–3.

[3] I.J. Coll., I/11/351, I/11/354.

outlying customs points nor in the capital do we find anything resembling the relatively unregulated practice of leasing and subleasing customs rights to entrepreneurs, largely Brahmins, which was described by European travellers in Golconda.

There can be no doubt that Hyderabad was beginning to undergo integration into the economic system of the empire. The central administration made efforts to enforce uniform taxation on inter-regional trade reaching Hyderabad. In 1692 the *diwan* of the Deccan received a statement from the agent of Kanahayya, Madhu, and others, merchants from Berar. In his statement, the agent complained that his principals had purchased opium, raw silk, and other goods from Burhanpur, Akbarabad, Ujain, Surat, and elsewhere in western India with the object of carrying them to Hyderabad for resale. They had paid the taxes assessed when the goods were purchased. Despite this fact, the accountants (*mutassadian*) at Hyderabad demanded and collected a forbidden cess of 1 per cent on the value of the goods. This was ruinous for the profits of the merchants. The *diwan* of the Deccan wrote to Mir Muhammad Jafar, who had just become *diwan* of Hyderabad, demanding a full investigation and report. The *diwan* also ordered the refund of any monies illegally taken from the group of Berar merchants and forbade any recurrence of these actions.[1]

Once again, as with an analogous situation in the Hyderabad grain trade, we can see local officials contravening imperial rules while undoubtedly making a handsome profit. That all illegal exactions taken from the long-distance traders found their way to the provincial treasury is unlikely. Yet there was also a centralized, bureaucratic, multi-regional source of authority which could intervene. A rule existed that goods should be taxed only once (5 per cent on value for non-Muslim traders) at the time and place of purchase. When the rule was violated in Hyderabad, the aggrieved parties complained and demanded redress. The chief fiscal officer of the Deccan, duly recording the complaint, ordered an investigation and report from the appropriate authorities in Hyderabad. If the facts were true, remedial action would be taken. In other words, the recorded complaint is not evidence of the breakdown of the imperial system, but rather of its continued operation. Only the realistic prospect of relief could have moved

[1] Ibid., I/8/2, I/8/4. There is a possibility that the forbidden cesses (*abwab mamnu'*) collected were actually a Golconda tax now illegal under the Mughals

the merchants to go to the expense of making a complaint at Aurangabad.

JAGIRS

The complex Mughal system of *jagirs*, or temporary assignments of land taxes to meet the salaries of *mansabdars*, was put into operation in Hyderabad. The existence of over 500 documents recording *jagir* assignments and transfers between 1687 and 1707 amply testifies to this fact.[1] The *diwan* of the six Deccan provinces assigned *jagirs* in Hyderabad to *mansabdars* on duty in Hyderabad to meet their salary needs. He also gave *jagirs* in the province to officers serving elsewhere in the Deccan, but rarely to those serving in North India. The *diwan* of Hyderabad and his staff carried out the supervision of *jagirs* in Hyderabad. This involved verifying and releasing assignments made by the *diwan* of the Deccan, controlling the actions of agents sent by the *jagir* holders, keeping records of *jagir* transfers and lands available for assignment, and collecting taxes in lands temporarily unassigned. The provincial *qanungo* also assembled, recorded, and transmitted data on the level of tax collections achieved by *jagirdars* in their holdings.

The distribution of *jagirs* in Hyderabad was uneven. There was a concentration of *jagirs* assigned in the capital and in the districts adjacent to it with a sharp drop in the incidence of assignments in Khammamett and the more distant districts in Andhra. Table XV which lists nearly 200 identifiable assignments made between 1695 and 1700, illustrates this pattern.

Obviously the assignment of *jagirs* was limited by the designation of some areas as *khalisa* lands. We would not expect to find many *jagirs* given out in the four *khalisa* districts in Andhra (Machilipatnam, Nizampatnam, Rajmundry, and Sikakul) or in Elgandel and Warangal districts which were almost entirely crown territories. Nevertheless, it would seem from this sample of assignments made in a five-year period that many *parganas* made available for *jagirs* in the 1689–90 Settlement were probably not used for that purpose before—or even after—1700. The areas favoured for *jagirs* were those closest to and most accessible to the

[1] Most of these documents are dated between 1695 and 1707. Few records of *jagirs* dated before 1695 have been found. This does not necessarily mean that no *jagirs* were assigned before that date, since we have no assurance that the surviving documents record all *jagirs* assigned.

TABLE XV

District	Number of *Jagirs*	Number of *Parganas*
Bhongir	24	7
Devarkonda	20	8
Elgandel	—	(Entire district in *khalisa*)
Ghanpura	2	1
Khammamett	—	—
Koilkonda	12	4
Kaulas	35	5
Malankur	—	—
Medak	18	9
Muhammadnagar	49	10
Nalgonda	—	—
Pangal	1	1
Warangal	5	3
Telengana	168	51
Eluru	5	1
Machilipatnam	—	—
Murtazanagar	4	1
Mustafanagar	1	1
Nizampatnam	—	—
Rajmundry	3	1
Sikakul	—	—
Andhra	13	4
Total Hyderabad	181	55

Source: Selected documents from the I.J. Coll.

capital. Bhongir, Devarkonda, Medak, and Kaulas, the districts adjoining the capital, as well as the capital district itself, i.e. Muhammadnagar, accounted for 146 of the 168 *jagir* assignments identified. Khammamett and Nalgonda districts, although originally classified *paibaqi*, supplied no *jagirs* before 1700, and very few thereafter. This was not accidental but occurred as the result of deliberate policy decisions.

Some *mansabdars* serving in Hyderabad received their salaries in cash from the provincial treasury; but most held *jagirs* which were partly or wholly located in the province. Certain *parganas*,

and certain districts not reserved for the *khalisa*, were earmarked for the support of the provincial cadre. The numerous small *mansabdars*, who worked in the central fiscal offices as accountants, clerks, secretaries, etc., often held petty assignments. Their ranks ranged from 40 *zat* to 100 *zat* and their pay from 500 to 2,000 rupees yearly. Because men like these did not have the resources to manage distant holdings, the *diwan* of the Deccan assigned villages or fractions of villages in the neighbourhood of the capital. *Hawili* Hyderabad and *hawili* Muhammadnagar, the two *parganas* surrounding Hyderabad city and Golconda fort respectively, were used most frequently for this purpose. Twenty-six *jagirs* assigned in these two *parganas* in the five years between 1695 and 1700 had returns (*hasil*) averaging only 1,231 rupees.[1] Proximity to the capital seems to have made it possible for the *jagirdars* to deal with single villages. Another, seemingly reliable, area used for this purpose was Rajkonda and a few other *parganas* in Bhongir district where extremely small *jagir* assignments were made. Also *mansabdars* holding higher ranks frequently obtained small *jagirs* in the capital district to make up small deficits in their total salaries.

Jagirs for many of the more important *mansabdars* of Hyderabad were concentrated in Telengana to the north and west of the capital. Kaulas *pargana*, consisting of over 230 villages, was fully devoted to this purpose (see Table XVI).

The *diwan* of the Deccan and his advisers made an obvious attempt to reserve the most accessible and stable areas for assignment to the provincial cadre of Hyderabad. But this concern did not prevent serious difficulties for the *mansabdars*—difficulties which arose from consistent drops in collections. Few *mansabdars* in Hyderabad (with the possible exception of the governor) seem to have obtained entirely satisfactory returns from their *jagirs*. Partly, this was a result of technical snags which accompanied the establishment of the Mughal system of *jagir* assignment. Because all lands in Golconda were newly acquired, Mughal revenue officials had no reliable pre-existing records of revenue returns which could be used to match *jagirs* with the month-scales held by each *mansabdar*. In the absence of such information, the *diwan*

[1] I.J. Coll., I/11/65, 68, 554, 580, 696; I/13/663, 707, 924; I/14/230, 408, 492, 546, 565, 653; I/15/648; I/16/94, 130, 177, 208, 438, 770, 824, 825, 1036. The highest figure was 7,500 rupees.

TABLE XVI

Jagirs Assigned in Kaulas Pargana, Kaulas District, as of April, 1695

Name	Position	*Jama'*	*Hasil*
(1) Jan Sipar Khan	Governor of Hyderabad	183,975	126,958
(2) Sayyid Muzaffar Khan	*Faujdar* of Kaulas	48,625	31,042
(3) Ra'ayat Khan	Commander of Kaulas Fort	43,000	21,500
(4) Jalaluddin Khan	Commander of Golconda Fort	106,450	65,947
(5) 'Izzatullah	Brother of Jalaluddin Khan	9,350	4,674
(6) Muhammad Muhsin	*Buyutat* of Hyderabad	10,725	4,479
(7) Ziauddin Husain	*Bakhshi* and *Waqa' nawis* of Hyderabad	3,250	1,625
(8) Muhammad s/o Muhammad Rabi'	Son of the *Kotwal* of Hyderabad city	5,700	2,859
(9) Selim Bek	Superintendent of the Provincial Artillery (*tupkhana*)	5,420	2,079
(10) Ahmad Bek	*Bakhshi* and *Waqa' nawis* of the territories (*chakla*) administered by Bindraban	4,000	1,671
(11) Sayyid Fatah Muhammad s/o Shaikh Abdul Wahab	Not Given	2,680	1,269
(12) *Paibaqi* (resulting from the transfer of Nazar Bek)		98	38
Total		423,273	264,141
1689–90 Settlement		264,000	263,999

Source: I.J. Coll., I/11/20, provides the *awarja* or summary for *haveli* Kaulas. The document restores the salaries of 200 *suwar* to Ra'ayat Khan, commander of Kaulas fort, who had lost the *jagir* when he failed to supply branding certificates. Jan Sipar Khan, the governor, was credited with a small abatement (*takhfif*) so that he was actually only considered to receive 122,622 rupees *hasil*, instead of the full amount with which he was credited. *Jama'* amounts are converted from *dams*.

and his advisers used the 'established collection' figures given in the 1689–90 Settlement as the officially anticipated level of collection, or *hasil*, for all *jagir* lands assigned in Hyderabad. But this was in most cases a purely normative figure with no essential relationship to the fluctuation of year-to-year collections under the Qutb Shahs. For example, in the majority of *parganas* open to salary assignment the established collection figure was a fixed 50 per cent of the *jama'*, which appears to have been a statement of the total produce of the area in question. The revenue office treated these areas as if the 1689–90 established collection figure represented actual collections and assigned them to *mansabdars* whose pay was on a month-ratio of six months. This meant that a *mansabdar* in this situation would have to collect every rupee of the state's demand in order to realize his full salary. In Kaulas *pargana* where the *hasil* figure was 100 per cent or 12 months of the *jama'* or demand figure the *mansabdars* given assignments in that area gained no concessions. The revenue office simply raised the *jama'* to a fictitious level in order to make the *jagirs* assigned conform to the month ratios of each *mansabdar*. For example, the governor Jan Sipar Khan, whose salary was on an eight-month ratio, held a *jagir* with a *hasil* of 126,958 rupees which was shown as two-thirds of the *jama'* (183,975 rupees). But the *jama'* figure was simply raised arbitrarily to place the *hasil* figure in the right ratio to the *jama'*. As a result the total (463,273) *jama'* for the *pargana* after all assignments were made was much larger than the *jama'* (264,000 rupees) shown on the 1689–90 Settlement (see above). The established collection total now shown as the *hasil* for the *jagirs* assigned remained unchanged.

Seemingly in response to this situation, the *diwan*'s office began to grant an adjustment or abatement (*takhfif*) to individual *jagirdars* requesting relief on the grounds of inadequate collections. This took the form of an adjustment of either 22 per cent ('ten-fifteen') or 33⅓ per cent ('ten-twenty'). This meant that the *diwan*'s office agreed that the *jagirdar* could only expect to achieve between four-fifths and two-thirds the 'established collection figure'. At first this was granted only in individual cases, but after 1698 the 'ten-twenty' or one-third abatement was given virtually automatically for all *jagirs* assigned in Hyderabad.

The operation of this complicated procedure is illustrated in a large number of *jagirs* for which records survive. For example,

Muhammad Jafar, supervisor of branding and inspection of cavalry contingents in Hyderabad, held a rank of 300 *zat*, 5 *suwar* (six months). His annual pay claim amounted to between 5,000 and 6,000 rupees per year. In 1698 Muhammad Jafar had received the greater part of his pay, but still held a salary claim outstanding for 1,700 rupees *jama'* and 850 rupees *hasil* (on a six-month ratio). The *diwan*'s office found a recently vacated *jagir* in Nurkerah *pargana*, Muhammadnagar district (i.e. the capital) which was valued at 2,075 rupees *jama'* and 1,278 rupees *hasil*. This was assigned to Muhammad Jafar to meet his claim for 856 rupees annual pay. Because the existing *hasil* figure of 1,278 rupees exceeded Muhammad Jafar's salary claim by one-third he had received the 'ten-twenty' adjustment.[1]

However, technical adjustments could be made which would meet the needs of the *jagirdars* in Hyderabad. Either an across-the-board adjustment in the *hasil* figures could be instituted or, given sufficient time, the revenue office could acquire accurate information as to actual returns and rate *jagirs* accordingly. The considerably more serious problem of collections would not be met by tinkering with bureaucratic regulations. The one-third adjustment in the *hasil* of their assignments requested by *jagirdars* in Hyderabad suggests a level of collection which is remarkably similar to that attained by the *amin* of the *khalisa parganas* in Telengana at this time. This officer could only extract on average 58 per cent of the *jama'* from picked *parganas*. Thus it is probably safe to assume that most *jagirdars*, armed with inferior administrative and military resources, would have even greater difficulties.

Many, if not most, *jagirdars* with holdings in Hyderabad suffered from the inability of the provincial administration to keep order and enforce revenue collections. Hardest hit were the *mansabdars* who held larger *jagirs*, often a full *pargana* in size, beyond the immediate neighbourhood of the capital. Often these men found that in the absence of any effective support from the governor they were forced to employ large numbers of temporary troops to assist their agents in making collections. This frequently consumed much of the funds collected which were supposed to be used to support cavalry contingents actually on duty with the *mansabdar*. These *jagirdars* also discovered that they were acting as *faujdars*

[1] I.J. Coll., I/14/491.

without the authority to do so. This situation resulted in a steady series of requests by *jagirdars* for fiscal relief, as well as for formal authority from the emperor to act as *faujdars* over their assignments. Both *jagirdars* serving in Hyderabad and those on duty elsewhere made these requests. For example, Sar Buland Khan, on duty with the imperial *wazir*, complained that he held a *jagir* in Koilkonda district in Hyderabad, which was supposed to have receipts of 150,000 rupees annually. But after he had hired sufficient temporary troops (*sih bandi*) to keep order, his net receipts were only about 45,000 rupees. Sar Buland Khan also complained that the incumbent *faujdar* had, through his 'tyranny' (*ta'addi*), hindered and scattered many of the *sih bandi* troops. Because the emperor had not designated a regularly appointed *faujdar* for the area around the *pargana*, the governor had given an irregular *sanad* to the other *jagirdar* in the *pargana*, one Abdulnabi Ludhi, which authorized him to act as *faujdar* over the immediate area. Under the circumstances, Sar Buland Khan asked for appointment by the emperor as *faujdar* over his *jagir*.[1]

A Maratha *mansabdar* serving as a *thanadar* in Bijapur submitted two protests, one dated ten months after the other, in 1698 and 1699, about the same problem. Khanduji (3000/2500) explained that he held *pargana* Atlur in Kaulas district just west of Hyderabad as his *jagir*. The *faujdar* responsible for that *pargana*, a *mansabdar* attached to Hyderabad province, had not sent a single horseman to Atlur. As a result, unrest had ruined the *pargana* and he, Khanduji, could collect nothing of his salary. Consequently, Khanduji asked that he be made *faujdar* of Atlur. In this capacity he could prevent miscreants seizing the roads, populate the area, and, at the same time, support his cavalrymen from the revenues of the *pargana*. In support of his request, the Maratha *mansabdar* pointed out that his predecessor as *jagirdar* of Atlur had also been appointed *faujdar* of the *pargana*. In fact, Khanduji argued, it was a common practice in the Deccan for *jagirdars* who held entire *parganas* to act simultaneously as *faujdars* for their holdings.[2]

[1] I.J. Coll., 1/14/237. Sar Buland Khan also asked for restoration of his *jagir* in the old country (*mulk-i qadim*) which had been absorbed into the *khalisa*. This *jagir*, as was frequently the case, supplied his personal salary (*hisa-i zat*) from the territory of the older provinces of the Deccan.

[2] I.J. Coll., I/13/626–7. Other similar requests include the petition of Jalaluddin Khan, commander of Golconda fort, for *faujdar* powers over his holding in Kaulas (see above). These powers would be given to his brother 'Izzatullah,

Officials under the *diwan* of the Deccan, commenting on the request, confirmed that Khanduji, along with his brother Jaganath, did hold *pargana* Atlur which had a *hasil* of 43,736 rupees. The *mansabdar* was correct in his assertion that the emperor had not officially appointed a *faujdar* to the *pargana*. Instead, a list submitted by the *diwan* of Hyderabad named one Mir Hadi, son of Sayyid Muhammad, as *faujdar* of Atlur. The *diwan*'s office also confirmed that 'earlier, in conformity with a request of the populace (*ra'ayya*) of that *pargana*, Sayyid Murtaza, son of Nasirulmulk, who held the town and a number of villages as salary, was given the position of *faujdar*.'[1]

These two examples and others show the obstacles which prevented full collections by *jagirdars* in Hyderabad. Gaps in the network of *faujdars* appointed by the emperor and over-extension of the existing provincial forces meant that the *jagirdars* got little support in their efforts to collect the land tax. As a result, many *jagirdars* were forced to assume the entire burden of general peace-making operations. If determined and resourceful, the larger assignees could do this by employing local troops to act under the command of their agents. The resulting expenses were heavy, but some funds would come into their coffers. However, under the Mughal system, the *jagirdars* needed the legitimacy conveyed by appointment as a *faujdar*. Without this authority any punitive military operations they undertook against local *zamindars* or villages could be represented to the central administration as tyrannical and illegal. Hence the requests for such appointments.

In the second of the two cases, the older Deccani concept of the proper function of a *jagirdar* and the much tighter definition of the Mughals collided. Under Bijapur and Golconda, a salary assignee held complete military and civil authority in his territory and could devolve these powers to subordinates and even private individuals as he saw fit. The more sophisticated imperial system of

who also held a small *jagir* in the *pargana*. I.J. Coll., I/11/71, I/11/101. An officer serving with Zulfikar Khan in the Karnatik asked for the *faujdari* of Bedianagar *pargana* in Warangal district where his *jagir* was located. Since the transfer of Sayyid Bahadur, *faujdar* of Bhongir, no one had been appointed to that post. I.J. Coll., I/15/349. This was followed by a request of Amanullah, the commander of Bhongir fort, for the same dual authority as *faujdar* of the district and commander of the fort enjoyed by his predecessors. I.J. Coll., I/15/7. See also I/13/656 and I/13/687–8.

[1] I.J. Coll., I/13/626.

the Mughals insisted on a sharp division between the tax-collecting rights of a *jagirdar* and the police and magisterial duties and powers of a *faujdar*. To Khanduji, a Maratha, the former approach was natural and justified. The emperor, who had no wish to invest heavily in the administration of Hyderabad, seems to have concluded that giving the *jagirdars* additional powers was the easiest way to keep the revenues moving and secure minimal order in the countryside. This meant that in a number of *parganas* under *jagirdars* who also acted as *faujdars* there would be little change from the older Golconda system.

The earlier plea by the local populace of Atlur *pargana* that Sayyid Murtaza, *jagirdar* of the central town and a number of villages, be made *faujdar* is noteworthy on two counts: first, it clearly derives from long-established expectations and practice; and second, an important segment of the local inhabitants (admittedly the term *ra'ayya* is ambiguous) desired some form of peace-keeping operation in the *pargana*. Disturbances and banditry unquestionably would hurt the central town and larger market villages. Local society which had been accustomed to the presence of a strong state in Telengana for generations depended on the state's representative to maintain public order. The request from the *ra'ayya* of Atlur suggests that they feared continued disruption of the normal life of the *pargana* unless a *faujdar* be named.

PAIBAQI

The 1689–90 Settlement set aside over half the revenue-producing lands in Hyderabad for assignment to meet the pay claim of *mansabdars*. *Paibaqi* lands in Hyderabad should have produced, according to this settlement, annual revenues of 8·8 million rupees. The emperor Aurangzeb could use these *paibaqi* lands in the province for *jagirs* which would set off the cost of assimilating the numerous nobles of Bijapur, Golconda, and the Maratha kingdom who became high Mughal officers at this time. *Jagirs* from the 'new lands' (*mulk i jadid*) of the Deccan should also help to support the great field army still in operation in the south. But these glowing prospects were never fulfilled. The distribution of nearly 200 identifiable assignments between 1695 and 1700 suggests that large tracts remained classified as *paibaqi* and were never assigned to *mansabdars*. Other later evidence for *jagir* assignments confirms that this pattern continued until Aurangzeb's death.

Entire districts, such as Khammamett and Nalgonda, appear to have been almost completely neglected.[1]

At first, the *paibaqi* lands remained under the administrative jurisdiction of the *diwan* of Hyderabad. Subordinate officials under Muhammad Shafi, and later Mir Muhammad Jafar, collected whatever funds could be gathered from these territories awaiting allocation as *jagirs*. However, by early 1694, it became evident that the *paibaqi* in Hyderabad would remain sizeable for some time. The emperor, concerned by deficiencies in receipts, detached a special officer from the staff of the *diwan* of the Deccan, and sent him to Hyderabad with orders to take charge of collections from all *paibaqi* lands in the province. On his arrival in Hyderabad, the new officer, Diyanat Chand, found himself engaged in a jurisdictional dispute with the Hyderabad *diwan*, Mir Muhammad Jafar. The latter, obviously unwilling to reduce the scope of his own powers, refused to recognize the new officer or to give up the administration of the *paibaqi parganas*. Diyanat Chand complained that he could not obtain the account papers from the *diwan*. Eventually, after an impasse lasting several months, Mir Muhammad Jafar received direct orders from Aurangzeb which forced him to accede to the new arrangement and hand over the necessary records to Diyanat Chand.[2] Since the *paibaqi* records from Hyderabad have not survived, it is impossible to tell whether or not this change improved collections. Unless Diyanat Chand was given the power and resources of a *faujdar* as well over the *paibaqi* lands (in an arrangement analogous to that enjoyed by the *amin* of *khalisa* in Telengana) it is doubtful that a meaningful improvement in collections could have taken place.

In spite of these administrative changes the continued existence of large tracts of unassigned *jagir* lands remained a problem in Hyderabad, as well as in other parts of the Deccan conquered in 1686–7. Eleven years after these victories, in 1698, the second *bakhshi* of the empire, Mukhlis Khan, compiled a report on the

[1] In Khammamett district, for example, the *jagir* records which survive show a large *jagir* assigned to successive *faujdars* of the district from the *hawili pargana* around the district town (37,020 *hasil*) and another consisting of the entire revenues of Kondikonda *pargana* (42,535 rupees *hasil*). I.J. Coll., I/14/425, I/16/68–9, I/16/865. There were other small assignments made to the commander of Mustafanagar fort in Kanikgiri *pargana* as well, cf. I/19/119. Aside from these, which did not consume more than a small fraction of the ostensible revenues of the district, no record exists of *jagirs* assigned in Khammamett.

[2] I.J. Coll., I/9/23, I/9/25, I/10/44.

utilization of land for salaries in the Deccan provinces. In this report Mukhlis Khan concluded that lands for *jagirs* were becoming scarce in the 'old lands' (*mulk-i qadim*) in Aurangabad and Berar. But *paibaqi* was still plentiful in Bijapur, Hyderabad, and the Bijapur and Hyderabad Karnatiks, or the 'new lands' (*mulk-i jadid*). As late as 1698, unassigned *paibaqi* revenues in the *mulk-i jadid* were 18·6 million rupees each year (on a *jama'* or demand of 38·6 million rupees).[1] By far the largest proportion of this sum came from territories in Bijapur, which together with the Bijapur Karnatik and the Konkan had 14·9 million rupees in *paibaqi* revenues.[2] The size of this figure suggests that virtually none of Bijapur's lands was given out in *jagirs*. The total for Hyderabad and the Hyderabad Karnatik, 3·7 million rupees, although far less, does imply continued under-utilization of the resources of Golconda. *Paibaqi* in Hyderabad alone was 1·8 million rupees (on a *jama'* of 3·9 million rupees) or one-fifth of the revenues set aside for *jagirs*.

According to Mukhlis Khan, the primary cause of this situation was that the tax collections (*hasil*) on lands assigned in Bijapur, Hyderabad, or the two Karnatiks were unsatisfactory and did not meet the levels expected of them. *Mansabdars* given salary assignments in these provinces, as a result, could not collect enough money to support their cavalry contingents. Consequently, these *mansabdars* could not muster enough men and horses of the required quality to pass the periodic inspections by the *bakhshi*'s office. When proper certification did not arrive on time from the *bakhshi*'s office the *mansabdar*'s salary assignment automatically reverted to *paibaqi*. In other words, since the lands in Bijapur and Hyderabad were overvalued in relation to possible collections, the *jagirdars* were caught by the efficiency of the Mughal system of military inspections. Instead of keeping their *jagirs* and maintaining at least part of their required contingents, the *mansabdars* lost everything when they could not pass the inspections.

Numerous documents which show reversions of *jagirs* to *paibaqi* in Hyderabad for failure to meet the branding regulations (*daghnama*) testify to the accuracy of Mukhlis Khan's analysis.[3] Another

[1] I.J. Coll., I/14/129–30.

[2] Ibid. The figures were Bijapur *jama'* 605,820,619 *dams*, *hasil*, 7,108,917 rupees Karnatik, 577,565,930 *dams hasil* 6,929,225; Konkan, 41,887,500 *dams*, *hasil*, 839,914 rupees.

[3] Cf. I.J. Coll., I/13/819, for one example.

difficulty lay in a peculiarity of the Mughal land alienation system: *mansabdars* normally had the right to refuse assignments which were distant, unproductive, or otherwise troublesome. *Jagirs* in Hyderabad and the other 'new lands' were clearly unprofitable and were widely known to be so. Thus rejections of *jagirs* assigned in these provinces tended to be numerous.

The *diwan* of the Deccan tried a number of devices to meet these problems. Diyanat Khan issued standing orders that, whenever possible, assignments should be made from *paibaqi* lands in Bijapur and Hyderabad.[1] To encourage *mansabdars* to accept these assignments, the *diwan* extended the 'ten-twenty' or one-third adjustment (*takhfif*) to nearly all *jagirs* given out in the new lands after 1698. The revenue office reduced the fixed *hasil* figure by one-third so that a *mansabdar* would be entitled to obtain additional lands to meet his pay claim. *Mansabdars* given *jagirs* in Bijapur and Hyderabad could also request that they be given *jagirs* in the 'old lands' equivalent to the salary for their personal or *zat* rank. This was supposed to give the *mansabdar* a more secure source of income for the support of himself and his household. The *diwan* of the Deccan also made arbitrary assignments of block *jagirs* in the new territories to large groups of *mansabdars* serving with the Deccan armies. In 1700 Aurangzeb approved extensive grants in Hyderabad, Bijapur, and Islamgarh (Deogarh) for 1,000 *mansabdars*. This was the remains of a force originally organized and led by the Gond Raja of Deogarh and now under the command of the general Ghaziuddin Khan Firuz Jang. The raja, Buland Bakht, who had gained his throne from Aurangzeb by converting to Islam, had taken advantage of the confused political situation at this time and fled back to his kingdom. He had become a virtually autonomous ruler in a fashion very similar to Padiyah Nayak, the Bedar leader.[2] Hyderabad's share of the salaries of these troops, who held ranks from 40 *zat* to 250 *zat*, was 535,430 rupees *hasil*. The *diwan* of the Deccan assigned five entire *parganas* in Telengana to Ghaziuddin Khan Firuz Jang for the salaries of these *mansabdars*.[3] Approximately half this *jagir* came

[1] I.J. Coll., I/13/465.

[2] Cf. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, V. 406–12. Padiyah Nayak, chief of Sakar, led a series of raids deep into Hyderabad. See my article 'Imperial Crisis in the Deccan', forthcoming in *The Journal of Asian Studies*.

[3] I.J. Coll., I/16/947–8. This document provides an interesting insight into Mughal military organization and financing. The total requested by Khan

from *paibaqi* lands; the remainder came from displacement of three *mansabdars* who held large *jagirs*. These would presumably be forced to accept assignments in *paibaqi* territory elsewhere.

At best, measures such as these were only partly successful. By early 1702 the emperor and his revenue officials in the Deccan had decided that Deccani, and especially Maratha, *mansabdars* would be given full-salary assignments with accompanying abatements in Bijapur and Hyderabad. In his order summarizing this decision, Aurangzeb wrote:[1]

> At first pay claims subject to inspection or bonding were assigned in the 'new lands'. But thereafter, the *bakhshi*'s office has received, year after year, accounts of undermanned contingents and unsatisfactory inspections. [The system is] that if the *bakhshi*'s office reports a deficiency in a contingent the *jagir* is transferred. If this were not done there would be no knowledge of whether or not the contingents of the *mansabdars* were at full strength. Previously, repeated orders were issued that the *paibaqi* of Bijapur and Hyderabad must be given for adjustments, grants (*in'am*), and additions to *mansabs*. But giving salary from territory without revenue is like giving water from the sea. Therefore, those ruined fiscal units (*mahal*) should be assigned, with a 10–15 or 10–20 adjustment, to meet the pay claims of the Deccanis. They, i.e. the Deccanis, may present either branding certificates or bonds. Despite the adjustment *ahadis* [i.e. gentlemen troopers] would not accept salary [in Bijapur and Hyderabad].
>
> As of now there are approximately eight million rupees of *paibaqi* under the administration of the *diwans* in Bijapur and Hyderabad, excluding the Karnatik. Little of this has proved useful to the state.

Thus, as the emperor conceded, in 1702 there still remained *paibaqi* land valued at eight million rupees in annual tax collections. This was very close to the figure given by Mukhlis Khan four years earlier for the two provinces: 8·9 million rupees for Bijapur and Hyderabad apart from the Karnatik.[2] To emphasize further his desire to reduce this figure, the emperor issued general orders not to transfer any *jagirdar* from his holding when making assignments in Bijapur and Golconda. Instead, all new assignments in these two provinces were to be made from *paibaqi* lands.[3]

Firuz Jang for his troops was 4,435,375 *jama'* and 1,848,072 rupees *hasil* on a five months' ($\frac{5}{12}$) basis. He actually got a total of 1·3 million rupees: 400,000 in tribute from Deogarh (unpaid for some time), 515,430 from Hyderabad, and the remainder from Bijapur. The composition and ranks of the force are given in the document, but only the total pay demand is noted

[1] I.J. Coll., I/18/269. [2] Ibid., I/13/129–30. [3] Ibid., I/19/1322.

Nevertheless, even these firmer policies failed to meet the essential issue: assignment of non-productive lands was self-defeating. Forcing Deccani *mansabdars*—especially Maratha chiefs—to accept *jagirs* in ruined tracts in Bijapur and Hyderabad was an open invitation for them to assume local power. By 1702 it is clear that Aurangzeb could not provide the *jagirdars* with adequate support for the administration of their *jagirs* in these two provinces; nor could he sustain adequate control over their increasingly desperate attempts to realize the salaries allotted to them.

GRANTS

As we have seen in an earlier chapter, Golconda, in common with all Muslim states in India, alienated a small proportion of the state's land-tax income for the support of religious leaders and institutions or for other charitable purposes. Such *in'am* or *madad-i ma'ash* concessions, whether temporary or permanent, could consist of either the use of tax-free agricultural land (or orchards) or assignments of tax revenues from one or more entire villages. Grants from the king had been a major source of support for members of the *ulema* who were a prominent segment of the urban Muslim ruling élite in every sizeable town in Golconda. The Muslim community also benefited from the existence of trusts of income-producing property (*wakf*), managed by trustees, whose income went to sustain mosques, or tombs or for other pious purposes. Sometimes these *wakfs* were created by the ruler, sometimes by wealthy individuals, but all were dependent on and subject to regulation by the state. Another type of land grant, predating the Muslim conquest of the eastern Deccan, was the Hindu *agraharam* or perpetual gift of tax-free villages to Brahmins. Under the Qutb Shah kings nearly every *pargana* retained a few *agraharam* villages set aside for this purpose. *Agraharam* lands were probably far greater in extent and value than the grants to Muslim *ulema* and institutions, since rajas and *nayaks* commonly gave and maintained such grants from tax-free lands under their control.

In 1687 (as with all other recipients of largess from the state) the grant-holders suddenly found their livings in jeopardy unless they gained formal ratification of their holdings by the new ruler of Golconda. Muslim conquerors in India tended to honour the commitments of their predecessors and provide new *sanads* to grantees on the same terms as before, but this was entirely up to

the discretion of the ruler. At first Aurangzeb moved cautiously. He unambiguously commanded Muhammad Ibrahim, the first Mughal governor of Golconda, not to interfere with any of the incumbent grant-holders (*in'amdaran*).[1] A few instances of the confirmation of grants suggest that this was the policy which was followed.[2] Before the fall of Golconda fort, Aurangzeb reaffirmed a grant of Abdullah Qutb Shah which set aside the revenues of about 670 acres of agricultural land for the support of a saint's tomb in Hyderabad.[3] The emperor also honoured extra-territorial grants made by the Qutb Shah rulers to the shrine of Shah Banda Nawaz at Gulbarga (in Bijapur), the most revered and widely worshipped Muslim saint in the Deccan. Throughout Aurangzeb's reign tax revenues from as many as a dozen villages in Hyderabad were collected by the descendants of the saint who administered the Gulbarga shrine.[4]

But grants which aided Sunni institutions were relatively uncontroversial from the emperor's viewpoint. Far more questionable was the alienation of the state's revenues to support heretical or non-Muslim institutions and families. The survival, after 1687, of the *wakf* of the town of Mustafanagar, which Abul Hasan had created in order to send its tax revenues to the tomb of Ali al-Riza at Mashad in Iran, is questionable.[5] Although we have no information one way or the other on this point, it seems likely that Aurangzeb's hostility both to Shi'ism and to the Sawafid monarch who was currently sheltering Prince Akbar, Aurangzeb's rebellious son, would have put an end to this arrangement. A more important question involves the grants of lands held by Brahmins. In 1672–3 the emperor had issued a general order which prohibited the

[1] British Museum, Persian MS. Sloane 3582.

[2] Of course, the difficulty here is that documentary evidence would only exist for those grants which were extended, not for those which were cancelled. Rejection of a claim did not require preparation of a *sanad* which would be recorded and preserved.

[3] Zore, *Tazkira-i Navadir Aiwan-i Urdu*, Document no. 212, p. 67. This was a *farman* issued for a *madad-i ma'ash* grant of 7 *chawar* (1 *chawar* = 120 *bigahs*) of agricultural land. The grant was ratified in the early eighteenth century by an order of Mubariz Khan, governor of Hyderabad.

[4] Khusro Husaini Collection, Bundle D, Document 6. The exact extent of these grants could not be determined at the time that I looked at the collection. The State Archives of Andhra Pradesh had not yet made the papers officially accessible to scholars. For this reason this is only a tentative citation.

[5] See Zore, I, no. 211, p. 66, for a summary of the contents of a document establishing this *wakf*.

holding of land grants by Hindus anywhere in the empire.[1] In practice, many such grants remained in Hindu hands, despite the order, but the policy could have been the rationale for an immediate resumption of all grants made to Brahmins everywhere in Hyderabad and the Hyderabad Karnatik. In fact, this does not seem to have occurred. A record from the reign of Aurangzeb's successor shows a small *madad-i ma'ash* grant for six acres (ten *bigah*) still in the name of Govind Bhat, a Brahmin (*zunnardar*) in a village near the capital. The grantee held *sanads* from Abul Hasan and a signed authorization for its continuance by the governor of Hyderabad under Aurangzeb (although not from the emperor himself).[2] This is the only case of continued holding of a grant by a Brahmin under Aurangzeb, however. A good many such grants to Brahmins which had proliferated under Abul Hasan must have terminated in 1686. Their holders were very likely either killed or driven from office in the general purge which took place in response to Aurangzeb's diplomatic and military pressure before the conquest. Apart from these possibilities, no evidence exists that the status of the large number of *agraharah* villages was seriously threatened in the first years of Mughal administration.[3]

Within a few years, however, the emperor's policies became much sterner than they had been at first. In 1695 he approved the expropriation of nearly 15,000 *bigahs* of tax-free land in nine separate districts held by persons whose grants had lapsed (*bazyaft*). The latter terms probably means that the grantees were not fortunate enough to secure a new *sanad* from the emperor or from one of his officials. As a result of this action, annual tax revenues of over 100,000 rupees formerly supporting what must have been a large number of grantees and their families now enriched the *khalisa* treasury (see Table XVII). Whether the grantees were Muslim *ulema*, or Brahmins, or both (the term *aimmadaran* is ambiguous), the result was a catastrophic reduction in royal patronage for these groups. An action such as this could only have

[1] Habib, p. 311.

[2] I.J. Coll., Bahadur Shah, III/6/40. Another larger grant to a Hindu, but not necessarily Brahmin, recipient is also recorded. This was for half a village near the capital (4 *chawars* of land). Originally obtained by *sanad* from Abdullah Qutb Shah, it was confirmed by documents issued by the *sadar* and the *diwan* of Hyderabad province under Aurangzeb. Cf. I.J. Coll., Bahadur Shah, III/6/42.

[3] The village in Kondavidu, granted by a Manak Rao chief to his Brahmin secretary during Abul Hasan's reign, remained in the same family until the early nineteenth century. Cf. Condaved, p. 48.

been carried out by a regime confident of its ability to withstand the loss of considerable political support. This also bears the mark of an imperial regime both anxious to increase its central revenues and relatively unconcerned by local political considerations. The real significance of these grants lay, not in their economic value, but in their capacity to link the fortunes of local religious and intellectual élites to those of the state.

TABLE XVII

Land Grants Resumed for the Khalisa, 1695

(1) District	(2) *Pargana(s)*	(3) *Bigahs*	(4) *Hasil*	(5) Average per *Bigah*
			(Rs.)	(Rs.)
A. Telengana				
(1) Muhammadnagar, Hayatabad		74	518	7
(2) Koilkonda	Darvir	240	1,680	7
(3) Medak	*haveli* Medak	156	1,092	7
(4) Bhongir	Udemmi	200	1,400	7
(5) Kaulas	Narainkheda	3,561	24,927	7
	Saholi	198	1,386	7
(6) Elgandel	*haveli* Elgandel	303	2,124	7
Total Telengana		4,732	33,127	7
B. Andhra				
(7) Machilipatnam	8 *parganas*	7,929	55,506	7
(8) Mustafanagar		1,930	13,517	7
(9) Sikakul		120	840	7
Total Andhra		9,979	69,863	7
Total for Hyderabad		14,711	102,990	7

Source: I.J. Coll., I/11/498, I/11/557. Confiscation of other lands with revenues of 300 rupees in Kotpalli *pargana*, Koilkonda district, is mentioned in I/12/14.

JIZIYA

The 4 per cent increment for *jiziya* levied on the land tax may have been collected, but individual *jiziya* collections in Hyderabad's cities were sporadic and probably not very rewarding. This was caused by occasional remissions of the tax, an inefficient collection

system, and, most importantly, popular resistance aroused by this new levy. So great was the general feeling against the *jiziya* that Mughal officials in Hyderabad were reluctant to become embroiled in attempts to collect it. Shortly after the Mughal victory, the governor of Hyderabad informed the emperor that the populace of the capital was far too impoverished by the recent war to pay the *jiziya*. The governor asserted that if it was levied all the inhabitants would flee leaving the metropolis deserted. Accordingly, Aurangzeb remitted for one year the *jiziya* as well as the multiple *sa'ir* taxes on the citizens of Hyderabad.[1]

Several years later, in 1699, a tax-collector arrived in Machilipatnam to make the first attempt in four years to assess and collect *jiziya* from the Hindus of the port town. His predecessor had been killed in 1695 by a Rajput soldier when the collector attempted to demand the tax at the soldier's home. The Rajput was not arrested; nothing more was heard of the affair; and no *jiziya* collectors had appeared at Machilipatnam in the ensuing four years. The new collector soon encountered similar problems: those of whom he demanded the tax fled to the countryside. The enraged *amin* applied to the town governor of Machilipatnam for help. The latter refused to supply any assistance unless he had a direct order from the provincial governor at Hyderabad, or the emperor. This refusal touched off a brawl between the tax-gatherer's men and the port governor's soldiers. The *jiziya* collector left Machilipatnam empty handed to obtain the orders he needed. Four months later, in March 1700, the *amin* of *jiziya* returned bearing full authority for his activities. Now fully vindicated, he began forcing payment of the tax from even the poorest persons and once again caused flights from the town.[2]

The unpopularity of the new tax with those who had to pay it is evident and predictable. However, the opposition to the *jiziya* displayed by Mughal officials in charge of the two largest urban places in Golconda is noteworthy. Both men apparently disliked

[1] Isardas Nagar, *Fatuhat-i Alamgiri*, British Museum, Persian MS. Add. 23,884, fol. 11[illegible]b.

[2] Das, 156–8. William Tillard [Diary] in 'The Manuscripts of P. Edward Tillard', *Reports of the Historical Manuscripts Commission of Great Britain*, 47. 15th R. X., p. 82. Francois Martin records in his journal that in December 1701 the 'Telingas of Matchlipatnam have revolted at being forced to pay the *jiziya*' Francois Martin, 'Extrait du Journal', Archives Nationales de France, Paris, Correspondance Génerale. Inde: Colonies C²66, fol. 41a.

the reaction the tax aroused and resisted its collection. This must have been an especially sensitive concern for Mughal officials in Hyderabad in the years between 1700 and 1704 when Maratha pressure on the province was at its height. Finally, in February 1704, the emperor removed this source of tension between rulers and ruled by stopping the collection of *jiziya* throughout all provinces of the Mughal Deccan. His action was in response to the Maratha raids.[1]

DIAMONDS

The diamond mines of Golconda and Bijapur with their world-famous output of large stones were one of the richest prizes to be found in the Deccan. Thus it is surprising (and perhaps a measure of the difficulties encountered by the Mughals in both kingdoms in the first post-conquest years) that the emperor allowed most of the mines to lie idle for several years before production began once again. As late as mid-1692 Francois Martin noted that diamond mining and trading had completely ceased. Money formerly invested in that trade was now put to other uses.[2] Finally, in the same year, the emperor approved new administrative arrangements for the nearly defunct mines. The mines in Bijapur were to come under the supervision of the *faujdar* of Kurnool (Qamarnagar); those north of the Krishna river (in Hyderabad) were to come under the *faujdar* of Khammamett, Hasan Quli Khan; and those to the south of the Krishna river were to come under Ali Mardan Khan, *faujdar* of the Hyderabad Karnatik.[3] These officers were to put the mines on a paying basis. The few mines which had been working did not produce enough to pay the salaries of the administrative staff.[4]

The revived operation of the mines, now under the direct supervision of Mughal accountants employed by the *khalisa*, was similar to arrangements in effect under Golconda. Private entrepreneurs paid a fixed fee for the exclusive right to mine a measured plot of land for diamonds.[5] The mining contractors hired labourers to do the actual work. Profits came from the right to keep all stones found below a certain size. All diamonds heavier than the weight of a gold *hun* (three-eighths of an ounce, according to Manucci)

[1] R. S. Sharma, *The Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperors* (London, 1902), p. 158.

[2] Martin, III. 222.

[3] 'Akham-i Alamgiri', fols. 34a-b, 34a-b, and 41a.

[4] Ibid., fol. 32a.

[5] Ibid., fol. 32b.

became the property of the emperor. Predictably, those mining contractors or miners who found large stones, and who could evade the Mughal authorities, took the risk of smuggling their finds out of the mines and selling them on the open market. Still, smuggling was not always possible in the crowded conditions of the mines. More often, the discovery of a large stone was a public event which was immediately reported to the emperor by the provincial news-writer.

After 1692 the mines began steady and profitable productions once again. Shipments of the largest and best stones, sometimes as many as eighteen at a time, travelled from the mines to the emperor's camp in the western Deccan.[1] Simultaneously a significant alteration occurred in the pattern of the diamond trade. Diamond merchants, agents, buyers, and speculators no longer frequented the great diamond quarter in Hyderabad city, which under the Qutb Shahs had been the busiest diamond market in the world. Instead, the trade focused on the vast assemblage of Aurangzeb's camp where in the dry season stones, money, and a market among the Mughal nobility could be found. Another subsidiary market was in Madras on the southern coast. The enormous Pitt diamond, for example, was a product of the Hyderabad mines in this period. The stone travelled to Aurangzeb's camp where it was purchased by a Hindu diamond merchant. He, failing to get a satisfactory price in the camp, sent it with his agent to Madras where it was eventually purchased by Thomas Pitt, the governor, and passed into English history.[2]

However, there were now problems of security in the production and transmittal of diamonds which had not been present under Golconda. For the first time the diamond mines were walled round and garrisoned to defend them against raiders—a measure of the new political instability of the Deccan.[3] There was also a distinct possibility that large diamonds sent from the mines would never reach the emperor. Thus, in 1702, officials at the mines reported the find of a stone of spectacular size weighing 2¼ ounces, which was seized by Maratha raiders *en route* to the imperial camp.[4] Still, despite these problems, the reopened diamond mines of Golconda and Bijapur provided highly negotiable and

[1] Cf. Akh., XLVI (? Rabi II), p. 79b, for a report of a mace-bearer bringing 18 diamonds from the mines of Sikakul (i.e. those north of the Krishna).

[2] Mr. Salmon, *The Universal Traveller*, 2 vols. (London, 1752), I. 164–5.

[3] Ibid. [4] Manucci, IV. 100.

prestigious additions to the income of the imperial *khalisa* in the last fifteen years of Aurangzeb's rule.[1]

CONCLUSION

Within five years of Mughal conquest and annexation, certain sectors of the economy of Hyderabad had recovered from the devastating effects of the war and dramatic political change which followed. By the early 1690s the imperial *khalisa* tapped a number of the most lucrative sources of revenue of the former kingdom: forty to fifty of the more fertile and accessible *parganas* in Telengana, the food-grain and other markets of the capital, the ports and centres of export along the coast, the coastal salt works, and the diamond mines. The governor and other officials serving in the province also held reasonably productive *jagirs* located near the capital or in the vicinity of district towns. The level of state revenues was probably considerably less than that which had prevailed under the Qutb Shahs. (Even the most productive *parganas* under the *khalisa* averaged less than two-thirds of the Qutb Shah collections.) Nevertheless, contrary to Abul Hasan's prediction, made during the siege to Aurangzeb, Hyderabad very soon financed the cost of its own administration. This left Aurangzeb free to divert part of the revenues of Hyderabad to imperial purposes elsewhere in the Deccan.

The emperor, among other purposes, made use of funds coming from Hyderabad to meet the expenses of the army under the command of Ghaziuddin Khan Firuz Jang. The latter, one of Aurangzeb's most capable generals, campaigned constantly in the Deccan against the Marathas in the latter part of the emperor's reign. Several great *amirs* attached to Khan Firuz Jang held large salary assignments in Hyderabad.[2] Lesser *mansabdars* and ordinary soldiers in his army were paid directly by funds carried from Hyderabad. In 1699 the *diwan* of Hyderabad sent 211,155 rupees under armed escort from the treasury of Hyderabad city to Khan Firuz Jang's headquarters.[3] This was in addition to 200,000

[1] Cf. Manucci, II. 417

[2] Cf. I.J. Coll., I/12/14, for *jagirs* assigned to Ali Khan (6000/3000) in Hyderabad. Ali Khan, who was identified as 'attached to the army of Khan Firuz Jang', held two *parganas* in Koilkonda district with revenues of 61,517 rupees (⅓ abatement on a total *hasil* of 92,275 rupees) and a *pargana* in Devarkonda district with receipts of 24,243 rupees.

[3] Asafia Scroll, Document no. 12.

rupees sent a short time before by the Hyderabad *diwan*. The total, 411,155 rupees, was needed to meet salary payments for the army over a four-month period.[1] The next year, 1700, the emperor and his financial advisers carved out a *jagir* in Hyderabad worth more than half a million rupees in annual revenues which would supply funds to pay the salaries of 1,000 *mansabdars* serving as cavalry under Khan Firuz Jang.[2]

At the end of this initial period we can find unmistakable signs of administrative and economic integration into the larger imperial system. One obvious index is the ready movement of Mughal fiscal officials into and out of the province. Between 1687 and 1700 four *diwans* (Muhammad Shafi, Mir Muhammad Jafar, Ali Akbar, and Kar Talab Khan) served in Hyderabad for a few years and then transferred elsewhere. Bindraban, first *amin* of the *khalisa* lands in Telengana, was transferred to another Deccan province. His successor, Kar Talab Khan, became *diwan* of Hyderabad and later, in 1700, *diwan* of Bengal. Another measure of centralizing control is the role of Diyanat Khan, the *diwan* of the six Deccan provinces. This officer increasingly demanded and succeeded in obtaining more detailed and timely reporting from the *diwan* of Hyderabad. Diyanat Khan also put pressure on the *diwan* of Hyderabad to investigate and remedy unsatisfactory revenue collections or violations of imperial revenue regulations in the province. By 1695, as we have seen, there was also an attempt to put pressure on the *deshmukhs* to pay up arrears of *peshkash*. The central administration also expropriated large numbers of lapsed *in'am* and *madad-i ma'ash* grants. Not entirely successful efforts were also made to enforce uniform imperial policies in taxation on groups like merchants engaged in long-distance trade, and on non-Muslims now liable to the *jiziya*.

The emperor and his officials also began to phase out the practice of *ijarah* or entrepreneurial tax-farming. This was a particularly complex problem in Hyderabad because of the long tradition of tax leasing and subleasing inherited from the Qutb Shahs. The emperor and his advisers never fully resolved the conflict between existing decentralized revenue-collection techniques and

[1] Ibid. Fakirullah Khan, *faujdar* and *amin* of Sikakul, had sent 150,000 rupees to the Hyderabad treasury, and Bindraban, *amin* of *khalisa* in Telengana, deposited 50,000 rupees of the total in the provincial treasury.

[2] I.J. Coll., I/16/947–8.

the regulations and practice of the empire. In the short term the emperor was interested in immediate revenue surpluses which could support his larger strategy in the Deccan. This could best be accomplished by leaving every part of the revenue system to the farms and monopolies in force under Golconda's administration. For many of the most productive revenue sectors this was precisely the expedient adopted: the ports, the salt works, the diamond mines, and certain of the centrally located agricultural lands in Andhra remained under a farming system virtually unchanged from that of the former regime. Even the personnel were often the same. The fact that a precedent existed for administration of ports like Surat through officials on farming terms probably helped to make this exception more palatable.

Where the Mughals were least successful, in the collection of the land tax in the interior districts of Telengana and the districts of Andhra originally classified as *paibaqi*, the former leasing system was officially abandoned. As we have seen in an earlier chapter, the Mughals failed to replace the tax-farmers with the intensive network of agrarian administration characteristic of the system in the North Indian plain. As a result, officials of the *khalisa* were denied effective administrative and military support. They could not hope to extract as much money from reluctant *deshmukhs* and village headmen as had the profit- and fear-driven tax-farmers of Golconda backed by central government forces. Agents of Mughal *jagirdars* were also badly supported. They could never be as successful at managing their absentee employers' *jagirs* as were the powerful nobles of Golconda who managed their holdings in person and who held full administrative authority and ample military power to overcome resistance.

The *jagir* system in Hyderabad functioned perfectly well throughout the 1690s in accordance with its own logic. *Jagirs* were assigned, transferred, and resumed all by the appropriate rules. But they did not produce as they should have. The *jagirdar*'s income was precariously dependent on the goodwill of the *deshmukhs* and other local officials. Yet the links of personal loyalty to the Qutb Shah ruler, as well as the threat of crushing military power, were far less compelling for these *pargana* officials after 1687. The only way by which a *jagirdar* could successfully obtain even a portion of the nominal value of his assignment in Hyderabad was to revert to the earlier Deccani or Golconda

concept of a *jagirdar*. He had to acquire full magisterial and military authority over his holding, hire large numbers of *sih-bandi* troops to enforce that authority, and retain his holding as long as possible so that he could begin to encourage greater production through loans to the peasantry and other measures. In short, he had to become a local chief in control of an incipient fief. Some of the larger *jagirdars* had the resources to hire *sih-bandi* troops and develop their holding successfully in this fashion. A few, like Ibtida Khan, the former Golconda noble, who were actually in residence on their *jagirs*, could, by personal administration, offset the weaknesses of provincial organization. But most had real difficulties.

Aurangzeb clearly did not intend to invest heavily in duplicating the agrarian structure of longer-settled parts of the Mughal empire in the eastern Deccan. The emperor's concern was for immediate returns which could support his armies in South India. This concern, although certainly understandable, explains what appears to have been inadequate manpower, financing, and attention from the emperor in Hyderabad between 1687 and 1700. From the perspective of an observer in Hyderabad, despite a slow process of consolidation and centralization, the province was really under-administered and under-financed. The surplus taken from it every year was largely artificial. The result of this policy was that Aurangzeb never made full use of the resources of Golconda (and Bijapur as well since these points probably apply to that kingdom also). In theory, the emperor should have been able to offset the greatly increased cost of salaries for the numerous Deccani *mansabdars* recruited for political purposes by using the newly acquired districts of Golconda and Bijapur for the assignment of *jagirs*. In practice, this was not the case. As the deputy *bakhshi* stressed in his 1699 report, most *jagirdars*, assigned lands in Hyderabad, Bijapur, and the two Karnatiks, could not get their full salaries from these holdings. As a result, most of the lands in Bijapur and a sizeable percentage of the lands earmarked for salary assignments were still unassigned as late as fifteen years after the conquest. It appears that the 'crisis of the *jagirs*' during the 1690s was not caused by a physical shortage of land available for that purpose. Instead, the excess of demand over supply was caused by the inability of the empire to assimilate and administer properly the large territories in the Deccan annexed in 1686–7.

IX

The Governorship of Prince Muhammad Kam Bakhsh, 1700–1707

THE political history of the eastern Deccan reached another important turning-point in A.D. 1700. In that year, the imperial machinery, which for over a decade had been intensifying its grip on Hyderabad, noticeably faltered. At the administrative centre of the empire, confusion grew, as the strength of the Marathas and other predatory groups in the Deccan increased. As impulses of control came uncertainly and erratically from the Emperor, signs of administrative breakdown became more pervasive in Hyderabad. All the careful checks built into the Mughal system began to weaken. Holders of large *jagirs*, faced with falling revenues and unconcerned about possible repercussions, engaged local troops and pushed tyranically for collections. Barriers and differentiated responsibilities designed to prevent aggrandizement by individual officers within a province also failed. The Hyderabad governor, freed of the usual restraints, constructed local alliances, extorted illicit payments, mismanaged official funds, and browbeat his fellow officials.

Lessened public order accompanied deteriorating administrative control. The tempo of Maratha and Bedar assaults picked up—to be matched by the plundering of numerous bandit groups. An extended drought, famine, and epidemic further increased the misery of the general populace. Contemporary observers noticed a concomitant loss of population and drop in agricultural production. State revenues declined precipitously.

In the same period, between 1700 and 1707, Hyderabad became the scene of intense manoeuvring for political advantage as members of the Mughal nobility awaited the struggle for power after the imminent death of Aurangzeb. In this contest of anticipation, the two main parties were the youngest Mughal prince, Muhammad Kam Bakhsh, and Rustam Dil Khan, son of Jan Sipar Khan, governor of Hyderabad.

SUCCESSION TO THE GOVERNORSHIP

Twelve years after becoming governor of Hyderabad, Jan Sipar Khan died in office.[1] Aurangzeb selected his own youngest son, Prince Muhammad Kam Bakhsh, as a replacement. The emperor had recently released the Prince after several years of imprisonment in the imperial camp, and restored him to favour.[2] The reconciliation seems to have been real and the aged emperor began to rely heavily on his favourite son's advice and support. The appointment to Hyderabad was necessarily an absentee arrangement. Aurangzeb named Rustam Dil Khan as the prince's deputy (*na'ib*) in Hyderabad and gave him a substantial increase in his rank.[3] The appointment of Rustam Dil Khan to succeed his father as chief administrator of Hyderabad was something of a departure from the long-standing practice of discouraging any possibility of hereditary attachments by Mughal governors and *faujdars* to any one region.

In spite of his absence from Hyderabad Kam Bakhsh had more than a casual interest in the province. The greater portion of those enormous salaries and allowances which accrued to him by virtue of his high rank (20,000/10,000) came from Hyderabad.[4] Upon becoming governor the Prince acquired *jagirs* in Hyderabad with annual revenues of 1·8 million rupees. These lands supplied approximately two-thirds of his pay and allowances. The remainder came from Berar province and from North India (Hindustan). His Hyderabad holdings were divided as follows:[5]

(1) Santolee *pargana* in Kaulas district (held by the prince previously)	56,500 rupees
(2) Twenty-four *khalisa parganas* in Telengana (transferred to his *jagir*)	1,227,719

[1] *Ma'asir-i Alamgiri*, p. 439.

[2] Ibid., p. 405. Kam Bakhsh had tried to negotiate a peace independently with the Marathas at the siege of Jinji and was arrested by Asad Khan, the imperial *wazir*.

[3] Ibid., p. 439. K.A. 1525 (29.10.1700), fol. 238v. Rustam Dil Khan's rank went up to 1500 *zat* and 1,000 *suwar*.

[4] When he was released the prince's rank rose to 20,000 *zat*, 10,000 *suwar*. *Ma'asir-i Alamgiri*, p. 405.

[5] I.J. Coll., I/16/413. Kam Bakhsh's total pay claim was 140 million *dam*. He was assigned 90 million *dam* in Hyderabad.

(3) Lands taken from the *jagirs* formerly held by the deceased governor, Jan Sipar Khan	532,039
	1,816,258

The Prince took over as many as thirty-five of the choicest *parganas* in interior Hyderabad in 1700. Twenty-four of these had formerly been crown *parganas* whose revenues went directly into the central treasury. The remainder had been part of the former governor's assignment. (The remaining portion of his father's *jagirs* with revenues of 205,000 rupees went to Rustam Dil Khan.) Muhammad Kam Bakhsh now had an overriding interest in the stability and productivity of the eastern Deccan.[1] It also provided a reason for the Prince to send and maintain a large staff to manage his *jagirs* in Hyderabad. This very quickly became sizeable. By the next year, in 1701, his agents had engaged a 1,500-man cavalry force of *sih-bandi* troops to collect the revenues in Kaulas.[2] The presence of a large body of administrators and soldiers active in an area so close to the capital would act as a restraint on the Prince's deputy, Rustam Dil Khan. The latter spared no pains to assure the Prince of his loyalty and trustworthiness by sending an expensive offering to the court.[3]

MARATHA ATTACKS: 1700–1702

Until 1698 the primary focus of the Mughal/Maratha war had been in the far south at Jinji in the Karnatik. But as soon as that great fort capitulated, the situation began to change. Raja Ram, the Maratha king, returned north to Maharashtra. Shortly after he reached his homeland, he began to organize large-scale raids against the Mughal provinces of Berar and Khandesh.[4] This northward shift in Maratha operations provoked the first of the emperor Aurangzeb's personally directed attacks on the hill-forts

[1] Cf. Manucci's comment: 'In the year [one thousand and] seven hundred (1700) the king granted Kam Bakhsh the province of Gulkandah for his allowances, he remaining present at court.' Manucci, II. 467.

[2] I.J. Coll., I/17/482.

[3] A court newsletter written in July 1701 relayed a report from Kam Bakhsh that Rustam Dil Khan had sent one elephant, two horses, a shield, and a sword, as *peshkash* to prove his fidelity. Akh., XLV (6 Rabi I), p. 118a.

[4] Duff, I. 296.

of Maharashtra. After Raja Ram died in 1700, his widow encouraged the various Maratha chiefs to lead their horsemen toward every part of the Deccan and to extort payments of *chauth* whereever possible. The most destructive and damaging phase of Maratha operations against the empire had begun.[1]

Hyderabad soon began to feel the impact of the change in Maratha activities. In 1701 the Mughal general Zulfikar Khan, commanding a force of 2,500 heavy cavalry, engaged in a series of running engagements with a large Maratha force in neighbouring Bidar on the western border of Hyderabad. Finally, after four days, the badly outnumbered Mughals reached Kaulas fort, near Nizam Sagar Lake, one of the major forts in Hyderabad. Here, Zulfikar Khan sheltered his supply train and drove off the Marathas after a desperate battle. As the Marathas retreated to the west, infantry forces of the local *zamindars* shielded them against Mughal pursuit.[2]

Inevitably, the mobile bands of Maratha cavalry were attracted to the wealthiest target in the eastern Deccan: the city of Hyderabad. Golconda fort was impregnable to a direct assault, but the city itself was open and virtually unfortified. Hyderabad's defencelessness (along with Patna and a number of other mercantile cities in Mughal India) was a testimony to the more stable and peaceful conditions of the past century.[3] In April or May 1702 a Maratha horde, estimated at 50,000 horse and foot, attacked Hyderabad. Rustam Dil Khan, deputy governor of the province, was in residence at the capital but made no attempt to defend the city. He simply remained in the governor's palace which he strengthened against attack by mounting cannon and posting guards.[4] The other officials and notables of the city either remained shut up in their guarded residences or fled to the shelter of Golconda fort. Meeting no resistance, the Marathas occupied the entire city and looted the defenceless populace for three full days. Their leaders demanded payment of an enormous ransom before they would leave. Finally, Rustam Dil Khan handed over 700,000 rupees from the provincial treasury and the raiders left.[5] Seizure

[1] Ibid. [2] Bhimsen. fol. 137.

[3] City walls were built during Mubariz Khan's governorship in the period 1713–24.

[4] K.A. 1570 (27.4.1703), fols. 322–3.

[5] Ibid.; Francois Martin, 'Extrait du Journal', Archives Nationales de France, Paris, Correspondence Générale, Inde: Colonies C[2] 66, 29 May 1702, fol. 161.

of the provincial capital in this way, with no resistance offered by the governor, was the most damaging blow to Mughal prestige since the Maratha raids fifteen years before.

BANDITS

The discomfort of the provincial administration and its inability or unwillingness to deal with the Maratha raids encouraged the development of banditry on an extraordinary scale in Hyderabad. One of the most notorious of the newly emerged bandit leaders was a former Mughal *faujdar*. In 1700 or 1701 the emperor sent Riza Khan, an Afghan *mansabdar*, to take over as *faujdar* of Ramgir, a town in Bidar province just north of Hyderabad's northern border (near Elgandel town).[1] When the new *faujdar* arrived, the incumbent officer refused to leave. Riza Khan recruited some soldiers, seized the *faujdar*, and took control of Ramgir district. However, with scarcely any delay Riza Khan rebelled, assembled a large irregular force, and began to seize the state revenues.[2]

Riza Khan wasted little time in moving south into Hyderabad. Leading a force of 9,000 to 10,000 men, mostly 'rogues and cow thieves', he blocked the route between Machilipatnam and Hyderabad city throughout 1702. In February 1703, still unchecked, he marched to within a short distance of Machilipatnam plundering and burning.[3] Later in the same year, Riza Khan again descended on the port and its hinterland. Everyone in the region, according to the Dutch, was too terrified of him to fight. After doing immense damage he moved off toward Warangal leaving a trail of plundered and burnt villages.[4] The next year, the ex-*faujdar* led a force of 30,000 cavalry and infantry to join the

6 July 1702, fol. 163. Cf. also Manucci, III. 414: '[Raja Ram] turned his arms next to the direction of Gulkandah [i.e. Hyderabad]. After appearing before that town, he entered it as into a conquered country, menaced it with fire and sword, and in the end forced the governor to pay him a considerable sum to save it from pillage.'

[1] Ramgir district had been seized by Qutb Shah officers when the Qutb Shahs captured Gulbarga from Bijapur. Golconda claimed that Ramgir as well as several other border districts 'were formerly attached to the country of Telengana' and thus were part of the Qutb Shah kingdom. These seized districts which had belonged to Bijapur were part of Aurangzeb's justification for making war on Abul Hasan. After 1687 the administration of Ramgir seems to have reverted to Bidar province. Cf. Khafi Khan, II. 293, and Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, IV. 340.

[2] Manucci, IV. 248–9.

[3] K.A. 1570 (27.4.1703), fol. 323

[4] K.A. 1570, Second Part (10.10.1703), fol. 28.

Marathas on their expedition to Machilipatnam on the coast.[1] In 1705, according to Manucci, Riza Khan 'collected a large sum of money from the province of Gulkandah (Golconda) and devastated it right up to the port of Machhlipatanam. In this way he goes on pillaging and making himself powerful, after the example of Shiva Ji [the first Maratha king].'[2] The bandit chief continued at large during the governorship of Prince Muhammad Kam Bakhsh. He was more powerful and active than ever in 1707, the year of Aurangzeb's death.[3]

Bandits in Hyderabad were not *zamindars* who already possessed ascribed political and social status in local society. Rather they were men like Riza Khan, the renegade Mughal *mansabdar*, or the equally notorious Pap Rai, son of a low-caste toddy seller.[4] These, and other less widely known bandit leaders, could see in the lessons of Maratha successes and Mughal weakness a road to wealth and power outside the accustomed social order. Many of the followers of these men were the normal sorts of desperadoes and adventurers who were nuisances even in more stable times. But by 1702 their numbers were swelled by 'troops of impoverished men' recruited from dispossessed groups in Hyderabad. Unpaid soldiers and homeless peasants and artisans turned to banditry. The bandit leaders offered hope, protection, and employment to active men previously plundered by the Marathas, by Mughal forces, or even by other bandits.[5]

REGIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Widespread raiding by both Marathas and indigenous bandits had serious effects on the economy of the province. An immediate casualty of the decline in public order was long-distance trade. Although the Qutb Shah court was lost, Hyderabad city continued to be one of the great metropolitan trading centres for the Deccan and South India. But by the beginning of 1702, and perhaps before then, trading conditions had become similar to those during the siege of Golconda fort. Trade of any sort had come to a com-

[1] See below, p. 227. [2] Manucci, IV. 249.

[3] K.A. 1637 (9.9.1707), fol. 463.

[4] For the complete story of Pap Rai see Chapter XIV.

[5] According to the Dutch reports both Marathas and poverty-stricken men blocked the roads ('hooftlegers vande marattys ende troupen der verarmde manschen'). Cf. K.A. 1584 (2.2.1704), fol. 111. Bhimsen, fol. 139a, also mentions peasants, oppressed by the Mughal tax agents in the Deccan, who obtained weapons and horses and followed the Marathas.

plete halt because of danger from bandits and Marathas on the roads. Between 1702 and 1704 no caravans of any sort came to Hyderabad from either the west-coast ports in Gujerat or from North India.[1] Any caravans originating in the Deccan which did try to reach Hyderabad were looted to the ruin of the merchants who organized them.[2] The vital road running east from Hyderabad to Machilipatnam, major outlet to the sea for the capital, was also cut off by Riza Khan's forces. Conditions got so bad that the accountants for the coastal salt monopoly sent a complaint to the *diwan* of the Deccan. They pointed out that they and the salt makers could no longer pursue their activities in peace. The roads between the capital and the coast were so troubled that the *banjaras* had difficulty coming to collect the salt.[3] Closure of all major trade channels certainly damaged the economic position of Hyderabad. The possibility of recovery, meaning the free movement of trade and road traffic, was completely dependent on the restoration of Mughal power—or its replacement by another political system.

However, the metropolitan populace did not suffer alone. Stepped-up Maratha attacks caused severe dislocation of agricultural production in Telengana, especially in the western districts. The peasantry lost draught cattle and other possessions to the marauders. This in turn brought about drops in the harvests.[4] Man-made economic problems received an additional impetus by an extended two-year drought which hit both the eastern and western Deccan in 1702. The entire region was subjected to the scarcities and soaring prices of famine conditions.[5] Widespread plague also added to the mortality rate.[6]

Difficulties such as these meant that returns from the land tax in Hyderabad were seriously reduced. The problem was particularly acute in those districts of Telengana which supplied the bulk

[1] K.A. 1584 (2.2.1704), fol. 111.

[2] Ibid. Cf. also K.A. 1570 (27.4.1703), fol. 322. The Dutch merchants at Negapatam reported to Batavia that the roads not far from Hyderabad city northward to the 'upper markets' were held shut by the Marathas.

[3] I.J Coll., I/17/810.

[4] William Norris recorded in his journal as early as 1700 that food grains were four times cheaper on the coast than in the interior. Das, p. 181.

[5] *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 18 Nov. 1703, p. 133; ibid., 10 May 1704, p. 40.

[6] Cf. Manucci, IV. 97: 'In the Dakhin provinces there was no rain from 1702 to 1704, but instead plague prevailed. In these two years there expired over two millions of souls . . .'

of *khalisa* revenues and *jagirs* for the pay of officials and soldiers. Although never completely satisfactory, these lands had generated sizeable state revenues during Jan Sipar Khan's governorship. After 1700 even the resources of a Mughal prince were not sufficient to overcome the problems faced by *jagirdars* in Hyderabad. In October 1701 Wizarat Khan, the prince's chief fiscal officer (*diwan*), submitted a request to the *diwan* of the Deccan for the transfer and replacement of *jagir* lands in Hyderabad which had been taken from the holdings of the deceased governor, Jan Sipar Khan, and given to the Prince as his successor. Lands worth 134,000 rupees in Kaulas *pargana* were completely unproductive. They did not provide the anticipated collections, because that area was rife with the rebellion (*shorash*) of malefactors (*mufisidan*). He (Wizarat Khan) had to employ 500 horsemen and 1,000 infantry simply to collect the minimal funds taken out of the *pargana*. The annual cost of this force was over 100,000 rupees. As a result, the *jagir* would have been unprofitable even if returns were normal (i.e. 134,000 rupees).[1]

Khan Firuz Jang, whose army relied on Hyderabad for much of its pay, voiced similar complaints on behalf of two of his commanders. The Mughal general wrote that Achluji (5000/5000), a Maratha officer, held half his *jagirs* in the 'old country', i.e. Aurangabad, but because of a shortage of *paibaqi* lands there he had not received any assignment. The remaining half of Achluji's *jagir*, totalling 73,569 rupees, came from lands in Kaulas, Muhammadnagar, and Bhongir districts of Hyderabad. These lands had been assigned but because of desolation (*kharabi*) the Maratha officer had received absolutely nothing in salary.[2] Another Deccani officer, Hasan Quli Khan (3000/2000), also faced ruin because he obtained no income from his *jagirs* in Kaulas, Devarkonda, and Medak districts.[3]

[1] I.J. Coll., I/17/482. Kam Bakhsh also gave up his *jagir* in Narainkheda *pargana*, Kaulas district, because of inadequate revenue receipts. The *pargana* was entered in the accounts of the provincial *bakhshi* as ruined (*wiran*) in the 47th regnal year (1703). The last recorded receipts from the entire *pargana* were from 1109/1698–9 when it was still in *khalisa* under Kar Talab Khan. At the time the receipts were just under 25% of the *jam'i-kamil* (45,492 rupees to 183,471), I.J. Coll., I/19/1322.

[2] I.J. Coll., I/17/1108–9.

[3] I.J. Coll., I/17/762; I/17/1115. Hasan Quli Khan was also denied pay for his *zat* rank from the 'old country' as a result of the emperor's decision not to allow Deccanis to obtain assignments in the older provinces of the Deccan. Cf. also

Data for revenue returns from the *khalisa* lands after 1700 are virtually non-existent. But a set of figures for one *pargana* in Telengana suggests that collections may have declined as precipitously for the *khalisa* treasury as for the *jagir* holders in Hyderabad. The full return (*hasil-i kamil*) for Rajgopalpur *pargana* in Malankur district was 47,065 rupees. Under Kar Talab Khan in 1698–9 actual collections were 35,316 rupees (75 per cent). The next year under Ali Akbar, the *diwan*, they were 24,300 (52 per cent). In 1700–1 under the *amin* Asadullah they had shrunk to 16,200 rupees (35 per cent). A repetition of that figure in 1701–2 suggests the appearance of some form of tax-farming arrangement.[1]

KAM BAKHSH'S DECCAN POWER BASE

By 1703 all the major nobles in the Mughal empire, knowing the octogenarian emperor's death could not be long delayed, were manoeuvring in anticipation of that event. Aurangzeb, too, was trying to leave behind him a reasonably stable situation which might even prevent the usual bloody war of succession between his sons. He was especially concerned to protect his youngest, and by general reputation least capable, son, Muhammad Kam Bakhsh. To achieve this end, Aurangzeb's aim in the remaining years of his life was to establish Kam Bakhsh in effective control of Bijapur, Hyderabad, and the Bijapur and Hyderabad Karnatiks, while the two other princes divided the remainder of the empire. As Manucci records the emperor's decision, Kam Bakhsh

> was made lord of the provinces of Bijapur and Gulkandah, as also of all the fortresses in the two Karnatiks. Aurangzeb told the prince he meant to leave him behind in the Dakhin to take his place, intending himself retire to the town of Dihili, there to live at his ease and seek God's favour during the few days of life that remained. This news spread abroad at once in all directions, and many persons rejoiced . . .[2]

ibid., I/17/1647, for the complaint of Rao Kanhu, a Maratha *mansubdar* attached to the army of Zulfikar Khan, that he was not receiving his salary from *jagirs* in Hyderabad and Bijapur. All these documents are dated in the 45th regnal year, i.e. 1701

[1] I J. Coll., I/19/1322.

[2] Manucci, III. 498–9. Aurangzeb also planned to make Kam Bakhsh custodian of the young Maratha prince Shahu, who was in captivity in the Mughal camp. Shahu was newly honoured with the rank of 7000 *zat* (that of a Mughal prince) and given the right to ¼ the revenues or *chauth* to the Deccan provinces. By this device Aurangzeb hoped to provide Kam Bakhsh with a means to defuse

Kam Bakhsh, on his part, was equally anxious to have a firm base in the Deccan. He also had long been an advocate of a conciliatory approach toward the Marathas—a fact which would have assisted him had he been able to assume control of the sub-empire which his father had tried to reserve for him.[1]

These developments coincided with rapid deterioration in the Mughal position in the eastern Deccan. If the raids of the Marathas and bandits continued unchecked there was a real danger of widespread uprisings among the Telugu military aristocracy of the region. If the emperor and Kam Bakhsh did not take action promptly one of the most important parts of his Deccan sub-empire would become worthless. Aurangzeb responded to this possibility with a series of administrative measures designed to tighten the Prince's hold over the province.

By May 1703 the emperor dismissed Rustam Dil Khan from his post as deputy governor of Hyderabad and transferred him to the coastal districts where he replaced Mahdi Khan Bek as *faujdar* of Sikakul.[2] Sayyid Muzaffar Khan, *faujdar* of Kovir, was made the new deputy governor of Hyderabad in Rustam Dil Khan's place.[3] This shift took place without immediate difficulty. The new deputy governor came with a force to take up his residence in Hyderabad and Rustam Dil Khan marched to Machilipatnam with a force of 500 or 600 horsemen and as many infantry.[4] The emperor also transferred *jagirs* in Bhongir district worth 71,000 rupees from Rustam Dil Khan to his successor.[5] Ample justification for Rustam Dil Khan's demotion certainly existed. His inaction when the Marathas sacked Hyderabad the previous year, as well as payment of a large bribe to induce them to leave, might well have brought a more rapid reaction from the emperor. Popular reports also had it that he was in active collusion with the Marathas. The Dutch

the Maratha attacks on Mughal territory. The decision, according to Manucci, was widely reported and known, but the emperor did not of course retire to Delhi before his death. The date is established by the reference to 'In this year of 1704' on page 501 and the comment that 'one year has already gone by without to this day any step being taken to put this plan into execution.' This puts the date at 1703 which is congruent with other measures of intensified control in Hyderabad on the part of Kam Bakhsh. Cf. also Sardesai, I. 366–7, and Duff, I. 343–4.

[1] Cf. Duff, I. 344. [2] K.A. 1570 (27.4.1703), fol. 324.

[3] K.A. 1570 (10.10.1703), fol. 20. [4] Ibid.

[5] I.J. Coll., I/19/500. Sayyid Muzaffar Khan refused a *jagir* offered in Pangal district worth 24,650,000 *dams* from this total. He kept his old holdings as *faujdar* of Kovir.

merchants heard that the new provincial *bakhshi*, appointed at the same time as Sayyid Muzaffar Khan, had intercepted and sent on to Aurangzeb two letters which Rustam Dil Khan had written to the Marathas.[1] But more important was the fact that the emperor had ended the fifteen-year domination of Hyderabad by Rustam Dil Khan and his father. Rustam Dil Khan still ruled over the coastal districts, but the true base of power at Hyderabad was now in other hands.

In October 1703 Aurangzeb ordered the officers (*mutasaddian*) of the *khalisa* to give Prince Kam Bakhsh full details about the *faujdars* and fort commanders of Hyderabad and their areas of responsibility. He also commanded that in future any transfers or changes in these officers should be cleared with the Prince.[2] In mid-year Kam Bakhsh gained another significant concession. His son, Sultan Muhyi-al Sunna (7000/2000), acquired a large salary *jagir* in Hyderabad valued at 600,315 rupees.[3] This consisted of Rajgopalpur *pargana*, Malankur district in Telengana (47,065 rupees), and all of Eluru district on the coast (531,913 rupees *hasil*). Both areas were previously classified as *khalisa*. The implications of this further inroad on the Hyderabad *khalisa* are not difficult to see. Kam Bakhsh himself had taken over twenty-five *parganas* from the *khalisa* two years before. This latest move placed that much more of the territory of the province under his direct administration. Possession of Eluru district by his son had the added advantage of reducing the scope of Rustam Dil Khan's authority on the coast. It also buttressed the revenue-collecting efforts of Hasan Quli Khan *faujdar* of Eluru, Mustafanagar, and Khammamett.[4]

RENEWED MARATHA ASSAULTS—1704

Sayyid Muzaffar Khan, the new deputy governor of Hyderabad, had a badly needed respite from external attacks on the province for nine or ten months (the remainder of 1703). However, when

[1] K A. 1570 (27.4.1703), fol. 324.

[2] Akh., XLVII (5 Jumada (I), p. 132a. The newsletter says that the Prince should be notified (*itla' dadan*) which I have interpreted to mean give his approval as well.

[3] I.J. Coll., I/19/452. A firm identification of Sultan Muhyi-al Sunna is given in *Ma'asir i 'Alamgiri*, p. 470.

[4] Cf. I.J. Coll., I/16/433, for a plea for more *jagir* lands from Hasan Quli Khan to support additional troops.

another series of Maratha raids in force began, Sayyid Muzaffar Khan's responses were as weak as those of his predecessor. First, in January 1704, an immense Maratha army, estimated at 25,000 horsemen and as many infantry, appeared in front of Hyderabad. While the unopposed raiders plundered the unprotected parts of the metropolis, the notables of the city fled to Golconda fort for shelter. Finally, the Marathas retired, destroying everything in their path and leaving famine and disease behind them.[1] Six months later, just after the arrival of the rainy season in June, another force of 30,000 Marathas infested Hyderabad, and drove Sayyid Muzaffar Khan into Golconda fort. Then they proceeded to plunder what must have been a weary urban populace. Finally, after extorting a large cash payment from Sayyid Muzaffar Khan, the invaders rode off.[2]

In July another, smaller band of about 4,000 raiders attacked the city. Sayyid Muzaffar Khan and most of his army were then engaged in a token pursuit of the last Maratha army. Nevertheless, the minor officials and *mansabdars* decided to resist this relatively small force. Under the direction of Mir Qasim, son-in-law of the provincial *buyutat*, the superintendents, accountants, and clerks fought desperately. The Marathas were only able to loot sporadically in the city before they were driven off. The defending bureaucrats pursued the raiders as they fled, took a number of captives, and recovered 5,000 to 6,000 rupees in goods and cash. The prisoners were immediately executed and their heads thrown in the streets.[3]

A late eighteenth-century history, the *Tarikh-i Zafrah*, refers to another incident which, if true, puts Sayyid Muzaffar Khan in an even more unfavourable perspective. According to the author, Girdhari Lal, the Mughal forces at Hyderabad under Sayyid Muzaffar Khan were seriously weakened by delays in pay. These delays were partly the fault of the new deputy governor, who was ineffectual. Finally, some of his unpaid soldiers rebelled. As soon as they did Sayyid Muzaffar Khan mounted a single horse and fled. His servants then divided among themselves all his goods, horses, and elephants. Although Girdhari Lal does not give his

[1] K.A. 1584 (2.2.1704), fol. 128. It is unclear from this report whether the Marathas actually occupied the entire city.

[2] *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 24 June 1704, p. 128. Manucci, III. 504, 506.

[3] Akh., XLVIII, part II (3 Rabi II), p. 134a. K.A. 1584 (6.12.1704), fols. 149–50.

source for this account, it may well be accurate, since there are no references to Sayyid Muzaffar Khan in the Mughal records after 1704.[1] These terrifying raids promised to be followed by others. News arrived at the capital that another Maratha army, thought to be about 15,000 men, was encamped a short distance from the city. The Marathas reportedly were waiting for the end of the monsoon before attacking.[2]

Still, the residents of Hyderabad city might have taken comfort from the fact that they shared the Maratha affliction with the remainder of the population of Hyderabad. The rich coastal ports were a natural target. A major incursion coincided with the attacks on Hyderabad:[3]

> In the month of February of the same year (1704) there appeared another force of twelve thousand horse and ten thousand foot, which attacked a factory (*habitation*) called Policonde (Palakollu) five leagues from Machhlipatanam. . . . This army took up its quarters at the above place, and thence dispatched troops in different directions, and exacted everywhere one-fourth of the revenues with great rigour. The deputies of the king [i.e. Aurangzeb], the governors and generals of the regions, could not prevent these extortions. . . . [Finally] the Mahrattahs, having taken all they could, get, retired.

Manucci's description of this raid amply shows the demoralization of the Mughals and the confidence of the Marathas. Neither Rustam Dil Khan, then at Rajmundry, nor any of his subordinate officers in or near Machilipatnam made an attempt to resist the invaders. Untroubled by the imperial forces, the Marathas did not engage in hurried indiscriminate plundering. Instead, they systematically collected one-quarter of the established land tax from the residents of the coastal districts. Collection of *chauth* in this

[1] Cf. Girdhari Lal. *Tarikh-i Zafrah*, ed. by Qazi Husain (Hyderabad, 1927), pp. 54–5.

[2] Manucci states that a Maratha force of 60,000 horsemen first appeared in May 1704 in the Bijapur Karnatik. After assembling and regrouping at Sira, they split into three divisions. The first moved into the Hyderabad Karnatik from there to Trichinopoly and then to Tanjavur both in Mysore. The second division moved into Hyderabad proper and attacked the capital, and the third 'is advancing into the rest of the country [i.e. the remainder of Golconda] conquering as much of it as it can, [and] placing commandants in the forts and places that it captures'. The latter is probably the 15,000 man army reported by the Dutch. Cf. Manucci, III. 503–4.

[3] Manucci, III. 500. Interpolations in round brackets are those of the editor and translator of Manucci; those in square brackets are mine.

fashion was one of the earliest steps in the long process by which the Marathas gradually took complete control of Mughal provinces in the western Deccan and in Gujerat. So incensed were the Dutch and British traders by what they considered collusion with the Maratha 'Robbers' by the Mughal official in charge of Machilipatnam that they refused to trust any longer to his ability to protect the port and the treasure stored there by them and other merchants. The traders put up five earthen bastions and mounted twenty-five artillery pieces with a guard of their own soldiers when news came of the Maratha raiders. At the first opportunity, they seized the gates and expelled the town governor and his troops from Machilipatnam. When Rustam Dil Khan demanded an explanation they said that they would only answer to the emperor.[1]

Whether this was really collusion as charged by the Europeans, or simply caution, is a difficult issue. Certainly, Rustam Dil Khan had been in contact with the Marathas and had already shown great reluctance to fight them on several occasions. More puzzling is the behaviour of the Telugu *zamindars* in Hyderabad. They too were completely passive. Despite what appear to have been unequalled opportunities to do so, they did not assist the Marathas nor did they rise up in rebellion. The active alliance between the Marathas at Jinji and the Telugu *zamindars* in the Karnatik, which so seriously threatened the Mughals in 1690, did not reappear. After fifteen years popular fears of Aurangzeb's iconoclasm seem to have abated. Also, the *zamindars* in Andhra were not in close proximity to the capital of the Maratha king. In the early 1690s Raja Ram had offered a legitimate Hindu monarchy and political system which could rally resistance to the Mughals. Instead there now appeared loosely knit raiding parties led by generals operating under a mandate from Tara Bai, Raja Ram's widow. Apparently these no longer had the same appeal to Telugu *nayaks*.

In contrast to the Marathi-speaking aristocracy of the western Deccan, the Telugu warrior chiefs seemed to find little attraction in the anti-Mughal appeal of Shivaji's successors. The powerful *zamindars* on the northern coast easily wrung concessions from Rustam Dil Khan at this time without any necessity for recourse to the invaders. Most of the established *zamindars* elsewhere remained quiet and hoped for minimal losses from the raids, or

[1] Ibid., III, 500–1. William Irvine has a lengthy note on the evidence for this incident in the Dutch and British records.

they took the opportunity to encroach on lands reserved for the state.[1] Others even offered to assist the Mughals. Thus, Venkat Rao, a *zamindar* who had held a high *mansab* under Abul Hasan Qutb Shah (as a *nayak*?), had come to Rustam Dil Khan in 1701 with a force of 500 horsemen and 2,000 foot and offered his services to the governor. At Rustam Dil Khan's request, Aurangzeb accepted the Telugu *zamindar* as a Mughal *mansabdar* with a rank of 500 *zat*, 200 *suwar*.[2] Apart from Yacham Na'ir, this is the first known appointment of a Telugu *zamindar* made by the emperor to the corps of imperial *mansabdars*. Both the date and circumstances of this appointment support the conclusion drawn earlier that Telugu *zamindars* had been, until now, part of a still-functional regional political structure. Only when that structure came under pressure, would Aurangzeb, acting in response to a plea from the provincial governor, confer membership in the imperial service on a Telugu chief.

ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES: 1705–1706

Rapid collapse of imperial authority north of the Krishna obviously called for strong measures. By November 1704 a complete reshuffling of the highest posts in Hyderabad had taken place. Both Sayyid Muzaffar Khan, the deputy governor at Hyderabad, and Rustam Dil Khan, the *faujdar* of Sikakul, lost their positions. The emperor transferred Rustam Dil Khan to the far south, where he became *faujdar* of the Bijapur Karnatik.[3] For the first time in over fifteen years neither Rustam Dil Khan nor his father held posts in Hyderabad. To replace Rustam Dil Khan as deputy governor of Hyderabad (still under the formal governorship of Prince Muhammad Kam Bakhsh) Aurangzeb selected Daud Khan Panni, the Afghan *mansabdar*. Daud Khan Panni was to continue to hold his post as deputy governor of the Hyderabad Karnatik (under Zulfikar Khan) and simultaneously assume command of the districts north of the Krishna.[4] Temporarily, at least, all of the territories previously ruled by Abul Hasan Qutb Shah were again brought under a single administration. The Mughal emperor also

[1] Cf. below for the usurpation of a village from a Muslim noblewoman by Reddi *zamindars*.

[2] Akh., XLV (1 Muharram), p. 73b.

[3] *Ma'asir-i Alamgiri*, p. 483.

[4] Manucci, IV. 98. *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 1704, p. 115.

sent Mahdi Khan Bek back to Sikakul as *faujdar* of the coastal districts replacing Rustam Dil Khan.[1]

Aurangzeb's aim in this was to prevent a repetition of the disasters of 1704. Because of the depredations of the 'worthless infidels' Hyderabad was 'without regulation or order'.[2] He ordered Daud Khan to go immediately to Hyderabad to drive out the Marathas. This Daud Khan was not at all eager to do. He was fully occupied with the administration of the Karnatik and had only saved himself against similar Maratha pressure by making an expensive clandestine agreement with them. The Afghan general temporized and tried to get his orders changed.[3] As a result, the administration of Hyderabad drifted for nearly a year while the appointed deputy governor remained in the Karnatik. The province escaped a further wave of Maratha incursions in part because of a sudden extension to the north of their operations. In early 1705 several Maratha armies crossed the Narmada River attacking Malwa, Khandesh, and Berar, as well as Gujerat.[4] The presence of the imperial army at the siege of Wakinkira in 1705 also acted as a deterrent. At last, the emperor, anxious to have a vigorous governor in residence in Hyderabad, dismissed Daud Khan Panni from the post, and turned once again to Rustam Dil Khan. The latter, his rank enhanced from (2000/1000) to (2500/1500) was restored to the deputy governorship of Hyderabad by December 1705.[5] Mahdi Khan Bek remained in office as *faujdar* of Sikakul. The emperor's motives for the reappointment of Rustam Dil Khan to Hyderabad are nowhere explicitly stated. Perhaps the

[1] *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 1704, p. 115.

[2] Inayatullah Khan, *Kalamat-i Tayibat*, Salar Jung Museum (Hyderabad), Persian MS. A.N. 232, fols. 77b–78a.

[3] Manucci, IV. 98. According to one source, Daud Khan Panni was a strong advocate of a peaceful settlement with the Marathas by this time. Cf. Lachmi Narayan Shafik, *Bisat-al Alghana'im*, India Office Library (London), Persian MS. no. 3595, fol. 74.

[4] Duff, I. 340, 1878 edition. Details about events in Hyderabad for 1705 are scanty. There is a gap in the Fort St. George letters between 1704 and 1707. The surviving Inayat Jang papers dwindle both in quantity and interest for the period 1704–7. A Dutch letter dated in October 1705 records general impoverishment of both merchants and the ordinary people by the Mughals in the coastal districts. This also reports with relief the departure of Rustam Dil Khan from the area. K.A. 1604 (7.10.1705), fols. 182–4. None of these or other sources record any Maratha raids.

[5] *Ma'asir-i 'Alamgiri*, p. 494. The dismissal of Daud Khan Panni and the appointment of Rustam Dil Khan are recorded for the events of the 49th regnal year (17 Dec. 1704–5 Dec. 1705).

most plausible explanation is that by 1705 Aurangzeb had difficulty in finding reliable high-ranking officers for any difficult assignment. It may well have been the case that Rustam Dil Khan was the only *mansabdar* with sufficient resources and experience who was willing to take over in Hyderabad. Rustam Dil Khan may have felt that his local connections and local understanding of the province, carefully nurtured over a period of fifteen years, would allow him to survive and even flourish; a stranger to the province sent as a governor would inevitably fail given the weakness and distracted state of the imperial centre. The record of Yusuf Khan, first governor under Bahadur Shah, suggests that this assumption may be justified. None the less, whatever the emperor's motives may have been, Rustam Dil Khan returned to Hyderabad bearing full authority to administer the province as deputy governor. His former protégé, Mahdi Khan Bek, controlled the coastal districts. Rustam Dil Khan thus had an opportunity to try and regain the dominant position in the province which he had lost a year earlier.

At the beginning of 1706, as Aurangzeb's death was expected and feared at any time, Mughal administration divided into two unharmonious factions in Hyderabad. The absentee governor, Prince Muhammad Kam Bakhsh, continued his efforts to build a power base in the Deccan for the anticipated succession struggle. The Prince even went so far as to send his chief financial officer, Wizarat Khan, to Hyderabad. The Prince's *diwan* was ordered to reassess or 'settle' (*bandobast*) the extensive lands held in the province by Kam Bakhsh.[1]

Kam Bakhsh's hold on Hyderabad (and Bijapur), although potentially a basis for the splitting apart of the empire after his father's demise was at this time a force for the continuation and extension of strongly centralized control over the province. This, however, was certainly not the case with Rustam Dil Khan, the other powerful figure in Hyderabad. As long as Aurangzeb lived, Rustam Dil Khan did not openly challenge or clash with the Prince, his nominal superior. Nevertheless, all the deputy governor's energies in this critical period were directed toward self-preservation, and as a result his activities tended to subvert the emperor's authority and power. Rustam Dil Khan continued to avoid any kind of direct clash with the Marathas, who sacked the

[1] *Ma'asir-i Alamgiri*, p. 497. I.J. Coll., I/22/5. Wizarat Khan died while on this assignment, so that it may not have been completed.

capital once again in 1706.[1] He also continued his harsh attempts to build up his personal treasury. More damaging to imperial interests, however, were Rustam Dil Khan's emerging alliances and compromises with the most aggressive and disruptive non-official figures in Hyderabad. Earlier popular rumours of the deputy governor's possible connections with the bandit leader, Riza Khan, were confirmed in mid-1706 when he invited Riza Khan to assist him in driving out the Telugu bandit, Pap Rai, another troublesome figure in the province.[2] The deputy governor also cultivated the friendship of Ananda Razu Pusapati, now the most powerful *zamindar* in the trans-Godavari region.

In bringing Rustam Dil Khan back to Hyderabad, the emperor had violated the meticulously observed practice, in effect for well over a century, of frequent transfers of provincial governors. By 1707 Rustam Dil Khan had been active in Hyderabad for nineteen of the past twenty years. He was shrewd, bold, and ambitious. These personal qualities, coupled with his official position and long tenure, enabled Rustam Dil Khan to build up a series of informal political ties and alliances within the region. This was the first, not inconsiderable, step on the road to autonomous political power in Hyderabad should the empire fail.

CONCLUSION

Disruptive forces were loosed in Hyderabad with an almost cyclonic effect after 1700. Maratha and Bedar raiders, indigenous Telugu *sardars* and *deshmukhs*, renegade Mughal officers, and all sorts of bandits freely attacked the villages and district towns, traffic on the roads, and even the capital itself. Severe drought, famine, and pestilence added to the general misery. This was a steady racking process, which was made even more devastating because it began less than a decade after the long period (1685–92) of troubles accompanying annexation. These disturbances, which were to continue, created a climate of insecurity and uncertainty that fractured the existing social and political order of the eastern Deccan.

After 1700 Hyderabad, in common with other parts of the

[1] Manucci, IV. 274.

[2] K.A. 1622 (25.5.1706), fol. 398. In 1703 the Dutch thought that Rustam Dil Khan might get support from Riza Khan in order to drive off Sayyid Muzaffar Khan and regain the governorship of Hyderabad. K.A. 1570, Part II (10.10.1703), fol. 28.

Mughal Deccan, suffered an observable reduction in population. Bhimsen, a Mughal officer serving in the Deccan at the time, wrote that the populated and cultivated area dwindled in Hyderabad as well as Bijapur and Khandesh in 1703.[1] His conclusion is supported by Dutch traders in Hyderabad who reported to their superiors that all the lands north and south of Golconda were laid waste. Troupes of Marathas and their Mughal pursuers had desolated the countryside.[2] Agrarian distress and inhibited production were products of the political instability of the period. So too was the stoppage of trade at the capital. When long-distance caravans no longer arrived regularly at the entrances to the city's caravanserais, the economic pre-eminence of the capital was completely undercut. A nucleus of commercial institutions and a sizeable mercantile community undoubtedly remained, but there is little question that the pace of commercial life slowed further every year after 1700.

Morale, efficiency, and standards of imperial administration in Hyderabad dropped precipitously as well. The emperor (unwilling to spare any of his declining armies for duty in Hyderabad) did little to help. Aurangzeb merely shuffled personnel in the highest provincial posts without any noticeable effect. Soon these Mughal officers on duty in Hyderabad concluded that they could not count on any meaningful assistance from the centre. That they refused to fight the Marathas and came to an accommodation with them instead is not at all surprising.

There are other signs of serious administrative breakdown. For example, the system of near-daily news-reports to the emperor began to founder in Hyderabad. In January 1707 Bharam Chak, official newswriter (*sawanah nigar*) of the province, submitted a protest about the behaviour of the fort commanders and *faujdars* in Hyderabad. He stated that his agents (*na'ban*) could not gain access to the territory under the jurisdiction of those officials. As a result they could not file their intelligence reports. The newswriter singled out Ram Chand, agent for the general Khan Firuz Jang, for particular criticism. It seems that Ram Chand, who was in charge of his master's *jagirs* in Devarkonda district, would not allow any newswriters to enter the *jagir* so that they could make their reports. This was because Ram Chand was engaged in all

[1] Bhimsen, fol. 149b.
[2] K.A. 1622 (28.2.1706), fol. 212.

sorts of tyranny, oppression, and double-dealing with the inhabitants of the *jagir*.[1] If the Hyderabad newswriter's description is accurate, there must have been a marked deterioration in the amount and quality of information from the province received by the emperor. News of open public events such as Maratha raids reached the imperial centre, but surveillance of the performance of *faujdars*, fort commanders, and of the practices of large *jagirdars* (which was equally important) suffered.

Normal procedures for assignment, transfer, and withdrawal of *jagirs* continued to be observed.[2] So too were the rules for inspection and verification of *mansabdar*'s contingents.[3] However, the squeeze on revenues due to lessened agricultural production and difficulties of collection did distort the *jagir* system. The largest holders of *jagirs* in Hyderabad of necessity began to acquire tighter holds on their assigned territories. In order to obtain even partially satisfactory collections they had to assume full military and magisterial powers. In some cases this was done formally by obtaining appointments as *faujdars*; in many cases, it was probably done tacitly and informally. Either way the result was the same: these larger *jagirs* in Hyderabad were imperceptibly becoming fiefs rather than salary assignments. This was especially noticeable for the holdings of the three largest *jagirdars* in the province, Khan Firuz Jang, Prince Muhammad Kam Bakhsh, and Rustam Dil Khan.

Continued administrative decline, although not, as yet, accompanied by mass revolts of the Telugu *zamindars*, deeply threatened Muslim domination in the eastern Deccan. Every year the privileged position of the ruling Muslim élite of the region became more vulnerable. Hardest hit were the urban Muslim notables, members of the *ulema*, and others. Thus a Muslim noblewoman, who was Abul Hasan Qutb Shah's widowed sister, had held a small subsistence grant in Hyderabad. The village in Rajkonda *pargana*, Bhongir district which she held had revenues totalling 1,042 rupees yearly. However, by 1702, she petitioned to have her grant changed

[1] I.J. Coll., I/23/65. The number of surviving newsletters from Hyderabad falls off sharply during Aurangzeb's last four or five regnal years.

[2] Cf. I.J. Coll., I/19/945, 984, 988, for examples of normal transfers of small *jagirs* which took place in 1703.

[3] Cf. I.J. Coll., I/19/616, I/19/754, for restoration of a *jagir* to a *mansabdar* serving in Hyderabad in 1703 who proved that he could muster five horsemen for his *suwar* rank (30) and pay.

to another village which had fallen into *paibaqi* status in Muhammadnagar district, closer to the capital. Because of attacks by two Reddi *zamindar* 'malefactors', her original village was no longer cultivated or populated. Since the grantee was completely dependent on this grant for her livelihood, she was in great distress.[1]

That a sense of insecurity existed among the Muslim community of the province is to be expected. Certainly the residents of the capital had ample cause to be fearful of insults to their persons, their honour, and their most sacred symbols. So we find that Shaikh Muhammad Shah, guardian of the holiest Muslim relic in the city, an impression of the Prophet's footprint, carried his charge to the Ambar Gardens on the outskirts of the capital. Fearing desecration 'at the time of the disturbance of the thieves [i.e. Marathas]' Shaikh Muhammad left the relic safe in its hiding place as late as 1706.[2]

[1] I.J. Coll., I/18/606. This was a *madad-i ma'ash* grant made in Aurangzeb's fortieth year (1696–7) for a total of 100,000 *dam* or 2,500 rupees *jama'* and 1,042 rupees *hasil*. The petitioner, Jani Khanom, was the widow of Sharif-ul Mulk, who defected to the Mughal side in 1685, but died before the annexation of Golconda. Cf. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II. 688–90.

[2] Zore, pp. 73–4, photocopies of old papers nos. 3 and 4. Dr. Zore, compiler of the catalogue, attributes Shaikh Muhammad Shah's hiding of the relic to disorders following the Mughal occupation of the city in 1686. However, *duzdan* (literally 'thieves') was an official synonym for the Marathas. As there is no other clue as to the relic's removal it is more likely that the Maratha occupations of the city in 1702–4 were the cause and not the earlier Mughal sack of the city. The Mughals were hardly likely to have desecrated a Muslim relic. The paper itself is a copy of an order from Asad Khan, issued in 1706, which forbids any interference by officials with the relic's resting place.

X

The Descending Spiral, 1707–1713

THE WAR OF SUCCESSION 1707–1709

AURANGZEB died in March 1707, touching off a protracted struggle between his three remaining sons, Azam Shah, Shah Alam, and Kam Bakhsh, all well along in years. In the first act of this drama the two chief contenders, Azam Shah, then governor of Gujerat, and Shah Alam, the governor of Kabul, met on the battlefield of Jajau near Agra. A hard-fought battle brought death to Azam Shah and the throne at Delhi to Shah Alam, who assumed the title of Bahadur Shah.

For nearly two years, until early 1709, the unresolved succession struggle dominated the political scene in Hyderabad province. When Aurangzeb died, Kam Bakhsh, the youngest and least powerful of the three contenders for the throne, was *en route* to take up his new post as governor of Bijapur. While his older brothers, Shah Alam and Azam Shah, fought their battle in the north, Kam Bakhsh tried to consolidate a position he had long been preparing in Hyderabad and Bijapur. In time, after Shah Alam's victory and his accession as Bahadur Shah, Kam Bakhsh took advantage of his brother's preoccupations in the north to move toward Hyderabad. There, in January 1708, Kam Bakhsh crowned himself king of Golconda. This was a strange revival of the concept of a kingdom of Golconda which had been dead for twenty years. During the following year the Prince was faced with covert resistance from local Mughal officials, lack of enthusiasm among his followers, and extreme financial problems. In the end, Kam Bakhsh failed to win complete control of the province or even to create an effective fighting force. Extreme measures, such as the execution of Rustam Dil Khan, the provincial governor, and others, or the imposition of harsh new taxes and forced loans on the citizens of the capital, merely contributed to the decline of the prince's position. Finally, Bahadur Shah led a large army to the Deccan and disposed of the remaining threat to his monarchy.

Augmented by desertions from Kam Bakhsh's unpaid troops, Bahadur Shah's army easily defeated the rebel force just outside of Hyderabad. The subsequent death of Kam Bakhsh from battle wounds in 1709 finally settled the issue of the succession.[1]

Although previous works have analysed the war of succession of 1707–9 from the perspective of the imperial centre, a close examination of the events taking place at Hyderabad during those years provides a case study in the working of Mughal provincial administration just prior to the collapse of the empire.[2] The operation of the checks and balances of the system can readily be seen, first of all in the struggle of the governor, Rustam Dil Khan, to preserve his position against the threat posed by Prince Kam Bakhsh's presence, and secondly in the efforts of Kam Bakhsh to overcome the resistance to individual aggrandizement which was built into the Mughal system.

On his return to the governorship of Hyderabad in 1705, after a year's transfer, Rustam Dil Khan had set about developing an entrenched position which would discourage any attempts at removal by the emperor. Although it is unlikely that Rustam Dil Khan considered the possibility of founding an independent dynasty, it is apparent that he intended to pass the governorship on to one of his sons in the same fashion that he had acquired it after the death of his father, Jan Sipar Khan. Indeed, the governor's sons already participated in the administration much as their father had.[3]

As soon as the long-anticipated news of Aurangzeb's death reached Hyderabad, Rustam Dil Khan intensified the build-up of his military and financial base. By mid-1707 a report reaching Madras said that 'Rustome Dil Khan hath taken vast sums of money from all the Inhabitants entertaining all that comes for Souldiers Peons. . . .'[4] The governor's hand was obviously strengthened by the inability of the central administration to

[1] For a full description of these events based on contemporary Persian chronicles and a Dutch account see W. Irvine, *Later Mughals*, 2 vols. (Calcutta, 1922), I. 50–67. Some of the letters to Batavia and some of the Mughal news-letters used in this chapter supplement Irvine's account.

[2] Cf. S. Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court (1707–1740)* (Aligarh, 1959), pp. 40–2.

[3] The British factors at Vishakapatnam reported that Rustam Dil Khan had written to the Vizianagram raja that he intended to send his son to administer the coastal districts (*RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 20 July 1707, p. 12).

[4] Ibid., 1707, p. 11.

enforce imperial regulations so long as Kam Bakhsh remained active in the Deccan. For the moment, at least, Bahadur Shah could only play up to Rustam Dil Khan's ambitions. In July 1707, just a month after Jajau, the emperor confirmed Rustam Dil Khan in his post at an increased rank, and gave him a new title, that of his father, Jan Sipar Khan.[1] The unusual award of his father's title to Rustam Dil Khan in this situation, at least, hinted at a new acceptance of a hereditary principle for the Mughal nobility.[2] Kam Bakhsh, on the other hand, who could scarcely afford to countenance any hereditary pretensions to the governorship of Hyderabad, bestowed the title of Azam Khan on Rustam Dil Khan when he arrived at Hyderabad.[3]

That the governor had indeed overstepped his legitimate authority was confirmed by the fate of Adi Khan, assistant to the *diwan* of Machilipatnam. This official tried to report to the imperial *wazir* that the usual tax revenues from the coastal districts could not be sent to court. Rustam Dil Khan had plundered the king's lands all over Golconda. Unfortunately, the governor's agents intercepted the letter and promptly seized the hapless Adi Khan. After paying a fine of 15,000 rupees and undergoing a brief imprisonment, the *diwan*'s assistant was freed and immediately fled to Kam Bakhsh's camp.[4] Rustam Dil Khan's interference in the revenue system of the province placed him squarely in opposition to the key officials of the financial line posted to Hyderabad: Shafi Khan, the provincial *diwan*, and Mir Qa'ma, the *diwan* of Machilipatnam, who was responsible for the financial administration of the coastal area.

Very soon thereafter the governor also demonstrated the reality of his power to Shafi Khan. One night a force appeared at the home of the *diwan* with a message that a letter had been received from the emperor. Instead of conducting Shafi Khan to the governor's palace, the governor's servants took him to a garden where they forced him to place his seal on an official document which

[1] Akh., I (16 Jumada I), p. 111. The new rank was 2500/1000/100 *do asp* (All Akh. references in this chapter refer to Bahadar Shah's reign unless otherwise noted.)

[2] Cf. in Athar Ali's copious lists of the Mughal nobility only two examples have been found of nobles who bore the titles of their father.

[3] K.A. 1653 (15.9.1708), fol. 315. Rustam Dil Khan also received inflated rank: 7000/7000.

[4] K.A. 1637 (9.9.1707), fols. 464–5.

certified that 700,000 rupees had been spent on salaries and other expenses for the imperial establishment in Hyderabad. The *diwan* had earlier refused to certify the same statement because he was not aware of any such expenditure. After obtaining what he wanted, Rustam Dil Khan released Shafi Khan and allowed him to resume his official duties.[1]

Obviously then, the provincial *diwan* and other officials of the financial office did not command sufficient military force immediately to check an ambitious governor aspiring to seize power. In the enforcement of regulations, they depended on support from the centre, which in this instance was not available. Yet the Mughal administrative system placed another more worrisome obstacle in the path of Rustam Dil Khan. In Hyderabad the commandant of Golconda fortress, holding a completely independent command, posed a serious and unpredictable threat to the governor's ambitions. Shortly after learning of Aurangzeb's demise, Rustam Dil Khan had already deployed his forces around the immense fortress and was considering ways to overrun and seize the stronghold.[2] Throughout the following year the governor kept continuous pressure, both military and economic, on the beset fort commander and his garrison. The economic squeeze must have begun well before this, for by 1709 the fort commander claimed arrears of two to three year's pay for himself and his troops amounting to 800,000 rupees.[3] However, during these years when no funds reached the garrison, Rustam Dil Khan had accumulated by diverse means a personal treasury of 3,300,000 gold *muhurs* as well as large numbers of precious stones.[4]

Finally in April 1708, just as Prince Kam Bakhsh paused at Gulbarga before his final march to Hyderabad, Rustam Dil Khan made a last attempt to usurp control of the fort in order to better his bargaining position with the prince. The commandant, however,

[1] KA, 1637 (9.9.1707), fol. 463. Popular report also had it that Shafi Khan was suspected of being ready to flee to Kam Bakhsh's camp or to the protection of Golconda fort. 700,000 rupees is precisely the amount that Rustam Dil Khan is reported to have paid the Marathas four years before when they surrounded Hyderabad. This embarrassing and irregular payment may have been the reason why Rustam Dil Khan wanted to obtain the *diwan*'s signature on a fraudulent voucher for salary payments. See above, Chapter IX.

[2] KA, 1637 (9.9.1707), fol. 466. A letter from Golconda dated 2[illegible] June 170[illegible].

[3] KA, [illegible] ([illegible].9.1708), fol. 328.

[4] Ibid., fol. 359. This is the amount of Rustam Dil Khan's treasury seized by Kam Bakhsh's officials.

stoutly resisted this move and retained full authority over the stronghold and its garrison.[1] Thus, despite harassments, serious as they were, the commandant continued to defy the governor and later Prince Kam Bakhsh. Unlike the other officers of the provincial administration, the commandant of Golconda fort was not immediately vulnerable. If he chose to resist, only a full-scale assault or long-drawn-out siege could overcome the great walls, the cannon, and the immense stores of supplies in the fort. A direct imperial commission provided him with the incentive to act independently. At the same time, of course, the fort commander's position was purely defensive. Only inside his charge did he remain invulnerable, and thus he could not challenge Rustam Dil Khan's activities in the remainder of the province. Consequently the commander of Golconda fort was a potential threat to the governor; but like the provincial *diwan*, he could only effectively control the governor if given some form of outside assistance. Characteristically for the Mughal system, the mechanisms of control required active support and intervention from the centre (i.e. the emperor).

At the same time that Rustam Dil Khan dealt vigorously with fellow officials obstructing his drive for untrammelled power, he also made important alliances with other non-official figures. In return for recognition of their spheres of power important chiefs agreed to support Rustam Dil Khan in his ambitions. Here, at least in an embryonic state, is the kind of political relationship between local lord and ruler which has characterized all Indian regional kingdoms. On the coast which the governor knew intimately he came to terms with the Vizianagram raja, Ananda Razu: 'Annumturaz is the most pow[erful] Rajah in these Parts and Lords it from [one] place to another whereto he is encouraged by [. . . .] from Rustumdel Cawn. . . .'[2]

By contrast, a variegated group of bandit leaders wielded formidable power around the capital. Accordingly Rustam Dil Khan's search for non-official alliances reached out to the bandit leaders, for he sent a mission to the most notorious, the ex-Mughal *faujdar*, Riza Khan. In response to this overture Riza Khan sent a large sum of money back to the capital and even put some of his

[1] K.A. 1653 (13.4.1708), fol. 159. It is not apparent from the report what means Rustam Dil Khan used in this attempt.

[2] *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 14 June 1707, p. 2.

men at the governor's disposal.[1] Later, Riza Khan and other bandit leaders sent forces into Hyderabad to support Rustam Dil Khan in his confrontation with Prince Kam Bakhsh. Rustam Dil Khan's deference to the power of these bandits suggests that, in Telengana at least, other groups, bandits as well as Muslims, were gradually pushing aside the Telugu warrior castes who had traditionally dominated the countryside.[2]

The Hyderabad governor also seems to have retained his links with at least one Maratha leader. 'Koesmalaar', named by Dutch observers as one of the 'bandits' (*rovers*) who supported Rustam Dil Khan with troops, was probably the Maratha leader Krishna Malhar. The latter was operating in the eastern Deccan at this time.[3] This identification is likely, but not as yet definite. That Rustam Dil Khan, in view of his earlier dealings with the Marathas, should call upon them for assistance is not at all surprising.

In the end, all of Rustam Dil Khan's precautions proved futile. Neither local alliances, newly recruited troops, nor a harshly extorted fortune could save him. Indeed, all these manoeuvrings eliminated any possibility of a reconciliation with Prince Kam Bakhsh who, trying desperately to save himself, could scarcely tolerate such an over-mighty official. Moreover, in the year 1708, armed resistance to a Mughal prince, even in a succession dispute, was nothing to be engaged in by a prudent *mansabdar*, no matter how ambitious or powerful. In ten years such defiance became

[1] K.A. 1637 (9.9.1707), fol. 466.

[2] Siddi Balal, mentioned in the Mughal newsletters as the *zamindar* of Bhongir and also of Medak, was presumably a Muslim of Abyssinian descent. Akh II (11 Ramazan), 143; Akh. V pt. II, p. 504. Cf. below for the career of Pap Rai as an extended example of this phenomenon.

[3] See Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, V. 202, for mention of Krishna Malhar and his factional affiliation with Dhana, one of the greatest Maratha generals. According to Maratha records, Krishna Rao Malhar had taken 800,000 rupees *chauth* from the province of Hyderabad in 1709. *Selections from the Peshwa's Daftar* (Bombay, 1933), VII, no. 4, pp. 794–5. See also Satish Chandra, 'Maratha Activities in the Deccan 1707–1712', *Medieval India Quarterly*, IV (1961), 36–43. 'Keshu Malhar' is also mentioned in two later Mughal newsletters in connection with plundering forays on the outskirts of the capital and in Medak district. Akh., vol. V (27 Jumada II), p. 211; Akh. V, pt. II (28 Shaban), 391. The assumption that 'Koesmalaar' was a Maratha leader, and not a bandit rests on an identification of Koes/malaar with Krishna Rao/Malhar and with Keshu/Malhar. Since the first and last represent corruptions into Dutch and Persian respectively, this is not at all unlikely. It is also possible that Coltoe/malaar, the celebrated bandit (*befaurmden rover*) operating nearby, also belonged to the same family, given the coincidence of the second name. K.A. 1653 (13.4.1708), fol. 158.

common, but in 1708 the customs, traditions, and weight of the empire were still too oppressive to allow an attack on a member of the Timurid line. Therefore, Rustam Dil Khan, on learning of Kam Bakhsh's march to Hyderabad, first sent a deferential message. The deputy governor offered a payment of tribute (*peshkash*) and the hand of his daughter for Kam Bakhsh's son. In return he asked for confirmation as governor of Hyderabad.[1] On receipt of a favourable reply from the prince, Rustam Dil Khan rode out of Hyderabad to make formal personal submission.[2] Thus, after Kam Bakhsh crowned himself king of Golconda, Rustam Dil Khan, newly titled, with a greatly increased rank, continued to administer the province as governor.[3]

At first Rustam Dil Khan felt enough confidence in his new master to transport his family and treasure from the fortress of Welikonda (modern Veligonda, 35 miles from Hyderabad) back to the governor's residence in the capital. But tension rose rapidly when the financially pressed Kam Bakhsh tried to confiscate Rustam Dil Khan's treasury. The governor opposed this both with his own forces and with troops sent by the bandit and Maratha leaders. The coalition forces even converted a temple within the city to a stronghold as the two sides confronted one another.[4]

The prince, learning that the royal treasury at Machilipatnam contained 3,200,000 rupees, sent a party of 500 horsemen to seize the money. Forewarned by secret orders from Rustam Dil Khan at the capital, and heartened by a *farman* granting a substantial promotion from the emperor, the *diwan* of Machilipatnam defied Kam Bakhsh and kept the prince's troops out of the city.[5] Finally, towards the end of the year, another larger force took possession of Machilipatnam and its treasury for Kam Bakhsh.[6]

After several months of conflict, Kam Bakhsh arrested Rustam Dil Khan on a contrived charge of treason and executed him in

[1] Akh. I (14 Shawal), 363. There is no evidence that the marriage took place.
[2] Irvine, I. 52; Khafi Khan, II. 608.
[3] K.A. 1653 (15.9.1709), fol. 315. [4] Ibid., fol. 327.
[5] K.A. 1653 (13.4.1708), fol. 113. Mir Qa'ma, the *diwan* received a *farman* from Bahadur Shah which appointed him *faujdar* or *sar-lashkar* of Eluru, Rajmundry, and Machilipatnam districts.
[6] K.A. 1645 (28.11.1708), I, fol. 84, on the final seizure of the town. K.A. 1653 (15.9.1708), fol. 329, on the sending of the original force. Irvine, I. 58–9, gives details of the numbers of troops and Rustam Dil Khan's orders to Mir Qa'ma. See also K.A. 1653 (Aug. 1708), fol. 498, for a memoir which mentions Mir Qa'ma's allegiance to Bahadur Shah.

September 1708. Immediately afterward the prince's officials seized the dead man's treasure and imprisoned his family.[1]

Removal of Rustam Dil Khan from the scene did not, by any means, eliminate all centres of resistance to Prince Kam Bakhsh—especially since support from the emperor had become a distinct possibility. With every passing day more *farmans* from Bahadur Shah reached officials in Hyderabad, and every day the emperor came closer to the capital in his march south. The commander of Golconda fort, for example, who had earlier demanded payment of the arrears for himself and his men from Kam Bakhsh, continued to refuse access to the prince when Kam Bakhsh only offered 300,000 of the full 800,000 rupees demanded.[2] A *farman* from Bahadur Shah further strengthened the commander's determination to hold out until the emperor arrived.[3] Once given encouragement from the imperial centre, officials such as the *diwan* of Machilipatnam resisted Kam Bakhsh more vigorously than they had Rustam Dil Khan. As a result, the prince never fully commanded the administrative machinery of the province, nor could he effectively mobilize the resources of Hyderabad in his fight for survival.

Political tensions generated by this uneasy two-year period disturbed every corner of the province. *Zamindars* on the coast took advantage of the distractions of the Mughals to plunder villages, to withhold tax or tribute payments, to war among themselves, or to unite in an assault on local Mughal officials.[4] Warangal and Bhongir, both thriving commercial centres in the interior, suffered disastrous attacks by bandit forces. (See the account of Pap Rai, the bandit chief, below.) Throughout the province imperial authority was compromised.[5]

[1] K.A. 1653 (15.9.1708), fols. 359, 334.

[2] K.A. 1653 (15.9.1798), fol. 328. [3] Irvine, I. 52.

[4] Four villages near Machilipatnam burned by Koldinder Ranga Razu's brother (K.A. 1637 (31.3.1707), fols. 32–3); rajas refusing to pay taxes (*RFSG: Letters to FSG*, June 1707, p. 11); revolt of the *zamindars* along the coast who had also united with some powerful individuals inland (K.A. 1645 (29.11.1708), fol. 84 V.); the defeat in a pitched battle of a Mughal *faujdar* and his forced departure from the district (Condaved, 61); Harassment of the Dutch factory at Pallakally by Koldinder Ranga Razu (K.A. 1653 (13.4.1708), fol. 124).

[5] By the end of 1707 Dutch merchants in Hyderabad dolefully concluded that the continued unsuppressed revolt of the hereditary Telugu police officials (*muniwars*) and tax intermediaries (*landpagters*, i.e. *deshmukhs*) meant that throughout the province their trade privileges granted by the Mughals could no longer be protected. Furthermore, although the Dutch did not articulate this,

In the capital the rapacity of Rustam Dil Khan and the desperation of Prince Kam Bakhsh greatly unsettled the populace, perhaps as much as the great Maratha raids a few years before. 'Everyone, great and small', had greatly feared the extortions of Rustam Dil Khan, but Kam Bakhsh far exceeded the governor in his capricious cruelties and frantic measures to raise funds.[1] The ordinary citizens of the capital reacted strongly when Kam Bakhsh's *diwan* arbitrarily retaxed at the original rate all goods for sale in the shops. He also reimposed the *jizya* on all non-Muslims. In protest, the shopkeepers, most of whom were Hindus, closed their shops in a combined strike.[2]

Predictably, the Prince's primary target was the large merchant community in Hyderabad. Despite the troubles of the past twenty years, the capital had not yet lost its role as a major financial and commercial centre. The continued presence of Muslim official establishments (if not of the same lavishness as the royal courts of the former kingdoms) did ensure that a substantial market remained for luxury goods.[3] After initial resistance, the principal merchants of the city grouped together to meet the prince's demands—each paying a share of a forced loan totalling 300,000 rupees.[4]

In summary, then, the latter phase of the war of succession in and around Hyderabad had a considerable impact on the province: the system of alliances, compromises, and personal power built up over two decades by Jan Sipar Khan and Rustam Dil Khan disappeared with the latter's execution. The strange possibility that Hyderabad would once more become a royal seat with Kam Bakhsh ruling a revived Kingdom of Golconda, tributary to his brother, also vanished—victim to the remorseless nature of

the obvious course of action for merchants in such a situation would be to come to terms with whoever could provide such protection (K.A. 1637 (11.10.1707), fols. 122–3).

[1] K.A. 1637 (11.10.1707), fol. 465.

[2] K.A. 1653 (15.9.1708), fols. 330–1. This is one of the few recorded instances when the imposition of the *jizyat* was almost certainly for purely fiscal reasons and hence of considerable interest.

[3] The British merchants at Madras regarded Hyderabad along with Bijapur as their principal import markets: 'Goods we import . . . are Generally carryed to the Capital Citys of Golcondah and Visapour . . .' (*RFSG: Diary*, 13 Aug. 1708, p. 45).

[4] K.A. 1645 (8.10.1708), fols. 88–9. This is the same figure which Kam Bakhsh offered to the commandant of Golconda fort: see above.

Mughal succession disputes. And so in 1709 an unpredictable political situation awaited the new governor of Hyderabad.

DISSOLUTION OF MUGHAL POWER: 1709–1711

Before leaving Hyderabad, the victorious emperor appointed Yusuf Khan, an Afghan *mansabdar* then serving as fort commander and *faujdar* of Kurnool, to the governorship of the province.[1] Kurnool, although administered as part of the Bijapur Karnatik, is located just below the Krishna river, approximately 100 miles south of Hyderabad city. Apparently, local experience counted heavily in the emperor's selection. Popular opinion in the province seems to have inclined favourably to the choice, for 'the [new] Suba [Governor] of Golcondah ... has the Caracter in all these parts of a very wise and just man who doubtless will restore that ancient City to its former greatness and luster. ...'[2]


But by 1709 restoration of the 'former greatness and luster' of Hyderabad and restoration of Mughal authority over the entire province were formidable tasks to set before any governor, no matter how able. This endeavour, requiring constant and vigorous support from the emperor, involved a slow and costly series of military campaigns against all the local chiefs who had defied imperial authority during the war of succession. Especially serious was the fact that even the core area of the province, usually far more stable than the outer districts, was in turmoil. The new governor's activities were determined by the need to attend to this vital area first.

The first fifteen months of Yusuf Khan's governorship saw a major campaign against Pap Rai, the bandit chieftain, whose headquarters at Shahpur were not more than fifty miles from the capital. During Bahadur Shah's stay in Hyderabad Pap Rai had won recognition and legitimation of his power at a personal audience in which the emperor bestowed a robe of honour on him. In return for acceptance as a *zamindar* within the imperial system, the chieftain made a large tribute payment (reportedly 1,400,000 rupees). He also supplied quantities of provisions for the imperial army as well.[3]

[1] Akh., II (12 Zelqada), p. 201

[2] *RFSG: Diary*, 24 June 1709, p. 55.

[3] K A 1670 (7.5.1709), fol. 41. The name Sarvapapra appears in the text. This is apparently a garbling of the name of Pap Rai and his colleague Sarva. Bahadur Shah left Hyderabad on 1 February 1709 (Irvine, I. 67).



MAP 6. The Domain of Pap Rai, c. A.D. 1708

This accommodation with Pap Rai met strong opposition from members of the local Hindu aristocracy and Muslim gentry of Bhongir and Warangal districts who, in effect, forced its reversal.

Continued pressure from these groups, moreover, eventually brought about the outlaw's destruction. To understand the fierce enmities aroused by Pap Rai one must comprehend the manner in which he violated the most jealously protected areas of status, caste, and religion. Simultaneously he threatened the stability of the social and political system of that area.

Born the son of a toddy seller, Pap Rai obtained the first working capital for a violent career by torturing his wealthy widowed sister for her money.[1] Then, attracting a group of followers, he erected a small hill-fortress and began to prey on nearby peasants and passing travellers. Before the local *faujdar* and the *zamindars* could act to restore the peace of the countryside, however, Pap Rai fled to Elgandel district where he took service as a petty military officer with Venkat Rao, the *zamindar* of Kaulas (*sic*—probably Paulas). In this new role he found an opportunity to fleece the subjects of his new master until Venkat Rao discovered it and threw Pap Rai into prison.

Freed accidentally (an amnesty granted for purposes of religious propitiation), Pap Rai moved on to Bhongir district where, in conjunction with another desperate character named Sarva, he found that the times were propitious for banditry. At the town of Shahpur, he erected a strong stone fortress from which he rode out to devastate the countryside and (according to the Mughal chronicler) to kidnap wealthy and beautiful women wherever they might be found. Outraged cries from the merchants and other wealthy groups led to direct orders from Aurangzeb to Rustam Dil Khan, then governor of the province, to punish the miscreant. Yet, as described above, repeated efforts by Rustam Dil Khan to capture Pap Rai failed.[2]

The high point of Pap Rai's violent career came in early 1708 during the war of succession. In March, while Prince Kam Bakhsh and Rustam Dil Khan confronted one another outside the walls of Hyderabad (just two to three weeks before the Prince entered the city), a real prize fell into the ruthless hands of Pap Rai's forces. The populace of the old Kakatiya capital of Warangal, now a rich commercial centre famous for its carpets, was at that season

[1] The following account of Pap Rai is taken from Khafi Khan, II. 630–43. *Pap* means 'sin' or 'evil' in Hindu and Urdu, but this does not seem to have been the origin of Pap Rai. *Papum* in Telugu is the word for sin, not *Pap*.

[2] Riza Khan also supplied troops to the governor for the expeditions against Pap Rai. Cf K.A. 1637 (9.9.1707), fol. 466.

busily engaged in the celebration of Muharram. Suddenly the inhabitants of the town awoke one holiday night to find the fort captured by invaders and a sack and massacre in progress. Throughout that night and the next day an estimated 12,000 to 15,000 persons lost their lives, while those who survived—especially the local gentry—had little honour or wealth left. Between 2,000 and 3,000 foot-soldiers and 400 and 500 horsemen had mustered under the bandit chief's banner for the assault on Warangal. Two months later the same force failed in a similar assault on Bhongir fort, located only twenty-eight miles from Hyderabad, but Pap Rai's army looted the large town at the foot of the hill-fort and carried off 2,000 to 3,000 prisoners. Enriched by these victories, Pap Rai (in order to better his defensive position) constructed a new stronghold within sight of his older bandit's roost at Shahpur on another hill called Tarikonda.

Unfortunately for his future, however, Pap Rai's behaviour during these attacks outraged the leading members of the Muslim community: the officials and *ulema* who made up the urban gentry of the region. In particular the abduction (among others) of the wife and eight-year-old daughter of the *qazi* of Warangal, the town's leading Muslim resident, opened a great reservoir of bitter class and religious feeling. That a *kafir* (infidel) brigand, and a low-caste Hindu at that, could place the wife of a *qazi* in his harem and enrol the daughter in a troupe of dancers, brought an indignant reaction which superseded the fear to be expected after such ruthless massacres. Reportedly, Pap Rai also offered graduated rewards to his soldiers who brought in captured Muslim girls (five rupees for girls of ordinary families and five *hun*, i.e. fifteen rupees, for those from the families of Shaikhs).

Thus, when the father-in-law of the afflicted *qazi* of Warangal led a deputation of prominent members of the *ulema* to complain in person to Bahadur Shah, the cry was not for protection, but for vengeance. The king himself should ride against this despoiler of Muslim honour. While Bahadur Shah temporized, the bereaved *qazi* retired to his house, divided his possessions among his servants, and, after forty days, died of grief and shame. Bowing to the occasion, the emperor then ordered Yusuf Khan to assemble a large force. The governor was to proceed against the man who just a short time before had been honoured as a tributary chief at a royal audience.

At this point frantic pleas for assistance reached the governor from Bhongir district. The *zamindar* of Kilpak, a town adjacent to Shahpur, was fighting for his life against Pap Rai who was besieging the town. A relief force sent by Yusuf Khan drove off Pap Rai's forces, and pursued them back to Shahpur. Then the Mughal forces, assisted by a group of prisoners held in the bandit's fort, seized the stronghold. Pap Rai then retreated to Tarikonda fort with the remainder of his followers.[1]

With the quarry run to ground the governor wasted no time in sending his *diwan*, Mirza Ali, to Tarikonda to begin siege operations. After several months the governor himself, leading another large army, arrived to take charge of the siege.[2] He also mobilized 10,000 to 12,000 cavalry and 20,000 foot-soldiers under the command of the fort commanders and *zamindars* of the vicinity. Despite this great army, armed with all the appurtenances of Mughal siege operations, the fort's defences were not broken. At last Yusuf Khan offered employment at double pay and allowances to any of the bandits who would desert the fort. Since, after a nine-month investment, supplies had begun to run low, many of the defenders chose to cross over the siege lines to take up the governor's offer.

Pap Rai, too, deserted his followers and escaped alone and in secret from the fort. At Hasanabad, ten miles distant, a toddy seller, recognizing his infamous customer, betrayed him to the Mughal deputy *faujdar* of the area.[3] Following a speedy and brutal execution, Yusuf Khan paraded the grisly remains of the once feared outlaw through the streets of Hyderabad before sending his severed head to the imperial court.[4] One measure of the empire-wide notoriety which Pap Rai had attained may be seen in the rewards which Bahadur Shah lavished on Yusuf Khan for his success. These included a robe of honour, an honorific head-dress, and an increase of 500 in his personal (*zat*) rank.[5]

[1] Akh., III (18 Jumada I), p. 103; Khafi Khan, II. 640.

[2] Khafi Khan, II. 642; Akh., IV (23 Muharram), p. 32. According to the newsletter, this occurred in March 1710.

[3] Khafi Khan, II. 642–3. The Mughal news-report, however, simply states that Yusuf Khan conquered the fort and imprisoned Pap Rai (Akh., IV (11 Rabi II), p. 96).

[4] Akh., IV (1 Jumada II), p. 158; Akh., IV (20 Rajab), p. 263; Khafi Khan, II. 643.

[5] Akh., IV (11 Rabi II), p. 96.

The detailed narrative of Pap Rai's rise and fall provided by Khafi Khan is the only descriptive account available to us of conditions in interior Hyderabad (i.e. Telengana) during the first years of the eighteenth century.[1] The impression conveyed by this account is of a formerly stable, still prosperous society, now subject to strain by a number of political changes. Prior to the turn of the century dominant Muslim and Hindu groups had arrived at a *rapprochement* which gave an attractive stability to the society of the area. On the one hand, an influential and sizeable Muslim gentry (*ulema*, officials, merchants) dominated the vigorous life of the towns. An equally influential Telugu warrior aristocracy through social status, military power, and hereditary local offices (*deshmukhs*, *muniwars*) controlled the rural population and disposed of most of the surplus agricultural production of the area. Scattered Mughal officials (town governors, fort commanders, and *faujdars*) in charge of military contingents both restrained and supported the indigenous ruling groups.[2]

But by 1700 Pap Rai and others like him had emerged to threaten the established order. Pap Rai, clearly a parvenu of low caste, was unacceptable to either Hindu aristocrats or Muslim gentry. Moreover, the outlaw's notorious cruelties and complete disregard for customary behaviour reinforced the distrust and fear of the ruling groups. Prior to the attack on Bhongir, for example, Pap Rai summoned a group of *banjaras* (itinerant carriers of bulk provisions by means of pack bullocks) in order to purchase grain for his army. Traditionally the *banjaras*, moving slowly through the Deccan with their great herds of bullocks, enjoyed complete immunity from attack. The contending armies who depended on them for supplies always treated them with great circumspection. However, instead of buying their grain, Pap Rai, in a ruthless violation of customary practice, seized it, threw the *banjaras* into prison, and put the 10,000-odd pack bullocks to ploughing or other agricultural labour in the lands now controlled by him.

Pap Rai's ambitions too were far greater than those of a mere predatory robber chief who, after marauding on the high roads, returns to his hidden mud fort. Around the stronghold at Shahpur a power base began forming which soon encompassed other forts,

[1] In fact any detailed narrative of the events of the years 1672–1724 is non-existent for the entire region.

[2] Before 1687 the officials were, of course, Golconda officers.

such as Tarikonda, as well as newly populated towns and areas of agricultural colonization and development.[1] In order to attract followers, both soldiers and peasants, it is very likely that Pap Rai had to offer substantial economic inducements. These would attract many discontented, dispossessed, and poverty-stricken men.[2] Moreover, expansion of this power base inevitably involved pressure on and eventual displacement of nearby *zamindars*, such as the *zamindar* of Kilpak (or to use the Golconda term, *nayaks*).

Whether any pro-Hindu or anti-Muslim religious appeal, open or even tacit, drew followers to Pap Rai is at this time open to question. That he affronted the sensibilities of the local Muslim community (or at least its most influential members) is clearly revealed in the chronicler's portrayal of him as a cruel, lustful infidel, who delighted in dishonouring and massacring Muslims. Therefore, we may assume that the Muslims of Hyderabad viewed Pap Rai as a religious, as well as a political, danger and that general reaction to him had a religious colouring.

The empire-wide notoriety achieved by Pap Rai rested, in addition, on far more than his own exploits, dramatic and disturbing as they may have been to local Muslims. As the empire began to have difficulties in Bahadur Shah's reign, upper-class Muslims began to feel more and more vulnerable. Shortly after the assaults of Pap Rai against Warangal and Bhongir in the south, a group of Sikhs under the fierce leadership of Banda engaged in a ferocious and avowedly religious war in the Panjab. In the course of this conflict several populous towns, largely inhabited by Muslims, were destroyed.[3] Steady Maratha raids and victories also badly shook Muslim confidence throughout the empire.

It is questionable that, for his part, Pap Rai developed any articulated ideology beyond the economic and socio-political appeal inherent in his activities. Indeed, in the earlier part of his career, the practice of abducting well-born women had been impartially directed against both Hindus and Muslims. Khafi Khan mentions that 'a group of merchants and nobles of every community (*har*

[1] Cf. the reference to his populating the town of Hassnabad, Khafi Khan, II. 643.

[2] As there is no mention of slave labour in the sources and there is little evidence for an ideological appeal, the economic motive would seem to be a safe choice.

[3] Cf. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, 2 vols. (Princeton, N.J., 1963–6), I. 102–8.

gaum) went to His Majesty to complain' about this affront to their honour.[1] The narrative suggests that later, however, the target did shift to Muslim women exclusively; but it is impossible to verify this shift without other sources. In summary then, the ideological element in this conflict seems to have come from the Muslims who viewed the infidel Pap Rai as one of the manifold threats to their lives and honour in existence at this time; whereas Pap Rai's followers were clearly not motivated by the religious passion of a sect like the Sikhs.

Confirmation of this analysis comes from the position of the Hindu *nayaks* of the region who joined the Muslim gentry in looking to the Mughal provincial government for assistance. Indeed, when Yusuf Khan required military aid during the last phase of the siege of Tarikonda, the local *nayaks* sent thousands of men to serve under him. An alliance between imperial administration and *zamindars* (i.e. *nayaks*), based on a mutual interest in stability and order, is seldom considered an important feature of the Mughal system.[2] Perhaps too much attention has been paid to the tension between the administration and the local aristocracy, and not enough to the possible congruence of interest between the two—especially when long-established *zamindari* houses were threatened by new and aggressive elements in the local society.

In the aftermath of his well-publicized victory Yusuf Khan returned to the direction of a series of similar campaigns against other local chiefs. Apparently, all were successful and all followed the same pattern: the resistance offered was slight and in each captured fort the governor established a *thana* or police post.[3] Renewed Maratha incursions, which by November 1710 were manifested in large numbers of Maratha troopers plundering near

[1] Khafi Khan, II. 632.

[2] Cf. Habib, p. 335. 'The struggle between the imperial administration and the *zamindars*, breaking out frequently into armed conflict, was an important feature of the political situation of the time.'

[3] In June 1710 Yusuf Khan sent an army to seize Kohunkhera fort, the possession of Kohungai the malefactor (Akh. IV (7 Jumada I), 117). In October of the same year the governor marched to the fort of Koyenpanah where the *zamindar* fled at his approach. The governor then established his *thana* at the fort and confiscated two cannon, swivel pieces, lead, and gun-powder (Akh IV (4 Ramazan), 345). The next year (1711) in March Muhammad Ali, the governor's secretary, besieged Malankur fort with a force of 3,000 cavalry. After its capture, a *thana* was established there (Akh. V, pt. I (10 Safar), 103).

the capital, met firm resistance from Yusuf Khan, who sent a cavalry force of 2,000 to drive them off.[1]

Despite modest military successes which outwardly restored Mughal authority in the interior of Hyderabad, Yusuf Khan failed to meet the crucial fiscal test for the success of any government. During his governorship the provincial administration of Hyderabad could not mobilize the rich resources of the province either for its own sustenance or for the use of the central government. Apparently the governor's victories did not bring in sufficient funds to help him pay his army. For example, profit and loss accounting of the lengthy campaign against Pap Rai would probably reveal that Yusuf Khan's military expenses were far greater than the amount of treasure seized, if any, after the capture of Tarikonda fort; for the Mughal newsletters mention only one early shipment of treasure from Hyderabad to the court in the years 1709–11.[2]

Moreover, by the end of 1710 Yusuf Khan could not command sufficient funds to pay the salaries of his personal followers. Under these circumstances the general financial condition of the provincial administration at the capital must have been equally bleak. Finally, in desperation, the governor paid his soldiers with bills of exchange (*hundis*) drawn on subordinate Mughal officials in the districts. But they could not fully honour the bills, and the salaries of the governor's troops remained in arrears until his death the following year.[3]

Nor was this a situation where local Mughal officials, looking to their own self-interest, simply did not forward tax receipts to the provincial capital, for some found that they had the same fiscal problems as the governor. One *mansabdar*, a commander of 2,000 cavalry, came to Machilipatnam in order to raise Rs. 40,000 with which to pay salary arrears of five months for his soldiers. Refused a loan and pressed by his men, the officer then attacked

[1] Akh. IV (13 Jumada II), 185. Satish Chandra has noted that 'Maratha activities in the Deccan began to be revived on an organized scale in 1710 after the return of Bahadur Shah' (Chandra, 'Maratha Activities', p. 43). British letters from Machilipatnam reported 'that there are great troubles near Golcondoh occasioned by the Morattas' (*RFSG: Diary*, 1711, p. 120).

[2] Akh., III (29 Rajab), p. 174. Of course, one could also argue that this silence of the sources is not conclusive and that Yusuf Khan may have impoverished himself by continuing to send funds to the centre throughout his governorship. On the whole this seems less likely than the interpretation adopted, given the immense pressures on Yusuf Khan for payment of his soldiers.

[3] K.A. 1695 (10.7.1711), fol. 80.

the residence of the ex-*faujdar* of the district on a claim that Rs. 14,000 was owed him for a previous debt.[1] Clearly, all sources of revenue (whether taxes collected locally or funds from the provincial treasury) had dried up for this *mansabdar*.

The traditional tax-tribute structure of the Hyderabad countryside, which had continued to function through the earlier part of the Mughal administration, had virtually collapsed by the end of Yusuf Khan's governorship. Somehow the linkage between the local *deshmukhs*, traditional and hereditary collectors of taxes, and the provincial treasury at the capital had snapped. A steady and reliable flow of resources to Hyderabad obviously no longer took place. By 1709 most of the *zamindars* of the province were reportedly three to four years in arrears on their tax and tribute payments.[2]

The seriousness of Hyderabad's fiscal crisis suggests that most of the individuals who normally paid tax or tribute in the province—*zamindars*, rajas, *deshmukhs*, and village headmen—had suddenly become cautious after the troubles of the past decade. By 1711 they only paid their revenue obligations under pressure. In other words, Mughal government in Hyderabad was suffering a crisis of confidence. Centuries-old habits made tax- or tribute-paying groups in the region reluctant to meet any demands of a failing regime—especially since this might be followed by equal or larger demands from a newer and stronger government.

Indeed, the phenomenon was empire-wide, for the decline in Hyderabad's finances coincides with similar bankruptcy in the central treasury. By the end of Bahadur Shah's reign only daily transfers of funds from Prince Azimush Shan's Bengal treasury kept the emperor's household solvent.[3] Yusuf Khan was accordingly deprived of any possibility of fiscal relief from the centre. At the same time, the Hyderabad governor did not possess the comfortable hoard (or the alliances with local groups) carefully built up by his dead predecessor, Rustam Dil Khan. Thus, if we consider Yusuf Khan's predicament, it is difficult to see how he could have achieved more. He fought a holding action to sustain minimal imperial authority in the central districts of Hyderabad *suba*. To be effective in Hyderabad immediately after the 1707–9

[1] K.A. 1670 (30.5.1709), fol. 165.
[2] K.A. 1670 (13.9.1709), Part II, fol. 83.
[3] Cf. Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, pp. 58–60.

war of succession, a governor needed far greater resources (men and money) and political and military abilities than Yusuf Khan seems to have possessed. He also needed more time. Conceivably, Yusuf Khan might have continued precariously to balance his finances, and might have built upon his military victories to restore Mughal credibility. But after only two and a half years in office his governorship ended, in May 1711, with his death by natural causes.[1]

DISSOLUTION OF MUGHAL POWER: 1711–1713

On receipt of the news of Yusuf Khan's death, Bahadur Shah named Rustam Khan as a replacement; but the new appointee died *en route* to Hyderabad.[2] Eventually, in January 1712, Ibrahim Khan, acting as deputy for his brother Daud Khan Panni, *subadar* of the six provinces of the Deccan, arrived at Hyderabad to take over the governorship of the province.[3] Thus, as a result of Rustam Khan's unexpected death, the governorship of Hyderabad remained vacant for a full seven months between May 1711 and January 1712. During this hiatus Mirza Ali, who had served as provincial *diwan* under Yusuf Khan, tried to assume full executive responsibility at the capital. Even though in better days such an interim arrangement would have caused no great difficulty, lack of strong leadership now was disastrous. The administration of Hyderabad, already badly deteriorated, became completely fragmented. Little remained to be salvaged by Ibrahim Khan when he assumed office.

One immediate result of Yusuf Khan's death was an onslaught from bandit and Maratha forces on the capital and on the inland districts. Krishna Malhar began looting and devastating the area on the outskirts of Hyderabad city. Siddi Balal, a Muslim *zamindar* from Medak district, gathered his followers and attacked the marauder.[4] By the end of 1711 Maratha bands had put the Mughals

[1] Akh., V, pt. I (15 Jumada I), p. 195; *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 7 May 1711, p. 45; K.A. 1695 (10.7.1711), fol. 80.

[2] Akh., V, pt. I (25 Jumada I), p. 208; Akh., V, pt. II (10 Ramazan), p. 405; *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 12 Sept. 1711, p. 109.

[3] Akh., V, pt. II (19 Zelqada), p. 511; *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 9 Jan 1711; K.A. 1720 (27.5.1712), fols. 84–6.

[4] Akh., V (27 Jumada II), p. 211. A few months later Siddi Balal received the title of 'Khan' from the emperor in return for his services (Akh. V, pt II (15 Zelqada), p. 504). The next month (September) Krishna Malhar was still plundering in Medak district (Akh., V, pt. II (28 Shaban), p. 391).

on the defensive throughout much of Hyderabad. Somna and other Maratha chiefs had beseiged Kurnool, Pangal, and two other forts. The fort commanders were still fighting and had retained possession of their charges.[1] To the north Shahpur fort was also under attack and another fort had been taken by one Sardar Khichi. Everywhere the Marathas and the outlaw leaders set up their *thanas* and harassed the royal territories.[2]

At a time when the isolated Mughal *faujdars* and fort commanders in the countryside so badly needed assistance, Yusuf Khan's army at the capital was incapacitated by a mutiny. Rather than march against the Marathas, Mirza Ali, the *diwan*, and Muhammad Ali, the governor's secretary, were forced to placate the dangerously aggrieved soldiers, unpaid for over a year. The angry soldiers held up their dead master's funeral for two hours until his widow persuaded them to allow the proceedings to continue.[3] Later, when the royal accountants came to confiscate Yusuf Khan's property (the usual procedure for settling outstanding accounts with the royal treasury), the soldiers again broke into the proceedings. They forced the secretary to distribute the goods in partial satisfaction of their salary claims.[4] Thereafter, the claims of the soldiers forced Mirza Ali and Muhammad Ali into expeditions against various *zamindars* in which the object was not really tax-collection but *ad hoc* pillaging of the countryside.[5]

The complete insolvency of the provincial government converted heretofore respectable Mughal officials into brigands plundering the countryside. The most noteworthy example of this phenomenon was the fate of Muhammad Ayar Mirza Bek, *faujdar* of the southern coastal districts (and son-in-law of Mirza Ali, the provincial *diwan*).[6] A vigorous and loyal officer Ayar Bek

[1] Akh., V, pt. II (13 Zelqada), pp. 505–5. Kurnool was just over the border in the Bijapur Karnatik.

[2] Akh., V, pt. II (13 Zelqada), pp. 505–6.

[3] K.A. 1695 (10.7.1711), fol. 80.

[4] Akh., V, pt. II (23 Jumada I), p. 251.

[5] Mirza Ali led one such plundering venture against Narayan Reddi, the Raja of Conda Sima. A clash with the raja resulted in a dozen deaths on each side (K.A. 1703 (29.9.1711), fol. 708). Mirza Ali also planned to send a combined force of Mughal soldiers and Riza Khan's followers to attack Koldinder Ranga Razu of Mogulturru (K.A. 1695 (14.9.1711), fol. 229).

[6] According to the Dutch merchants he administered Machilipatnam, Nizampatnam, Kondapalli, Kondavidu, and Khammamett districts (K.A. 1703 (29.9.1711), fol. 29).

had pressed the coastal rajas hard during Yusuf Khan's governorship. In March 1711, two months before Yusuf Khan's death, Ayar Bek's forces surrounded three of the most powerful *zamindars* (Koldinder Ranga Razu of Mogulturru, Tami Razu of Peddapuram, and Appa Rao of Nuzivd) in Eluru fort and killed a number of the *zamindar* forces.[1] By the end of April Ayar Bek had forcibly extracted 25,000 rupees and an agreement to pay 875,000 rupees in tax arrears from Koldinder Ranga Razu. Payment from Koldinder Ranga Razu would have enabled the *faujdar* to meet his soldier's salary claims which were a year in arrears.

After the death of Yusuf Khan, however, Koldinder Ranga Razu repudiated the agreement and retired to Mogulturru fort claiming that he could not recognize Ayar Bek's authority as *faujdar* until a new governor confirmed his position. With the ground thus cut from beneath him by this challenge to his authority, Ayar Bek could not control his soldiers. They were well aware that their pay rested on the promised payment from Ranga Razu. The troops also knew that another lengthy blockade (this time of Mogulturru fort) would be necessary to coerce any further payments from the raja. Ayar Bek's soldiers then mutinied, seized their commander, and indiscriminately attacked Ranga Razu's territories. They 'robbed all his Governments burning Towns killing many people, much people leapt into [the] river. Men women and children there perisht.'[2]

Ayar Bek's desperate army, with its commander as prisoner, continued to scourge the countryside in the ensuing months. The port at Machilipatnam, the richest target on the coast, prepared for an inevitable assault. Various merchant groups in the town, Muslim, Hindu, and European, organized and financed a joint defence effort—spurred by a warning letter from Ayar Bek. The helpless commander, whose wife, steward, and personal priest (*pir*), and the remainder of his household lived in the town, tried to divert the soldiers from Machilipatnam. But after alternatively threatening and starving him, they sent the distraught officer into the town to raise a 500,000-rupee loan. In his absence the soldiery looted and burnt approximately twenty nearby villages and tortured the unfortunate villagers for their money. When Ayar Bek

[1] The report from Thomas Faucett in Ingeram also noticed that the *faujdar* was enlisting more horsemen (*RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 7 Mar. 1711, p. 24).

[2] Ibid., 7 May 1711, p. 46, K.A. 1720 (15.9.1712), fol. 211.

returned with empty hands, the soldiers then forced him to lead an attack on the town. In the course of the assault a Dutch cannon shot killed Ayar Bek and two of his followers. The immediate threat to Machilipatnam disappeared in the confusion that followed. Rasul Khan, the second-in-command, was able to scatter the troops and end the attack.[1]

The story of Ayar Bek reveals that, at least in the coastal districts, the demise of the provincial governor shattered the already fragile structure of Mughal power and authority. In Andhra several local *deshmukhs* had risen to dominate the region in the aftermath of the Mughal conquest. The inattentiveness of the central government during the years just prior to Aurangzeb's death and the war of succession added considerably to the power of figures like Koldinder Ranga Razu. But since 1709 Ayar Bek had begun to redress the balance in the southern coastal districts by enforcing payment of long-unpaid taxes or tribute. Although Ayar Bek was not strong enough to destroy the most powerful rajas, he could, however, by persistent campaigning, convince them that in the long run it was better to settle the Mughal claims at least partially. On their part, the *zamindars* paid for a mixture of reasons: a degree of military inferiority in open battle, some recognition of the legitimacy of the Mughal emperor, long-standing and customary patterns of deference and tribute payment to the ruler of Hyderabad, and a wary eye for the possibility of renewed Mughal strength.

However attenuated the power of the central government and however swollen the power of the rajas, the customary lines of these power relationships were not violated. Thus the conflict between Ayar Bek, Mughal officer and representative of the Muslim power in Hyderabad, and Ranga Razu, Telugu warrior chief and hereditary *deshmukh*, was accepted and proper according to custom. *Deshmukhs* at times did have to be forced to pay arrears, especially on the coast.

The system broke down, however, when the legitimacy of the *faujdar*'s position was questioned by Ranga Razu and when simultaneously the Mughal soldiers also rejected their commander's authority because he could not pay them in the foreseeable future. The soldiers forced Ayar Bek to shift his attention from the *deshmukhs* to the possessors of wealth wherever it could be found.

[1] K.A. 1720 (15.9.1712), fols. 209–11; *RFSG: Diary*, 1 Nov. 1711, p. 145.

At one stroke Ayar Bek was transformed from a legitimate Mughal officer to a harried mercenary captain whose unpaid followers ravaged unprotected towns and villages. The difference between the latter activity and punitive expeditions designed to coerce payment of taxes or tribute from landed intermediaries may be a subtle one; but it is a valid distinction, well recognized by Ayar Bek's opponents. Moreover, the descent of the Mughal soldiery in Hyderabad to directionless marauding raids represents a terminal stage in the decline of imperial authority—a stage from which recovery would be extremely difficult.

During the seven months when no authority was being exercised from the capital, Ayar Bek's former soldiers continued to occupy the *faujdar*'s headquarters at Gudur, a few miles from Machilipatnam. Final dispersal of the mutineers took place when Abid Khan, the *faujdar* of the northern coastal districts, prodded by news of a new governor, acted. Abid Khan sent two of his subordinates in company with several of the most powerful rajas to drive out the dissidents and take Gudur. Both Ranga Razu and Appa Rao of Nuzvid readily joined in this effort. It offered them an opportunity to get rid of the nuisance of the uncontrolled soldiers and to pose as champions of order for the new governor:

> These people having turn'd out all Mahmud Jarr's [Muhammad Ayar Bek's] people have writt a general letter to the new Suba [governor] of Golcondah; what they have done, that the Country may be free from Such bad people what Orders he is pleased to give about the Government and widdow, wait his Answer therein; Jentures [the Hindu *rajas*] return to their Governments, Mecire Assedo'a and Mowsom Cawn [the two Mughal officers] stay.[1]

The appearance a short time later of a new *faujdar* sent by the new provincial governor freed Machilipatnam and Elura districts from further troubles for a time. The 'sudden appearance' of the representative of imperial authority 'struck such a fear upon all these bad people' that in 'Hours none of them appeared in these parts.'[2]

Not all officials in Hyderabad suffered from the deterioration of imperial authority and the vacancy in the provincial governorship. Some, like Abid Khan, the *faujdar* of the northern coastal districts (and counterpart to Ayar Bek), found this to their liking. In 1709

[1] *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 22 Jan. 1712, p. 18.
[2] Ibid., 30 Jan. 1712, p. 22.

Bahadur Shah appointed Abid Khan *faujdar* and *amin* (revenue collector) of the entire territory north of the Godavari from Rajmundry to the border with Orissa beyond Srikakulam.[1] Only Vishakapatnam remained in the provincial governor's grasp, since Yusuf Khan had succeeded, after an extended dispute, in having the *faujdari* of Vishakapatnam retained by one of his followers, Fakirullah Khan, a localized Mughal official.[2]

Despite this setback, Abid Khan rapidly established a base of operations at Rajmundry fort and set about converting himself virtually into a local ruler. By the crisis of 1711, he had acquired fortresses, a full treasury, and a reliable army—in sharp contrast to Ayar Bek. Unlike the latter figure, with whom he clashed in several skirmishes, Abid Khan had skilfully developed understandings with Ranga Razu, the *deshmukh* of Mogulturru, and other *zamindars*, which helped him to consolidate his position. Somehow, partly through his relationships with the rajas and partly through direct (and brutal) access to the producers of wealth, Abid Khan created reliable revenue resources independent of the condition of the provincial government. Nor did he dissipate those funds by unnecessary deference to his superiors: 'this Nabob [Abid Khan] Values not whot he does taking no Notice of any Messenger from the Subah' of Golconda or the Kings having remitted no money to court these 2 Years he has heaped up a vast Treasure and lodged it in Rogemondm [Rajmundry] Fort. . . .'[3] Despite his independence of action and power, Abid Khan had not yet become an autonomous, or even a tributary, ruler. He still feared the possibility of dismissal or transfer which would deny him the legitimation afforded by an imperial appointment.[4]

Since Abid Khan was not thrust into a struggle for survival

[1] This assertion rests on a newsletter which reports in June 1709 that Bahadur Shah transferred the *pargana* of Sikakul (Srikakulam) from the administration of Yusuf Khan to that of Abid Khan who was made *faujdar* and *amin* of Sikakul. Also the *pargana* of Sikakul was ordered to be considered *khalisa* land (Akh., III (10 Rabi II), p. 83).

[2] Cf. the following references: a new *nawab* was to be appointed for Vishakapatnam (*RFSG: Diary*, 6 Jan. 1709, p. 1). The British at Vishakapatnam mistakenly recognized Abid Khan as *faujdar* of the town—a mistake which materially contributed to later difficulties for them (ibid., 16 Feb. 1710, p. 10). According to a Dutch analysis, reported by the English, Abid Khan had no direct control over Fakirullah Khan, who raised money and sent it to Yusuf Khan (*RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 7 Mar. 1711, pp. 24–6).

[3] *RFSG: Diary*, 1 Nov. 1712, p. 202.

[4] Cf. ibid., 9 Nov. 1711, p. 132.

immediately after the provincial governorship fell vacant, he had time to extend his area of dominant power. First, he captured Fakirullah Khan, the *faujdar* of Vishakapatnam, seized his treasury, and imprisoned him in Rajmundry fort.[1] Having achieved direct control over Vishakapatnam, Abid Khan then attacked Ananda Razu of Vizianagram and the other chiefs of that area. After a lengthy campaign he finally succeeded in forcing a settlement upon them.[2] Thereafter, by the end of 1712, he moved south and attacked Ranga Razu and others of his erstwhile allies below the Godavari.[3]

The sharply contrasting destiny of two Mughal officers, bearing comparable status and responsibility, is striking. Ayar Bek, tied to and dependent upon the governor, suffered most grievously in 1711. But Abid Khan, whose factional alignment opposed that of the governor, and who had nurtured independent sources of finance, improved his position in the same period. Thus, even though each man took up his post at the same time and under virtually the same conditions on the coast, Abid Khan adapted, became a localized Muslim chief, and survived—Ayar Bek did not.

The arrival of the new governor, Ibrahim Khan Panni, at the beginning of 1712 did not immediately resolve the difficulties facing the Mughals in Hyderabad. Maratha raids continued in force for most of the year. In July the *faujdar* of the Hyderabad Karnatik fought and won a pitched battle against Apu Ghorpade, a Maratha general who led an enormous army (70,000 horse and 20,000 foot) towards Kurnool, just south of the Krishna River.[4] In the same period Maratha bands raided right up to the walls of the capital itself and none of the residents dared leave the city's protection.[5]

Suddenly in August of 1712 Maratha incursions seem to have subsided or even stopped altogether. The apparent cessation of Maratha attacks coincides precisely with a new development in

[1] Ibid., 24 July 1711, pp. 74–5.

[2] The imprisonment of Fakirullah Khan could not have been too serious, for it is reported that a year later he was fighting with the united rajas in the north against Abid Khan, having already been released (K.A. 1720 (18.8.1712), fol. 127). Cf. K.A. 1720 (15.9.1712), fols. 206–7, for a description of the settlement with the northern rajas.

[3] See *RFSG: Diary*, 26 Dec. 1712, p. 231, for a brief reference to the capture of Nursapur fort by Abid Khan.

[4] Akh., Jahandar Shah, I (29 Jumada II), p. 183.

[5] K.A. 1720 (15.9.1712), fol. 208.

Mughal/Maratha relations at the highest level. Jahandar Shah, newly crowned as emperor, attempted to undercut Shahu, the son of Shambhaji. The new emperor recognized, instead, the infant son of Raja Ram of the Kolhapur branch of Shivaji's line. Such recognition included a title, *mansabdari* rank in the Mughal service, and the position of *deshmukh* of Hyderabad province.[1] The award of the position of *deshmukh* of Hyderabad to Shambhaji may well have caused a discontinuance of the Maratha raids into that province—although it is difficult to document this interpretation.[2]

The decrease in Maratha attacks offered a reprieve to Ibrahim Khan. He emerged from the capital for the first time for the 'management and the punishment of malefactors'.[3] Upon learning that the governor had come out of the capital, the bandit leader Riza Khan, in conjunction with several *zamindars*, conceived a plot to take the governor prisoner. Thus threatened, Ibrahim Khan lured Riza Khan, instead, to a personal meeting. At the meeting the bandit leader, who had alternately attacked and supported the provincial administration for a decade, was murdered. In the battle which followed this act most of Riza Khan's followers were also killed.[4]

Although the elimination of this powerful figure might well be considered a victory for Mughal authority, the circumstances surrounding Riza Khan's murder show the abysmal level of imperial power in the province. (On the part of Ibrahim Khan, resort to assassination can only be seen as a reflection of the weakness of his position.) At the height of the empire it is unlikely that any group of local leaders, no matter how bold, would have seriously attempted to capture any provincial governor.

[1] Shambhaji and Raja Ram were brothers, older and younger respectively. Thus their sons were first cousins. Shambhaji's line is referred to as the Satara branch and Raja Ram's as the Kolhapur branch. The son of Raja Ram recognized by Jahandar Shah was also named Shambhaji and he was the son of the second wife of Raja Ram. Cf. Duff, I. 361.

[2] Duff does say that at a slightly later date (in 1716) Hyderabad, Bijapur, and the Karnatik were 'overrun by the partizans of Sumbhajee, *raja* of Kolapoor', ibid., p. 370.

[3] Akh., I (12 Ramazan), p. 273. The governor attacked the small fort (*qalacha*) of Bakuran, the home of Lohia, and imprisoned the family of the aforesaid malefactor.

[4] Akh., vol. I (12 Ramazan), p. 278, Jahandar Shah. Although this identification is as yet unsupported, Riza Khan does not appear in any of the sources after this date.

CONCLUSION

After his victory at Jajau, the attention of Bahadur Shah was drawn to the badly neglected northern provinces at the heart of the empire where Sikhs, Rajputs, and Jats caused problems of the greatest urgency. Partly as a result of neglect by the centre, those political trends already present in Hyderabad during the latter part of Aurangzeb's reign accelerated. The provincial government continued its downward spiral towards impotence and bankruptcy; Mughal officials became local Muslim chiefs; bandits in the interior and Telugu warriors on the coast increased their already potent political power; the ports of Vishakapatnam, Pondicherry, and Madras became nearly autonomous commercial city-states;[1] and the continued decline of public order resulted in uncertainty, fear, and disequilibrium for the general populace. For cultivators, artisans, and shopkeepers such uncertainty was frequently resolved by robbery, mutilation, forced migration, or death. The mythical picture of the unconcerned peasant peacefully tilling his fields while armies clash in the distance is far from accurate for early eighteenth-century Hyderabad.

[1] For details of this process see my article 'European City-States on the Coromandel Coast'. (Forthcoming.)

XI

Mubariz Khan, a Proto-Dynastic Figure

THE arrival in Hyderabad of the next Mughal governor, an experienced Turani officer with a long record of capable service, constituted a significant turning-point in the political history of the region. Mubariz Khan, who ruled Hyderabad for over a decade (1713–24), had by the end of this period, achieved two important goals: reassertion of the long-standing role of the ruler of Hyderabad city as the focus of power within the region; and severance of nearly all meaningful administrative ties with the central administration of the empire. When he lost his life at the battle of Shakar Khera in 1724, Mubariz Khan's legacy to the victor, the first Nizam, Asaf Jah I, was a functioning political system in Hyderabad which lacked only certain formalities to stand forth as an independent Muslim kingdom.

EARLY CAREER

Within a few months after his successful revolt and seizure of the throne, Farrukhsiyar, the new Mughal emperor, removed Ibrahim Khan from the governorship of Hyderabad. In his place the new emperor sent an exceedingly able fifty-year-old soldier and administrator, who had previously served as governor of Gujerat and, later, Malwa. The man thus selected and given the title Mubariz Khan was a Turani.[1] Born Khwaja Muhammad, his mother had migrated from Balkh to North India during his early childhood. The family apparently was obscure, without many official connections (although seemingly well bred). The young Khwaja Muhammad searched for government employment for some time before he finally attached himself as a clerk to a minor, but influential, official at Aurangzeb's court. A series of similar positions followed until, somehow, Khwaja Muhammad succeeded in marrying one of the daughters of Inayat Ullah Khan Kashmiri, a high and favoured official of Aurangzeb. Soon thereafter 'the garden of his fortune started to blossom'; Khwaja Muhammad's rank increased.

[1] Mubariz Khan's biography is given in Irvine, II. 138–50, and also in *Ma'asirul Umara*, III. 729–46.

He became *bakhshi* (paymaster and military inspector) in the establishment of Prince Kam Bakhsh.

From this launching-point a series of upward moves followed culminating in the position of *mutasaddi* (manager or accountant) and then *faujdar* of the port of Surat. In this capacity Khwaja Muhammad, now entitled Amanat Khan, soon found an opportunity to demonstrate his abilities when the governor of Gujerat, Khan Firuz Jang, died. The young officer moved immediately, first to sequester the dead governor's effects and the provincial treasury for the required audit by royal accountants, and second to secure the government of the province against disorder. Khwaja Muhammad's reward for this decisive action was the vacated governorship of Gujerat and promotion to the rank of *amir* (a noble with a personal rank exceeding 1000).

Khwaja Muhammad's talents apparently extended into the political arena as well; for he contrived to stay in favour throughout the struggle for the throne in the years immediately after Bahadur Shah's death. Under Emperor Jahandar Shah he was transferred to the governorship of Malwa, another important post. There he gained further distinction by winning an impressive victory against a local raja who had built up considerable power. This victory earned him the high title Shahamat Khan, 'Noble of Dauntless Courage'. At the outset of Emperor Farrukhsiyar's reign Khwaja Muhammad, once again assigned to the Gujerat governorship, was suddenly replaced by Daud Khan Panni after only two weeks in office. Thereafter followed his assignment to Hyderabad.

This brief sketch shows Khwaja Muhammad's considerable personal qualities: ambition, resolution, courage, military ability, and diplomatic and political skills. These attributes, supported by high family connections (from his marriage), had already brought him far, and might in time have made him imperial *wazir*. Instead bankruptcy and disorganization at Delhi provided both reason and opportunity for Khwaja Muhammad, a heretofore faithful and efficient imperial servant, to use his talents in building a virtually independent power base in Hyderabad.

GOVERNOR OF HYDERABAD: 1713–1716

An official order (*farman*) from Farrukhsiyar dated 30 June 1713 conferred the governorship of Hyderabad on Khwaja Muhammad.

The emperor's order also changed his official name from Shahamat Khan to Mubariz Khan, his final and now best-known title.[1] The royal patent of office informed Mubariz Khan that, in addition to the provincial governorship, he had been honoured with the *faujdari* of Muhammadnagar, the administrative district surrounding the capital. His responsibilities would extend to all districts now under the administration of the outgoing governor Ibrahim Khan (alternately titled Bahadur Khan). Mubariz Khan would also administer certain coastal districts not controlled by that official. To the governor's existing rank of 2500 *suwar* (*ruyter*) would be added 1500 for a total of 4000 *suwar* (1900 *do asba*). The governor was to maintain an additional force of 3,000 horse and 3,500 foot. On receipt of this order he was to proceed to Hyderabad, establish himself as governor, punish the unjust and reward the just, and give favourable dispensations to merchants so that they could carry on their work.

The *farman* further specified that the districts (*provintien*) of Masulipatnam (Machilipatnam), Nizampatnam, Sikakul (Srikakulam), Rajmundry, Eluru, Kondapalli, Kondavidu, Khammamett and the diamond mines, classified as royal territories (*galiza* = *khalisa*), could not be granted as *jagirs*. However, a total of seventeen subdistricts (*landschappen* = *pargana*) in the interior were now at the governor's disposal.

Mubariz Khan arrived with full authority and rank to administer Hyderabad. Indeed certain provisions of the imperial *farman* made concessions not granted to his predecessors. More important was the provision of complete power over the coastal districts even though they remained classified as *khalisa*. Before 1713 the *faujdar* of Sikakul (Srikakulam, the position now held by Abid Khan) had enjoyed near autonomy in his relations with the Hyderabad governor. In the period just prior to Mubariz Khan's appointment Abid Khan had developed a firm hold over the districts north of the Godavari.

Presumably because of the growing local power and increasing independence of the coastal officials, Mubariz Khan gained another helpful concession from the central government. Towards the end

[1] The following is based on a translated copy of the *farman* obtained by the Brahmin agent of the Dutch East India Company at Hyderabad. The order was first copied in Persian and later translated into Dutch. Only the Dutch translation survives. K.A. 1547 (3.3.1714), fols. 92–3. The date is old-style. Mubariz means 'warrior' or 'hero'.

of 1713, just before he reached Hyderabad, an official newsletter recorded the transfer of the positions of *faujdar* and *amin* of Sikakul from Abid Khan to Mubariz Khan and a similar transfer for the same posts in Machilipatnam from Mir Qa'ma. The same order also provided Mubariz Khan with command over Medak fort.[1] These appointments were not unnecessary, as they might seem in view of Mubariz Khan's authority as provincial governor. Under imperial regulations he could now dismiss both Abid Khan and Mir Qa'ma and put members of his entourage in their place. Such authority would be particularly useful in the case of Abid Khan who had spent the past few years beyond the effective control of any superior.[2]

Abid Khan, well aware that reassertion of imperial authority in Hyderabad might have disagreeable consequences for him, reacted immediately to news of the accession of Farrukhsiyar: 'News of a Setled Government at the Moguls Court and fear of being accountable to a Superior power in those parts, made him in May 1713 prepare for his escape and appoint for his Deputy or Phousdar one Hodge Housein (Haji Husain).'[3] Throughout the remainder of the year, the *faujdar* pressed the coastal rajas hard in an effort to squeeze as much from them as possible while the opportunity still existed. The rajas, equally aware of the political situation, alternately promised payment of tribute and resisted at the slightest weakening of the *faujdar*'s attention. Violence accompanying this sparring inevitably destroyed villages and hurt the non-military population caught in the path of armies manoeuvring for better position.[4]

[1] Akh., II, pt. II (5 Zelqada), p. 197. This news-report listed Mubariz Khan's rank as 4000 *zat*, 2000 *suwar*, 1600 *do usba*, and 1000 *mashrut* (conditional on the office). A still different variant is mentioned in another newsletter: 3000 *zat*, 3000 *suwar*, and an indecipherable number of *sih bandi* troops. These figures are valuable for providing at least a mention of Mubariz Khan's personal (*zat*) rank which the Dutch translation does not, but it is impossible at present to reconcile the differing figures. Cf. Akh. II, pt. II (3 Rajab), p. 10.

[2] Cf. above, Chapter X, for a description of Abid Khan's activities prior to 1712.

[3] *RFSG: Diary*, 21 Jan. 1715, p. 13.

[4] K.A. 1747 (21.4.1714), fols. 15–16. The Dutch recorded that the villages surrounding Bimlipatnam, their northernmost factory, were burnt, and that inhabitants were preparing to migrate elsewhere. In July when Abid Khan reached the town of Kasimkota, capital of Sikakul district, he created such a panic that the most powerful merchants (*komatis*), weavers, and peasants were about to flee (K.A. 1734 (30.8.1713)). In early April Abid Khan successfully assaulted Manchuli fort near Rajmundry. The raja had not paid any tribute for two years. Akh., II, pt. I (17 Rabi I), p. 151.

As soon as word arrived that the emperor had selected a new governor for Hyderabad, Abid Khan immediately sent his family south to take refuge at Gandikota fort. When Mubariz Khan reached Hyderabad Abid Khan at once marched with his army and treasury south to his fortress retreat.[1]

Mubariz Khan, undoubtedly delighted that the problem of Abid Khan had been so easily resolved, wasted no time in sending his son-in-law, Thana Ulla Khan, to take charge of Abid Khan's vacated territories.[2] The fact that Abid Khan chose, despite the outward strength of his position, to flee rather than defy the new governor testifies to the aura which legitimate Mughal authority yet retained. Still, for several years, Abid Khan remained unchallenged at Gandikota fort. A shadowy figure, he was frequently mentioned in popular reports as a possible successor to Mubariz Khan, upon whose removal there was constant speculation.[3] None the less, the flight of the most prominent renegade official meant that those remaining on the coast and indeed throughout the province would accept the authority of the new governor. Members of his establishment took office without incident at Vijayawada and Machilipatnam.[4]

In the early months of 1714 Mubariz Khan set about firmly impressing on the inhabitants of Hyderabad province that a new regime had indeed begun. First, a pitched battle took place with a

[1] K.A. 1747 (21.4.1714), fols. 112–14. Masulipatnam letters dated 15 Nov. and 17 Dec. 1713 and 18 Jan. 1714. Gandikota fort is located on the Penner river near Tadpatri several hundred miles to the south-west of Machilipatnam, but the text says that this stronghold was 25 Hindu or 75 European miles south of the port town. A Mughal newsletter states that Abid Khan moved to Ganjikota fort (Akh., III (1 Jumada I), p. 105), but the local history of Kondavidu district refers to Gandekota (Condaved, p. 68). Abid Khan's later activities make it probable that he did not retreat too far to the south, for he is mentioned frequently in later years by European sources.

[2] The governor also sent Mir Jalaluddin to Vijayawada and Jakat Rao to Machilipatnam. Cf. K.A. 1747 (21.4.1714), fols. 112–14. Akh., III (1 Jumada I), p. 105. The *Ma'asir-ul Umara* biography also mentions that Thana Ulla Khan served as *faujdar* of Sikakul. Thana Ulla Khan was the grandson of Inayat Ullah Khan Kashmiri, Mubariz Khan's own father-in-law, *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III. 746.

[3] Cf. K.A. 1788 (8.10.1717), fol. 8.

[4] Mir Jalaluddin went to Vijayawada and Jakat Rao to Machilipatnam. K.A. 1747 (21.4.1714), fols. 112–14. Cf. also K.A. 1747, pt. II (20.9.1714), fol. 20, which mentions that the Mughal officers have given over the kingdom to Mubariz Khan without any difficulties. A Mughal newsletter reports that Mir Jalaluddin went to Sikakul with 2,000 horse and 4,000 foot. Akh., III, pt 1 (4 Rabi I), p. 6.

plundering Maratha force near Hyderabad. The raiders suffered 150 dead and 100 wounded.[1] Next he vigorously drove off Krishna Malhar, the Maratha chief who had occupied Elgandel town.[2] Simultaneously, a portion of the governor's army besieged the fort of one Venkat, a local Telugu *nayak*, at Changapettah, located just forty-two miles south of Hyderabad.

At the height of the hot season Mubariz Khan himself brought the forty-day siege to an end by a determined assault on Changapettah fort. (Possible variants are Jangapettah, Khangapettah.) The Mughal troops overrran the fort walls, killed Venkat, his son-in-law Birmal, and a large number of their followers, and took 400 prisoners. In the 'army of Islam' 260 soldiers died and 350 were wounded. Next, in central Asian fashion, the victors erected a tower built with severed heads of the slain Telugu Hindu warriors. The head of Venkat, the defeated *zamindar*, was sent first to Hyderabad and subsequently on to Delhi. The governor's agent presented the trophy to the Mughal emperor in public audience. To emphasize his message to all dissidents Mubariz Khan had the decapitated trunk of Venkat crushed under the feet of an elephant.[3] Finally, to commemorate his hard-fought victory, the governor renamed Changapettah town and its fortress Farrukhnagar—the name used today.

Before returning to the capital, part of the Mughal army (1,000 horse and 2,000 foot) set off for Gopalpettah in Pangal district to the south-east with a commission to seize Venkat's brother, his followers, and family. This action against the unfortunate Telugu chief accurately forecast the intensity and forcefulness of Mubariz Khan's continuing assault on the *nayaks* (i.e. in Mughal terminology *zamindars*) of Hyderabad. The new governor must have determined from previous experience in Malwa that only ruthless policies, consistently implemented, could hope to shift the balance of power from the local chiefs back to the provincial government.

In the more remote coastal districts the new regime faced the same problem that had harassed the Hyderabad government since the days of Rustam Dil Khan: the stubbornly rooted strength of

[1] Akh., III, pt. I (4 Rabi I), p. 6.

[2] Akh., III, pt. 1 (2 Jumada I), p. 103.

[3] Akh., III, pt. I (13 Jumada I), p. 115; (4 Jumada II), pp. 143–4; (2 Rajab), p. 186. The identification of this *nayak* is obscure. It is possible that Venkat and his brother Birmal (or Nirmal) were part of the Jatpol lineage. The connection with Pangal district suggests this.

half a dozen leading *zamindars* from the Razus in the north to the Valama and Kamma warrior families in the south. But the classification of the coastal districts as crown territories (as set forth in the governor's patent of office) complicated the matter of administrative responsibility. Muhammad Jafar, the newly appointed provincial *diwan*, apparently used this order as an excuse to try to seize full executive and fiscal control of the area. Acting under direct orders from Nizam-ul Mulk, the viceroy of the Deccan at Aurangabad, Muhammad Jafar ignored the provincial governor. He set up his own network of officials in the districts. When the coastal rajas rejected his claims for arrears of taxes Muhammad Jafar launched his own punitive campaigns against them.

On the other hand Mubariz Khan, on his initial tax- and tribute-gathering trip to the coast, had rapidly discovered the recalcitrance of the local rajas. The governor appeared in Vijayawada in early 1714 and demanded that Maka Appa Rao of Nuzvid, *muniwar* of Mustafanagar, and Koldinder Ranga Razu, *deshmukh* of Eluru district, both leading *zamindars*, appear before him in person to answer for their arrears in tribute and the land tax. He received a flat refusal.[1] Any attempt to crush these insubordinate *zamindars*, however, would immediately collide with the provincial *diwan* and his activities in the crown territories. A tripartite struggle for dominance began between governor, *diwan*, and *zamindars*. This lasted for the initial two to three years of Mubariz Khan's governorship.

Directly on the heels of Mubariz Khan's first expedition to the coast, Muhammad Jafar brought another Mughal force of 1,000 horsemen—presumably members of his personal contingent—into Eluru district. The *diwan* again confronted both Maka Appa Rao and Koldinder Ranga Razu in an effort to force them to pay their arrears.[2] Unsuccessful on his first demand, Muhammad Jafar spent much of the remainder of 1714 in a stubborn, but presumably fruitless, effort to force Koldinder Ranga Razu to pay up. Part of this campaign involved an attempt to put economic pressure on Ranga Razu through the European companies. In August Muhammad Jafar conveyed to the British at Madras an order from the viceroy of the Deccan, Nizam-ul Mulk, which commanded them to seize the ships of Koldinder Ranga Razu when-

[1] *Tribuyt en pugt-gelden*, K.A. 1747 (21.4.1714), fols. 112–14.
[2] K.A. 1747 (21.4.1714), fols. 112–14.

ever they appeared in British ports.[1] Although one of Ranga Razu's ships was then at anchor off Madras, the British, anxious not to offend the powerful local magnate, allowed it to slip away unmolested—despite the viceroy's order.[2] Only when 'there comes a Nabob (governor) with a full power to govern, and keep the Rajahs in such subjection that his *perwannas* (orders) will be received and obey'd in all their Countrys' would the trading companies co-operate with the provincial government.[3]

For the moment the internal administrative struggle hindered 'full power to govern', as the conflict between Mubariz Khan and the *diwan* continued. In early 1715 the Hyderabad newswriter reported to Delhi that marauders had gathered in great numbers and were plundering the royal territories. Because the fiscal divisions (*mahals*) of the crown lands (*khalisa*) were the responsibility of the provincial *diwan*, Mubariz Khan could not act to defend them.[4] Later, by June of the same year, Mubariz Khan did set out on a three-month punitive expedition towards Srikakulam —an expedition which was an intensification of his struggle with the *diwan*, not a capitulation.[5]

FACTIONAL STRUGGLE IN KONDAVIDU

A local history, the 'Provincial Annals of Condaved', provides a detailed case study of the working out of the conflict between governor, *diwan* and *zamindars* at the district level. The history of Kondavidu *sarkar* (modern Guntur district) was compiled in the early nineteenth century from contemporary local records kept by the hereditary accountants of the district. Through the strictly chronological narrative the relationship between local and imperial power within the district can be traced month by month and at times day by day.

Shortly after the appointment of Mubariz Khan became known in Kondavidu district in late 1713, the two officers appointed by Abid Khan (who had recently taken over the district) fled south

[1] *RFSG: Diary*, 19 Aug. 1714, p. 109. [2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., 21 Jan. 1715, p. 13.

[4] Akh., IV, pt I (3 Jumada I), pp. 105–6. Cf. also a report that Jadev, a rebellious chief, had established a fortified place 36 miles from Srikakulam and was plundering the villages of the *khalisa*. Akh., vol. 4, pt. I (27 Jumada II), p. 233. Jadev could conceivably be a Maratha name—e.g. Chandrasen Jadev the famous Maratha general.

[5] Cf. Akh., IV, pt. II (25 Shawal), p. 96; Condaved, p. 71.

to Gandikota fort with their master.[1] At Vijayawada were a *faujdar*, newly appointed by Mubariz Khan, and an *amildar*, sent by the provincial *diwan*. Together these two officers made an ineffectual attempt to force the leading *zamindars* of Kondavidu to appear before them for purposes of revenue and tribute extraction. The attempt failed, for the *zamindars* had no intention of foolishly travelling to Vijayawada to be thrown into prison at the mercy of the Mughal officials.[2] Finally in September 1714, after nearly a year without any direct Mughal representation in Kondavidu, an agent of the provincial *diwan* named Tula Ram (termed an *amildar* in the text) arrived in the district and set up his headquarters at Chebrole.[3]

Tula Ram's first move upon reaching the district was to appoint subordinates (called *thanadars* by the text) for every subdistrict within Kondavidu. Later another Hindu official came from the provincial *diwan* to assist Tula Ram; together the two officials issued an order to all the local *zamindars* and the village headmen and accountants to 'come and settle the revenues of the Villages'.[4] Within a week 'the people of all the Villages were coming in' to Tula Ram at Chebrole or to his colleague who had established himself at Mangalagiri.[5] A full month of negotiations followed with most of the nearly 1,000 village headmen and accountants in the district, in an effort to establish a settlement figure for each village. The *amildar* and his assistant then took written engagements from their subordinates in each *pargana* to ensure proper collection of the revenue.[6] Next, the *amildar* recognized Rama Rao Manak Rao, a member of the hereditary Valama *deshmukh* family of Kondavidu, as the *deshmukh* of the district and confirmed for him the 'Roosooms, Sawaram, Customs and Lands' which traditionally had attached to that office. Rama Rao Manak Rao retired

[1] Condaved, p. 68. [2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 69. Sometime after this, a *faujdar* for Kondavidu named Shah Bek was appointed by Mubariz Khan, but he seems not to have been very effectual. Cf. Condaved, p. 71.

[4] Condaved, p. 70. The new arrival's name is given variously as 'Bandojee Murjoolauloo' or 'Badojee Murjoolaaloo'.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Condaved, p. 70. Although it seems unlikely that the two Mughal officials personally interviewed all the village officials in the district, none the less it is conceivable that by each meeting fifteen to twenty persons a day over several weeks they could indeed have dealt with the representatives of the more accessible and centrally located villages at Kondavidu.

to the family capital at Rapilly. Finally, the *diwan*'s representative approved the traditional allowances for the family of hereditary district accountants, the Brahmin Manur Raos, and dismissed them.[1]

In spite of Tula Ram's careful arrangements, reimposition of even the loose revenue system in Kondavidu district, after so long a period of desuetude, was not easy. Within three months' time a full-scale revolt directed against this possibility broke out. Another member of the Manak Rao family, Krustani Tirupati, possibly upset by the award of nominal *deshmukh* rights to his kinsman Rama Rao, appeared for an audience with Mubariz Khan, who was then present in the coastal districts. Krustani Tirupati seems to have represented a number of the *zamindars* who objected to the *amildars*' activities.[2] On his return to the family fort at Rapilly (from which Rama Rao, the titular *deshmukh*, had absented himself) Krustani Tirupati ordered the soldiers of the fort garrison, the hereditary professional Muslim and Hindu soldiers (*Shaikhs* and *Nayaks*), into the countryside. They were to seize the money from the customary dues and land-tax allotments which had been assigned to Rama Rao and others by the Mughal *amildar*. It is impossible to say conclusively that Mubariz Khan had encouraged Krustani Tirupati in this action in order to undercut the representatives of the *diwan* in Kondavidu. But the juxtaposition in time of the latter's visit to the governor and his action in ordering out the Rapilly garrison only two weeks later makes this interpretation at least plausible.[3] Once unleashed, however, the soldiery proceeded to carry out a tactic traditional in Kondavidu, to deny resources to the ruling government: they forced the peasantry to stop cultivation and to abandon their homes under threat of mutilation and death.[4]

[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] Cf. the Mughal news-report cited above in which Mubariz Khan denied any responsibility for the activities of plunderers in the coastal districts because they were under the jurisdiction of the provincial *diwan* as crown territories (*khalisa*). The Mughal newsletter reporting the outbreak of violence on the coast is dated 25 April 1715, only one day after the local chronicle states that Krustani sent his troops into the countryside.

[4] Cf. Condaved, p. 70. 'On the 3rd of Soodum of Visakom and on Monday [25 April 1715] Croostanee Terropattee Maunee Karainengaroo at Rapilly dispatched from thence the Shakolee [Shaikhs] and Naiks into the Seemas to collect the Money of the Roosooms and Savarams of the Villages of Mahalls and Moolapullaloo from the several Partners which had received permission from the Deevanum and to expel all the families of the Inhabitants; after they had

The next month, in May 1715, the Telugu chief celebrated his triumph by beginning with great ceremony and greater expense the construction of a group of Siva temples at Rapilly. Krustani Tirupati invited a famous Brahmin priest to come to Rapilly and officiate at the ceremonies for the installation of the idols on their altars. Subsequently he appointed him chief Brahmin of the temples. Eight thousand other Brahmins, assembled for the occasion, received food, money, and clothing at Rapilly.

The struggle for power in Kondavidu was, however, far from resolved. In June Mubariz Khan had moved to take direct control over the district both from the various *zamindar* factions and from the *diwan*'s agents. Camped in July in the coastal districts (near Machilipatnam), Mubariz Khan discharged both the *faujdar* of Kondavidu and the *amildar*, 'Toolaram and his people'. In their place Bakhshi Ratan Singh Lal with 200 cavalry came to take charge of the district as *faujdar*.[1] No representatives from the *diwan*'s office replaced the dismissed *amildar*. The new *faujdar* soon took over, in a brutal fashion, the revenue-gathering function of that office: 'On the 9th of Soodum of that month and on Saturday [27 August 1715] Bakusee Ratansing Laulla went to Guntoor from Vellore with his Savaurs Horse with Dustucks [orders] on the Villages for daily Batta [allowance] at the rate of 2 Rupees for each man to force from the Inhabitants the Amount of 2 Years revenue for every Village.'[2] A demand for arrears of two years of the land tax was equivalent to the two years in which Mubariz Khan had been in office in Hyderabad. This suggests that, despite his elaborate machinery, the former *amildar*, Tula Ram, had not succeeded in making substantial revenue collections in the district—if, indeed, he had made any. Thus, now that the district *faujdar* had sequestered all fiscal functions to himself, it is clear that Mubariz Khan had fully triumphed over his rival, the provincial *diwan*, for control over Kondavidu district. Very likely this was also true for the remaining crown districts on the coast.

Bakhshi Ratan Singh's troops continued to harass the district for nearly a year. So burdensome was their presence that the local chronicler insisted 'In this Current Year all the Inhabitants

collected on their arrival these Naiks forwarded the bags with the Money agreeable to their Master's Orders and then began to cut the bodies of the inhabitants who would not abandon their dwellings and they determined to destroy all the Country in the same manner.'

[1] Condaved, p. 71. [2] Ibid., p. 72.

abandoned their habitations and went off from their Districts owing to the extortions of Backseeseerow.'[1] Even the *faujdar's* death in May 1716 provided no relief for the residents of the district. As soon as Mughal authority momentarily relaxed, troops of the Manak Rao family at Rapilly fort emerged and began plundering. They held up travellers, seized well-to-do persons and kept them for ransom in the fort, looted grain storage pits, and killed all who resisted. This remained the chaotic situation in Kondavidu district between May and November 1716, while Mubariz Khan was occupied with his trip to Aurangabad, the capital of the six Deccan provinces.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH HUSAIN ALI KHAN

At the beginning of the reign of Farrukhsiyar in 1713 (at the same time that Mubariz Khan received his appointment to the governorship of Hyderabad) the emperor sent Chin Qilich Khan, newly titled Nizam-ul Mulk, to become viceroy to the six Deccan provinces.[2] In this capacity, the Nizam appeared as a faithful and zealous overseer of imperial interests. He repudiated a revenue-sharing agreement (one-fourth the land tax for *chauth*) made by his predecessor with the Marathas. By a combination of military pressure and divisive diplomatic tactics he began to make inroads on the power of the myriad Maratha chiefs, bandits, and revenue-collectors who infested the western half of the Deccan.[3] Towards the east, in Hyderabad, the Nizam apparently supported the royal *diwan* of the province in his dispute with Mubariz Khan over control of the crown districts on the coast.[4] Beyond this, however, little specific information is available about relations between the Nizam and Mubariz Khan during this period. Presumably the Nizam, preoccupied with the Marathas, confined himself to written orders rather than direct intervention, even when Mubariz Khan seized control of the crown district on the coast (see above).

In May 1715, despite the Nizam's efforts, the emperor recalled him and appointed in his place Husain Ali Khan, one of the Sayyid brothers who had put Farrukhsiyar on his throne. This move to

[1] Condaved, p. 72.

[2] Yusuf Husain Khan, *The First Nizam* (2nd and rev. ed., Bombay, 1963), pp. 54–5.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Cf. *RFSG Diary*, 19 Aug. 1714, pp. 109–10, where the Nizam sent orders to the British which commanded them to support the *diwan* in his campaign to obtain revenue arrears from Ranga Razu.

the Deccan by one of the most powerful men in the empire was the outcome of one phase of the bitter power struggle between Farrukhsiyar, his supporters, and the Sayyid brothers. Even though the new viceroy ostensibly came to the Deccan with full authority granted by the emperor, he still faced direct opposition stirred up by imperial agents.[1] Indeed, as soon as Husain Ali Khan reached Khandesh he found Daud Khan Panni, his erstwhile supporter, transferred to the governorship of that province. Daud Khan Panni had the emperor's promise that if he succeeded in killing Husain Ali Khan, the viceroyalty of the Deccan would be his once again. But in a hard-fought battle just outside the province's capital (Burhanpur) Daud Khan Panni was killed and his army dispersed. Husain Ali Khan was then free to proceed to Aurangabad.[2] For a time news of this victory eliminated any open opposition to Husain Ali Khan. Nevertheless, Farrukhsiyar continued to send secret orders to all provincial *diwans* and *zamindars*, as well as to Shahu, the Maratha king, to resist the authority of the Sayyid.[3]

One of the conditions whereby Husain Ali Khan agreed to come to the Deccan was that he be given extraordinary powers over Mughal administration in that region. These included authority—heretofore the prerogative only of the emperor—to appoint, dismiss, or transfer provincial *diwans* and commanders of strategic fortresses.[4] These sweeping powers seemed to put Husain Ali Khan in a position to make the Deccan virtually his personal fiefdom. However, in point of fact, the covert activities of the emperor's agents as well as widespread knowledge of the factional struggle at the centre so undermined Husain Ali Khan's power that he could establish no effective control. The new viceroy soon began to search for allies wherever they might be found.[5]

It was thus within the context of the factional struggle at the

[1] Khafi Khan, II. 780. Mir Jumla, the principal rival of the Sayyids at the time, tried to separate and thus weaken the two brothers by sending one of them to the Deccan. On their part the Sayyids welcomed the opportunity to get control over the Deccan territories but wanted to rule through their deputy, Daud Khan Panni. The emperor and Mir Jumla of course insisted that Husain Ali Khan go personally to Aurangabad. Finally the deadlock was resolved by the empress-mother. She negotiated an agreement whereby Mir Jumla would also leave the capital and become governor of Patna in Bihar when Husain Ali Khan left for the Deccan.

[2] Khan, *First Nizam*, pp. 68–9.

[3] Khafi Khan, II. 780.

[4] Cf. Irvine, I. 303.

[5] Khafi Khan, II. 780; see also *RFSG: Diary*, 21 Jan. 1715, p. 13.

imperial centre that Mubariz Khan saw an opportunity to secure his own position in Hyderabad. Instead of aligning himself with the emperor Mubariz Khan shrewdly decided to come to terms with the new viceroy. In December 1715 Husain Ali Khan commanded Mubariz Khan to come to Aurangabad. The viceroy enforced his order by dispatching a large force of cavalry and infantry towards Hyderabad city.[1] Mubariz Khan travelled willingly with his entourage to the *wazir*'s headquarters. A series of cordial meetings ensued. The governor of Hyderabad made the necessary presents according to imperial protocol; but Husain Ali Khan graciously accepted only part of the presents and returned the remainder to the son of Mubariz Khan.[2]

After these discussions Mubariz Khan left Aurangabad for the return journey secure in the confirmation of his office as governor of Hyderabad, in itself an important concession. But, in addition, he had also obtained from the viceroy an appointment as *diwan* over all territory within Hyderabad province. Furthermore, the viceroy appointed Mubariz Khan's son imperial commander of Golconda fort.[3] The price for Mubariz Khan's allegiance proved to be abdication of central administrative control over the entire fiscal structure of Hyderabad province—including the crown districts—as well as over its most powerful and strategic fortress. Only the unprecedented authority given Husain Ali Khan by the emperor allowed him to make these concessions.

On returning to Hyderabad Mubariz Khan named Ali Bek as his deputy to act as *diwan* of the province. The governor kept his eldest son, Khwaja Ahmad, in charge of the capital city and fort.[4] However, Khwaja Ahmad seems to have left the actual command of Golconda fort to a subordinate. Khwaja Ahmad acted as his father's second-in-command at Hyderabad while Mubariz Khan was on campaign.[5]

[1] A Dutch report of 5 December states that a force sent by Husain Ali Khan of 6,000 horse and as many foot had come within 15 Hindu miles (45 European miles) of Golconda (Hyderabad city). K.A. 1776 (12.2.1716), fol. 83.

[2] K.A. 1776 (30.4.1716), fol. 256. [3] Ibid.

[4] K.A. 1776 (14 Aug. 1716), fol. 330. Evidently an appointment of one Anwaruddin Khan as *diwan* of Hyderabad in March 1710 by Farrukhsiyar was ignored by the governor. Cf. Akh., V. pt. I (4 Rabi II), p. 33.

[5] Cf. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III. 745–6. This pattern is very similar to the division of responsibilities of Jan Sipar Khan and Rustam Dil Khan at an earlier period. Although, in the former case, Jan Sipar Khan remained in the capital and his son went on campaign. See above, Chapter V, p. 79.

Mubariz Khan emerged from this venture into imperial politics with untrammelled power over his 'possession' as the chronicler termed it.[1] Husain Ali Khan, who could have made—at some cost to himself—a serious effort to remove Mubariz Khan, now left him a free hand in Hyderabad. The fact that the governors of Bijapur, Bijapur Karnatik, and Hyderabad Karnatik also rejected Husain Ali Khan's authority and sided with the emperor immensely strengthened the Hyderabad governor's position *vis-à-vis* the viceroy.[2]

All parties in this affair continued to keep up the appearance of legality according to both imperial regulations and precedent. The viceroy only delegated to Mubariz Khan powers derived by him from the emperor as the source of all authority. On his part, Mubariz Khan welcomed and needed the legitimation of imperial authority to function. Some months after the governor's safe return to Hyderabad, the emperor, resigned, for the moment at least, to the *status quo*, dispatched a robe of honour as a mark of royal esteem.[3] Receipt of this award put an end to many popular rumours circulating in the province that Abid Khan, dispossessed *faujdar* of Sikakul, would return to become governor in place of Mubariz Khan.[4]

POST-AURANGABAD CONSOLIDATION 1716–1720

Soon after returning to Hyderabad, Mubariz Khan, newly confident, initiated a series of rapid moves against the local *zamindars* of the province. He first attacked an old trouble spot in the interior: the fort of Sarvapetta located between Warangal and Bhongir. In September 1716 the widow of the ill-famed Sarva (the associate of Pap Rai: see above), who still retained control of her former husband's fortress, felt the impact of Mubariz Khan's army. Despite a determined defence, the Mughal troops captured the fort and drove off all the 'malefactors' still alive. Sarva's widow escaped and fled.[5] In a sense, this victory was a sequel to an earlier

[1] Khafi Khan, II. 780, uses the term *ta'alluq* as a synonym for Hyderabad province.

[2] Ibid. [3] K.A. 1788 (8.10.1717). fol. 8. [4] Ibid.

[5] Akh., V, pt. I (16 Shawal), p. 95. The newswriter also reported that ten of the bandits led by one Shaikh Burhan (evidently a local or Deccani Muslim) surrendered to the governor and were 'consoled' by him. This action on Mubariz Khan's part is in direct contrast to his customary treatment of bandits and rebels. In October the emperor awarded a robe of honour to the newswriter of Hyderabad for his reporting of the capture of the fort. Akh., V, pt. I (16

assault (in 1714) on Krishna Malhar's stronghold in nearby Hasanabad (see above). Together the two attacks may have at least temporarily discouraged bandit and Maratha power in this region. Thereafter, Mubariz Khan turned his attention to problems of control and consolidation elsewhere.

Toward the end of the year the governor marched in force from the capital to Vijayawada on the Krishna. Here he intended to force the coastal *zamindars* to pay long-overdue tribute.[1] In January 1717 he moved his camp to Gollapallee (twenty-five miles to the east) and summoned the local *nayaks* for audiences.[2] Among these were the leading figures of Kondavidu district (Guntur) who, with the exception of the Manak Rao group, came obediently across the Krishna to the governor's audience tent.[3] In mid-January the governor (with a string of temporarily docile Telugu chiefs in tow) again shifted his camp. He moved only a few miles to the east to Eluru, a major urban centre for the region between the Krishna and the Godavari. Here he placed all the *zamindars* with him in confinement. Simultaneously he appointed a new *faujdar* and a new officer charged with the administration of the fort garrisons for the southern coastal districts.[4] Finally, after two months of what must have been heavy pressure, the captive *zamindars* contrived to make promises and assurances convincing enough to bring their release. By March leaders of the Vasu Reddi and Manur Rao families arrived back safely in Guntur town from their encounter with Mubariz Khan.[5]

Mubariz Khan next set out on an extended expedition throughout Eluru, Khammamett, and Kondapalli districts in order to exact tribute and personal submission from the Telugu chiefs of this extensive region. These tracts, relatively untouched by previous Muslim rule in Golconda, were bounded in the west by the borders of the core area of the province, on the north-east and south-west by the Godavari and Krishna rivers respectively, and to the east by Kolleru Lake. Previous governors such as Rustam

Zelqada), p. 140. See also K.A. 1776 (6.10.1716), fol. 9, for another reference to the attack on Sarvapetta.

[1] K.A. 1788 (3.3.1717), fol. 94.

[2] Ibid. The Dutch factors commented that if Mubariz Khan carried out his intentions on the coast it was very likely that some of the rajas and lessors of the land tax (*landpagters*) would lose their lives.

[3] Condaved, p. 73. The Manak Rao group, then in active rebellion, had fled to Rapilly, their headquarters in Murtazanagar.

[4] Condaved, p. 73. [5] Ibid.

Dil Khan had paid more attention to Machilipatnam and other ports on the coast. But the strategic importance of this block of territory, contiguous to the interior districts, would scarcely be lost on any Muslim ruler bent on constructing a regional political entity. Over a nine-month period Mubariz Khan led his army in a great circular route: north-east to Polavarum on the Godavari; up the Godavari to Bhadrachalam, the temple town; south-west away from the river to Paloncha; to the east to Chennur, Narasimharapalam, and finally back to Rajmundry, and by the end of the year to Eluru again.[1] At Polavarum the Mughal army 'took the Fort of the Reddy Pollavarum Rajah' and at Bhadrachalam Mubariz Khan received 'Gifts of Nazars' from the 'Bhadrachalom Rajah Aswarow'. At 'Matookoo Seem' (as yet unidentified) the governor received 400,000 rupees (or possibly *pagodas*) from the ruling Rani. At Chennur the Kamma *zamindars* of the area presented 'many Nuzzers and Nayabats' to the governor.[2]

In the course of this expedition, partial confirmation of Mubariz Khan's single-minded interest in this area came when even serious troubles at the provincial capital failed to divert his attention. A bandit (*rover*) named 'Juwasie' plundered the suburban village of Hayatnagar, a pleasure spot near the capital. 'Juwasie's' forces had even surrounded the capital and prevented transport of grain into the city.[3] The governor left the defence of the capital up to its commander, his eldest son, and remained in the coastal district to complete his tribute-gathering.


By January 1718, having completed the lengthy march, Mubariz Khan still did not return to the capital. Instead he confronted the rapidly growing power of the Valama house which had long dominated Kondapalli and Eluru districts. The governor's success in the territory between the two rivers rested on his ability to subjugate Appa Rao of Nuzvid and his brother, Subbana Rao of Gundugolanu. At the opening encounter Mubariz Khan appeared with his army in the vicinity of Nuzvid. The two adversaries opened bargaining on a settlement of tribute—for this procedure could scarcely be called tax-collection. After considerable haggling Appa Rao paid over 105,000 rupees and agreed to submit a like

[1] Condaved, p. 74, K.A. 1788 (8.10.1717), fol. 8, mentions Mubariz Khan's presence at Rajmundry in October.

[2] Condaved, p. 74.

[3] K.A. 1788 (8.10.1717), fol. 8. The Dutch factors predicted that Mubariz Khan would soon go back to his capital to meet this grave threat.

sum in another two months.[1] With this tangible evidence of, if not loyalty, at least recognition of his paramount power, Mubariz Khan led his army toward Subbana Rao's headquarters at Gundugolanu, just north of Kolleru Lake. Subbana Rao, who proved to be more stubborn than his brother, refused to pay the 81,000 rupees demanded and retired with part of his army to his fort.[2]



MAP 7. Mubariz Khan's Expedition to Andhra, A.D. 1717–18

The governor, enraged by this response, immediately commanded his army to surround Gundugolanu fort. The Mughal forces began a siege accompanied by a daily bombardment. Determined to prevail, Mubariz Khan put all his energies and every soldier that could be spared from elsewhere in the province into

[1] *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 9 Jan. 1718, p. 2; ibid., 17 Jan. 1718, pp. 10–11.

[2] The identification of Gundugolanu as Subbana Rao's fort is based on the following corruptions found in the texts: Kankol (Persian in Mughal newsletter), Cannocolloo (English translation of a local history written in Telugu), and Cawnecull, Conncull (British factory records). The location of Gundugolanu also fits the general area of Subbana Rao's activities.

the siege.[1] Eventually, the governor and his eldest son Khwaja Ahmad, brought from Hyderabad to act as assistant commander, deployed 3,000 cavalry and 12,000 infantry before Subbana Rao's stronghold. Even the *diwan* of Golconda brought 200 horse and 300 foot with him to the battle. Other local power-holders on the coast found it prudent to heed the governor's command and lead their followers to the siege as well. Among several of the local rajas and *nayaks* present with their forces was Koldinder Rama Razu, the *zamindar* of neighbouring Rajmundry. He offered to pay the 81,000 rupees tribute demanded from Subbana Rao in return for control over his neighbour's territories. The English East India Company—always sensitive to the shifting balance of power—sent a number of Portuguese and British gunners to man the Mughal's guns before the fort. The Company also sold powder and shot to the governor's agents.

As the siege went into its second month, Mubariz Khan, frustrated by the stubborn defence of the 1,500-man garrison, grew more and more determined to destroy Subbana Rao.[2] The governor rejected all attempts at compromise made by Appa Rao, Subbana Rao's brother Mubariz Khan accused him of sending aid to Subbana Rao and dispatched a party of Mughal troops to plunder one of Appa Rao's towns.[3] The defenders of the fort were not cowed simply by the presence of the Mughal army, while the strength of the fort walls made a direct assault a costly proposition, liable to failure. Mubariz Khan then adopted the usual expedient of a Mughal commander confronting a siege operation: a sap and mine operation underneath the wall. Unfortunately, an underground spring appeared at a critical point in the operations and caused the mine to fail. The aroused governor's determination can be gauged by his next move which was even more expensive and time-consuming than a mining operation. By late March a 'point' or fortified gun platform slowly began to rise opposite the walls of

[1] Unless otherwise noted the account of the siege is taken from descriptive comments made by the British factors at Machilipatnam in letters to their superiors at Fort St. George. *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 1718, pp. 1–41, *passim*.

[2] The British factors commented that 'If this siege of Subbana's (holds) out six months or longer that Nabab is in point of Honour oblig'd to Continue it till such time has brought Subbannah under what Articles in agreement he pleases otherwise it would give encouragement to all petty Rajahs to stand in Opposition against him. . . .' (*RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 25 Feb. 1718, p. 26)

[3] Ibid., 2 Feb. 1718, pp. 18–19. Reportedly 100 Hindu women immolated themselves rather than be dishonoured by the Mughal soldiers.

the fort which, on completion, was to be as high or higher than the defensive guns.[1]

As the siege operations intensified, so did the supply demands of the Mughal army. Areas adjacent to the fort began to experience famine conditions as prices rose and food stocks dwindled. General lack of rain and the manifestations of an approaching failure of the harvest added to the general distress. In April Mubariz Khan ordered 'all People that dwell in Villages and towns under his protection (now) about these parts for the space of fifteen leag(ues) to supply his Camp with Provisions and not to dispose of any elsewhere on penalty of very severe Punishment'.[2] At Machilipatnam the *kotwal* was to purchase all provisions arriving in the port and forward them to camp.

Completion of the raised gun platform in May allowed the Mughal troops, under the personal direction of Mubariz Khan and Khwaja Ahmad, to mount the final assault on the fort. No quarter was given. Those defenders who were not able to follow Subbana Rao in his flight across a nearby river died under Mughal swords. According to the official news-report, 400 Telugu soldiers died in the fort and another 300 drowned while trying to escape across the river.[3] Subbana Rao escaped with a remnant of his followers to the territories of Ranga Razu. There he found shelter and a base from which he could incite unrest in his former territories.[4] The post-victory settlement awarded Subbana's fort and its environs to one of his cousins. However, most of the extensive territories of the deposed chief now came under the direct control of Khwaja Ahmad Khan, newly appointed *faujdar* over all the coastal districts south of the Godavari.[5]

A short time later Mubariz Khan set out for the capital at Hyderabad for his first extended residence there in well over a

[1] Ibid., 27 Mar. 1718, p. 34. The Mughal newsletters also mention the construction of a battery (*murcha*) opposite the fort Akh. VI VIII (29 Jumada II), 71–2, and (2 Jumada II), p. 51

[2] *RFSG. Letters to FSG*, 23 Apr. 1718, p. 39.

[3] Akh., VI VIII (29 Jumada II), pp. 71–2. The British also reported that 200 men escaped but that the remainder were beheaded inside the fort. *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 23 Apr. 1718, p. 41.

[4] Subbana Rao was killed in 1725 by the first governor appointed by the first Nizam of Hyderabad Asaf Jah defeated and killed Mubariz Khan the previous year at the battle of Shakar Khera. See Burhan Ibn Hasan, *Tuzak-I-Walajahi*, trans. by S Muhammad Husayn Nair, part I (Madras, 1934), p. 38.

[5] Appointment of Khwaja Ahmad to take charge of Subbana Rao's territories is mentioned in *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 9 May 1718, p. 50.

year. His departure was hastened by news of a Maratha attack on his son at Nalgonda (forty-five miles east of the capital).[1] Sending a relief force on ahead, the governor drove off the Marathas and reached the capital without difficulty.[2] At the close of this encounter Mubariz Khan evidently concluded that all was secure in the interior. Reports began to reach the coast as early as October that he planned to return.[3] One possible motive for the decision may well have been continued harassment of Mughal territories by Raja Subbana Rao. The British factors at Machilipatnam wrote in July: '... Notwithstanding Mauberize Cawne has given Coja Gee [Khwaja Bahadur Khan], Rajah Subbanas Country that was; nevertheless the Latter gives a great deal of trouble, & hinders the People plowing the Ground, the Consequence of which, We cannot Judge how it will end'.[4] By preventing the peasantry from cultivating, Raja Subbana—in a traditional tactic for opposing the central government at Hyderabad—could thus eliminate any revenues from agriculture. He could even hope to force the governor to reinstate him to his holdings. Instead, Mubariz Khan determined to return to the coast, in order to place his third son (called Saheb Zada) at Vijayawada so that he might supervise all the coastal *faujdars*. Mubariz Khan next decided to intensify and renew his pressure on the coastal *zamindars*. He also extended his operations south of the Krishna into Kondavidu district.

In Kondavidu, Khwaja Bahadur had at first been relatively successful in restoring control. He sent officials to the various subdivisions and pacified the leading member of the Valama Manak Rao house, Krustani Tirupati, who had figured prominently in the disorders of the two previous years in that district (1716–18).[5] However, another warrior house, the Vasu Reddis, of the Kamma agricultural caste, had steadily grown in power since the earliest days of Mughal rule in Hyderabad. They now posed a serious problem for Mubariz Khan. The Vasu Reddis had originally obtained a small grant of land on the north bank of the Krishna in Kondapalli district from the Qutb Shahs just a few years before the Mughal conquest. Later they gained a foothold south of the Krishna as supporters of the administration against the Manak

[1] *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, May 1718, pp. 46–7.
[2] Ibid., 9 May 1718, pp. 49–50. [3] Ibid., 15 Oct. 1718, p. 107.
[4] Ibid., 30 July, 1718, p. 80.
[5] In July 1718 'Cojah Bahadoolla shewed much favor to Croostanee Terraputtynaidoo & granted him Roosooms & Savarams', Condaved, p. 75.

Rao family. By late 1718 they had come to dominate a large tract of territory on both sides of the river. In alliance with the Mal Razus, another Valama family, they had seized the great fortress at Bellamkonda.[1] Rather than negotiate, Mubariz Khan chose to make the Vasu Reddis, along with Makka Appa Rao of Nuzvid (Subbana Rao's brother), his primary target for the next round of punitive operations in this region.

In early 1719 Mubariz Khan marched from Eluru (where he had paused for a few weeks after his arrival from the capital) across the Krishna into Kondavidu district. At Bellamkonda he drove off the occupants and retook the fortress without any difficulty. Then, less than ten days later, he led his army north to Chintapalli, capital of the Vasu Reddis, in the bend of the Krishna river: 'On the 5th of Bahoolum of Maka & Sunday [29 January 1719] Samut Cawn Sooba [Mubariz Khan] arrived at Chentapilly & caused the fort to be demolished; they then began to demolish all the Forts in that Dasom.'[2] Toward the end of February Mubariz Khan's army, still campaigning, 'destroyed the fort at Hyateapilly—then Comaties [i.e. contractors from the Komati caste] were employed to demolish the forts on East & South of the Kistna [Krishna] River.'[3] Finally, in March the governor recrossed the Krishna, paused at Vijayawada, then 'arrived & destroyed the Fort at Madoor'.[4] The latter fortress (tentatively identified as modern Moturu in Machilipatnam district) was part of the possessions of Maka Appa Rao of Nuzvid.[5] The sweep of this campaign constituted a devastating follow-up to the bitter siege against Subbana. Mubariz Khan was acting directly in the long-established Mughal tradition of direct punitive action against recalcitrant *zamindars* and their fortresses.[6]

When Mubariz Khan arrived in force, the Vasu Reddis and Mal Razus, choosing discretion rather than resistance, 'abandoned immediately their Countries & went to the Southward'.[7] On arrival, they opened guerrilla operations near Bapatala on the coast,

[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 76. Hyateapilly is unidentified as yet. [4] Ibid.

[5] Cf. Grant, p. 305. Cf. also *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 2 Mar. 1719, p. 32, for a notice of the arrival of Mubariz Khan at Gudur near Machilipatnam.

[6] Cf. Habib, p. 165 n. 21. 'A petition to the court by an officer, probably the Governor of Akbarabad (Agra), reports a march by a subordinate from Kalpi and *Etawa via* Kol and Marehra to Agra, destroying the forts of *zamindars*.'

[7] Ibid.

and 'began to burn the heaps of Grain'. Still their departure left the area adjacent to the Krishna open for an attempt at administrative reformulation. Khwaja Bahadur Khan, acting with his two Hindu subordinates, was now free to begin a land survey for a revised assessment of the land tax.[1] In the space of approximately three months the *faujdar* supervised the survey of lands in villages in several parts of the district.[2]

No details of the survey procedure are mentioned. However, the chronicle does refer to land measurement implying that this was in fact an effort to begin a systematic cadastre of the district.[3] It is possible that efforts to survey the district lands continued. Several years later (in 1722) the local chronicle contains another reference to a survey of the 'Lands from one Village to another' under the direction of Khwaja Bahadur.[4]

Toward the end of 1719 Khwaja Bahadur began to establish a new administrative headquarters at 'Mootnoor' (present-day Mutluru?) approximately twelve miles south of Guntur town. This development coincided with and undoubtedly resulted from establishment of 'Saheb Zada', one of Mubariz Khan's sons, at Vijayawada as his father's deputy in over-all command of the southern coastal districts.[5] Mutluru was evidently not utilized as a residence for the *faujdar* prior to this, because Khwaja Bahadur was forced to begin construction of a house for himself and his official establishment.[6] The *faujdar* simultaneously built residences for several of the leading Telugu nobles of the district. Thus a severe punitive campaign by Mubariz Khan, destruction of a number of fortresses, seizure of the Vasu Reddi lands, and forced departure of the Vasu Reddis and the Mal Razus all cleared the ground for a new assertion of Khwaja Bahadur's powers: the *faujdar* ordered these nobles to come and reside in the newly

[1] 'From this day [after Mubariz Khan took Madoor fort] Cojah Bahader concerted with Moortee Somayagee daily to Survey the Lands of each Village . . .', Condaved, p. 76.

[2] The text mentions 'Chendavooloo' (unidentified), 'Purchoor' (modern Paruchuru), and Vinukonda. Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 86. [4] Ibid., p. 82.

[5] Ibid., p. 77. Mutluru is tentatively identified as the Mootnoor of the text because at least one reference refers to travel of the Mughal *faujdar* from Ponur to Chebrole with an intermediary stop at Mootnoor. Modern Mutluru is located midway between these two towns in Guntur district. Thus the similarity of the names and this reference make the identification defensible. Cf. Condaved, p. 79.

[6] Ibid., p. 77.

prepared residences under his watchful eye.[1] Members of the Valama Manak Rao family and the Manur Rao family hereditary *deshmukh* and *deshpand* respectively of the district came obediently to 'Mootnoor'. So, surprisingly, did 'Chandramoullee', the leading Vasu Reddi rebel, who had quietly returned north to make his peace with the Mughal representative in Kondavidu.[2]

Clearly, by 1718, the Hyderabad government had restored its dominance in Kondavidu district. Land surveys, destruction of forts, and enforced residence of the *zamindars* at the district headquarters all indicate that administrative consolidation had begun—as opposed to punitive campaigns and tribute taking. Given enough time the new regime might well have restored or even surpassed the control maintained by the Qutb Shahs over the local warrior chiefs of that district. Whether meaningful ties of interest and service could have also been restored between *zamindar* and the Hyderabad government is another and perhaps unanswerable question. Mubariz Khan, product of a harsher imperial system, may have chosen to forego active co-operation in favour of a more straightforward system of military occupation leading eventually to the dispossession or setting aside of the *nayaks*. On the other hand, once a satisfactory pattern of dominance and submission had been established by force, Mubariz Khan may also have moved in the more politic direction of conciliation.

MARATHA RELATIONS

While assessing Mubariz Khan's record as governor of Hyderabad, the compiler of the *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, the biographical dictionary of the Mughal nobility, wrote:

> He [Mubariz Khan] spent nearly twelve years there [Hyderabad] in punishing the rebellious, and favouring the submissive. . . . He never ceased to exert himself, and was continually touring from one end of the territory to the other. Although he did not have more than 3,000 horse in his service, yet he drove off large armies of Mahrattas. One of the wretches, wherever he advanced beyond the borders received a severe reverse from the Khan, and every time he wanted to attack this zone, had to run away after being defeated by his strong force.[3]

Thus a salient feature of Mubariz Khan's governorship, according

[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] *Ma'asiru-ul Umara*, III. 733–4. This passage is taken from the translation by Beveridge, II. 293.

to a near-contemporary source, was his aggressive defence of the province against the Marathas. This interpretation, consistent with his over-all policies in Hyderabad, is supported in its essentials by other references to his relations with the Marathas.

Between 1713 and 1715 only sporadic encounters occurred between the new governor and raiding Maratha bands.[1] In the most serious incident Krishna Malhar, a Maratha leader who had been operating within Hyderabad for several years, assaulted and occupied Elgandel town (near Karimnagar) in collusion with a local *zamindar*. A pursuing Mughal force, led by the governor, caught up with the raiders as they plundered near Warangal, but only captured a few horses and standards from the fleeing Marathas.[2] Other Maratha activities seem to have been occasional, small-scale, plundering expeditions which posed no serious threat to the Mughal hold on the province.

Yet fragmentary evidence does exist that the local Telugu *zamindars* might have begun to adopt Maratha tactics. At least one description of local imitators of the Marathas may be found in a Hyderabad news report dated October 1715. Venkanna, Bhoja, and others, having assembled, had decided upon troublesome, Maratha-like marauding in the countryside. They had erected a small fort, stocked it with war materials, refused to pay the revenue demand, and terrorized the local populace and passing travellers. Finally, after repeated warnings and commands from Mubariz Khan were ignored, a Mughal force captured and then destroyed the fortress.[3] The vigour of Mubariz Khan's response to such behaviour very likely dissuaded other *zamindars* or bandits from the same path, for this report is not accompanied by any similar accounts.

Maratha pressure on Hyderabad also eased as a result of the appointment of Nizam-ul Mulk as viceroy of the Deccan in 1713. The Nizam vigorously repudiated the tacit agreement for *chauth* collection in the Mughal territories arrived at by his predecessor,

[1] In March 1714 Mubariz Khan led his troopers in an assault on one Anta Tabra(?) who was plundering about 25 miles from the capital. The Marathas suffered 150 dead and 100 wounded. Akh., III, pt. I (4 Rabi I), p. 6. Two months later in May of the same year a Mughal officer drove Krishna Malhar away from Hasanabad fort and established an imperial *thana* there. Akh., III (3 Jumada I), p. 105.

[2] Akh., III, pt. I (2 Jumada I), p. 103.

[3] Akh., IV, pt. II (15 Shawal), pp. 81–2.

Daud Khan Panni. Instead he adopted a policy aimed at driving the Marathas completely out of the Mughal-administered territories.[1]

In 1716 the Maratha problem moved to a different plane for the governor of Hyderabad when Husain Ali Khan replaced Nizam-ul Mulk as viceroy of the Deccan. Husain Ali Khan, hampered by the intrigues of the emperor's agents against him, and unsuccessful in several punitive expeditions against the Marathas, soon opened talks with Shahu and his chief officer Balaji Vishwanath.[2] By 1717 both parties had agreed to terms which amounted to an alliance between Shahu and his followers and the Sayyid brothers: Husain Ali Khan, viceroy of the Deccan, and Abdullah Khan, *wazir* or chief minister of the empire. The negotiators worked out a formal treaty under which the Mughals granted Shahu the right to collect 25 per cent (*chauth*) and 10 per cent (*sardeshmukhi*) of the land tax as well as a similar 35 per cent of the *sa'ir* and road taxes normally arriving in the Mughal coffers. This alienated over one-third of the assessed imperial revenues in the Deccan. In return, Shahu agreed to help maintain the peace and to supply 15,000 horse for imperial service. The Maratha king also promised to clear the Karnatik, Bijapur, and Hyderabad provinces of the partisans of Tara Bai and the Kolhapur branch. After the treaty was signed he would also make good any losses suffered by the inhabitants of those provinces.[3]

The most sweeping concession granted Shahu—and ultimately the most damaging to the Mughals—provided that Maratha agents could collect their stipulated share of the revenues directly from the inhabitants of the Mughal provinces.[4] Even though emperor Farrukhsiyar rejected the treaty as soon as he learned of its provisions, Husain Ali Khan put it into effect immediately without waiting for approval from Delhi.[5] According to the Mughal chronicler two Maratha revenue agents (one for *chauth* and one for *sardeshmukhi* collections) moved into every subdistrict.[6] These

[1] Cf. Khan, *The First Nizam*, pp. 54–65. As James Duff noted, 'During the first government of Nizam-ool-Moolk, the policy and vigour of that viceroy had greatly tended to control the Mahrattas.' Duff, I. 375.

[2] Cf. Duff, I. 376–8.

[3] Ibid. The treaty contained other provisions regarding control of the Maratha home districts and payment of tribute. Cf. Husain, pp. 72–3.

[4] Khafi Khan, II. 783–4.

[5] Duff, I. 381.

[6] Khafi Khan, II. 784.

were followed by other Maratha officers leading parties of troops who began to collect their portion of *sa'ir* and road taxes in every *pargana*.[1]

Had the terms of this treaty been carried out in Hyderabad as they apparently were observed in Aurangabad and the western Deccan provinces, a Maratha administrative structure parallel to the Mughal provincial administration would have been imposed on every subdistrict within the province. A crippling proportion of the province's revenues would have been siphoned off to Shahu's treasuries. It is, perhaps, not surprising that the Hyderabad governor refused to delegate such sweeping authority to the Marathas. In so far as can be determined, none of the elaborate arrangements described by the Mughal historian was put in force in Hyderabad.[2]

At least one positive piece of evidence tends to support this assertion. In May 1718 a large Maratha army appeared. The commander deployed his troops in the countryside between the capital and Nalgonda. He then demanded payment of *chauth* from Mubariz Khan's sons penned up in Golconda fort.[3] To render

[1] Ibid., p. 785. [2] Cf. Khafi Khan, II. 963.

[3] References to the Maratha incursion appear in *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 1, 9, and 14 May 1718, pp. 46–54. The appearance of the Mughal force is referred to on 14 May as follows: 'Yesterday the Dutch recd. a Letter from Golcondah which advises that Seib Abdulah Cawne has sent one Muckimsing his Duan, Nabob of these Parts with three thousand horse & that he is within three Gentue Leagues of Golcondah & withall the Morattas has joyn him on which acct. they give a great deal of trouble to Mauberize Cawns Sons at Golcondah, & in case he should offer to make his Escape then the Morattas to seize on this Nabob or cut him [off] his sons now keep cloose in Golconda Fort with their family's it's [. . .] questioned whither the new Nabob will be able to overpower [. . .] but we shall know after they have had a battle or two' (p. 54). As yet, the Dutch letter referred to has not been found, but partial corroboration of the Mughal incursion comes in a slightly garbled reference in Condaved, p. 75: 'On the 10th of Bahoolum of Sravanum [23 July 1718] & on Sunday the Devan came into the Mahals from Faracksha Padshah with 2,000 Horse have made Peace [*sic*] with the Padshah.'

That such a joint Maratha/Mughal expedition was not improbable is shown by the events of 1719 when Husain Ali Khan returned to Delhi accompanied by Baji Rao Vishwanath and a large Maratha force. There may well have been a strong motive arising from the politics of the centre which encouraged Sayyid Abdullah Khan to put pressure on Mubariz Khan at this time. In early 1717 Inayat Ullah Khan Kashmiri, father-in-law of Mubariz Khan, came out of retirement and accepted the post of *diwan* of the crown lands (*khalisa*) and salaries (*tan*) as well as the absentee governorship of Kashmir. Encouraged by the emperor, Inayat Ullah Khan tried to eliminate the revenue farming which had been instituted by Sayyid Abdullah and his chief officer Ratan Chand. This

the situation more serious a Mughal force of 2,000 to 3,000 horsemen sent by Sayyid Abdullah Khan, the imperial *wazir*, joined the Marathas. Apparently the *wazir* was concerned about substantial arrears of revenue resulting from Mubariz Khan's persistent refusal to send funds to the imperial centre (see below). Popular report has it at least that the officer in command was destined to become governor and *diwan* of Hyderabad in place of Mubariz Khan. The governor at that point had just concluded the siege operations against Raja Subbana on the coast (see above). He initially sent one of his sons with a large relief force and shortly thereafter brought his entire army back to the provincial capital to confront the invaders. However, when faced with a double threat (i.e. both Maratha and imperial forces), Mubariz Khan chose to negotiate rather than fight. Evidently some form of satisfactory settlement was reached, for no mention is made in the contemporary accounts of the continued presence of the intruders in Hyderabad. It is more than likely that Mubariz Khan made at least a token payment of both *chauth* and some of the imperial revenue arrears in order to encourage a speedy departure for both intruders. Although on this occasion, at least, Mubariz Khan yielded to Maratha pressure, such an expedition and demands for *chauth* would have been unnecessary had the Marathas actually established revenue-collection machinery in Hyderabad the year before as suggested by Khafi Khan.

Early the next year, the Sayyid coup against Farrukhsiyar took place, resulting in the emperor's deposition and death. The successful king-makers put a series of puppets on the throne and administered the empire through them. The Maratha Peshwa, Balaji Vishwanath, the chief Maratha strategist, now demanded royal confirmation of the treaty first drawn up two years earlier in return for Maratha participation in the revolt.[1] Three imperial *farmans* of March 1719 formed the basis for Balaji Vishwanath's reorganization of the Maratha revenue and administrative system. That system, resting on an elaborate series of interlocking divisions of the revenues, was administered by Brahmins, agents of the Peshwa, who accompanied the various officers assigned military

struggle at the centre, still under way in 1718, may have been one of the reasons for Sayyid Abdullah Khan's interest in the Hyderabad governor. Cf. Irvine, I. 334.

[1] Khan, *First Nizam*, pp. 83–4.

jagirs by Raja Shahu.[1] On the highest level 'there were particular quarters of the country [the Deccan] assigned to the principal officers.'[2] Thus, 'Futih Sing Bhonslay [Fatah Singh Bhonsle] was appointed to the Carnatic; whilst the general charge of the old territory from the Neera to the Warna, *and the collections from Hyderabad* and Beder, were left to the Pritee Needhee and the immediate agents of the raja.'[3]

En route to the Karnatik Fatah Singh Bhonsle appeared outside Hyderabad city in August with an order (*parwana*) from the *wazir*, Sayyid Abdullah Khan. This commanded Mubariz Khan and his *diwan* Mir Jalaluddin to pay the *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* claims of the Marathas.[4] Whether this order was obeyed with any regularity is uncertain. Two years later, in November 1721, another large Maratha army invaded the province and surrounded the capital. This time Mubariz Khan did not bother to negotiate but led his forces out from the city and drove off the Marathas. This was his last known encounter with them before his death in 1724.[5]

FINAL PHASE, 1720–1724

During his last four years in Hyderabad problems of imperial politics came increasingly to occupy Mubariz Khan. By this time the greatest threat to his carefully built power came not from the emperor or the *wazir* at the imperial centre, but rather from other prominent Mughal nobles competing desperately for regional holdings in the waning days of empire. In particular, as Satish Chandra has pointed out in his detailed study of later Mughal court politics, the post of viceroy of the Deccan had become by the early eighteenth century the most sought-after position in the empire. Only the *wazirate* itself had more appeal for the ambitious noble. Even the attractions of Delhi began to pale before the possibilities of independent rule in the vast tracts of the Deccan sub-empire.[6] Under these circumstances, Mubariz Khan, already securely established in the eastern half of the Deccan at Hydera-

[1] Cf. Duff, I. 386–9, for a complete description of this system.

[2] Ibid., p. 388.

[3] Ibid., p. 389, italics added. There are no subsequent references to Pritee Needhee.

[4] K.A. 1819 (18 Aug. 1719), fols. 32–3. The text has 'Pattie Singh' a Maratha general. The Dutch reporter refers to a required payment of 30% which is obviously an error for the combined 35% demanded.

[5] Condaved, pp. 79–80.

[6] Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, pp. 43–4.

bad, inevitably thwarted the plans of whoever succeeded Husain Ali Khan to the viceregal seat at Aurangabad. Indeed, Mubariz Khan's Nemesis proved to be his old associate, a fellow Turani noble, the Nizam-ul Mulk, drawn back repeatedly to the Deccan both by events and his own attachment to the region.

After the deposition and execution of Farrukhsiyar the Nizam was relegated to the governorship of Malwa. However, a dispute over the appointment of a fort commander led to his dismissal by Sayyid Abdullah Khan and the dispatch of an army to Malwa to bring him back to the capital.[1] Rather than submit, the Nizam decided to move south in an attempt to dispossess the existing Sayyid-appointed administration in the Deccan. Before he left Malwa, the Nizam received an offer of support and an invitation to move to the Deccan from Maratha leaders of the Kolhapur faction opposed to Raja Shahu (then allied with the Sayyids). He also received similar sentiments carried by a personal envoy from Mubariz Khan.[2] Possibly the joint Sayyid/Maratha expedition against him the previous year encouraged Mubariz Khan thus to align himself openly against the ruling duumvirate at Delhi (see above).

The Nizam marched to Khandesh and seized Asirgarh, the great fortress, and Burhanpur, the capital. At Burhanpur he steadily recruited and strengthened his army. In the ensuing few months the Nizam decisively defeated two armies sent against him by the Sayyids. During the final battle fought in July 1720 at Husainpur, thirty miles north of Burhanpur, the newly appointed viceroy of the Deccan, a young member of the Sayyid clan (Barha), was killed. According to Yusuf Husain, the Nizam's biographer, 'This victory established the undisputed supremacy of Nizam'l Mulk in the whole of the Deccan.'[3]

Although he had not sent any forces to assist the Nizam in Khandesh, Mubariz Khan had with great foresight expressed his support at the right time. To secure further his claim on the Nizam's goodwill the governor led an army of 6,000 to 7,000 horsemen from Aurangabad and made a ceremonial submission to the new ruler of the Deccan.[4] Agreeing with Mubariz Khan on a 'common cause' the Nizam promised him a high rank and new

[1] Khan, *First Nizam*, pp. 90–1. [2] Ibid., p 95.
[3] Ibid., p 111. [4] Khafi Khan, II. 897.

title when Sayyid rule in Delhi was brought down.[1] While Mubariz Khan was still in residence at Aurangabad news arrived of the death of both the Sayyid brothers. On learning of the appointment of his uncle Muhammad Amin Khan as *wazir* by Muhammad Shah, the Nizam, wholly freed from worries of intervention from Delhi, turned his attention to tightening the Deccan administration.[2] No longer in immediate need of Mubariz Khan's forces, the Nizam confirmed his position as governor of Hyderabad and sent him back to his province.[3]

Cordiality between the two nobles disappeared very quickly. The interests of the Nizam, trying to dominate the entire Deccan, diverged sharply from those of Mubariz Khan, *de facto* ruler of a single province. In the latter months of 1720 the Nizam launched a tribute-gathering expedition into the Bijapur and Hyderabad Karnatik directed against the various *faujdars* in that region (mostly Afghans) who had completely ignored any imperial obligations for several years.[4] When he arrived at Adoni (in the Bijapur Karnatik) the Nizam ordered Mubariz Khan to come with his army to help convince the recalcitrant chiefs that they should pay a regular tribute. The Hyderabad governor was manifestly unenthusiastic. He 'was fully conscious of the change in the position' [i.e. the new power of the Nizam] and 'though he should, to inspire terror, have brought a large force, he had only a small force with him when he joined Asaf Jah.'[5] Furthermore, the chronicler goes on to point out that:

> Mubariz Khan did not see his advantage in the Sardars [i.e. the Karnatik chiefs] submitting and giving over whatever Asaf Jah demanded, for he himself drank water from the same cistern, and as a result Fath Jang [the Nizam, Asaf Jah] could not obtain even a hundredth part of his expectation. Though in view of the prevailing situation he [i.e. Mubariz Khan] did not express his dissatisfaction and the dust of dissension did not rise, yet he was inwardly greatly displeased.[6]

[1] *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III. 734. He would have a rank of 7000/7000 and the title of Imad-ul Mulk.

[2] Khan, *First Nizam*, p. 115 and Irvine, II. 138–9.

[3] Khan, *First Nizam*, p. 115.

[4] These included men like Bahadur Khan Panni, *faujdar* of Kurnool, Abul Fath, son of Abd-un Nabi Khan *faujdar* of Cuddapah, and Sa'adat Ullah Khan, *faujdar* of the Hyderabad Karnatik. Cf. *Ma'asir ul Umara*, III. 738.

[5] Ibid. (trans.), p. 94 (text), p. 735.

[6] Ibid. (trans.), p. 94 (text), pp. 735–6.

One reason that the 'dust of dissension' did not arise immediately is that a short time after the Adoni expedition the Nizam was removed entirely from the Deccan political scene. Muhammad Shah, the emperor, summoned him to Delhi as imperial *wazir*. The sudden shift in the 'prevailing situation' must have eased Mubariz Khan's worries considerably; the author of the *Ma'asir-ul Umara* dates the fiscal and administrative independence of the Hyderabad governor and the chiefs of the Karnatik from the departure of the Nizam: 'From that time, he [Mubariz Khan] and the other southern governors became completely independent. He took possession as a proprietor of the *mahals* of Sikakul (crown lands upon which he had paid revenue from time to time), as well as the other *mahals* of that province.'[1]

The Nizam, once established at Delhi, wasted little time in inquiring into the salaries of Mubariz Khan, his sons, and companions and the existing fiscal relationship between Hyderabad and the centre. Discovering large arrears, the Nizam made a sharp demand upon Mubariz Khan's representative at court (one of his sons) for payment of the revenues of the crown lands in Hyderabad. An altercation followed and the Nizam, unable to force payment, openly showed his displeasure. The enraged *wazir* made two subsequent attempts to transfer Mubariz Khan to other governorships: first to Kabul and later to Gujerat.[2] There matters rested, for Mubariz Khan, determined to maintain his hold on Hyderabad, could not be dislodged at this late date by imperial orders alone. Only direct military intervention in Hyderabad could accomplish that end.

With the Nizam safely distant and distracted at Delhi, Mubariz Khan could resume his interrupted campaign against the *zamindars* in Hyderabad—especially those in the rich coastal area. The governor first repulsed a Maratha assault in the interior (see above); by late 1721 he had returned to the Krishna area near Nuzvid where he began holding audiences for the local *zamindars*.[3]

[1] *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II. 736, my translation. Beveridge's translation omits the reference to 'other *mahals* of that province' and simply mentions 'other estates'. To render *mahals* as 'estates' is, moreover, extremely misleading, for a correct translation would be 'fiscal unit'. 'Completely independent' is a contraction of the literal phrase 'withdrew their hearts/minds (*dil*) entirely from examination'. There is no reference to Delhi in the passage, as Beveridge's translation implies. Mubariz Khan had gained administrative powers over Sikakul several years earlier.

[2] *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III. 736.

[3] Condaved, p. 80.

Numbers of the Telugu chiefs accompanied the governor as he marched to Vijayawada, the principal town on the Krishna, then north to Rajmundry on the Godavari, and returned by March 1722 to Vijayawada.[1] Displeased by the progress of these enforced negotiations, Mubariz Khan left abruptly for Hyderabad, carrying with him a number of the coastal *zamindars* whom he confined in Golconda fort.[2]

In Kondavidu these actions precipitated another confrontation between the most powerful *zamindari* house in the district, the Kamma Vasu Reddi family, and Khwaja Bahadur Khan, *faujdar* of the area. Khwaja Bahadur Khan's complaints to the governor had led to the seizure by Mubariz Khan of several members of the Vasu Reddi house as well as other *zamindars* and officials of the district. In June 1722 news of their incarceration in Golconda fort triggered a revolt: '. . . the People belonging to Vasureddyvaroo by names Cherumamella Jangannah & Venkannah Chava Soorapah took the fort of Cotaveram [north-west of Guntur town] & assembling the Mooka [Telugu infantry] employed them to plunder all Travellers & to cut off their noses Ears & to kill the Inhabitants to terrify them from cultivating the fields'.[3]

Khwaja Bahadur Khan reacted by first issuing a series of orders to the populace to continue cultivating. Next he led his troops to Kotevarum fort and surrounded the insurgents. After a brief siege the Mughal troops seized the fort and either drove off or made captive the defenders. Acting on Mubariz Khan's orders, the *faujdar* completely demolished Kotevarum's fortifications. He followed this by a public execution of the two Vasu Reddi rebel leaders. As an object lesson Mubariz Khan also killed several of the district notables confined in Golconda fort.[4] Within three months the *faujdar* had completely crushed the revolt and returned to work on a village land survey.

For a time at least the swiftness and ferocity of the reaction thoroughly squashed any further notions of challenging Mubariz Khan's regime in Murtazanagar. One member of the Vasu Reddi house (possibly less culpable or simply more fortunate than his dead kinsfolk) was given a robe of honour by the *faujdar* and dismissed.[5] A month later another Vasu Reddi notable obtained an audience with the *faujdar* and offered his submission.[6] Through-

[1] Condaved, p. 81. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid. [5] Ibid., p. 82. [6] Ibid.

out this short-lived episode none of the other *zamindari* families seems to have offered to aid the Vasu Reddis. The Manak Raos, hereditary *deshmukhs* of the district, who had rebelled often enough before, by this time were actively collaborating with the district *faujdar*, much as they had with the Golconda officials forty years earlier under the Qutb Shah regime.[1] By the end of 1722 nearly a decade of steady military and administrative pressure exerted by Mubariz Khan and his agents had begun to show results on the local level. The inhabitants of Murtazanagar district had begun to adjust once again to the demands of a strong Muslim-dominated regional state based at Hyderabad.

In mid-1723 Mubariz Khan returned in person to the coast. This was to be the final move in his long-standing campaign against the Telugu warrior chiefs in the southern coastal districts. Under the governor's direction a large army surrounded Nuzvid, capital town and stronghold of Maka Appa Rao. Maka Appa Rao (the brother of Subbana Rao) was the dominant member of the Valama warrior family. His own holdings, as well as numerous ties to other smaller chiefs, made him the most powerful force between Krishna and Godavari.[2] The governor's strategic purpose is scarcely difficult to perceive: unquestioned dominance over Mustanafagar district which commanded the route between Hyderabad city and the port at Machilipatnam. This object inevitably brought into question the swollen powers of the Maka family, which had, along with other Telugu warrior groups, taken advantage of the disarray of the Hyderabad government since the last years of Aurangzeb. To the north of the Godavari Mubariz Khan was apparently prepared to accept the *status quo* as long as suitable tribute was forthcoming, but not in the southern coastal districts. Furthermore, Appa Rao, fully realizing the governor's

[1] Ibid., p. 81.

[2] Cf. Grant, p. 663. 'It is therefore no less from clanship or family attachment, than from interested and rebellious views, that these *zamindars* [of Chintalapudi], together with those of Midoor Gutt, Janlavoy, Mylaveram, and Bejwara [Viayawada] which encircle the larger jurisdiction of Opparow [Appa Rao], make usually a common cause with that refractory landholder . . .' The Muslim chronicles state that Mubariz Khan was assaulting the fort of Phulchari near Machilipatnam which also belonged to Maka Appa Rao. However Condaved, p. 84, mentions Nuzvid as the target. I have adopted the latter's version on the grounds that, as a local history discussing an event that prominent, it is more likely to be accurate. Furthermore, the selection of Appa Rao's capital as a target fits better with Mubariz Khan's strategy in that region and his earlier actions against the Maka family.

hostility, had begun intriguing against Mubariz Khan at Delhi. Indeed as early as 1719 the British factory chief at Machilipatnam reported:

> The Nabob [Mubariz Khan] is very shortly expected here but not to stay, only disigning to call here in his way and so march against Upperah [Appa Rao] so[me] of whose Letter he having intercepted as they were carrying to Court informing severall things against the Nabob which has so enraged him that he is going with a full resolution to destroy all his Countrys and to take off his head.[1]

Although on this occasion Mubariz Khan delayed a full-scale assault on Appa Rao in favour of a march to the north to Rajmundry and Kasimkota, his ultimate aim was clear.[2]

Mubariz Khan soon discovered that capture of the Valama chiefs' stubbornly defended fortress would require a siege equal in length and intensity to that mounted against Subbana Rao five years before. With characteristic energy the governor set about his task. However, after spending more than half a year camped in front of Nuzvid, once more Mubariz Khan was brought into the vortex of imperial politics. Inayat Ullah Khan had learned that the Nizam planned to seize control of the Deccan administration at Aurangabad. He urged his son-in-law to accept a royal appointment as viceroy of the Deccan. Buttressed by an official appointment, a promised subsidy of 500,000 rupees, and an army to be sent from Delhi by the emperor, Mubariz Khan would be in a favourable position to meet the Nizam in a head-on engagement as he fled south and (with good fortune) destroy him.[3]

In reality Mubariz Khan had little choice, for once established at Aurangabad, the Nizam would not rest until a power relationship satisfactory to him was established with the ruler of Hyderabad. A confrontation before the Nizam could reach the Deccan was far more desirable from Mubariz Khan's viewpoint—especially since he could count on the support of Muhammad Shah. Unfortunately, Mubariz Khan, about to see the fruition of a project of many years' standing, continued to besiege Nuzvid for several weeks before he settled on terms with Appa Rao.[4] He de-

[1] *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 24 Sept. 1719, p. 93.

[2] Ibid., 13 Nov. 1719, p. 97.

[3] Irvine, II. 138–50, gives a full description of the entire encounter between the Nizam and Mubariz Khan. See also Khan, *First Nizam*, pp. 129–39.

[4] *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III. 737.

layed still further assembling his army and recruiting the Afghan chiefs of the Karnatik before he finally marched for Aurangabad. The upshot of this delay was that the Nizam learned of Mubariz Khan's appointment and immediately set out for the south and reached Aurangabad before his opponent.

At the capital of the Deccan, the Nizam engaged a large body of Maratha troops under Baji Rao Vishwanath, organized and supplied his army, and then marched toward Mubariz Khan. The two armies met at a village in Berar about eighty miles from Aurangabad. There Mubariz Khan outmanoeuvred by the Nizam, died from battle wounds on the field of Shakar Khera, 11 October 1724.

After his victory the Nizam buried the dead, treated the wounded, and then brought his army back to Aurangabad. In a few days he set out on the 270-mile march to Hyderabad city where Khwaja Ahmad Khan, Mubariz Khan's eldest son, still ruled.[1] Khwaja Ahmad waited in vain at Golconda fort for confirmation of his father's post from the emperor. Refusing to accept defeat, he sent orders to all his subordinates and the *zamindars* to render neither obedience nor revenues to the approaching Nizam for at least one full year, until the issue of control of Hyderabad could be decided. But, finally, after a year Khwaja Ahmad Khan, seeing no prospect of any meaningful resistance, surrendered on generous terms. Thus in early 1725 Hyderabad came under the control of the Asaf Jahi dynasty for the first time.[2]

CONCLUSION

After four decades a victorious army once more occupied Hyderabad city. Representatives of a new regime moved out into the districts to take over what was in fact, if not in name, a conquered kingdom. Over a twelve-year period Mubariz Khan had transformed himself from a duly appointed provincial governor to *de facto* ruler of a regional kingdom. Had he survived, Mubariz Khan would surely have founded a dynasty which (taking an appropriate name) would have continued to rule in Hyderabad and might even have challenged the Marathas for control of Mughal territory in the western Deccan. In the sense of what might have been, Mubariz Khan may well be termed a proto-dynastic figure.

[1] Cf. Irvine, II. 150–2.

[2] *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III. 744.

Coming in the wake of political disintegration in the years after Aurangzeb's death the new regime built by Mubariz Khan's strong hand could scarcely fail to attract the attention of contemporary observers. Thus, in late 1719, when the British merchants at Vishakapatnam learned of the imminent arrival of Mubariz Khan with his army, they faced a severely practical problem: accurate assessment of the governor's status in order to give him a present appropriate to it in cost and elegance.

> The Subba [Governor] Maubereize Cawn [Mubariz Khan] . . . is . . . ex(pected) at Cassimcoat in six or seven days by our Nabob's hastning to meet him tis conjectured that the Subba designs to reside at Chicacull [Srikakulam] if so we may be assured of being plagued with him here much longer than (it) suits with our Interest to have him so near us before the charge of a great Present for calculating ye. (Value) of which we have no other rule than what has formerly been given to Meida Cawn Rustumdill Cawn Habib Cawn [Abid Khan] *Men who in regard of the power & (authori)ty they exercized in these Parts seem to approach nearest to his character and Quality yet with this rem(arka)ble distinction that those men acted by orders & . . . under command of their superiors this for some years has set himself above orders and been accountable (to) none.*[1]

Muslim sources such as the *Ma'asir-ul Umara* also certify to the administrative and fiscal independence of the Hyderabad governor (see above) and the accuracy of the British analysis.

Once established in Hyderabad, the governor's approach was twofold: first, concentration of all possible power within the province in his person, and second, attenuation or rejection of all constraining external ties and obligations, whether imperial or imposed by extra-imperial forces like the Marathas.

Whether he was engaged in a full-scale assault on Changapettah (renamed Farrukhnagar), an attack on Sarvapetta, the bitter siege of Maka Subbana Rao, ruin of the Vasu Reddi fort at Kotaverum, or sequential destruction of the forts along the Krishna, the true basis of Mubariz Khan's dominance over Hyderabad was his habit of hammering, year by year, at *zamindari* strongholds. Very often, when the fortresses fell, the garrisons were massacred and towers built of their severed heads in the central Asian practice of the Timurids—nor did the governor shrink from the execution of the chiefs themselves. Riding at the

[1] *RFSG: Letters to FSG.* 13 Nov. 1719, p. 96, emphasis supplied.

head of 3,000 to 4,000 Mughal heavy cavalry, Mubariz Khan 'never ceased to exert himself, and was continually touring from one end of the territory to the other'.[1] Straightforward crushing force applied unceasingly throughout Hyderabad put local power-holders on the defensive during Mubariz Khan's residence in the province. In battle after battle indigenous Telugu infantry and light horse could not stand against determined Mughal assaults. Intruding Maratha bands also found the speed, firing power, and weight of the governor's troops (characteristic of Mughal cavalry in its best days) devastating. They could gain no permanent hold anywhere in the province.

In line with his forceful military policy, Mubariz Khan made no attempt to use the services and thus gain the loyalties of the Telugu *nayaks* as had the Qutb Shahs. Instead he relied on fear to keep *zamindars* docile and caution to cause them to disgorge long-unpaid tribute and tax payments. In this endeavour the governor was clearly successful. He suffered no obvious financial problems--unlike Yusuf Khan his predecessor—and even the most recalcitrant *nayaks* unwillingly paid tribute.

Possessed of a sound strategic sense, the governor further strengthened his position by limiting his goals. To the north of the Godavari he was willing to accord tributary status to the Vizianagram chief, without trying to destroy his power base In much the same fashion he began to establish a tributary relationship with the Afghan chiefs of the Karnatik, who as nominal Mughal officials of that region were not formally subject to his authority. They were, however, increasingly drawn into the emerging regional political system north of the Krishna.[2] But in the interior and in the crucial coastal districts his response to local power was an assault in force.

That harsh policies achieved their immediate aim there can be no doubt. The year-by-year narrative of events in Kondavidu district offers clear evidence of tightened control from Hyderabad. After early revolts the Valama *deshmukhs* of the district accepted the new order and began to assist the *faujdar* in subduing the rival Kamma Vasu Reddis pressing south across the Krishna. When his power had increased sufficiently, the *faujdar* established a new headquarters at Mutluru and forced members of the leading

[1] *Ma'asir-ul Umara* (text), pp. 733 (trans.), 93.
[2] Cf. Condaved, p. 83.

zamindari families to build houses and reside there under his surveillance. Frequently Mubariz Khan, while on tour, ordered leading Kondavidu *nayaks* to his audience tent for what must have been uneasy meetings for those so honoured. Several *nayaks* even found themselves in confinement at the capital in the prisons of Golconda fort. As the distribution of power changed in favour of Hyderabad, the *faujdar* could begin a systematic revenue-collection through agents placed in every subdistrict. There were, moreover, attempts at survey and settlement operations.

In restrospect it is also evident that Mubariz Khan, allowed only a few years in power in Hyderabad, failed to move beyond this important but preliminary stage of repression of the local notables of Kondavidu. The more difficult process of disengaging the *zamindars* from their local bases, either by assimilation into the larger regional political system, or by outright extermination, remained to be accomplished.

Another equally important aspect of Mubariz Khan's approach was sustained pressure against any members of the provincial bureaucracy with independently derived power. The expulsion of Abid Khan, *faujdar* of the northern coastal districts, occurred as soon as Mubariz Khan took office; Abid Khan had built on a long-standing direct relationship to the emperor (due to the classification of this area as crown territory) and created his own power base on the coast. This could not be tolerated by Mubariz Khan. Another virtually immediate conflict began between the governor and the independently appointed *diwan* or fiscal officer of Hyderabad.

In 1716 Husain Ali Khan, viceroy of the Deccan, ratified Mubariz Khan's unsurpation of fiscal powers in return for political support in the factional conflicts of the nobility. At this time the governor also won the right to replace the commander of Golconda fort, previously responsible only to the emperor, with one of his own servants. Mubariz Khan, untrammelled by the necessity to defer to imperial regulations, wielded full and autonomous powers in Hyderabad within four years of his arrival.

Furthermore, Mubariz Khan's external relations were fully congruent with his internal policies. He made only token and erratic revenue payments to the central treasury—one possible reason for his strong position within the province. In 1719 the Dutch estimated that he had paid only 400,000 rupees of a total of

1,800,000 rupees arrears.[1] During his term as *wazir*, the Nizam, disturbed by confiscation of crown territories in Hyderabad, attempted vainly to interrogate Mubariz Khan's agent (his son) at the court about violations of imperial regulations.[2] The governor ignored Maratha demands with equal indifference—only rarely, if the cost of resistance outweighed the cost of payment—would he pay *chauth*.

Presumptive evidence also exists that virtually all official appointments to and transfers from Hyderabad ceased after 1713. Instead Mubariz Khan filled provincial offices with members of his own family and entourage. Hence all of his six sons served in various capacities: the eldest, Khwaja Ahmad Khan, served as his father's deputy at Hyderabad while Mubariz Khan campaigned; Khwaja Mahmud Khan 'was a governor of forts'; and another son, identified only as Saheb Zada, governed at Vijayawada.[3] A son-in-law, Thana Ullah Khan, was *faujdar* of Sikakul.[4] Both Mubariz Khan's uncle, Muhammad Bek Khan, and his wife's sister's husband, Dilawar Khan, served as military officers and advisers.[5] Dilawar Khan accompanied Mubariz Khan to Aurangabad in 1719.[6] For additional manpower the governor relied on personal retainers like Sandal Khan, a household eunuch, who became commander of Golconda fort.[7]

It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that, although Mubariz Khan's relationship with the viceroy of the Deccan at Aurangabad was his greatest concern, interaction between the Hyderabad governor and the viceroy was hardly that between inferior and superior officials. On the contrary, Mubariz Khan negotiated with Husain Ali Khan Barha and later with Nizam-ul Mulk more as a tributary ruler. In the course of his various sessions at Aurangabad Mubariz Khan gave his support to one or the other faction only to sustain a political interest: maintenance of his power in Hyderabad. His loyalties varied as did the demands of the political situation in the Deccan. A continuing position, regardless of other political requirements, was steadfast opposition to any Maratha influence or presence within Hyderabad's borders.

[1] K.A. 1819 (18 Aug. 1719), fol. 32 (presumably arrears for a single year).
[2] *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III. 736. [3] Ibid., pp. 744–6.
[4] Ibid. The posts of the three remaining sons are not specified.
[5] Cf. Khafi Khan, II. 897.
[6] Cf. Irvine, II. 146, for the lists of officers at Shakar Khera.
[7] Irvine, II. 146, *Ma'asir-ul Umara*. 744.

A final question, as yet unanswered, involves the degree to which what appears to be growing political stability under Mubariz Khan brought order and possibly even some economic recovery to the hard-pressed citizens of Hyderabad. Given unsatisfactory contemporary documentation—especially for the interior—any answer must indeed be tentative; but a few bits of evidence support the assertion that the changing political climate was on the whole beneficial. An early nineteenth-century chronicle (compiled from earlier accounts) contrasted the appearance of the capital in 1713 upon Mubariz Khan's arrival with its prosperity twelve years later:

After the evening prayer, on a night chosen by the astrologers, [Mubariz Khan] entered the city by the 'Gate of the Bridge'. [From that point] to the house of Rustam Dil Khan, which was the palace at that time, notwithstanding the length of that journey, all the shops, except three, were unlighted and deserted. But this *khan* [Mubariz Khan] in conformity with the exalted order of His Majesty (perfect peace be upon him) with a heart-felt effort succeeded in populating Hyderabad city and its *mahals*. And within twelve years he impressed the image of proper rule on that spacious country [Hyderabad].[1]

A similar transformation appears to have taken place in the metropolitan port at Machilipatnam. In 1723 Humphery Holcombe, the British merchant sent to reopen the East India Company trading station, reported on his difficulties in making repairs to the factory because of demands on the labour force in the port:

. . . the work goes on very slowly thro' the Difficulty of getting at present both materials and Workmen, the Dutch being rebuilding three quarters of their Factory, the Moors refitting the long bridge [and] seven or eight new houses a making, upon which account if I gett People att work one day I cant gett them the next, the Governmt. pressing them for their buissiness, besides the trouble of getting them they now ask a greater rate for their hire, a Carpenter or Bricklayer that work't before for eighteen pence per diem will now not for less than twenty four . . .[2]

Twenty-three years earlier such bustling activity was hardly typical of Machilipatnam. William Norris, the British ambassador to Aurangzeb, emphatically described the reduced trade and

[1] *Hadiqah ul'Alam*, II. 24, my translation.
[2] *RFSG: Letters to FSG*, 25 Mar. 1723, p. 21.

population of the port and lamented the disappearance of most of the textile workers and other workmen in the town. Trade had been so depressed after the Mughal conquest and subsequent famine that by 1700 only the Dutch continued to maintain a trading station.[1] At least in the two most important urban centres of the province there appears to be a direct correlation between population growth, economic recovery, and the re-establishment of a strong regime at Hyderabad.

Yet in the final analysis Mubariz Khan's independent power resulted from a fortuitous circumstance. The Mughal central administration under Farrukhsiyar placed an able and ambitious administrator in charge of Hyderabad with a mandate to regain fast-slipping imperial authority at precisely the point in time that the centre itself, gravely weakened and distracted by the power struggle in Delhi, could neither supervise nor support its servants in the provinces. There is no reason to believe that Mubariz Khan would have flouted imperial regulations had they been enforced. Many of his struggles with fellow officials appear to be the normal pattern of behaviour for any vigorous governor sent to restore order in an unruly province. That is, such an individual would wish to achieve as much dominance over other provincial officials as possible, *within the limits of the imperial system.* Yet by 1713 Mubariz Khan, heretofore an impeccable Mughal administrator, suddenly found that the regulations no longer mattered and that without great risk he could engross all imperial powers within the province. Paradoxically as Mubariz Khan began to carry out his original mission, i.e. to increase Mughal power in Hyderabad, the centre lost all power to control him. Indeed, one could argue that the empire weakened and ultimately was lost in Delhi, not Hyderabad.

[1] Das, p. 125

Conclusion: Imperial Administration and Public Order in Hyderabad

THE capture of Golconda fort in 1687 was an unquestioned triumph for Aurangzeb, perhaps the greatest of his reign to that date. Thereafter, however, for the twenty years remaining of his reign, the emperor faltered noticeably in his administration of Golconda. As we have seen, he failed to realize the full economic potential of Golconda. Under Mughal administration the eastern Deccan experienced a sharp decline in both population and productivity. State revenues never recovered to their pre-conquest levels. The Mughal emperor failed to utilize the energies and services of the Telugu *nayaks*. Aurangzeb never touched the military ethos of this group or gained its loyalty in anything approaching the manner in which the Qutb Shahs had done. The *nayaks* found no access to the empire-wide arena of the *mansabdar*, while they found only increasingly dubious benefits in the localized domain of the *deshmukh* and the *muniwar*. By 1711 the previously strong bond between the *nayaks* and the Muslim state at Hyderabad had withered almost to nothing. But most importantly, the Timurid monarch failed to impose and maintain public order and security in Golconda. Peace, tranquillity, and prosperity did not accompany imperial rule. The reverse occurred, for Hyderabad and the Karnatik were both scourged by war, banditry, famine, and general disorder.

Why this triple failure in Hyderabad? The reasons usually advanced to explain the larger imperial crisis and subsequent decline, and collapse do not satisfactorily explain incomplete consolidation in the eastern Deccan. Nor, for that matter, is it possible to assume that the problems of the empire were uniform throughout the Deccan. Thus, the Marathas were unable to penetrate the eastern Deccan. They offered no serious challenge to Muslim political domination in the east; nor did they permeate and subvert the agrarian structure of Hyderabad under the Mughals. To be sure, damaging raids did take place—especially in the period just after the conquest and in the years 1700 to 1705—but the

Maratha presence in the east was never permanent. Later, the vigilance and aggressiveness of Mubariz Khan prevented a Maratha take-over and preserved intact the territory of Hyderabad. Contrary to a common assumption, based on general statements to be found in Mughal chronicles and narratives, the Marathas did not overrun the entire Mughal Deccan in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century.

For at least the first twenty years of Mughal administration (i.e. up to the reign of Bahadur Shah) mass revolts of *nayaks*, or to use the Mughal term *zamindars*, did not thwart the efforts of imperial officials posted to Hyderabad. Despite Aurangzeb's inability and/or unwillingness to accept the services of the *nayaks* as *mansabdars*, the regional agrarian order remained intact. The process by which local Telugu chiefs were formally linked to the new regime by means of *sanads* appointing them *deshmukhs* and *muniwars* was reasonably successful. The provincial *diwan* obtained bonds and appointment fees in return without encountering outright defiance. Nor do we find examples of Telugu *zamindars* collaborating with alien Maratha or Bedar raiders. Some evidence suggests that dispossessed peasants turned to banditry, but the larger intermediary *zamindars* or *nayaks* clearly did not. As conditions worsened after 1700, Telugu peasant cultivators, dominant in individual villages, and the intermediary *deshmukhs* undoubtedly produced less and paid taxes more reluctantly. But reactions such as these fall considerably short of rebellion.

It is also difficult to see how tendencies toward oppressive administration inherent in the Mughal system of *jagirs* contributed to the failure in Hyderabad. The argument advanced by Irfan Habib (supported by some seventeenth-century observers) is that the *jagir* system had a structural flaw which permitted and even encouraged ever increasing exploitation and oppression of the producers by the *jagirdars*. The flaw, put simply, is that *jagirs* were transferred so frequently as to preclude any sense of responsibility for the welfare of the peasantry from arising in the mind of those who held salary assignments. The end result was migration, flight, or, ultimately, armed resistance by the peasants and their natural leaders, the *zamindars*.

The *jagir* system was implemented in Hyderabad—but more than half the province remained under the direct control of the central treasury—either as *khalisa* lands or as *paibaqi*. Therefore

we cannot blame Mughal problems in Hyderabad on harsh, extortionate measures perpetrated on the producers by absentee *jagirdars*. Moreover, in that portion of the province in which salary assignments were regularly made, the *jagirdars* were scarcely in a position to threaten either peasants or *nayaks*. Collections by most *jagirdars* were much lower than anticipated because they were unable to obtain sufficient state support. Lack of an effective revenue infra-structure in the countryside, comparable to that in operation in North India, meant that *jagirdars* in Hyderabad were dependent on their own resources and servants and on the co-operation of the *deshmukhs*. Without the latter, the Hyderabad *jagirdars* could not even approach their stipulated collections, much less realize excessive demands.

When we do find instances of oppression by salary assignees, the central administration had clearly lost control. Thus, after 1700, when grandees like Khan Firuz Jang were building up incipient fiefs, these nobles, no longer subject to frequent transfer, began hiring temporary local troops and pressing harshly for greater revenues from their holdings. When this occurred, agents of the provincial administration could no longer obtain information or exert control over the administration of these *jagirs*. But under these circumstances oppression of the peasantry resulted from weakening of the state's capacity and willingness to control its assignees. That is, it appears that these nobles were oppressive because they were building up semi-permanent local bases, not because they were frequently transferred.

Another, widely accepted view is that the rise of intense factionalism among the Mughal nobility, which contributed to the collapse of the empire, originated in sharp conflicts over the allocation of increasingly scarce *jagirs*. According to this interpretation, Aurangzeb awarded so many high positions in the imperial service to Muslim and Maratha nobles from the Deccan (in his efforts to control that region) that he nearly doubled the total number of imperial *mansabdars*. As a result, not enough lands could be found by the central finance office to satisfy the steeply enhanced demand for salaries. Thus, demoralization of the once reliable Mughal nobility can be traced directly to this economic squeeze.

But for Hyderabad, at least, this argument must be reconsidered. Those *mansabdars* serving in Hyderabad found ample *jagirs* to support themselves and their followers. Moreover, those lands set

aside for the support of the provincial officials and army (i.e. in Kaulas *pargana*, in the immediate hinterland of the provincial capital, and in the *hawili parganas* adjacent to the major forts and district towns) seem to have been reasonably productive prior to the 1708–9 war of succession. Thus, the growing demoralization and slackened discipline of the highest Mughal officials in Hyderabad was not a response to economic pressures. Rather *mansabdars* in Hyderabad seem to have been subject to a sense of isolation and helplessness. By 1700, direction and encouragement and, most critically, reinforcements came haltingly and late from the emperor's camp. Regardless of how beset the governor or other Hyderabad officers may have been, they could count on little support from their superiors at the centre.

Administrative failure and continuing disorder in Hyderabad can be directly attributed to Aurangzeb's larger goals in the Deccan. The Mughal ruler neglected Hyderabad (and probably Bijapur as well) in order to move aggressively into the Western Ghats and other areas in the Deccan not subject to direct Mughal administration. Aurangzeb's only concern in Hyderabad was to extract, at the lowest possible cost, funds which could be used to support his field armies engaged in the Maratha wars.

Consequently the Emperor ignored the scale of the task presented to the imperial administration by the annexations of 1686–7. Bijapur and Golconda, swallowed virtually simultaneously, constituted an enormous burden for an administrative system with finite resources. (Combined revenues of these vast territories should have added an additional 23 per cent or 53 million rupees annually to the total income of the empire.) Successful absorption of these two conquered kingdoms was dependent on the services of capable, efficient *mansabdars*, drawn from the general pool of available administrators and field commanders. But in the highly centralized Mughal system, the direction of these men (sometimes on a day-to-day basis) could only come from the energetic attention of the emperor.

Consolidation in Hyderabad suffered because the energies of the emperor, his most reliable administrators, and the surplus resources of the empire were diverted to expensive military campaigns, rather than to the task at hand. It appears that Aurangzeb's preoccupation with his continuing Deccan war emerged from an expansive policy which he had long maintained. Throughout his

career, even before winning the throne, Aurangzeb continually pressed for extension of the sphere of direct Mughal administrations at the expense of the varied body of tributary chiefs, rajas, and kings. His unvarying aim, if at all feasible, was to annex any areas possessing internal autonomy. Aurangzeb may not have articulated this as a specific policy pronouncement (such announcements were rare for Mughal emperors), but the pattern of expansion into internal frontier areas is plain. In 1660 the emperor ordered the occupation and annexation of Palamau (in Bihar); in 1661 the seizure of Kuch Bihar; in 1669 the occupation of southern Gondwana; in 1679 the annexation of Marwar (Jodhpur, the Rathor state); and in 1686–7 Bijapur and Golconda. Aurangzeb's desire to extend the empire also converged with his pious wish to extend the reach of Islamic rule. When annexation occurred, the emperor changed the name of the territory, destroyed the principal temple (if it was a Hindu kingdom) to enable the building of a mosque on the site, and ordered the sounding of the Muslim call to prayer. Thus the Mughal emperor's objectives after the victories of 1686–7 were fully consistent with his past practice. He aimed at the full defeat and final annexation of the Maratha kingdom as well as that of the Bedars and other lesser tributary states in the Deccan.

But the occupation of the Maratha kingdom in 1689, accompanied by the capture and brutal execution of Shambahji, the Maratha king, was not at all successful. As was the case with the Rathor Rajputs of Marwar in 1679, Mughal annexation failed to put an end to Maratha resistance. Instead Aurangzeb's nominal victory in 1689 touched off a series of wide-ranging raids by Maratha chiefs into the Mughal provinces of the Deccan. Coping with these raids and the disruption caused by them distracted the emperor and his most capable officers for nearly two decades.

Aurangzeb could have paused in 1687 to negotiate some form of tributary relationship with Shambhaji, the Maratha king. Had he done so, the legitimate head of the Maratha state could have assured protection for the newly occupied lands in Bijapur and Golconda. Mughal administrators could have proceeded systematically with the organization of the new provinces. Instead, both kingdoms remained vulnerable, ill defended, and turbulent. The imperial administrative and military machinery in the Deccan was stretched past its capacity.

The problems of Mughal rule in Hyderabad can be laid, not to incapacity, but to bad management. Ample evidence from the archival remains demonstrates that the organization of the empire was both impressive and effective. The total impression conveyed by these documentary sources is that of a great machine, built on and organized for continuous expansion and gradually intensifying control from the centre. Although the assimilation of Hyderabad was perhaps a larger task than most, the technicians of the empire were fully prepared to carry out their assignments—just as they or their predecessors had on dozens of occasions in the past. The move into Hyderabad should have been a routine procedure in which the province was rapidly converted into one of the most lucrative in the empire. Instead Aurangzeb's larger policies caused difficulties which destroyed public order in Hyderabad. Mughal failure was not a failure of the administrative system, but a failure of its management.

A basic assumption of this study has been that in the seventeenth century a realm of public order existed which was the responsibility of the state, not of private individuals or groups. Public order is here defined as the maintenance of individual and corporate security against predatory threats from other individuals or groups within the same culture, or from alien intruders. Although much more restricted than in modern states, this area of responsibility did exist and was of great importance. In periods of political transition when the state broke down, the degree to which society did depend on this regulatory activity became evident.

State responsibility for public order in an urban setting was reasonably well defined, and not all that controversial. Financial and commodity markets, inter-urban and inter-regional trade, seaports, and roads all required some form of state protection in order to flourish. Uncontrolled violence hit cities and the urban populace very hard indeed. But in the countryside the state was less noticeable. It is not unreasonable to question the extension of the realm of public order to agrarian society. How did the state impose order in a peasant society as impenetrable as that of the Telugu lands of the eastern Deccan?

By A.D. 1600 the Muslim state in the eastern Deccan, i.e. Golconda, had forcibly defined three major political roles in the countryside: the official, the *nayak* (i.e. Mughal *zamindar*), and the bandit or hill chief. Officials divided into two subgroups:

regularly appointed officers, usually Muslims, sent out from Hyderabad, and unofficial agents of the state, tax-farmers who were usually Brahmins. Membership in these groups was not hereditary, but based on earned qualifications: either administrative or military skills (for the Muslim officers) or financial resources, experience, and skills (for the Brahmin tax-farmers). *Nayaks*, who were further divided into tributary rajas, *muniwars*, and *deshmukhs*, possessed high hereditary social status and political power. Bandits were frequently members of low or possibly even untouchable Hindu castes. Hill chiefs were outside the hierarchy of both Muslim and Hindu society.

Officials and *nayaks* mobilized men and resources for the state and maintained order. As seen from and defined by Hyderabad these roles were positive and essential to the operation of the state. The king appointed and removed officials on the basis of performance. The king also consistently claimed and enforced his right to determine the status of *nayaks* and to approve the succession of *deshmukhs* and *muniwars*. The role of the bandit was residual and essentially negative, for banditry was a direct challenge to legitimate authority. The critical point is that the state, provided that it remained strong, could decide who the occupants of these roles were to be and could enforce that decision. Thus the state kept officials from becoming *nayaks*; *nayaks* from becoming bandits; and bandits from attacking or displacing *nayaks* and officials.

When the state successfully delimited these three primary agrarian roles, it could be sure of steady and reliable collection of its principal source of income: the land tax. However, in this tripartite division, the most important element was the nexus between the state and the *nayak*. The latter's function as an intermediary between the state and the village headmen was essential to the operation of the agrarian system. Consequently, the *nayak* had to be persuaded that the probable balance of sanctions and rewards was such that his own, perceived interest lay in support for the state, not in opposition. Partly this was a matter of habit, of long-standing deference to the authority of the masters of Hyderabad. But more significant was the capacity of the Muslim regime to supply an essential service to the rural society of the eastern Deccan. In all but the most remote refuge areas, the state had to offer a minimal level of security for each *nayak*. *Sanads* issued by

the king of Golconda meant little unless they carried with them an assurance of protection both from invasion and from predatory assaults by neighbouring chiefs. In return for this warranty, a *nayak* could make his own commitment for loyal service in the collection of revenues and maintenance of order.

Once established, the bond between local rural aristocrat and the state became closer over time—provided that the state did not weaken. Gradually pressures from the state began to erode the autonomous powers of the *nayak*, to convert each into a quasi-official. The state allowed and encouraged a steady blurring of the distinction between the role of the official and the *nayak*. Even if by 1687 few *nayaks* had been actually reduced to the status of officials, we may surmise that, in the course of several generations of incorporation into Golconda's agrarian system, the political horizons of most *nayaks* had become foreshortened. The *nayaks'* field of action was limited to his district and to his relationship with Hyderabad. Any ambitions for political independence or state building necessarily receded. In other words parochialism was a response to state power and did not necessarily precede imposition of an effective centralized state in the region.

The evidence from seventeenth-century Golconda suggests that the interests of the *nayaks* were sufficiently congruent with those of the state to encourage some degree of co-operation in the Golconda agrarian system. But what of the peasantry, the peasant cultivators, members of the dominant caste, who actually controlled and directed agricultural production in each village? Here the question is much more difficult.

Telugu villages in the seventeenth century were obviously independent of the state for the settlement of internal disputes, the allocation of resources, and political integration. If the necessity arose, each village could constitute itself into a single defensive unit. Nevertheless, under a strong state, such as Golconda in the seventeenth century, the need for such local defensive action diminished. The desolation, loss of production, and depopulation accompanying internal conflicts between local chiefs or from external invasions were sharply reduced. On the whole, this imposed peace more than compensated for occasional capricious, damaging acts of state violence against the peasantry. Whether individual peasants actually recognized any relationship between payment of the land tax and their personal and collective security is a point

yet to be established. Possibly, more politically perceptive peasant leaders, such as village headmen, recognized the relationship, but considered the price paid to be too high. However, both of these questions are essentially side issues. The state did in fact impose and maintain a minimal level of public order in the countryside, and this was certainly more beneficial to greater numbers of the rural populace than the turbulence which occurred when the state weakened.

Reasonably persuasive evidence to support this assertion can be found in the severe disorders which accompanied the breakdown of state authority in Hyderabad. Especially in the period 1700 to 1713 the peasantry unquestionably suffered because of political turmoil. The movement of raiders—whether Marathas, Bedars, unpaid Mughal troops, or bandits—inevitably meant thefts of livestock, demands for tribute, or outright robbery, mutilation, rapine, and death for peasants caught in their path. Mughal officers, peasants, *nayaks* trapped in the general breakdown of order had to come to terms with whomever held military power simply in order to survive. Public order was most in evidence when it disappeared.

After 1713, Mubariz Khan, in what was virtually a reconquest of the region, did restore the political primacy of Hyderabad. Mubariz Khan's bloody campaigns against the Telugu *zamindars* were in themselves disruptive and harmful to those peasants caught in the vicinity. But state-directed and controlled violence of this sort, aimed at restoring political authority, seems to have been less damaging to the general populace than the more diffuse and uncontrolled violence prior to Mubariz Khan's governorship.

The position of Mubariz Khan in 1713 as Mughal governor is parallel in many respects to that of Sultan Quli Qutb Shah, the Bahmani governor, in 1491. Both men were appointed in the failing days of empire; both were ruthless and tireless campaigners against the recalcitrant Telugu warrior aristocracy of the eastern Deccan; and both regained lost military and political domination to the east and south over an area far wider than the constricted salient around Golconda fort. But the comparison diverges as well. By the beginning of the eighteenth century the institutional basis of Islamic domination in Hyderabad far exceeded the early ephemeral arrangements made by the Bahmanis. Two centuries of Muslim rule in Hyderabad meant that the Telugu chiefs would be

struggling, not for complete independence, but rather for the best possible terms of accommodation to Islamic overlordship. Long-established institutional patterns of the agrarian order of Golconda's administrative system, such as that embedded in the *parganas* or subdistricts, encouraged acceptance of rule from Hyderabad. Also, specific groups, such as those Telugu warrior families who had occupied *deshmukh* positions on a semi-hereditary basis for generations, or Brahmin families confirmed as *deshpands* (accountants) on the same basis, constituted a clientele who regarded service to a Muslim king as natural. In general, too, the transmitted experience of successive generations of Telugu warriors who had fought and lost, rebelled and lost, made it easier for Mubariz Khan to achieve his goals. In other words by the early eighteenth century, in the course of six to eight generations, the Islamic political system had become legitimate in Hyderabad.

Throughout these political changes the resilience of Islamic political power is a constant feature. In the eastern Deccan, as in other parts of the subcontinent during the Muslim period, the vector of change was always in the direction of centralized power exercised by an Islamic ruler. The largest territorial entities, the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal empire, might decline, but their dissolution usually meant only a reversion to regional Muslim polities—not the overthrow of Islamic rule in favour of indigenous non-Muslim political leaders. Only the Marathas, who originated in an area on the fringes of Islamic conquest, ever succeeded in forcibly overthrowing Muslim regimes and pushing back the area of Islamic conquest. As Manucci, that shrewd observer of Indian politics, wrote in his memoirs in 1700:[1] 'But in all these fifty-four years I have seen no Hindu prince on the increase, but only ruined; Shiva Ji [the Maratha ruler] alone have I seen living and thriving in the manner that I have recounted.'

Despite the extent and severity of revolts and disorder in the first half of the eighteenth century, Muslim rulers and Muslim institutions retained a tenacious hold on power. Often in some eighteenth-century regional political systems decline had gone so far that there appeared to be only 'a balancing of relative weakness' between newly autonomous Mughal governors and the local

[1] Manucci, III. 243.

zamindars.[1] Nevertheless, as the example of Mubariz Khan demonstrates, the dynamics of Islamic rule in India were such that new Muslim ruling figures would emerge on the break-up of the empire to consolidate political power within each region. Only intervention by outside forces, such as the British in Bengal and the Karnatik, or the Marathas in Gujerat and Malwa, could halt this process. In Hyderabad, as in Bengal, Oudh, and other Mughal successor states, the technique, the structure, and the confidence of long-established dominance remained.

[1] Bernard Cohn, 'Political Systems in Eighteenth-Century India: the Banaras Region', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, LXXXII (1962), 315.

Select Bibliography

I. PRIMARY SOURCES

Unpublished Documents: Collections

Inayat Jang Collection. National Archives of India, New Delhi [Cited by the abbreviation I.J. Coll., followed by the serial number assigned by the archives: e.g. I.J. Coll., I/14/532.]

This is a massive collection of official Mughal documents. Reports, memoranda, and accounts were sent regularly to the *diwan* of the Deccan or to the *bakhshi* from the provincial *diwans* and *bakhshis* in each of the six Deccan provinces. The Inayat Jang papers consist of large numbers of copies of these documents which were kept in the imperial chancery at Aurangabad. The entire collection totals some 150,000 documents for the period *circa* 1680 to 1761. Prior to 1724, these are imperial Mughal records; after 1724, they are archival sources for Hyderabad State under the first Nizam and his immediate successors. In 1961 the National Archives purchased the collection from Inayat Jang, the owner, whose ancestor had served as chief minister of Nizam Ali Khan in the late eighteenth century. The papers had been in the family's possession for two centuries. Since acquisition, the processing of these papers has proceeded slowly, beginning with the earliest papers and moving along in chronological order. (The Mughal files must have been kept in careful chronological order in the *diwan* and *bakhshi*'s offices, for that is how they have survived the centuries.) Each brittle document is sealed in chiffon, its contents read and summarized; placed in a protective docket or envelope; and assigned a serial number. At present, only about one-fifth of the documents have been so processed. Because of this difficulty, I have been able to use only about 1,500 documents relating to Hyderabad and the Hyderabad Karnatik for the period 1687–1707 (Aurangzeb's reign). These form the most important single body of source material for this work. A similar or even larger number of Hyderabad papers is now becoming accessible for the period 1707–24. I hope to analyse these in the future.

Information gained in this way may well modify statements made in the last two chapters of the present work.

The papers themselves are written in Persian. (Occasionally marginal comments or notations in Modi script, in what appears to be Marathi, are found.) The documents are difficult to read: the script is invariably *shikasta*, the Mughal shorthand script, which often omits crucial dots. Almost all numbers appear in *siyaqat*, the Indian system of using shorthand versions of the Arabic words for numeration. On the other hand, the documents are gratifyingly authentic and exact, once deciphered. Each, with few exceptions, gives the date of writing expressed in *hijra* months and the regnal year. Each paper bears the official seal of the issuing officer. This is an ink stamp containing the officer's title, his date of taking office, and the name of the emperor. Each is headed by its technical title, representing its function.

In sharp contrast to the chronicles and narrative histories of the period (or to popular stereotypes of luxuriant Oriental prose), these papers are terse and laconic, at times to the point of incomprehensibility. The language is technical—written by experienced administrators for other administrators working in the same system. The form for each type of document was standardized. The scribes and copyists who actually wrote the documents, followed these forms rigidly. Most of the papers (perhaps two-thirds of those from Hyderabad), were fiscal papers originating in the office of the *diwan* of a province. The remainder are primarily from the office of the provincial *bakhshi*. These deal with issues of military pay and inspection. Most deal with a specific case or problem, e.g. transfer of a *jagir* from one *mansabdar* to another, the complaint of an official about his pay, etc. In other words the majority of these documents represent cases or problems dealt with on an *ad hoc* basis. Intentionally synoptic documents, such as the summaries used in the chapter on fiscal organization, are rare. For this reason, it is impossible to make statements based on negative evidence, i.e. on the absence of references in these documents.

The absence of higher-level summary papers and policy statements is, of course, regrettable. However, the fact that the Inayat Jang papers are clearly middle-level administrative memoranda, accounts, and notes, dealing, for the most part, with single cases, is impressive testimony to the complexity and sophistication of the

imperial bureaucracy. The Inayat Jang papers do not record normative rules, but evidence of actions taken and recorded by imperial officials. In deciding on courses of action regulations, precedent, as well as general orders from the emperor are cited. Marginal comments and addenda reveal efforts to search files for further information and also give the disposition of cases handled. Particularly difficult problems (e.g. especially intricate *jagir* entanglements) engendered what was in fact a file maintained over several years and containing as many as twenty documents.

This collection has great potential value for the history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Apart from the Jaipur records and those of other tributary states, it is the only large Mughal archive to survive intact. The sequence of disasters which hit Delhi from Nadir Shah's sack in 1739 to the Mutiny in 1857, obliterated the great central repository of Mughal records. From this smaller subsection generated in the Deccan we can estimate the possible size of what must have existed at one time. Indeed, the Mughal archives at Delhi must have been as extensive as the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Ottoman records now extant in Istanbul.

Considering its great importance, it is unfortunate that scholars wishing to use the collection are confronted with discouraging working conditions. There are, as yet, no indexes or finding aids of any sort. This necessitates physical inspection of the documents themselves for any research project. The documents are simply arranged chronologically. No attempt has been made to group them by province, type, or other classification. This means that as many as 20,000 papers (as of this writing) must be inspected for a truly comprehensive search. For additional information on the collection, consult A. I. Tirmizi, 'Inayat Jang Collection', *Studies in Islam*, 1 (July 1964), 174–84.

Sitamau Collection. 'Akhbarat-i-Darbar-i-Mualla . . .', Raghubir Library, Sitamau (M.P.), India

A collection of Mughal newsletters (*akhbarat*) to the royal court (*darbar-i-mu'alla*) of Aurangzeb and his immediate successors. Official newswriters (*akhbar-navis* or *waqi-navis*) sent brief but informative news-reports from all parts of the empire to the Mughal emperor. Those selected and used for this work pertain to Hyderabad. For a complete description of the collection see

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A collection of letters received at Batavia from the Dutch trading stations on the Coromandel coast. For the most part the Dutch merchants were concerned with their own trading affairs, but they also supplied their superiors with analyses of local political affairs which are invaluable. The Dutch and English letters provide details which coincide with and supplement information gained from the Mughal official sources. The complete series of these letters is also available on microfilm at the National Archives of India, New Delhi, where there is also a typescript index to the series (up to 1700 only).

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East India Company. Correspondence C—Letters received from India, etc., 'Original Correspondence', 1602–1712. 71 vols. India Office Library, London.

This collection includes letters from Fort St. George at Madras, headquarters of the East India Company on the Coromandel coast. The availability of printed series of correspondence from and to Fort St. George reduces the importance of this collection. For a complete description, see William Foster, *A Guide to the India Office Records* (London, 1919), pp. 11–20.

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lectively of great importance for the political and administrative history of these regions and the empire in the last decade of the seventeenth century.

Asafia Scroll Documents. Asafia Library (State Central Library), Hyderabad, India. Tarikh MS. 2785

Twelve official Mughal documents pertaining to the Deccan in Aurangzeb's reign. Four pertain to Hyderabad. Cited by numbers 1–12 in order of their appearance on the scroll.

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A collection of cryptic summaries of letters sent by Aurangzeb. Collected and edited by Inayatullah Khan, one of his chief secretaries. For a description see *A Concise Descriptive Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts in the Salar Jang Museum and Library*, compiled by Muhammad Ashraf, vol. III (Hyderabad, 1966), no. 866. Cited by title after first reference.

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KHAN, YUSUF HUSAIN, ed. *Farmans and Sanads of the Deccan Sultans*. Hyderabad: State Archives of Andhra Pradesh, 1963.

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A detailed list of every village *pargana* and district in the province along with the normative tax figure for each unit. The list was compiled about 1720 at the beginning of the reign of Muhammad Shah.

East India Company. Factory Records: Masulipatnam, 1699–1700. India Office Library, London. G/26/13.

This is one of the few existing volumes of records from the trading stations subordinate to Madras in the seventeenth century. By far the most important is that for Vishakapatnam (below).

——. Vizagapatam, 'Consultations', 1693–5. India Office Library, London. G/39/1.

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This is perhaps the most detailed and informative of any of the Mackenzie Collection accounts from the Telugu areas. It is especially valuable as a view from below the Muslim system compiled by a Brahmin using local records which had still survived into the early nineteenth century. The chronicle covers the periods 1674–91 and (with one intervening reference) then moves to the period 1708–35. For the latter period this becomes much more complete until it is nearly a day-by-day account of Kondavidu district and Andhra in general. Each entry in the narrative is usually dated to the day in the Telugu cyclical era (sixty-year cycle). When converted and checked with major imperial and provincial events, these appear to be reasonably accurate.

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valuable retrospective information gathered from the various *zamindars* about their previous relations with the dominant Muslim states in the region. This report is also reproduced in W.K. Firminger, ed., *The Fifth Report on the Affairs of the East India Company*, 3 vols. (Calcutta, 1918). References in this work are to the original report.

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